(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

 CULLEY ET AL. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
                OF ALABAMA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

      No. 22–585.      Argued October 30, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024
Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled
  over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of
  marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was
  stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking
  methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under
  an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “inci-
  dent to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a for-
  feiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed
  forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13
  days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceed-
  ings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action
  complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 

, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by
  retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding pre-
  liminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit af-
  firmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfei-
  ture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate
  preliminary hearing is constitutionally required.
Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Pro-
 cess Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a
 separate preliminary hearing. Pp. 5–14.
    (a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a
 hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately
 seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property
 (for example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or con-
 cealed before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal prop-
 erty, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See
2                         CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                                   Syllabus

    United States v. Von Neumann, 

, 249–250; United States
    v. $8,850, 

, 562–565.
       The Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal
    clear that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing
    to determine whether seized personal property may be retained
    pending the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court ad-
    dressed the process due when the Customs Service seized currency
    from an individual entering the United States but did not immediately
    file for civil forfeiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a post-
    seizure delay “may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property
    owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful
    time,” 461 U. S., at 562–563, and prescribed factors for courts to con-
    sider in assessing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. 

 at 564–
    565. In Von Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase
    of his new car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs
    official seized the car after determining that it was subject to civil for-
    feiture. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in
    essence, a request under federal law that the Government exercise its
    discretion to forgive the forfeiture—which the Government did not an-
    swer for 36 days. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government’s
    delay in answering the remission petition violated due process. The
    Court rejected that claim, broadly holding that due process did not re-
    quire a pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the first place.
    See 474 U. S., at 249–250. Instead, Von Neumann held that a timely
    forfeiture hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and
    that $8,850 specifies the standard for when a forfeiture hearing is
    timely.
       Petitioners’ argument for a separate preliminary hearing appears to
    be a backdoor argument for a more timely forfeiture hearing to allow
    a property owner with a good defense to recover her property quickly.
    But the Court’s precedents already require a timely hearing, and a
    property owner can raise $8,850-based arguments to ensure a timely
    hearing. Petitioners’ efforts to distinguish Von Neumann on the
    ground that the statutory remission procedure in that case was discre-
    tionary fail because that fact played no role in the Court’s constitu-
    tional analysis. Petitioners also cannot distinguish the relevant lan-
    guage in Von Neumann as dicta, as the Court ruled for the
    Government on the ground that a timely “forfeiture proceeding, with-
    out more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due process” in
    civil forfeiture cases. 

. Similarly, petitioners’ conten-
    tion that Mathews v. Eldridge, 

, should govern petition-
    ers’ request for a preliminary hearing fails given that this Court de-
    cided $8,850 and Von Neumann after Mathews.
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                                Syllabus

     In addition, petitioners point to the Court’s Fourth Amendment de-
  cisions in the criminal context to support their contention that a pre-
  liminary hearing is required in the civil forfeiture context. That anal-
  ogy fails. Fourth Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and
  address only whether probable cause supports the arrestee’s deten-
  tion. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 

, 119–122. Here, petitioners
  argue that the immediate seizure of personal property requires adver-
  sarial preliminary hearings, and they assert that those hearings must
  address their affirmative defense of innocent ownership. But the Due
  Process Clause does not require more extensive preliminary proce-
  dures for the temporary retention of property than for the temporary
  restraint of persons. Pp. 5–10.
     (b) Historical practice reinforces the Court’s conclusions in $8,850
  and Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hear-
  ings in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, many federal and
  state statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal prop-
  erty and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate pre-
  liminary hearing. Petitioners and their amici do not identify any fed-
  eral or state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required
  preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Some States have re-
  cently enacted laws requiring preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture
  cases, but those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate
  for preliminary hearings in every State. History demonstrates that
  both Congress and the States have long authorized law enforcement to
  seize personal property and hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The ab-
  sence of separate preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—
  from the Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty evidence
  that due process does not require such hearings. Pp. 11–13.
Affirmed.

   KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
                       Cite as: 

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                            Opinion of the Court

    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
    Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
    [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                  _________________

                                  No. 22–585
                                  _________________


 HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
   STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
              OF ALABAMA, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                 [May 9, 2024]

  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
  When police seize and then seek civil forfeiture of a car
that was used to commit a drug offense, the Constitution
requires a timely forfeiture hearing. The question here is
whether the Constitution also requires a separate
preliminary hearing to determine whether the police may
retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing. This Court’s
precedents establish that the answer is no:            The
Constitution requires a timely forfeiture hearing; the
Constitution does not also require a separate preliminary
hearing.
                             I
  Halima Culley loaned her car to her college-aged son. On
February 17, 2019, police officers in Satsuma, Alabama,
stopped the car while the son was driving, and the officers
discovered marijuana and a loaded handgun in the car. The
officers arrested Culley’s son and charged him with
possessing marijuana. The officers also seized the car
incident to the arrest.
  At about the same time in 2019, Lena Sutton loaned her
2                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                     Opinion of the Court

car to a friend. On February 21, 2019, police officers in
Leesburg, Alabama, stopped the car while Sutton’s friend
was driving, and the officers discovered a large amount of
methamphetamine in the car.           The officers arrested
Sutton’s friend and charged him with trafficking
methamphetamine and possessing drug paraphernalia.
The officers also seized the car incident to the arrest.
  At the time of the seizures of the two cars, Alabama law
authorized the civil forfeiture of a car used to commit or
facilitate a drug crime. See Ala. Code §20–2–93(a)(5)
(2015). Officers could seize the car “incident to an arrest”
so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture
case. §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). In the interim before the
forfeiture hearing, the car’s owner could recover it by
posting bond at double the car’s value. See §20–2–93(h);
§28–4–287 (2013). At the forfeiture hearing, the owner
could prevail and recover the car under Alabama’s
“affirmative defense” for “innocent owners of property
subject to forfeiture.” Wallace v. State, 

 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). That defense required the
owner to show that the owner lacked knowledge of the car’s
connection to the drug crime. See Ala. Code §20–2–93(h)
(2015).
  The State of Alabama filed a forfeiture complaint against
Culley’s car on February 27, 2019, just 10 days after the
seizure of the car. But Culley waited six months before
answering that complaint. And she waited another year—
until September 21, 2020—before raising an innocent
owner defense in a motion for summary judgment. Soon
thereafter, on October 30, 2020, an Alabama state court
granted Culley’s motion and ordered the return of her car.
  Sutton similarly moved slowly in her forfeiture
proceeding. Alabama brought a forfeiture case against
Sutton’s car on March 6, 2019, just 13 days after the seizure
of the car. Sutton initially failed to appear in the case,
causing the state court to enter a default judgment for
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                      Opinion of the Court

Alabama. Sutton later requested that the state court set
aside that judgment, and the state court did so. Sutton then
submitted a brief answer and served discovery requests on
Alabama, but Sutton otherwise took no action until the
state court set a date for the forfeiture trial. On April 10,
2020, three weeks before the scheduled trial date, Sutton
finally moved for summary judgment on the ground that
she was an innocent owner. Soon thereafter, on May 28,
2020, the state court granted her motion, and she recovered
her car.
   While those forfeiture cases were ongoing, Culley and
Sutton filed purported class-action complaints in federal
court. Culley sued in the U. S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama. Sutton sued in the U. S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Both
sought money damages under 

, claiming
that the state officials violated their due process rights by
retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without
holding preliminary hearings. Culley and Sutton argued
that a preliminary hearing (also referred to as a retention
hearing) is required under the Mathews v. Eldridge due
process test, which balances the private interests at stake,
the value of added procedures, and the burdens on the
government from the added procedures. See 

,
334–335 (1976).
   The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
dismissed Culley’s complaint. Culley v. Marshall, Civ.
Action No. 19–701 (Sept. 29, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert.
58a. Relying on this Court’s decisions in United States v.
$8,850, 

 (1983), and United States v. Von
Neumann, 

 (1986), the District Court held that
due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but not a
separate preliminary hearing. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
44a–46a. The District Court then assessed the timeliness
of Culley’s forfeiture hearing under the four-factor test set
forth in $8,850, which looks to (i) the length of the delay of
4                     CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                        Opinion of the Court

the forfeiture hearing, (ii) the reason for the delay,
(iii) whether the claimant requested a timely hearing, and
(iv) whether the delay was prejudicial. See 

 at 46a–47a
(citing $8,850, 461 U. S., at 563–565). The District Court
concluded that Culley’s forfeiture hearing was timely under
those factors because she played a “significant role” in
delaying her own case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
   The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
similarly entered summary judgment against Sutton on her
due process claim. Sutton v. Leesburg, Civ. Action No. 20–
91 (Sept. 13, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The District
Court determined that Sutton’s claim depended on whether
she received a timely forfeiture hearing within the meaning
of $8,850. See 

 at 66a–70a. The District Court ruled
that Sutton’s forfeiture hearing was timely and satisfied
due process, in part because Sutton never asked for an
earlier hearing. See 

 at 70a–71a.
   The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
consolidated the two cases and affirmed. Culley v. Attorney
General, No. 21–13805 etc. (July 11, 2022), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1a–2a. The Court of Appeals agreed with the two
district courts that a timely forfeiture hearing affords
claimants due process and that no separate preliminary
hearing is constitutionally required. See 

 at 6a–8a. The
Court of Appeals rested its conclusion on circuit precedent,
which in turn relied on this Court’s decisions in $8,850 and
Von Neumann. See 

   Because of a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over
whether the Constitution requires a preliminary hearing in
civil forfeiture cases, this Court granted certiorari. See 

 (2023). Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–8a, with
Ingram v. Wayne County, 

 (CA6 2023);
Krimstock v. Kelly, 

 (CA2 2002).1
——————
  1 Before the entry of judgment by the Court of Appeals, Alabama

amended its forfeiture laws to allow an innocent owner to request an
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                          Opinion of the Court

                             II
  Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted by this Court, States ordinarily
may not seize real property before providing notice and a
hearing. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 

 (1993).        But States may
immediately seize personal property (for example, a car)
that is subject to civil forfeiture when the property
otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before
a forfeiture hearing. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 

, 679–680 (1974).
  When States seize and seek civil forfeiture of personal
property, due process requires a timely post-seizure
forfeiture hearing. See United States v. Von Neumann, 

, 247–250 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 

, 562–565 (1983). In this case, petitioners Culley
and Sutton do not challenge the timeliness of their
forfeiture hearings. Rather, they argue that the Due
Process Clause requires States to also hold a separate
preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.
                                A
  Culley and Sutton argue that a preliminary hearing is
constitutionally necessary to determine whether States
may retain seized personal property pending the ultimate
forfeiture hearing.         As petitioners envision it, the
preliminary hearing would focus on the “ ‘probable
validity’ ” of the forfeiture. Krimstock v. Kelly, 

 (CA2 2002) (quoting Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S.
——————
“expedited hearing” “at any time after seizure of property and before
entry of a conviction” in a “related criminal case.” Ala. Code §15–5–63(3)
(2018); §20–2–93(l) (Supp. 2023); see also Ala. Act 2021–497 (effective
Jan. 1, 2022). That amendment did not moot this case because Culley’s
and Sutton’s requested relief includes money damages against the
municipalities of Satsuma and Leesburg. See Culley v. Attorney General,
No. 21–13805 etc., App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a.
6                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                      Opinion of the Court

614, 629 (1976)). The preliminary hearing would be
adversarial, the parties could introduce evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, and property owners could raise
affirmative defenses, including innocent ownership. In
essence, the preliminary hearing would be an earlier
version of the forfeiture hearing itself.
  Alabama and its amici, including the United States,
disagree. They argue that a preliminary hearing is not
constitutionally required. To begin, they emphasize that
most States and the Federal Government do not currently
provide preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. So
requiring a preliminary hearing as a matter of
constitutional dictate would necessitate a major change in
the States’ and the Federal Government’s longstanding
practices. Alabama and its amici also contend that a
property owner’s post-seizure rights are already protected
by the constitutional requirement that the forfeiture
hearing be timely. They further assert that requiring a
“hearing before a hearing” in every case, as petitioners
want, would interfere with important law-enforcement
activities that must occur after the seizure and before the
forfeiture hearing—including identifying and contacting
potential claimants of the property; coordinating forfeiture
proceedings with related criminal investigations and
prosecutions; and ensuring that property is not removed,
destroyed, or put to illegal use before the forfeiture hearing.
  Ultimately, we need not reweigh the competing due
process arguments advanced by the parties because this
Court’s decisions in United States v. $8,850, 

(1983), and United States v. Von Neumann, 

(1986), already resolved the issue. After a State seizes and
seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due process
requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a
separate preliminary hearing.
  The dispute in $8,850 arose when the Customs Service
seized currency from an individual entering the United
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                      Opinion of the Court

States, but then waited before filing for civil forfeiture of
the currency. See 461 U. S., at 558–561. The property
owner argued that the delay violated due process. See 

.
   This Court concluded that a post-seizure delay “may
become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner
has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful
time.” 

 at 562–563. The Court elaborated that
timeliness in civil forfeiture cases must be assessed by
“analog[izing] . . . to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial”
and considering four factors: the length of the delay, the
reason for the delay, whether the property owner asserted
his rights, and whether the delay was prejudicial. 

 at
564 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 

 (1972)).
Those factors are appropriate guides in the civil forfeiture
context, the Court explained, because the factors ensure
that “the flexible requirements of due process have been
met.” 461 U. S., at 564–565.
   In Von Neumann, the Court addressed whether a timely
forfeiture hearing, without more, provides the process that
is due in civil forfeiture cases. See 474 U. S., at 249–251.
The property owner there failed to declare the purchase of
his new car upon driving it into the United States. See id.,
at 245. A customs official determined that the car was
subject to civil forfeiture and seized it. See ibid. The
plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in
essence, a request under federal law that the Federal
Government exercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture.
See id., at 245–246. The Government did not respond to
that petition for 36 days. See id., at 246. The plaintiff sued,
arguing that the Government’s 36-day delay in answering
the remission petition violated due process. See id., at 246–
247.
   Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court broadly held that
due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing
remission procedure in the first place. See id., at 249–251.
8                       CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                          Opinion of the Court

Citing $8,850, the Court ruled that a timely “forfeiture
proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing
required by due process” to protect the plaintiff ’s “property
interest in the car.” 

. The Court explained
that the plaintiff ’s “right to a forfeiture proceeding” that
meets the $8,850 timeliness test “satisfies any due process
right with respect to the car.” 

. A separate
remission hearing is not “constitutionally required.” 

.2
  This Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann
resolve this case. As the Court stated in Von Neumann, a
timely forfeiture hearing “satisfies any due process right”
with respect to a “car” that has been seized for civil
forfeiture. 

; see also 

. The Due
Process Clause does not require a separate preliminary
hearing.3
  Culley and Sutton’s argument for a separate preliminary
hearing appears in many respects to be a backdoor
argument for a more timely hearing so that a property
owner with a good defense against forfeiture can recover
her property more quickly. But the Court’s precedents
already require a timely hearing, and a property owner can
of course raise $8,850-based arguments in an individual
case to ensure a timely hearing.
  Culley and Sutton (echoed by the dissent here) try to
brush aside Von Neumann on the ground that the statutory
remission procedure in that case was discretionary. See
——————
   2 At oral argument in Von Neumann, Justice O’Connor asked the

United States whether the “forfeiture proceeding itself provides all the
process that’s due” to protect the “property interest in the car.” Tr. of
Oral Arg. in United States v. Von Neumann, O. T. 1985, No. 84–1144,
p. 18. The United States answered, “that is our position.” Ibid.; see also

 at 26–27. The Court subsequently agreed with that position. See
Von Neumann, 474 U. S., at 249–251.
   3 In this opinion, we do not address any due process issues related to

civil forfeiture other than the question about a separate preliminary
hearing.
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                      Opinion of the Court

, and n. 2 (citing 

 (1982
ed., Supp. III)); see also post, at 8–9 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting). But the discretionary nature of the remission
procedure played no role in the Court’s constitutional
analysis. See 474 U. S., at 249–251. Culley and Sutton also
try to characterize the language in Von Neumann as dicta.
We disagree. The Court ruled for the Government in Von
Neumann on the ground that a timely “forfeiture
proceeding, without more, provides the postseizure hearing
required by due process” in civil forfeiture cases. 

.
No separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally
required.
  Culley and Sutton also contend that Mathews v. Eldridge
should be the test for deciding when additional process is
due and that, under Mathews, a preliminary hearing would
be required in civil forfeiture cases. 

 (1976).
But this Court decided $8,850 and Von Neumann after
Mathews, yet in those two cases, the Court did not apply the
Mathews test. In any event, there is no good reason to think
that the Mathews balancing test would yield a different
result here. A timely forfeiture hearing protects the
interests of both the claimant and the government. And an
additional preliminary hearing of the kind sought by
petitioners would interfere with the government’s
important law-enforcement activities in the period after the
seizure and before the forfeiture hearing.
  In arguing that the Constitution requires a preliminary
hearing, Culley and Sutton also point to this Court’s Fourth
Amendment decisions in the criminal context. That
analogy is flawed. The Fourth Amendment requires that
any person who is arrested without a warrant be brought
before a neutral magistrate within 48 hours, absent
extraordinary circumstances. See County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 

, 56–57 (1991). But the Fourth
Amendment hearings are not adversarial, and they address
only whether probable cause supports the arrestee’s
10                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                      Opinion of the Court

detention. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 

, 119–122
(1975). Here, Culley and Sutton do not request a mere
probable cause hearing of the kind described in Gerstein.
Rather, they argue that the immediate seizure of property
requires adversarial preliminary hearings, and they assert
that those hearings must address their “affirmative
defense” of innocent ownership. Wallace v. State, 

 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). Culley and Sutton
therefore contend that the Due Process Clause requires
more extensive preliminary procedures for the temporary
retention of property than for the temporary restraint of
persons. The Due Process Clause does not demand that
incongruity. See United States v. Monsanto, 

,
615–616 (1989).
   Finally, the dissent here relies heavily on United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 

. See post,
at 10. There, this Court held that the government must
ordinarily provide notice and a hearing before seizing real
property that is subject to civil forfeiture. See 

. The Court emphasized that real property, unlike
personal property, “can be neither moved nor concealed”
during the forfeiture process. 

 at 52–53; see also 

 at
56–57. That case did not purport to disturb the rule that
the government may seize and retain personal property,
such as a car, that is subject to civil forfeiture when the
property otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or
concealed before a forfeiture hearing. See 

 at 57 (citing
Calero-Toledo, 

). And more to the point,
that case did not alter Von Neumann’s holding that a timely
forfeiture hearing provides the process that is due following
the immediate seizure of personal property.
   In sum, Von Neumann held that a timely forfeiture
hearing satisfies due process in civil forfeiture cases, and
$8,850 specified the standard for when forfeiture hearings
are timely. Culley and Sutton have not asked the Court to
discard those precedents in this case. And those precedents
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                      Opinion of the Court

make crystal clear that due process does not require a
separate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.
                               B
   Historical practice reinforces the holdings of $8,850 and
Von Neumann that due process does not require
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases.
   Since the Founding era, statutes have authorized the
Government to seize personal property and hold it pending
a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary
hearing. For example, the first federal forfeiture law, the
Collection Act of 1789, authorized the civil forfeiture of
ships, goods, and merchandise involved in suspected
violations of the customs laws. See, e.g., Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, §§12, 22–24, 34, 

, 39, 42–43, 46; see
generally C. Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil
Forfeiture, 125 Yale L. J. 2446, 2464–2466 (2016). The
Act’s forfeiture process began with the seizure of property
by a customs collector. See, e.g., §25, 

. The
collector then filed a forfeiture action, which a court would
“hear and determine . . . according to law.” §36, id., at 47.
While that action was pending, the seized property could
“remain in the custody of the collector.” §25, id., at 43. A
claimant could also recover the property on bond. See §36,
id., at 47.
   The Collection Act did not require a separate preliminary
hearing before the forfeiture hearing. Rather, the forfeiture
“trial” supplied the opportunity for the property owner to
challenge the collector’s case. Ibid.
   In 1790 and 1799, Congress revised and reenacted the
Collection Act. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 

;
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 

. The revised versions
of the Act contained similar forfeiture provisions and
likewise lacked anything resembling a separate
preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, §§69,
89, 

, 695–696; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§49, 67, 1
12                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                      Opinion of the Court

Stat. 170, 176–177.
   Many state forfeiture statutes from the Founding period
similarly did not require a preliminary hearing before the
forfeiture hearing. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11, 1787, ch. 81, in
2 Laws of the State of New York Passed at the Sessions of
the Legislature Held in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787 and
1788, Inclusive pp. 514–515, 517–520 (1886); Act of Oct.
1785, ch. 14, in 12 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection
of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the
Legislature, in the Year 1619 pp. 46–47 (1823). For
example, a New York customs statute from that era
provided that a property owner could recover his seized
goods by either prevailing at a forfeiture “trial” or executing
a “bond” for an appraised amount. Act of Apr. 11, 1787, at
517–518. The statute did not allow property owners to
challenge the validity of the seizure through a separate
preliminary hearing or any similar procedure. See id., at
517–520.
   In addition, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868, Congress did not require preliminary
hearings. In 1864, for example, Congress provided that
goods seized under a new revenue law should “remain” in
the “care and custody” of the government “until final
judgment” in a forfeiture trial. Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20,
§2, 

, 15. Although that revenue law provided for
bond, it did not grant property owners a right to
preliminary hearings. See 

 Similarly, in 1866,
Congress required that goods and vessels seized under a
new customs law “remain in the custody” of a customs
official pending “adjudication by the proper tribunal.” Act
of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, §31, 

, 186.
   Many state forfeiture laws from around the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment likewise did not provide for a
preliminary hearing. For example, a New Hampshire
statute required that a state official “detain” personal
property that was seized for civil forfeiture until the
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)            13

                      Opinion of the Court

property was “legally disposed of ” through either bond or a
forfeiture trial. The General Statutes of the State of New-
Hampshire, ch. 249, §§3, 6–7, pp. 503–504 (1867).
Likewise, a Vermont statute authorized the seizure of
liquor that was intended for sale, required the seizing
officer to “keep” the liquor “until final action is had
thereon,” and limited the conditions in which a claimant
could recover the liquor. The Revised Laws of Vermont,
1880, §3818, p. 738 (1881); see §3827, id., at 740.
   Petitioners and their amici do not identify any federal or
state statutes that, before the late 20th century, required
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. To be sure,
some States have recently enacted laws requiring
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. See, e.g., Ala.
Act 2021–497, p. 9; 2021 Minn. Laws pp. 2064–2065; 2017
Ill. Laws pp. 6854–6855; 2017 Wis. Laws p. 815; 2012 Colo.
Sess. Laws pp. 856–857; 2001 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 1159. But
those recent laws do not support a constitutional mandate
for preliminary hearings in every State.
   In short, both Congress and the States have long
authorized law enforcement to seize personal property and
hold it until a forfeiture hearing. The absence of separate
preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture proceedings—from
the Founding until the late 20th century—is weighty
evidence that due process does not require such hearings.
Cf. United States v. Ursery, 

, 287–288
(1996); Bennis v. Michigan, 

, 446–448 (1996);
Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 680–690. The historical
practice in civil forfeiture proceedings thus reinforces
$8,850 and Von Neumann: In civil forfeiture cases involving
personal property such as cars, the Due Process Clause
requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a
preliminary hearing.
14                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                      Opinion of the Court

                         *      *   *
  To balance the interests of the government and
individuals in civil forfeiture cases involving personal
property, the States and Congress have adopted a wide
variety of approaches. For example, some States require
that the forfeiture hearing occur within a fixed period of
time. Others require a jury trial. Still others condition civil
forfeiture on a successful criminal prosecution. And a few
now require preliminary hearings. See Brief for State of
Georgia et al. as Amici Curiae 5–21.
  Our decision today does not preclude those legislatively
prescribed innovations.        Rather, our decision simply
addresses the baseline protection of the Due Process
Clause.
  In civil forfeiture cases, the Due Process Clause requires
a timely forfeiture hearing, but does not require a separate
preliminary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
                                              It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              1

                     GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–585
                          _________________


 HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
   STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
              OF ALABAMA, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                          [May 9, 2024]

   JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
concurring.
   I agree with the Court that, at a minimum, the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires a prompt hearing in civil forfeiture
cases. Ante, at 5. I agree that no legal authority presented
to us indicates a prompt hearing must necessarily take the
form Ms. Culley and Ms. Sutton suppose. Ante, at 6. I
agree, too, that Mathews v. Eldridge, 

 (1976),
does not teach otherwise. Ante, at 9. Under its terms,
judges balance “the private and governmental interests at
stake,” Mathews, 

, to determine “what pro-
cedures the government must observe” when it seeks to
withhold “benefits” “such as welfare or Social Security,”
Nelson v. Colorado, 

 (2017) (ALITO, J.,
concurring in judgment). That test does not control—and
we do not afford any particular solicitude to “governmental
interests”—in cases like this one where the government
seeks to deprive an individual of her private property. But
if all that leads me to join today’s decision, I also agree with
the dissent that this case leaves many larger questions un-
resolved about whether, and to what extent, contemporary
civil forfeiture practices can be squared with the Constitu-
tion’s promise of due process. I write separately to high-
light some of them.
2                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

                                I
   The facts of this case are worth pausing over because they
are typical of many. Halima Culley, a Georgia resident,
bought a 2015 Nissan Altima for her son to use while he
was away studying at the University of South Alabama.
App. 58, ¶¶22–24. The car belongs to her and she pays for
its registration and insurance. Ibid., ¶¶25–26. The plan
was for her son to bring the car home during the summer
for the family to share. Id., at 60, ¶37. But before that
could happen, a police officer in Alabama pulled her son
over and arrested him for possessing marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. Id., at 59, ¶27. The officer also took the car.
Ibid., ¶28. Eventually, law enforcement officials learned
that the Nissan belonged to Ms. Culley, not her son. But
instead of returning it, they initiated civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings in the hope of keeping the vehicle permanently.
Ibid., ¶¶30–33. It took a lawsuit and a 20-month wait for
the car to make its way back to her. App. to Pet. for Cert.
3a.
   For Alabama, this was business as usual. Often, the
State’s law enforcement agencies may take and keep pri-
vate property without a warrant or any other form of prior
process. Ala. Code §20–2–93(d) (2023 Cum. Supp.). In-
stead, only after taking the property must the agency file a
civil forfeiture action in court. Once there, the agency need
present only a “prima facie” case that the property in ques-
tion represents proceeds “traceable” to a drug crime or prop-
erty used to “facilitate” one. §§20–2–93(b)(3), (b)(5);
Ex parte McConathy, 

 (Ala. 2005). If the
agency proves just that much, the burden sometimes shifts
to the property’s owner to prove she was an “innocent
owner” who did not know about or consent to the conduct
that caused the property to be taken. §§20–2–93(w), (a)(4).
Should the agency prevail in the end, it may keep the prop-
erty for its own use or sell it and keep the money. §20–2–
93(s).
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              3

                     GORSUCH, J., concurring

   Laws like Alabama’s exist in many States and at the fed-
eral level. But as commonplace as these civil forfeiture laws
may be, most are pretty new. As part of the War on Drugs,
in the 1970s and 1980s Congress began enacting sweeping
new civil forfeiture statutes allowing the government to
seize and keep the proceeds of drug crimes and the personal
property used to facilitate them. See S. Cassella, Asset For-
feiture Law in the United States §2–4, p. 48 (3d ed. 2022).
Since then, the federal government has extended similar
civil forfeiture rules to most federal offenses. Id., at 49. To-
day, it appears, “[w]hite-collar and firearms crimes” now
“accoun[t] for larger shares of all [federal] forfeitures than
drug crimes.” L. Knepper, J. McDonald, K. Sanchez, & E.
Pohl, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfei-
ture 26 (3d ed. 2020) (Knepper). Following the federal gov-
ernment’s lead, many States have adopted similar laws of
their own. See id., at 170–185.
   These new laws have altered law enforcement practices
across the Nation in profound ways. My dissenting col-
leagues catalogue a number of examples, see post, at 3–6
(opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), but consider just a few here. To
secure a criminal penalty like a fine, disgorgement of illegal
profits, or restitution, the government must comply with
strict procedural rules and prove the defendant’s guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 

(1970). In civil forfeiture, however, the government can
simply take the property and later proceed to court to earn
the right to keep it under a far more forgiving burden of
proof. See Knepper 39. In part thanks to this asymmetry,
civil forfeiture has become a booming business. In 2018,
federal forfeitures alone brought in $2.5 billion. Id., at 15.
Meanwhile, according to some reports, these days “up to
80% of civil forfeitures are not accompanied by a criminal
conviction.” Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae
14 (Buckeye Brief ).
4                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

   Law enforcement agencies have become increasingly de-
pendent on the money they raise from civil forfeitures. The
federal government shares a large portion of what it re-
ceives with state and local law enforcement agencies that
aid its forfeiture efforts. Dept. of Justice & Dept. of Treas-
ury, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State, Local, and Tribal
Law Enforcement Agencies 3, 12 (Mar. 2024). At one time
or another, “[o]ver 90% of the agencies serving jurisdictions
with populations” above 250,000 have participated in this
“equitable sharing” scheme. E. Jensen & J. Gerber, The
Civil Forfeiture of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding
Criminal Sanctions While Reducing Due Process Protec-
tions, 42 Crime & Delinquency 421, 425 (1996). And it
seems that, when local law enforcement budgets tighten,
forfeiture activity often increases. B. Kelly, Fighting Crime
or Raising Revenue? Testing Opposing Views of Forfeiture
15 (2019).
   Not only do law enforcement agencies have strong finan-
cial incentives to pursue forfeitures, those incentives also
appear to influence how they conduct them. Some agencies,
for example, reportedly place special emphasis on seizing
low-value items and relatively small amounts of cash, hope-
ful their actions won’t be contested because the cost of liti-
gating to retrieve the property may cost more than the
value of the property itself. See Knepper 9. Other agencies
seem to prioritize seizures they can monetize rather than
those they cannot, posing for example as drug dealers ra-
ther than buyers so they can seize the buyer’s cash rather
than illicit drugs that hold no value for law enforcement.
See Buckeye Brief 7–8.
   Delay can work to these agencies’ advantage as well. See
Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16.
Faced with the prospect of waiting months or years to se-
cure the return of a car or some other valuable piece of prop-
erty they need to work and live, even innocent owners some-
times “settle” by “paying a fee to get it back.” Knepper 36.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              5

                     GORSUCH, J., concurring

Contributing to the inducement to settle is how little proof
the agencies must produce to win forfeiture, the cost of liti-
gation, and the need to appear in court—sometimes, as Ms.
Culley learned, in a different State. And if these tactics and
burdens work against all affected individuals, can it be any
surprise “the poor and other groups least able to defend
their interests” often suffer most? Leonard v. Texas, 

, 1180 (2017) (statement of THOMAS, J., respect-
ing denial of certiorari); see post, at 4–5.
                               II
   To my mind, the due process questions surrounding these
relatively new civil forfeiture practices are many. Start
with the most fundamental one. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no government in this country
may take “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” As originally understood, this promise usually meant
that a government seeking to deprive an individual of her
property could do so only after a trial before a jury in which
it (not the individual) bore the burden of proof. See, e.g., 1
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 134–
135 (1765) (Blackstone); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 

 (CC Pa. 1795) (Patterson, J.); Wilkinson v.
Leland, 

 (1829) (Story, J.). So how is it that,
in civil forfeiture, the government may confiscate property
first and provide process later?
   The answer, if there is one, turns on history. If, as a rule,
the Due Process Clauses require governments to conduct a
trial before taking property, some exceptions are just as
deeply rooted. And for just that reason, these exceptions,
too, may be consistent with the original meaning of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As this Court has put
it, “a process of law . . . must be taken to be due process of
law” if it enjoys “the sanction of settled usage both in Eng-
land and in this country.” Hurtado v. California, 

 (1884); see, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land
6                    CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                     GORSUCH, J., concurring

& Improvement Co., 

, 278–280 (1856).
   But can contemporary civil forfeiture practices boast that
kind of pedigree? In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 

 (1974), this Court noted that English
and early American admiralty laws allowed the govern-
ment to seize a vessel involved in “piratical” or other mari-
time offenses and later initiate postdeprivation civil forfei-
ture proceedings. 

. The Court observed that
similar legal rules existed for cases involving “objects used
in violation of the customs and revenue laws.” 

;
see also K. Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 

, 1466 (2019). After emphasizing the existence
of those traditions, the Court proceeded to uphold the civil
forfeiture of a boat. Calero-Toledo, 

.
Later and proceeding on much the same basis, the Court
approved various aspects of civil forfeiture practice in the
context of customs enforcement actions. See United States
v. $8,850, 

 (1983); United States v.
Von Neumann, 

 (1986).
   These historical traditions suggest that postdeprivation
civil forfeiture processes in the discrete arenas of admiralty,
customs, and revenue law may satisfy the Constitution.
But as the Court stressed in Von Neumann, “the general
rule” remains that the government cannot “ ‘seize a person’s
property without a prior judicial determination that the sei-
zure is justified.’ ” 

. And it is far from clear
to me whether the postdeprivation practices historically tol-
erated inside the admiralty, customs, and revenue contexts
enjoy “the sanction of settled usage” outside them. Hur-
tado, 

.
   The reasons for the law’s traditionally permissive atti-
tude toward civil forfeiture in those three contexts may
merit exploration, too. From a brief look, it seems they were
sometimes justified for reasons particular to their fields. In
the early Republic, for example, once a ship involved in vi-
olations of the Nation’s piracy or customs laws slipped port
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              7

                     GORSUCH, J., concurring

for a foreign destination, American courts often could not
exercise jurisdiction over it or its crew, let alone its owners.
See R. Waples, Proceedings in Rem §19, p. 22 (1882)
(Waples). In many instances, the law recognized that seiz-
ing the ship, subject to postdeprivation procedures, repre-
sented “the only adequate means of suppressing the offence
or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party.”
Harmony v. United States, 

 (1844) (Story,
J.); see also 3 Blackstone 262 (1768) (justifying civil forfei-
ture in customs cases as necessary “to secure such forfeited
goods for the public use, though the offender himself had
escaped the reach of justice”). But if history sanctions that
line of thinking, it’s hard not to wonder: How does any of
that support the use of civil forfeiture in so many cases to-
day, where the government can secure personal jurisdiction
over the wrongdoer? And where seizing his property is not
the only adequate means of addressing his offense?
   Even supposing some modern civil forfeiture regimes are
able to claim the sanction of history, I wonder whether all
their particulars might. In the past, it seems the govern-
ment could confiscate only certain classes of property. So,
for example, admiralty statutes regularly authorized the
government to seize and pursue the civil forfeiture of “the
instrument[s] of the offence,” say, a ship used to engage in
piracy. Smith v. Maryland, 

 (1855); see Har-
mony, 

. But statutes like that did not neces-
sarily mean forfeiture extended to the vessel’s cargo, and
courts were loath to assume they did. 

. Today,
by contrast, civil forfeiture statutes routinely permit gov-
ernments to confiscate not just instruments used in an of-
fense, but other “facilitating” property as well. See supra,
at 3. (In this respect, Alabama’s statute is again illustra-
tive.) And if that difference seems a small one, it is any-
thing but: It is the difference between being able to confis-
cate the materials and equipment used to produce an illicit
drug and being able to confiscate someone’s car after he
8                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

used it as the site to conduct a single drug transaction as
either buyer or seller. See Austin v. United States, 

, 627–628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment).
   Even in the areas where the law tolerated civil forfeiture,
earlier generations tempered some of its harshest features.
Courts, for example, ordinarily entertained “overwhelming
necessity” as a defense to “the violation of revenue laws”
that might otherwise justify forfeiture. 1 J. Bishop, Com-
mentaries on the Criminal Law §697, p. 575 (1856)
(Bishop); see Peisch v. Ware, 

 (1808) (Mar-
shall, C. J.) (“[A] forfeiture can only be applied to those
cases in which the means that are prescribed for the pre-
vention of a forfeiture may be employed”). Some statutes
permitted the owner to avoid forfeiture by proving that the
violation “proceeded from accident or mistake.” 

;
see United States v. Nine Packages of Linen, 

 (No. 15,884) (CC NY 1818); Bishop §697, at 575; cf. 

 (no forfeiture of goods from “bona fide purchaser”).
Others empowered the Treasury Secretary himself to afford
the same remedy—and evidence suggests officials “were ex-
ceedingly liberal in their use of the . . . power, granting re-
lief in the overwhelming majority of cases presented to
them.” Arlyck, 119 Colum. L. Rev., at 1487; see also The
Laura, 

, 414–415 (1885). These days, mean-
while, many civil forfeiture statutes lack some or all of these
mitigating features. I acknowledge that this Court has sug-
gested an innocent owner defense is not always constitu-
tionally required. Bennis v. Michigan, 

(1996); see 

 at 455–457 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing limits to the Court’s holding); 

 at 457–458 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring) (same). But even putting that debate
aside, what of early forfeiture’s other ameliorative attrib-
utes?
   It appears, too, that time was often of the essence in tra-
ditional civil forfeiture practice. So, for example, an early
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)             9

                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

federal statute permitting forfeiture for nonpayment of in-
ternal duties “enjoined” the “collector” “to cause suits for
[forfeiture] to be commenced without delay, and prosecuted
to effect.” 

. In an admiralty case, Chief Justice
Marshall remarked, “If the seizing officer should refuse to
institute proceedings to ascertain the forfeiture, the district
court may, upon the application of the aggrieved party,
compel the officer to proceed to adjudication, or to abandon
the seizure.” Slocum v. Mayberry, 

 (1817).
And in many instances owners could recover their property
while the forfeiture proceedings were ongoing by posting a
bond. See, e.g., 

; United States v. Ames, 

 (1879); Waples §81, at 112; ante, at 12. It’s another
feature of historic practice that raises questions about cur-
rent ones in which even innocent owners can wait for
months or years for forfeiture proceedings to play out.
                              III
   Why does a Nation so jealous of its liberties tolerate ex-
pansive new civil forfeiture practices that have “led to egre-
gious and well-chronicled abuses”? Leonard, 580 U. S., at
1180 (statement of THOMAS, J.). Perhaps it has something
to do with the relative lack of power of those on whom the
system preys. Perhaps government agencies’ increasing de-
pendence on forfeiture as a source of revenue is an im-
portant piece of the puzzle. Cf. Calero-Toledo, 

 (indicating, over 50 years ago and before the rise of
many modern innovations, that “self-interes[t]” did not mo-
tivate the forfeiture of the vessel at issue). But maybe, too,
part of the reason lies closer to home. In this Nation, the
right to a jury trial before the government may take life,
liberty, or property has always been the rule. Yes, some
exceptions exist. But perhaps it is past time for this Court
to examine more fully whether and to what degree contem-
porary civil forfeiture practices align with that rule and
those exceptions.
10                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

   Really, it’s hard not to wonder whether some current civil
forfeiture practices represent much less than a revival of
the archaic common-law deodand. The deodand required
the forfeiture of any object responsible for a death—say, a
knife, cart, or horse—to the Crown. See 1 Blackstone 290.
Today, the idea seems much the same even if the practice
now sweeps more broadly, requiring almost any object in-
volved in almost any serious offense to be surrendered to
the government in amends.
   The hardships deodands often imposed seem more than
faintly familiar, too. Deodands required forfeiture regard-
less of the fault of the owner, himself sometimes the de-
ceased. Not infrequently, the practice left impoverished
families without the means to support themselves, faced
not only with the loss of a loved one but also with the loss
of a horse or perhaps a cart essential to their livelihoods.
See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law
472 (1895); E. Burke, Deodand—A Legal Antiquity That
May Still Exist, 

, 17, 19–20 (1930).
Sometimes grieving families could persuade authorities or
juries to forgo a deodand, but often not, and generally the
burden to avoid a deodand was on them. See M. Foster,
Crown Law 266 (1762).
   As time went on, too, curiously familiar financial incen-
tives wormed their way into the system. Originally, the
Crown was supposed to pass the deodand (literally, a thing
given to God) onto the church “as an expiation for the sou[l]”
of the deceased. 1 Blackstone 290. Over time, though, the
Crown increasingly chose instead to sell off its rights to de-
odands to local lords and others. These recipients inevita-
bly wound up with a strong interest in the perpetuation of
the enterprise. See 

. Ultimately, the deodand’s
appeal faded in England, and this Court has held that it
“did not become part of the common-law tradition of this
country.” Calero-Toledo, 

; see 

. But has something not wholly unlike it gradually
                  Cite as: 

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                    GORSUCH, J., concurring

reemerged in our own lifetimes?
                                *
  In asking the questions I do today, I do not profess a com-
prehensive list, let alone any firm answers. Nor does the
way the parties have chosen to litigate this case give cause
to supply them. But in future cases, with the benefit of full
briefing, I hope we might begin the task of assessing how
well the profound changes in civil forfeiture practices we
have witnessed in recent decades comport with the Consti-
tution’s enduring guarantee that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)            1

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–585
                          _________________


 HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
   STEVEN T. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL
              OF ALABAMA, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                          [May 9, 2024]

   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
   A police officer can seize your car if he claims it is con-
nected to a crime committed by someone else. The police
department can then keep the car for months or even years
until the State ultimately seeks ownership of it through
civil forfeiture. In most States, the resulting proceeds from
the car’s sale go to the police department’s budget. Peti-
tioners claim that the Due Process Clause requires a
prompt, post-seizure opportunity for innocent car owners to
argue to a judge why they should retain their cars pending
that final forfeiture determination. When an officer has a
financial incentive to hold onto a car and an owner pleads
innocence, they argue, a retention hearing at least ensures
that the officer has probable cause to connect the owner and
the car to a crime.
   Today, the Court holds that the Due Process Clause never
requires that minimal safeguard. In doing so, it sweeps far
more broadly than the narrow question presented and ham-
strings lower courts from addressing myriad abuses of the
civil forfeiture system. Because I would have decided only
which due process test governs whether a retention hearing
is required and left it to the lower courts to apply that test
to different civil forfeiture schemes, I respectfully dissent.
2                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

                                 I
                                 A
   Civil forfeiture occupies a murky space between criminal
forfeiture and ordinary government deprivations of prop-
erty. Criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant’s criminal
punishment. The government must therefore proceed
against the person (in personam) to obtain someone’s prop-
erty via criminal forfeiture, which generally requires notice
of intent to forfeit the property in a criminal indictment and
full criminal procedural protections for the defendant. At
the outset, the government must typically prove that it has
probable cause to seize the person for a specific crime and
therefore to hold any property related to that crime. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 

 (1975).
   Outside the criminal context, the government usually
must provide a hearing before depriving someone of essen-
tial property. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 

,
264–266 (1970) (public assistance); Bell v. Burson, 

, 542–543 (1971) (driver’s license); Fuentes v. Shevin,

, 96–97 (1972) (household goods to which a cred-
itor lays a claim). In some circumstances “the necessity of
quick action by the State” may prevent a predeprivation
hearing. Parratt v. Taylor, 

 (1981), over-
ruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 

(1986).     Then, however, the government must make
“availab[le] . . . some meaningful means by which to assess
the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the
initial [seizure], [to] satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process.” 

.
   Civil forfeiture is a hybrid, where prosecutors proceed
against any property (in rem) they believe is connected to a
crime, even when the owner is innocent. Unlike criminal
forfeiture, civil forfeiture proceedings are untethered from
any criminal prosecution. In fact, as many as 80% of civil
forfeitures are not accompanied by any ultimate criminal
conviction. Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae
                   Cite as: 

 (2024)              3

                    SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

14. Civil forfeiture is unnecessary where the government
pursues criminal forfeiture in an indictment and sustains a
conviction. Only if an officer seizes property that he be-
lieves is connected to a crime, but does not belong to a de-
fendant charged with that crime, must prosecutors bring
civil forfeiture proceedings outside a criminal case. Even
when the State abandons the prosecution that formed the
basis for the seizure, an innocent property owner can be left
in civil forfeiture proceedings trying to get her property
back.
                                B
   The Federal Government, States, and localities set their
own rules for civil forfeiture, subject only to the limits of the
Due Process Clause. This lack of standardized procedural
safeguards makes civil forfeiture vulnerable to abuse. In
32 States and the federal system, when law enforcement
agencies forfeit property, the proceeds go to their own budg-
ets. Brief for Institute for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 4.
As a result, police agencies often have a financial incentive
to seize as many cars as possible and try to retain them.
The forfeiture revenue is not a supplement; many police
agencies in fact depend on cash flow from forfeitures for
their budgets. See, e.g., J. Worrall & T. Kovandzic, Is Po-
licing for Profit? Answers From Asset Forfeiture, 7 Crimi-
nology & Pub. Pol’y 219, 222 (2008) (“[M]ore than 60% of
police agencies surveyed reported dependence on asset for-
feiture”). These cash incentives not only encourage coun-
ties to create labyrinthine processes for retrieving property
in the hopes that innocent owners will abandon attempts at
recovery, they also influence which laws police enforce, how
they enforce them, and who they enforce them against. See
Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (detail-
ing empirical studies on the effect of fiscal incentives in civil
forfeiture on law enforcement decisionmaking).
   Police officers have an incentive to enforce the law in a
4                   CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                    SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

way that leads to the recovery of fungible property, like
cash or cars. For example, officers might pose as drug deal-
ers instead of buyers in a sting operation, because “it allows
police to seize a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs
(which have no legal value to the seizing agency).” E. Blu-
menson & E. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s
Hidden Economic Agenda, 

, 67 (1998).
Similarly, police officers might target low-level drug posses-
sion in cars instead of drug transactions on the street, so
that they can seize the vehicle. In this case, police officers
pulled over petitioner Halima Tariffa Culley’s college-age
son while he was driving a car registered to her, charged
him with possession of marijuana, and seized the car. A
police officer cannot sell recovered marijuana and a prose-
cutor’s office does not ordinarily pursue low-level marijuana
offenses. When a police department can recover the pro-
ceeds from a car civilly forfeited in connection to a low-level
marijuana offense, however, targeting that offense becomes
more appealing.
   Moreover, officers have a financial incentive to target
marginalized groups, such as low-income communities of
color, who are less likely to have the resources to challenge
the forfeiture in court. See A. Crawford, Civil Asset Forfei-
ture in Massachusetts: A Flawed Incentive Structure and
Its Impact on Indigent Property Owners, 35 Boston College
J. L. & Soc. Justice 257, 274–277 (2015) (“[O]ne way for law
enforcement agencies to generate profits is to target low-
income parties who are financially incapable of challenging
seizures”). A 2019 study found that “the seizure of nonnar-
cotic property from black and Hispanic arrestees increases
with the size of the [budget] deficit in states where police
departments can retain revenue from seized property.” M.
Makowsky, T. Stratmann, & A. Tabarrok, To Serve and Col-
lect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforce-
ment, 48 J. Legal Studies 189, 208–209 (2019).
                   Cite as: 

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                    SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

   “[T]hese same groups are often the most burdened by for-
feiture,” because “they are more likely to suffer in their
daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item
of property, such as a car.” Leonard v. Texas, 

, 1180 (2017) (statement of THOMAS, J., respecting de-
nial of certiorari). For many people, loss of access to a car,
even temporarily, is significant. Over 85% of Americans
drive to work. J. Hirsch & P. Jones, Driver’s License Sus-
pension for Unpaid Fines and Fees: The Movement for Re-
form, 54 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 875, 881 (2020). Unsurpris-
ingly, studies have found a link between the inability to
drive and the loss of a job. For example, “[i]n New Jersey,
42% of people lost their jobs after their driver’s license was
suspended.” 

 Loss of a car not only “takes away one’s
ability to commute” but also imposes a barrier to “buy[ing]
necessities, access[ing] healthcare, and visit[ing] family
members, pharmacies, grocery stores, hospitals, and other
essential services.” 

   Given these burdens, low-income communities are also
the most vulnerable to pressure from unchecked prosecu-
tors, who can use coercive civil forfeiture processes to ex-
tract settlement money from innocent owners desperate to
get their property back. See Brief for Institute for Justice
et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20 (detailing examples). In De-
troit, to take one example, car owners recently alleged that
Wayne County seizes vehicles in areas generally associated
with crime and holds on to the vehicles and their contents
unless the owners pay steep redemption fees: $900 for the
first seizure; $1,800 for the second; and $2,700 for the third.
See Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 

 (CA6 2023).
If the owner is unwilling or unable to pay this fee, she must
either abandon the vehicle or wait for county prosecutors to
decide whether to initiate forfeiture proceedings. Before
such proceedings are brought, however, the owner allegedly
must attend four or more pretrial conferences during regu-
lar work hours, during which the owner typically will not
6                      CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                       SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

get to plead her case to a judge. Instead, prosecutors will
attempt to persuade her to pay the redemption fee, towing
costs, and storage fees. Missing just one conference alleg-
edly will result in automatic forfeiture and transfer of title
to the county.
   Similarly, in Massachusetts, one investigation found over
500 instances in a single county where law enforcement
held property for a decade or more before officials finally
commenced forfeiture proceedings. S. Datar & S. Dooling,
Massachusetts Police Can Easily Seize Your Money. The
DA of One County Makes It Nearly Impossible To Get It
Back, ProPublica (Aug. 18, 2021), www.propublica.org/arti-
cle/massachusetts-police-can-easily-seize-your-money.-the-
da-of-one-county-makes-it-near-impossible-to-get-it-back.
In other words, those owners had to wait more than a dec-
ade for the chance to explain to a judge why they should get
their property back. In one instance, prosecutors ran a
newspaper notice four years after a seizure, at which point
the property owner had only 20 days to file a claim to avoid
forfeiture. Similar delays have been reported in South Car-
olina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. See Brief for Institute
for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (collecting studies).
   In short, law enforcement can seize cars, hold them indef-
initely, and then rely on an owner’s lack of resources to for-
feit those cars to fund agency budgets, all without any ini-
tial check by a judge as to whether there is a basis to hold
the car in the first place.
                            II
  This Court granted certiorari to address which of its tests
should govern due process challenges that seek a retention
hearing after an officer seizes a car.1 Now, the Court
——————
  1 See Pet. for Cert. i (“In determining whether the Due Process Clause

requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable
cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if
so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the
                     Cite as: 

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                       SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

reaches far beyond that question to hold that people whose
cars are seized by the police never have a due process right
to a retention hearing. The Court arrives at this conclusion
by relying on two customs cases from the 1980s and histor-
ical practice that purportedly reinforces their application.
Its reasoning is deeply flawed.
                                A
   The majority says that “[t]his Court’s decisions in $8,850
and Von Neumann resolve this case.” Ante, at 8. These
cases, however, have little to say about what due process
requires when an innocent owner seeks to retain her car
pending an ultimate forfeiture determination in schemes
like those described above. Instead, the claimants in these
cases argued that the United States Customs Service took
too long to resolve forfeiture proceedings against property
seized at the border as part of the claimants’ own alleged
violations of customs law.
   In United States v. $8,850, 

 (1983), a
customs inspector seized $8,850 in cash from Mary Jose-
phine Vasquez, who had declared she was carrying less
than $5,000. Vasquez was charged with a felony and a mis-
demeanor, with the indictment seeking forfeiture of the
$8,850 as part of the misdemeanor charge. When a jury
ultimately convicted Vasquez of only the felony count,
which did not contain the forfeiture allegations, the Gov-
ernment finally filed civil forfeiture proceedings against the
cash. Vasquez argued only that the Government’s 18-
month delay in filing civil forfeiture proceedings was uncon-
stitutionally long. To evaluate her claim, the Court bor-
rowed the Barker v. Wingo multifactor test from the speedy-
——————
‘speedy trial’ test employed in United States v. $8,850, 

(1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 

 (1972), as held by the Eleventh
Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 

 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits”).
8                  CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

trial context and held that “the balance of factors indi-
cate[d] that the Government’s delay . . . was reasonable” in
the circumstances. 

; see 

 at 564 (citing
Barker v. Wingo, 

 (1972)). In so holding, the
Court emphasized that the Government had “diligent[ly]”
pursued the pending criminal proceedings against Vasquez.

. Because a conviction on the misdemeanor
count could have rendered civil forfeiture unnecessary, the
Government’s delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding
was understandable. 

   In United States v. Von Neumann, 

(1986), Von Neumann failed to declare a newly purchased
Jaguar Panther car to customs officials when he drove it
back to the United States. United States Customs seized
the car, and Von Neumann filed a petition for administra-
tive remission proceedings the same day. Two weeks later,
he posted a bond and regained possession of the car. Thirty-
six days after he filed his remission petition, Customs re-
solved it by reducing Von Neumann’s penalty for failure to
declare to $3,600.
   Von Neumann argued that the 36-day delay in respond-
ing to his administrative remission petition violated due
process. The Government responded that “due process con-
siderations do not govern the Secretary’s disposition of [ad-
ministrative] remission petitions.” 

. The Court
agreed with the Government. “Implicit in this Court’s dis-
cussion of timeliness in $8,850 was the view that the [regu-
lar civil] forfeiture proceeding, without more, provides the
postseizure hearing required by due process to protect Von
Neumann’s property interest in [his] car.” 

. The
administrative proceedings did not trigger a separate due
process right, the Court continued, because they were dis-
cretionary and “not necessary to a forfeiture determina-
tion.” 

.
   The Court then declined to address the argument that the
                      Cite as: 

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                       SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

remission statute “itself creates a property right which can-
not be taken away without due process.” 

 “[E]ven if
respondent had such a property right,” the Court explained,
“any due process requirement of timely disposition was
more than adequately provided here.” 

 The Court had
“already noted that his right to a forfeiture proceeding
meeting the Barker test satisfies any due process right with
respect to the car and the money.” 

. Von Neu-
mann had also failed to show “what prejudice [he] suffered
from the 36-day delay in the response” to his remission pe-
tition. 

.
   The majority takes Von Neumann’s imprecise categorical
language out of this vital context to hold that “a timely for-
feiture hearing ‘satisfies any due process right’ with respect
to a ‘car’ that has been seized for civil forfeiture.” Ante, at
8 (quoting Von Neumann, 

).2 In doing so,
it extends the holdings of both Von Neumann and $8,850 to
situations neither Court contemplated. In both, the Gov-
ernment sought to forfeit property tied to the claimants’ un-
lawful conduct. The claimants were not, and did not claim
to be, innocent owners of property used for criminal ends
without their knowledge. Unlike petitioners here, neither
the claimant in $8,850 nor the claimant in Von Neumann
had argued that a retention hearing was necessary to test
Customs’ justification for seizing their property at the out-
set. Instead, both argued only that the Government took
too long to resolve their proceedings: in $8,850 through a
statutory process, and in Von Neumann through a discre-
tionary administrative one. The majority’s reading here
improperly resolves a constitutional challenge that the
Court in those cases had no cause or reason to address.


——————
  2 Perhaps recognizing that it stretches the reasoning of the opinion, the

majority relies in a footnote on statements made at oral argument. See
ante, at 8, n. 2.
10                     CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                      SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

                               B
   With the sole exception of the Eleventh Circuit, every
court of appeals has rejected Von Neumann’s application to
state and county civil forfeiture schemes concerning claim-
ants’ cars.3 Indeed, this Court has distinguished Von Neu-
mann in contexts where officers have a financial incentive
to seize property and owners may assert innocence of the
underlying crime as a defense. In United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 

 (1993), for ex-
ample, this Court held that the Government must conduct
a predeprivation hearing before it seizes real property con-
nected to criminal conduct through civil forfeiture. Four
years after James Daniel Good pleaded guilty to state
charges based on drugs found in his home, the Federal Gov-
ernment filed civil forfeiture proceedings against his home.
Even though Good did not assert innocence, the Court em-
phasized that proceedings without a predeprivation hear-
ing created an unacceptable risk of error for property own-
ers asserting an “innocent owner” defense, because waiting
until the final forfeiture hearing “ ‘would not cure the tem-
porary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have pre-
vented.’ ” 

. Crucial to the Court’s reasoning was
the fact that “the Government has a direct pecuniary inter-
est in the outcome of the proceeding” when it is entitled to
forfeit the property. 

 at 55–56.
   This reasoning applies directly to due process challenges
where police seize the cars of innocent owners and use for-
feiture proceeds to fund department budgets. The narrow
holdings of $8,850 and Von Neumann should not determine
the due process claims of every claimant deprived of access
——————
  3 See Ingram v. Wayne Cty., 

, 616–617 (CA6 2023); Ser-

rano v. CBP, 

 (CA5 2020) (per curiam); Smith v. Chi-
cago, 

, 837–838 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v.
Smith, 

 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 

(CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.); cf. Booker v. St. Paul, 

 (CA8
2014) (declining to reference Von Neumann).
                  Cite as: 

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                    SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to her car by state prosecutors on untested grounds for
months or years.
                              III
   The majority’s categorical rule that due process never re-
quires a retention hearing also cannot be squared with the
context-specific analysis that this Court’s due process doc-
trine requires. “ ‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 

 (1961) (alteration in
original). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such proce-
dural protections as the particular situation demands.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 

 (1972).
   The Court granted this case to resolve which of two flexi-
ble due process tests should govern, not to resolve whether
due process ever requires a retention hearing in civil forfei-
ture schemes. That difference is important. An appropri-
ately context-specific due process test should not always
yield the same result when applied to different schemes. Of
the six Circuits that have applied the test from Mathews v.
Eldridge, 

 (1976), to various civil forfeiture
schemes, three have held that due process requires a reten-
tion hearing, Ingram, 

; Smith v. Chicago,

 (CA7 2008), vacated as moot, Alvarez v.
Smith, 

 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 

,
67–68 (CA2 2002) (Sotomayor, J.), and three have held that
it does not, Serrano v. CBP, 

, 500–502 (CA5
2020) (per curiam); Booker v. St. Paul, 

, 736–
737 (CA8 2014); United States v. One 1971 BMW, 

, 820–821 (CA9 1981). That result is consistent with the
flexible dictates of any due process test, which should take
into account all the component parts of an individual
scheme.
   For instance, petitioners had the right to post a bond to
12                 CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

get back their vehicles, the right to move for summary judg-
ment in the forfeiture proceeding itself, and the opportunity
to seek separate relief under the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure for an illegal seizure. The adequacy of those al-
ternative procedures was never briefed below because the
only question was which test should apply. By contrast, the
New York City scheme that the Second Circuit concluded
violated due process lacked all of those procedures. See
Krimstock, 

, 59–60. Differences in the ade-
quacy of available procedures can and should result in dif-
ferent due process outcomes.
   Instead of answering the question presented and then re-
manding to the lower court to apply the appropriate test,
the majority instead holds that due process never requires
a retention hearing. The majority acknowledges that “the
States and Congress have adopted a wide variety of ap-
proaches.” Ante, at 14. Yet it prescribes a categorical con-
stitutional rule for all of them. The Court today hamstrings
federal courts from conducting a context-specific analysis in
civil forfeiture schemes that are less generous than the one
here.
                               IV
   The majority’s holding relates only to retention hearings.
It does not foreclose other potential due process challenges
to civil forfeiture proceedings. See ante, at 8, n. 3. People
who have their property seized by police remain free to chal-
lenge other abuses in the civil forfeiture system. For in-
stance, such claimants could challenge notice of a forfeiture
posted only in a newspaper, the lack of a neutral adjudica-
tor at an initial hearing, or the standard of proof necessary
to seize a car. Lower courts remain free to apply Mathews
to those claims. See ante, at 9. Due process also still “re-
quires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing,” ante, at 5,
                      Cite as: 

 (2024)                       13

                        SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

so claimants may continue to challenge unreasonable de-
lays.4
  The abuses of many civil forfeiture systems are well doc-
umented. See, e.g., supra, at 3–6. I commend States or lo-
calities that have adopted retention hearings as a way of
guarding against those abuses. See, e.g., Brief for Legal Aid
Society as Amicus Curiae (detailing the benefits of New
York City’s prompt postseizure hearings). Other States and
localities should not view today’s decision as precluding
them from following suit and adopting similar measures.
                         *    *     *
   The majority today holds that due process never requires
the minimal check of a retention hearing before a police of-
ficer deprives an innocent owner of her car for months or
years. Given the diverse schemes adopted by States, some
with adequate safeguards and some without, the Court
should have just answered the question presented. Instead,
it announces a universal rule for all schemes without heed-
ing the dictates of this Court’s due process precedents that
require a scheme-specific analysis. Because I instead would
——————
  4 Courts applying the Barker factors to due process challenges of un-

reasonable delay should not apply a narrower version of that test than
the one this Court articulated in $8,850. The $8,850 Court emphasized
that Barker is a “flexible” test, and “none of [its] factors is a necessary or
sufficient condition for finding unreasonable delay.” United States v.
$8,850, 

, 564–565 (1983); see also Barker v. Wingo, 

 (1972) (“[T]hese factors have no talismanic qualities; courts
must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process”). The
factors are merely “guides in balancing the interests of the claimant and
the Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of
fairness has been satisfied in a particular case.” $8,850, 

. In the civil forfeiture context, “the balance of the interests, which
depends so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ
from a situation involving the right to a speedy trial.” Ibid., n. 14. Rec-
ognizing that the Barker and Mathews balancing tests have similar aims
and factors, the Government notes that the tests are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, at 20–
22.
14                 CULLEY v. MARSHALL

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

have answered the question presented and left lower courts
the flexibility to apply the appropriate test in these myriad
circumstances, I respectfully dissent.