(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                        GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

     CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
                       OKLAHOMA

  No. 22–7466.       Argued October 9, 2024—Decided February 25, 2025
In 1997, Justin Sneed beat Barry Van Treese to death with a baseball
  bat at an Oklahoma hotel owned by Van Treese and managed by peti-
  tioner Richard Glossip. Glossip initially made inconsistent statements
  to the police about Sneed’s role in the murder, but he ultimately told
  police that Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese. Sneed later claimed
  Glossip had asked him to murder Van Treese because, among other
  things, Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese’s money. Glossip main-
  tained his innocence and refused a plea deal that would have had him
  avoid the death penalty in return for testifying against Sneed. Sneed
  then testified against Glossip at trial in exchange for avoiding the
  death penalty, and Sneed’s testimony was the only direct evidence con-
  necting Glossip to the murder. The jury convicted Glossip and sen-
  tenced him to death. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
  (OCCA) overturned that conviction because the defense had been inef-
  fective in challenging Sneed’s testimony and the remainder of the evi-
  dence only weakly corroborated Sneed’s account. At the retrial, Sneed
  provided inconsistent testimony on potential motives for Glossip’s
  murder. Sneed also denied that he had been prescribed lithium or seen
  a psychiatrist. After the defense established (through the State’s med-
  ical examiner) that Van Treese had been attacked with a knife as well
  as a bat, Sneed testified that he had repeatedly tried to stab Van
  Treese in the chest with a pocket knife. But Sneed had previously de-
  nied stabbing Van Treese both when questioned by the police as well
  as at Glossip’s first trial. Glossip moved for a mistrial based on the
  prosecution’s failure to notify the defense about Sneed’s change in tes-
  timony, which the trial court denied after the prosecution disclaimed
  any knowledge about the change. Glossip was again convicted and
  sentenced to death, and a closely divided OCCA affirmed, holding that
2                         GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                                   Syllabus

    circumstantial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the hotel,
    combined with Glossip’s concession that he had been dishonest in his
    initial statements after the murder, sufficiently corroborated Sneed’s
    testimony that he killed Van Treese at Glossip’s direction.
       Glossip subsequently filed several unsuccessful habeas petitions.
    Concerns over the integrity of his conviction led a bipartisan group of
    Oklahoma legislators to commission an independent investigation by
    a law firm, Reed Smith. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported “grave
    doubt” about Glossip’s conviction, citing factors such as the prosecu-
    tion’s deliberate destruction of key evidence and the false portrayal of
    Justin Sneed as a non-violent “puppet.” The State then disclosed seven
    boxes of previously withheld documents, including letters suggesting
    Sneed had considered recanting and a note from prosecutor Connie
    Smothermon to Sneed’s lawyer noting they should “get to” Sneed to
    discuss his problematic testimony about a knife found in Van Treese’s
    room. Glossip filed for post-conviction relief based on this evidence and
    evidence revealed by Reed Smith. Glossip also argued that, during his
    second trial, Smothermon had interfered with Sneed’s testimony about
    the knife in violation of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits wit-
    nesses from hearing each other’s testimony. Oklahoma waived any
    procedural defenses to Glossip’s claims, and asked the OCCA to deny
    the claims on their merits. The OCCA denied Glossip’s claims as pro-
    cedurally barred and meritless.
       The State then discovered additional documents revealing that
    Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lith-
    ium, contradicting his trial testimony. The attorney general deter-
    mined that Smothermon had knowingly elicited false testimony from
    Sneed and failed to correct it, violating Napue v. Illinois, 

,
    which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct
    false testimony. Glossip filed a successive petition for post-conviction
    relief, which the attorney general supported, conceding multiple errors
    that warranted a new trial. The OCCA denied the unopposed petition
    without a hearing, holding that Glossip’s claims were procedurally
    barred under Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), and
    further that the State’s concession was not “based in law or fact” be-
    cause it did not create a Napue error. This Court stayed Glossip’s ex-
    ecution and granted certiorari.
Held:
    1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment. The
 independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes the Court
 from considering a federal question if the state court’s decision rests
 on an independent and adequate state law ground. OCCA’s applica-
 tion of the PCPA was not such a ground, because the OCCA’s decision
 to apply the PCPA depended on its antecedent rejection of the attorney
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                              Syllabus

general’s confession of a Napue error, which was based solely on fed-
eral law. The OCCA held that the confession could not overcome the
PCPA’s limitations because it lacked a basis in law or fact, specifically
finding no Napue error.
   Oklahoma precedent confirms that the OCCA normally rejects an
attorney general’s confession of error only after finding it unsupported
by law and the record. By making the application of the PCPA contin-
gent on its determination that the attorney general’s confession of fed-
eral constitutional error was baseless, the OCCA made the procedural
bar dependent on an antecedent ruling on federal law. To the extent
that the OCCA’s reasoning on this point is insufficiently “clear from
the face of the opinion,” the Court presumes reliance on federal law
under Michigan v. Long, 

, 1040–1041.
   2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct
false testimony.
      (a) Under Napue, a conviction obtained through the knowing use
of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that
the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false testimony to go
uncorrected. If a violation is established, a new trial is warranted if
the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected
the jury’s judgment; meaning, ordinarily, that the prosecution must
establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Bagley, 

; Chapman v. California, 

. Here, Oklahoma’s attorney general joins Glossip in asserting a
Napue error, conceding that Sneed’s testimony about his lithium pre-
scription was false and that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct
it. The record supports that confession of error. Evidence showed that
Sneed was prescribed lithium to treat bipolar disorder, not after ask-
ing for cold medicine as he claimed at trial. The evidence likewise es-
tablishes that the prosecution knew Sneed’s testimony was false. The
prosecution almost certainly had access to Sneed’s medical file through
Sneed’s competency evaluation. And Smothermon’s notes show that
she had a pre-trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned
“lithium” and “Dr. Trumpet.” The straightforward inference is that
Smothermon was aware before trial that Sneed had received his lith-
ium prescription from Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist and the sole medi-
cal professional at the Oklahoma County jail authorized to prescribe
lithium.
   Because Sneed’s testimony was the only direct evidence of Glossip’s
guilt, the jury’s assessment of Sneed’s credibility was material and
necessarily determinative. Correcting Sneed’s lie would have under-
mined his credibility and revealed his willingness to lie under oath.
The false testimony also bore on Glossip’s guilt because evidence of
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                                   Syllabus

    Sneed’s bipolar disorder, which could trigger impulsive violence when
    combined with his drug use, would have contradicted the prosecution’s
    portrayal of Sneed as harmless without Glossip’s influence. Hence
    there is a reasonable likelihood that correcting Sneed’s testimony
    would have affected the judgment of the jury. Napue, 

.
    Additional prosecutorial misconduct, such as violating the rule of se-
    questration, destroying evidence, and withholding witness statements,
    further undermines confidence in the verdict. Consequently, the pros-
    ecution’s failure to correct Sneed’s false testimony entitles Glossip to a
    new trial under Napue.
          (b) The OCCA’s contrary holding rests on a mistaken interpreta-
    tion of Napue. The OCCA held that there was no violation because the
    defense was aware or should have been aware that Sneed was taking
    lithium. But Sneed’s false testimony concerned the reasons for his pre-
    scription, not merely the fact that he had taken lithium. Moreover, the
    Due Process Clause imposes the duty to correct false testimony on the
    State, not the defense. The OCCA’s holding that Sneed was likely in
    denial of his mental health disorders is beside the point; what matters
    is that the testimony was false and the prosecutor knowingly allowed
    it to stand.
       Additional arguments in support of the OCCA’s position are unper-
    suasive. Napue does not require that the false testimony itself must
    have directly affected the trial’s outcome; Napue requires assessing
    whether the prosecutor’s failure to correct the testimony could have
    contributed to the verdict. Also unpersuasive are arguments based on
    extra-record materials and insufficient time spent interviewing the
    prosecutor.
       Because the attorney general’s confession of error is supported by
    ample evidence, the Court declines to remand this case for further ev-
    identiary proceedings. When the Court has jurisdiction, a new trial is
    the appropriate remedy for a violation of Napue.

, reversed and remanded.

   SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and in which
BARRETT, J., joined as to Part II. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which ALITO, J., joined, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Parts IV–
A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. GORSUCH, J., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–7466
                                   _________________


    RICHARD EUGENE GLOSSIP, PETITIONER v.
                OKLAHOMA
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
                 APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
                              [February 25, 2025]

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
  An Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Richard Glossip
of paying Justin Sneed to murder Barry Van Treese and
sentenced him to death. At trial, Sneed admitted he beat
Van Treese to death, but testified that Glossip had offered
him thousands of dollars to do so. Glossip confessed he
helped Sneed conceal his crime after the fact, but he denied
any involvement in the murder.
  Nearly two decades later, the State disclosed eight boxes
of previously withheld documents from Glossip’s trial.
These documents show that Sneed suffered from bipolar
disorder, which, combined with his known drug use, could
have caused impulsive outbursts of violence. They also es-
tablished, the State agrees, that a jail psychiatrist pre-
scribed Sneed lithium to treat that condition, and that the
prosecution allowed Sneed falsely to testify at trial that he
had never seen a psychiatrist. Faced with that evidence,
Oklahoma’s attorney general confessed error. Before the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the State
conceded that the prosecution’s failure to correct Sneed’s
testimony violated Napue v. Illinois, 

 (1959),
2                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     Opinion of the Court

which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obliga-
tion to correct false testimony. The attorney general ac-
cordingly asked the court to grant Glossip a new trial. The
OCCA declined to grant relief because, it held, the State’s
concession was not “based in law or fact.” 

,
¶25, 

. Because the prosecution violated
its obligations under Napue, we reverse the judgment below
and remand the case for a new trial.
                              I
                              A
  Barry Van Treese owned a Best Budget Inn in Tulsa and
in Oklahoma City. Richard Glossip managed the Oklahoma
City hotel and lived there with his girlfriend. In the sum-
mer of 1996, Justin Sneed and his stepbrother approached
Glossip and asked him about working for a room. 

. Glossip agreed to let them stay in return for help with
maintenance and housekeeping. Sneed, however, had a
history of violence, angry outbursts, and substance abuse
that included marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and
acid. Id., at 700–701. When, on January 6, 1997, Van
Treese visited the inn to collect cash deposits there, Sneed
beat him to death with a baseball bat. See 

,
¶¶4–5, 

, 147–148 (Glossip II ).
  After killing Van Treese, Sneed evaded law enforcement
for several days. Police did promptly interview Glossip,
who told them that Sneed had knocked on his door that
night with a bump on his head “like somebody punched
him.” App. to Response to Petitioner’s Succ. Application for
Post-Conviction Relief in No. PCD–2022–819, Tr. of Glossip
Police Interview 15 (Jan. 8, 1997). Glossip added that
Sneed had told him he slipped in the shower. 

 Glossip
disclaimed any knowledge of Van Treese’s murder, but ad-
mitted that he helped Sneed replace (from the outside) the
broken window of the room where Van Treese’s body was
later found. The next day, officers arrested Glossip in front
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                     Opinion of the Court

of an attorney’s office with approximately $1,700 in cash on
him. 1 App. 291–292. Glossip then admitted Sneed had
told him “that he killed Barry.” Tr. of Glossip Police Inter-
view 10 (Jan. 9, 1997). When confronted with his prior in-
consistent statements about the murder and Van Treese’s
whereabouts, Glossip said that he had been scared to tell
the truth because he feared his failure to notify the police
immediately meant he was “already involved in it.” Id., at
29–30.
   The State thereafter charged Sneed with capital murder
and Glossip as an accessory after the fact based on his in-
accurate statements to the police. Eventually, police lo-
cated and interviewed Sneed, who had $1,680 in bloody
cash on him. See 14 Tr. 18 (May 28, 2004); 15 Tr. 170 (June
1, 2004). The officers told Sneed that before he “ma[de] up
[his] mind on anything” they wanted him “to hear some of
the things” they “[had] to say,” including that they did not
think Sneed had acted alone and that he should not “take
the whole thing” himself. 2 App. 645–646. “[E]verybody”
was making Sneed “the scapegoat in this,” they told him—
especially Glossip, who was “putting it on [him] the worst.”
Id., at 655.
   Sneed initially responded to the officers’ prompts by at-
tempting to implicate his brother, ibid., but eventually said
that Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese’s money and
that Van Treese’s death had been the result of a robbery
gone wrong. Id., at 655–660. Sneed described breaking into
Van Treese’s room and beating him with a baseball bat un-
til he “figured he was knocked out.” Id., at 665. According
to Sneed, he then took Van Treese’s car keys, stole an enve-
lope with approximately $4,000 in cash from his car, and
split the money with Glossip. Id., at 665–669. When offic-
ers pressed him on the state of Van Treese’s body, Sneed
asserted that, “[a]ctually,” Glossip had asked him to kill
Van Treese so that he “could run the motel without him be-
ing the boss.” Id., at 675.
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                      Opinion of the Court

   Following Sneed’s interview, Oklahoma charged Glossip,
too, with capital murder. The prosecution offered Glossip a
deal: plead guilty and avoid the death sentence in return
for testifying against Sneed. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 22–6500, p. 144a. When Glossip refused, maintaining
his innocence, the State offered Sneed the same deal, and
Sneed accepted. 

, 

(Glossip I ). Sneed then testified at Glossip’s trial that he
beat Van Treese to death “because [Glossip] asked him to
do it.” 

 When asked whether there was “any particular
reason why Glossip wanted to kill [Van Treese] that night,”
Sneed replied, “Not that I know of. Every time that Mr.
Van Treese showed up, [Glossip] was wanting me to kill
him.” 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998). In closing, the prosecution
argued that Glossip had asked Sneed to kill Van Treese be-
cause he believed Van Treese planned to fire him for em-
bezzling hotel profits. 8 Tr. 14–15 (June 10, 1998). The jury
convicted Glossip and sentenced him to death.
   The OCCA unanimously reversed. Sneed’s testimony
was the only direct evidence connecting Glossip to the mur-
der, it held, and “[t]he evidence at trial tending to corrobo-
rate Sneed’s testimony was extremely weak.” Glossip I, 

. Defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine
Sneed on his many inconsistent statements was therefore
“so ineffective” as to undermine any “confidence that a reli-
able adversarial proceeding took place.” 

   In 2004, after Glossip rejected another plea offer, 

, the State tried him a second time. Several witnesses
confirmed what Glossip had told the police in his second in-
terview: In the hours following Van Treese’s killing, Glossip
feigned ignorance and lied about Van Treese’s whereabouts.
As in the first trial, however, only one witness, Justin
Sneed, testified that Glossip was involved in anything
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                          Opinion of the Court

more. 1
  This time, moreover, the defense established (through
the State’s medical examiner) that Van Treese had been at-
tacked with a knife as well as with a baseball bat. 1 id., at
240–245. Although Sneed had denied stabbing Van Treese
to the police and at Glossip’s first trial, he now said that he
had repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a
pocket knife. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 148–149. Because
the prosecution had not notified the defense about this
change in testimony, Glossip moved for a mistrial. 12 Tr.
105 (May 26, 2004). The trial court denied that motion after
the prosecution attested that the change was news to them,
too. Id., at 107–108 (“The chest thing we’re all hearing at
the same time”).
  The prosecution also asked Sneed whether anyone had
prescribed him any medication:
     “Q. After you were arrested, were you placed on any
     type of prescription medication?
     “A. When I was arrested I asked for some Sudafed be-
     cause I had a cold, but then shortly after that somehow
——————
   1 The dissent’s narrative, which presents as historical fact the testi-

mony of the prosecution’s witnesses at Glossip’s second trial, relies heav-
ily on Sneed’s testimony to suggest that Glossip directed the crime and
an elaborate coverup. See post, at 1–6 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). To the
extent the dissent relies on witnesses other than Sneed, their testimony
confirms no more than what Glossip himself admitted to the police. As
for Sneed’s testimony, the dissent constructs its favored narrative from
among his multiple inconsistent accounts of the murder. See supra, at
3–5; compare post, at 2 (dissent asserting that “Sneed left [Van Treese’s
room] when he thought that he had killed Van Treese”), with 

(Sneed telling police he left Van Treese’s room when he thought Van
Treese was “knocked out”); compare post, at 2 (dissent asserting Glossip
told Sneed “they would both be evicted if Glossip lost his job”), with 2
App. 655–665 (Sneed telling police that Van Treese’s death was the acci-
dental result of a robbery gone wrong), 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998) (Sneed
testifying that he did not know why Glossip wanted him to kill Van
Treese), and 12 Tr. 75 (May 26, 2004) (Sneed testifying that Glossip had
wanted to rob Van Treese).
6                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

    they ended up giving me Lithium for some reason, I
    don’t know why. I never seen no psychiatrist or any-
    thing.
    “Q. So you don’t know why they gave you that?
    “A. No.” Id., at 64.
Sneed then confirmed that he used illegal drugs including
marijuana and “crank” (methamphetamine) “twice a week”
prior to his arrest. Id., at 64–65. Finally, Sneed testified
about Glossip’s purported motives for killing Van Treese.
He asserted that Glossip had suggested “robbing Barry of
his money,” id., at 75, that he had “told [Sneed] at one point
that with Mr. Van Treese out of the way . . . he would be
able not only [to] manage the motel on Council but also an-
other one they had [in Tulsa],” id., at 89, and that he had
worried he “was going to get fired” because “a couple of the
rooms that were already supposed to be remodeled . . .
weren’t,” id., at 95.
   The prosecution weaved these suggestions into its closing
argument along with its original theory that Glossip had
wanted Van Treese dead to avoid being fired for embezzle-
ment. See 15 Tr. 65 (June 1, 2004) (arguing Glossip’s mo-
tive was “a big wad of around 4,000 bucks of American good
Yankee dollars to split with the kid”); id., at 153, 163 (argu-
ing Glossip was going to be fired because of “missing
money”); id., at 164–165 (arguing Glossip was going to be
fired because of the condition of the rooms). It then argued
that Sneed, “satisfied and contented with [his] humble life,”
id., at 68, had no propensity to violence except at Glossip’s
direction:
    “[I]t’s as if Justin Sneed was a Rottweiler puppy, let’s
    say 11 months old, and Richard Glossip was the dog
    trainer. You can sure sick a dog on somebody, but if
    you’re going to do that and you send a dog that’s not
    trained or is a little bit too young, he might trip and
    fall, he might get scared and run away, he might do
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                      Opinion of the Court

    something stupid, he might not do a good job. But no
    matter how you slice it, no matter how you parse it, the
    person that says ‘sick’ em’ is the person that makes the
    decision.” Id., at 73.
  The jury again convicted Glossip of capital murder and
again sentenced him to death.
  A closely divided OCCA affirmed, holding that circum-
stantial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the
hotel, combined with the concession that Glossip had been
dishonest in his initial statements after the murder, suffi-
ciently corroborated Sneed’s testimony that he killed Van
Treese at Glossip’s direction. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 151–
153. In dissent, Judge Chapel and Judge A. Johnson ar-
gued that the majority “overstate[d] the strength of the ac-
complice corroboration evidence.” Id., at 164–165, 175.
                               B
   Glossip continued to maintain his innocence in the years
after his conviction, filing several habeas petitions in state
and federal court. Although that litigation did not result in
relief, mounting concerns over the integrity of Glossip’s con-
viction drew the attention of the Oklahoma Legislature. A
bipartisan group of 62 Oklahoma legislators retained a law
firm, Reed Smith, to conduct an independent investigation
into the case. Pet. for Cert. 12; App. to Pet. for Cert. 390a–
391a. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported its “grave doubt
as to the integrity of Glossip’s murder conviction and death
sentence.” Independent Investigation of State v. Richard E.
Glossip 6 (June 7, 2022). Among other things, Reed Smith
concluded the prosecution had deliberately destroyed “key
physical evidence” before Glossip’s retrial, including sev-
eral items from the crime scene and the inn’s receipts and
deposit books, which could have helped Glossip address the
accusations of embezzlement. Id., at 7, 9, n. 25, 34, 48.
Reed Smith further concluded that the State had “falsely
8                       GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                           Opinion of the Court

portrayed Sneed at trial as a meek and non-violent ‘pup-
pet,’ ” id., at 10, and that key testimony about Glossip’s mo-
tive and actions on the morning after the murder had been
provided by a former police officer of “ ‘very limited honesty
and integrity’ ” who was jailed for making false statements
shortly after Glossip’s second trial, id., at 6–12.
    Two months after Reed Smith’s report, the State dis-
closed seven boxes of previously withheld documents from
Glossip’s trials. Those boxes contained a note the head
prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, sent to Sneed’s lawyer be-
fore Sneed testified at the second trial. Smothermon’s note
concerned “a few items that have been testified to that I
needed to discuss with Justin,” including the “biggest prob-
lem,” which (the note said) was “still the knife.” 

.
The examiners’ testimony about the knife was problematic,
Smothermon’s note explained, because “Justin [told] the po-
lice that the knife fell out of his pocket and that he didn’t
stab the victim with it,” yet the victim had “ ‘lacerations’ ”
consistent with the “knife blade.” Ibid. It did not “make
much sense” to Smothermon, moreover, “that Justin could
have control of the bat and a knife” on his own. Ibid. “[W]e
should get to him this afternoon,” the note concluded. Ibid.
    The boxes further contained letters from Sneed to his at-
torney suggesting he had expressed a desire to recant his
testimony prior to Glossip’s second trial. See id., at 811–
816. For example, in a letter dated May 15, 2003, Sneed
wrote to his attorney asking “ ‘do I have the choice of recant-
ing my testimony at any time during my life,’ ” and is “ ‘there
. . . anything you know, on [Glossip’s] court date and about
re-canting.’ ” Id., at 815; App. to Pet. for Cert. in Glossip v.
Oklahoma, No. 22–6500, at 192a. 2
——————
  2 The dissent claims Sneed thought the phrase “ ‘recan[t] my testi-

mony’ ” meant “ ‘refuse to testify,’ ” post, at 10, n. 2, meaning (on the dis-
sent’s view) Sneed asked his lawyer: “If I [testify] again, do I have the
choice of [refusing to testify] at any time during my life?” The dissent
further points to an interview Sneed gave decades later, where (with
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                           Opinion of the Court

   Based on this new evidence and the evidence revealed by
Reed Smith, Glossip filed another motion for post-
conviction relief with the OCCA. Among other things, Glos-
sip argued that, during his second trial, Smothermon had
interfered with Sneed’s testimony about the knife in viola-
tion of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits witnesses
from hearing each other’s testimony. 3 App. 785–882. Ok-
lahoma responded that Glossip’s claims were meritless, but
that it would nonetheless waive any procedural defenses in
order to mitigate the damage from a “media campaign” on
Glossip’s behalf. Id., at 717–718. Oklahoma further asked
the OCCA to deny Glossip’s claims on their merits so as “to
trigger the state court deference anticipated in [the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]” in any future fed-
eral review. Id., at 718, n. 7. Noting that it alone would
“determine whether the rules of this Court should be aban-
doned,” the OCCA held that Glossip’s claims were procedur-
ally barred as well as meritless. Id., at 775–783.
   Shortly thereafter, the State “unearthed disturbing reve-
lations about the contents of ” an eighth box of trial docu-
ments “consisting of material it previously prevented the
defense from obtaining.” Brief for Respondent 10. “Buried
inside Box 8,” the State says, “was a page of notes hand-
written by Smothermon during a pretrial interview with
Sneed,” indicating “that Sneed had told Smothermon that
he was ‘on lithium’ not by mistake, but in connection with
a ‘Dr. Trumpet.’ ” Ibid. Oklahoma’s attorney general “de-
duced the import of these notes in short order”: Only a sin-
gle psychiatrist worked in the Oklahoma County jail when
Sneed was held there, and his name was Dr. Larry
Trombka. Ibid.; see also 

. A summary of Sneed’s
medical records (previously withheld from Glossip’s counsel

——————
Glossip’s execution imminent) he denied ever “ ‘want[ing] to change the
truth.’ ” Ibid. Of course, Sneed’s much later denials do not erase his prior
statements about recanting.
10                     GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          Opinion of the Court

after motion practice seeking their discovery) showed that
Sneed had received lithium to treat his undisclosed bipolar
disorder. Brief for Respondent 10; 

. After this
discovery, Dr. Trombka signed an affidavit attesting that
he was the only medical professional at the jail who would
have prescribed Sneed lithium. Id., at 1003.
  The attorney general accordingly determined that Sneed
“was not in fact mis-prescribed lithium, but rather diag-
nosed with bipolar disorder and treated with lithium under
the care of a psychiatrist”—and “despite her knowledge of
these facts,” Smothermon “elicited false testimony from
Sneed” on that subject. Brief for Respondent 11. 3
  The attorney general thereafter disclosed Box 8 to Glos-
sip and retained an independent counsel to conduct another
review of Glossip’s conviction. As relevant here, the inde-
pendent counsel concluded that Smothermon’s attempt to
interfere with Sneed’s testimony about the knife violated
the rule of sequestration, that her failure to turn over
Sneed’s statements about his mental health treatment vio-
lated Brady v. Maryland, 

 (1963), and that her
failure to correct Sneed’s false trial testimony that he had
been given lithium after asking for cold medicine violated
Napue, 

. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, 58a. His
report concluded:
     “[T]he State must vacate Glossip’s conviction due to its
     decades-long failure to disclose what I believe is Brady

——————
   3 Also included in Box 8 were prosecutors’ witness interview notes sug-

gesting the State may have omitted certain details from the summaries
it turned over to the defense. For example, one witness apparently told
the prosecution that Glossip had sold him a big screen TV and a couch
for $900, 3 App. 952—a sum that would account for much of the cash
Glossip had on his person at his arrest. That same witness testified at
trial that he did not know how much money Glossip had received for
those sales. 1 

. Glossip’s girlfriend later explained in a post-
trial affidavit that Glossip had been selling their possessions to pay for
an attorney. 2 id., at 703.
                     Cite as: 

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                          Opinion of the Court

     material, correct what I believe was false trial testi-
     mony of its star witness, and what I believe was a vio-
     lation of the Court ordered Rule of Sequestration of wit-
     nesses. . . . In my view, this case is also permeated by
     failures to secure, safeguard, and maintain evidence in
     a capital murder case.” Id., at 62a.
  Following the Box 8 disclosure and the independent coun-
sel’s recommendation, Glossip filed a successive petition for
post-conviction relief with the OCCA asserting Brady, Na-
pue, cumulative error, and actual innocence claims. 4 The
attorney general filed a “Response in Support of Petitioner’s
Successive Application for Post-Conviction Relief.” 

. Although the attorney general did not endorse Glos-
sip’s actual innocence claim, he represented that his office
had “concluded that Justin Sneed . . . made material mis-
statements to the jury regarding his psychiatric treatment
and the reasons for his lithium prescription,” which the
State had failed to correct in violation of Napue. 

.
In addition, the State indicated it was “concerned that there
were multiple and cumulative errors, such as violation of
the rule of sequestration and destruction of evidence, that
when taken together with Sneed’s misstatements warrant”
a new trial. Ibid.; see also id., at 977 (“[T]he State believes
Glossip is entitled to post-conviction relief ”); id., at 978
(State is “compelled, consistent with Napue,” to correct mis-
statements); id., at 979 (“[T]he State requests that the
Court vacate Glossip’s conviction and that the case be re-
manded to the district court”). Because Oklahoma agreed
with Glossip on the pertinent facts, it did not request an
evidentiary hearing.
——————
  4 The dissent faults Glossip for “ignor[ing] the lithium issue on direct

appeal” years earlier. Post, at 7–8. Glossip had no reason to know at the
time of his direct appeal that Smothermon knowingly failed to correct
Sneed’s false testimony about why he had been given lithium, however,
so he would have had no occasion to raise his Napue or Brady claims
then.
12                   GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                       Opinion of the Court

  The OCCA denied Glossip’s unopposed petition without a
hearing. It acknowledged the attorney general’s request
that Glossip’s conviction be vacated, noting that this con-
cession alone could not “directly” provide a ground for relief.

. The court said the following about the
State’s confession of Napue error:
     “Glossip claims that the State failed to disclose evi-
     dence of Justin Sneed’s mental health treatment and
     that Sneed lied about his mental health treatment to
     the jury. Though the State in its response now con-
     cedes that this alleged false testimony combined with
     other unspecified cumulative errors warrant post-
     conviction relief, the concession alone cannot overcome
     the limitations on successive post-conviction review.
     See 22 O.S. Supp. 2022, §1089(D)(8). The State’s con-
     cession is not based in law or fact.” 

     (footnote omitted).
The OCCA then applied Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Pro-
cedures Act (PCPA) to hold that Glossip’s claims were pro-
cedurally barred. It concluded separately that the evidence
presented by the parties did not “create a Napue error.”

 (footnote omitted).
   This Court thereafter stayed Glossip’s execution at the
joint request of the parties and granted certiorari to con-
sider Glossip’s Brady and Napue claims and the effect of the
attorney general’s confession of error. 5 

 (2024).
The Court also requested argument on an additional ques-
tion: whether the OCCA’s holding that the PCPA precluded
post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-
law ground for the judgment.
   Because Oklahoma agrees with Glossip on the merits of
his appeal, the Court appointed Christopher Michel as ami-
cus curiae to defend the judgment below. 

——————
  5 Because the Court grants relief under Napue, the Court need not

reach the merits of Glossip’s Brady claim.
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

(2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
                               II
                               A
   We begin with this Court’s jurisdiction to review the
OCCA’s judgment. “ ‘This Court will not take up a question
of federal law presented in a case “if the decision of [the
state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent
of the federal question and adequate to support the judg-
ment.” ’ ” Cruz v. Arizona, 

 (2023) (quoting
Lee v. Kemna, 

 (2002)). “In the context of
direct review of a state court judgment, the independent
and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional.” Cole-
man v. Thompson, 

 (1991). A state
ground of decision is independent only when it does not de-
pend on a federal holding, Foster v. Chatman, 

 (2016), and also is not intertwined with questions of
federal law, Michigan v. Long, 

, 1040–1041
(1983). “[W]hen the adequacy and independence of any pos-
sible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opin-
ion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so.” 

   Amicus argues this Court lacks jurisdiction because the
OCCA held that Glossip’s claims were barred under the
PCPA, and the PCPA is “a paradigmatic independent and
adequate state-law ground.” Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae 13. That argument fails because it over-
looks an antecedent holding that turned on federal law.
The OCCA first rejected the attorney general’s confession
of Napue error, deeming it meritless and therefore incapa-
ble of “overcom[ing]” application of the PCPA. 

. Only then did it apply the PCPA to Glossip. Because
the OCCA’s decision to reject the attorney general’s confes-
sion of error rested exclusively on federal law, so too did its
subsequent decision to apply the PCPA.
14                     GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          Opinion of the Court

   In his brief to the OCCA, the attorney general disclaimed
reliance on any procedural defenses, including the PCPA.
Instead, the attorney general “concede[d] error under Na-
pue,” 

, acknowledging that, as a matter of federal
law, the prosecution’s knowing failure to correct Sneed’s
“material misstatements” entitled Glossip to a new trial.
Id., at 977, 978, 979. The OCCA held that this confession
of Napue error could not “overcome the [PCPA’s] limitations
on successive post-conviction review” because it was “not
based in law or fact.” 

. Specifically, the
OCCA concluded that the underlying evidence “d[id] not
create a Napue error.” 

 (footnote omitted). Thus, the
OCCA’s application of the PCPA over the attorney general’s
confession of error depended on its determination that no
Napue violation had occurred. That was a federal holding,
and it was the only reason the OCCA provided for its con-
clusion that the attorney general’s confession could not
“overcome” the PCPA. 

 The PCPA therefore poses no
impediment to our review in this case.
   Oklahoma precedent involving confessions of error by an
attorney general confirms this reading. As the OCCA has
repeatedly explained, it will normally reject an attorney
general’s confession of error only after finding that it lacks
a basis in the law and in the record. See, e.g., Bindrum v.
State, 

, 

 (1924) (“Where the
Attorney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine
the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and
is well founded in law, the conviction will be reversed” (syl-
labus by the court)). 6 Otherwise, if the confession of error
——————
   6 See also Raymer v. State, 

, 

 (1924)

(“Where the Attorney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine
the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby and is well founded
in law, the conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Dorsett
v. State, 

, 

 (1919) (reversing convic-
tion because “the confession of error [of the attorney general] is well
founded” in law); Whittemore v. State, 

, 

                      Cite as: 

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                          Opinion of the Court

is supported by the law and the record, the OCCA will re-
verse the underlying conviction and remand for a new
trial. 7 Ibid. The OCCA applied that same rule here: It re-
jected the attorney general’s confession of error as having
no basis “in law or fact,” and explained that it would there-
fore apply the PCPA. 

.
   In doing so, the OCCA “made application of the proce-
dural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law,
that is, on the determination of whether federal constitu-
tional error ha[d] been committed.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 

 (1985). After all, it made application of the
PCPA contingent on its determination that the attorney
general’s confession of federal constitutional error had no
basis in law or fact. To the extent that the OCCA’s reason-
ing on this point is insufficiently “clear from the face of the
opinion,” we nonetheless presume reliance on federal law
under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S., at 1040–1041. This
Court therefore has jurisdiction to review the judgment be-
low.
                            B
  The dissent dismisses all this as an “invent[ed] . . . fed-
eral holding that the OCCA never made.” Post, at 18. As
the dissent sees it, the OCCA rejected the attorney gen-
eral’s confession of error because (the dissent says) the

——————
(1924) (same); Day v. State, 

 (OCCA 1960) (“Where the At-
torney General confesses error, Court of Criminal Appeals will examine
the record, and, if confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in
law, conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Casey v. State,

 (OCCA 1968) (“When the Attorney General confesses
error, this Court will carefully examine the record for fundamental er-
ror”); McConnell v. State, 

 (OCCA 1971) (similar); One
Ford Touring Car v. State, 

, 

 (1924)
(establishing identical rule in civil forfeiture context).
  7 The PCPA would not stand in the way of a reversal under this rule

because it is not a jurisdictional bar. See Valdez v. State, 

, ¶¶24–28, 

.
16                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

State failed adequately to address all of the PCPA’s proce-
dural requirements. See post, at 19. The OCCA plainly
held that the attorney general’s confession was “not based
in law or fact,” 

, however, forcing the dis-
sent to provide an awkward explanation that this holding
about a federal confession of error on the merits was only
about the PCPA’s state-law, procedural requirements.
Post, at 19. Yet the State expressly attempted to waive
those procedural requirements by arguing that Glossip was
entitled to a new trial. 

 (“[T]he State requests
that the Court vacate Glossip’s conviction and that the case
be remanded to the district court”). So to explain away the
“based in law or fact” language, the dissent must proceed
on the assumption that Oklahoma law requires applicants
to satisfy the PCPA’s nonjurisdictional provisions even
when the State waives them and even if the State’s confes-
sion of constitutional error is otherwise meritorious—not-
withstanding the many other contexts where the OCCA
privileges meritorious confessions of error. See n. 6, supra
(collecting cases); App. to Brief for National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 1a–21a (cata-
loging the OCCA’s decisions in the 298 confession-of-error
cases predating Glossip’s, all of which resulted in relief ).
  That assumption is hardly “clear from the face of the
opinion” below. Long, 

. Thus, we must
“accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so.” 

                             III
                              A
  Turning to the merits, we conclude that the prosecution
violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testi-
mony.
  In Napue v. Illinois, this Court held that a conviction
knowingly “obtained through use of false evidence” violates
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant
must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false
testimony or knowingly allowed it “to go uncorrected when
it appear[ed].” 

 If the defendant makes that showing,
a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony “may
have had an effect on the outcome of the trial,” 

 at 272—
that is, if it “ ‘in any reasonable likelihood [could] have af-
fected the judgment of the jury,’ ” Giglio v. United States,

 (1972) (quoting Napue, 

).
In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ‘ “the benefi-
ciary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” United States v. Bagley, 

 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California,

 (1967)).
   Here, Oklahoma’s attorney general joins Glossip in as-
serting a Napue error, conceding both that Sneed’s testi-
mony was false and that the prosecution knowingly failed
to correct it. The record supports that confession of error.
A summary of Sneed’s medical records created by the local
sheriff ’s department establishes that someone diagnosed
Sneed with bipolar disorder and prescribed him lithium. 

. Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist, attested in a sworn
affidavit that he was the only medical professional at the
Oklahoma County jail who would have issued Sneed that
prescription. Id., at 930–931. Dr. Trombka also confirmed,
and nobody contests, that lithium is used only in psychiat-
ric treatments and not for dental pain (as Sneed said at a
pretrial hearing) or a cold (as Sneed testified at Glossip’s
trial). Ibid. Nor would anyone confuse lithium with Su-
dafed, which is a cold medication. Ibid. Sneed’s trial testi-
mony that he had been given lithium after asking for Su-
dafed and had “never seen no psychiatrist or anything” was
therefore false.
   The evidence likewise establishes that the prosecution
18                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

knew Sneed’s statements were false as he testified to them.
The prosecution almost certainly had access to Sneed’s
medical file, which would have listed both the lithium pre-
scription and the bipolar diagnosis. Among other things,
those records would have been provided to the State as part
of Sneed’s competency evaluation, id., at 931, and the State
opposed Glossip’s discovery request of Sneed’s medical files
on its merits, 2 id., at 622–623; 3 id., at 933. As amicus and
the dissent emphasize, moreover, “[l]ithium is prescribed
only for mood disorders.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus
Curiae 14; post, at 7 (“It is undisputed that lithium’s sole
medical purpose, both in 1997 and today, is to treat bipolar
disorder and other mental health disorders”). Yet the pros-
ecution knew that Sneed had previously told a competency
evaluator that he had been prescribed lithium “after his
tooth was pulled,” 

; that statement was part of a
competency record to which both the State and Glossip had
access, id., at 698–703. Prosecutors then heard Sneed tes-
tify to a different version of events at trial: that the lithium
had been given to him after he asked for Sudafed because
he had a cold. 1 id., at 312.
   In addition, Smothermon’s notes show that she had a pre-
trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned “lith-
ium” and “Dr. Trumpet.” 3 id., at 927. Glossip argues, and
the attorney general admits, that this shows Sneed told
Smothermon that Dr. Trumpet (meaning Dr. Trombka) had
prescribed him lithium. As just discussed, the record shows
that, in fact, Dr. Trombka did diagnose Sneed with bipolar
disorder and prescribe him lithium. Sneed plainly dis-
cussed these matters with the prosecution. In that private
conversation, he would have had little to gain from prevar-
icating about his prescriptions, nor do the notes suggest he
did anything of the kind. The straightforward inference is
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                          Opinion of the Court

that Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trombka had pre-
scribed him the lithium. 8
   That leaves materiality. Evidence can be material even
if it “goes only to the credibility of the witness,” Napue, 

; indeed, “[t]he jury’s estimate of the truthful-
ness and reliability of a given witness may well be determi-
native of guilt or innocence,” 

 Because Sneed’s testi-
mony was the only direct evidence of Glossip’s guilt of
capital murder, the jury’s assessment of Sneed’s credibility
was necessarily determinative here. Besides Sneed, no
other witness and no physical evidence established that
Glossip orchestrated Van Treese’s murder. Thus, the jury
could convict Glossip only if it believed Sneed.
   Had the prosecution corrected Sneed on the stand, his
credibility plainly would have suffered. That correction
would have revealed to the jury not just that Sneed was un-
trustworthy (as amicus points out, the jury already knew
he repeatedly lied to the police), but also that Sneed was
willing to lie to them under oath. Such a revelation would
be significant in any case, and was especially so here where
Sneed was already “nobody’s idea of a strong witness.”
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 37. Even if
Sneed’s bipolar disorder were wholly irrelevant, as amicus
argues, his willingness to lie about it to the jury was not.
“ ‘A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject.’ ” Napue, 

 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d 554,
557, 

, 854–855 (1956)).
   Sneed’s false testimony also bore on Glossip’s guilt in a
——————
  8 The dissent claims Sneed instead repeated his prior false statement

that he had been given the lithium after having his tooth pulled. See
post, at 12, 13, n. 3, 25, n. 6, 42. Yet the dissent’s only source for this
theory, Smothermon’s co-counsel Gary Ackley, acknowledged under oath
that he knew lithium was not a pain medication, 

, meaning he
would have known this story, too, to be wrong. In any event, even if the
prosecution did believe Sneed had been given lithium for a toothache,
that still would have put them on notice that Sneed’s testimony at trial
(about receiving lithium after asking for cold medication) was false.
20                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

more direct way. As Smothermon’s co-counsel Gary Ackley
has conceded, it “would have been an important fact for the
defense to know” that Sneed had been prescribed lithium to
treat bipolar disorder. 

. After the Box 8 disclo-
sures, Dr. Trombka explained to Glossip’s counsel that bi-
polar disorder symptoms “can be exacerbated by illicit drug
use, such as methamphetamine,” to “cause an individual to
be more paranoid or potentially violent.” Id., at 932. Sneed
admitted at trial that he regularly used drugs, including
methamphetamine. His diagnosis with a disorder that
could trigger impulsive violence when combined with drug
use thus would have undermined the prosecution’s theory
that Sneed was harmless on his own—a Rottweiler puppy
beholden to his trainer. 15 Tr. 73 (June 1, 2004). That the-
ory was an important part of the prosecution’s case and fea-
tured prominently in its opening and closing statements.
See, e.g., 3 Tr. 209 (May 13, 2004) (arguing in opening that
Sneed was “pretty content . . . to do whatever it is that Rich-
ard Glossip wanted him to do”); 15 Tr. 69–74 (June 1, 2004)
(emphasizing in closing that Sneed would have never com-
mitted murder without Glossip). Hence there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that correcting Sneed’s testimony would have
affected the judgment of the jury. Napue, 

.
  Amicus objects that “the jury already knew that Sneed
had been prescribed lithium, used illegal drugs, and be-
haved impulsively; he admitted that he beat a man to death
with a baseball bat in the middle of the night with no ad-
vanced planning.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Cu-
riae 36. As amicus sees it, the additional evidence provided
by Sneed’s lie and his treatment for bipolar disorder could
hardly have made a difference in light of so much other im-
peaching evidence. 

 at 36–37. Of course, at trial, the
prosecution urged the jury to believe just the opposite: that
despite his prior dishonesty and violence, Sneed was now
telling the truth. See, e.g., 15 Tr. 153–155 (June 1, 2004).
A prosecutor’s midtrial revelation that Sneed lied on the
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                      Opinion of the Court

stand would have significantly undercut that argument.
   In any event, amicus’s position is self-defeating. If the
evidence impeaching Sneed’s credibility was already over-
whelming, then no reasonable jury could have convicted
Glossip in the first place, given that the prosecution’s case
rested centrally on Sneed’s credibility. Amicus appears to
assume the jury would have believed Sneed no matter
what. Such an assumption has no place in a materiality
analysis, which asks what a reasonable decisionmaker
would have done with the new evidence. See Wearry v.
Cain, 

, 393–394 (2016) (per curiam) (rejecting
argument that evidence was immaterial because witness’s
credibility was “already impugned”); cf. Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 

 (1984).
   Although the prosecution’s failure to correct Sneed’s false
testimony was a material Napue violation on its own, addi-
tional conduct by the prosecution further undermines con-
fidence in the verdict. The attorney general has confessed
to “ ‘violation of the rule of sequestration’ ” with respect to
Smothermon’s apparent midtrial attempt to speak with
Sneed about the knife, as well as to “ ‘destruction of evi-
dence,’ ” including the hotel’s financial records and items
Glossip and Sneed allegedly handled in Van Treese’s room.
See Brief for Respondent 13; 

 (prosecutor Ackley
attesting under oath that “I was informed that a box of evi-
dence containing 10 items was destroyed by the Oklahoma
City Police Department. . . . It is likely that I was aware of
that fact during the 2004 retrial . . . . That this happened
horrifies me”); Independent Investigation of State v. Rich-
ard E. Glossip, at 7, 12–13, 41–43 (cataloging destroyed
items). In addition, the eight boxes of documents released
to Glossip included statements from Sneed evincing a de-
sire to recant his testimony and witness notes with details
not previously turned over to the defense. For example, the
files suggest one witness told the prosecution (contrary to
his trial testimony) that Glossip sold him a couch and a TV
22                     GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          Opinion of the Court

for $900. 

. That evidence would have supported
Glossip’s account of the cash he carried at his arrest outside
an attorney’s office: that he had sold his possessions to pay
for an attorney. See 2 id., at 703. Because prejudice anal-
ysis requires a “cumulative evaluation” of all the evidence,
whether or not that evidence is before the Court in the form
of an independent claim for relief, these documents rein-
force our conclusion that the Napue error here prejudiced
the defense. Kyles v. Whitley, 

 (1995). 9
  For these reasons, we conclude that the prosecution’s fail-
ure to correct Sneed’s trial testimony violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Glossip is entitled to a new trial.
                           B
  The OCCA’s contrary holding rested on a mistaken inter-
pretation of Napue. According to the OCCA, there was no

——————
  9 The dissent’s attempts to minimize these issues are unpersuasive.

Sneed’s letter inquiring about “ ‘the choice of recanting my testimony,’ ”

, disproves the dissent’s assertion that “there is no evidence
Sneed wished to ‘recant’ his testimony.” Post, at 32. That Glossip re-
called receiving only $490 for his possessions during his first trial does
not absolve the prosecution from its ordinary duty to disclose incon-
sistent statements by its witnesses. Contra, post, at 32–33. The State’s
conceded sequestration violation also is not merely an insignificant state-
law issue, ibid.; like any other attorney, a prosecutor may not seek to
influence the content of a witness’s testimony. See, e.g., Geders v. United
States, 

 (1976) (“An attorney must respect the im-
portant ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking im-
properly to influence it”). The dissent labors to discredit certain “hand-
written notes” on which neither Glossip nor this Court relies, see post, at
32, n. 8, but Smothermon undisputedly wrote to Sneed’s counsel that she
needed to “get to” him “to discuss” his problematic testimony about the
knife. 

. The next day, Sneed’s testimony corrected the very
problem raised by Smothermon’s letter. Smothermon nonetheless dis-
claimed any knowledge of Sneed’s change in testimony when Glossip ob-
jected. 12 Tr. 107–108 (May 26, 2004). Finally, not even the original
prosecutors dispute that the police destroyed key evidence before Glos-
sip’s retrial; the dissent nonetheless dismisses that claim, undisputed for
over two decades, as this Court’s “own creation.” Post, at 32.
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

violation because the defense “was aware or should have
been aware that Sneed was taking lithium at the time of
trial,” and the prosecution could not have “knowingly con-
cealed” something the defense already knew. 

. As an initial matter, Sneed’s false testimony con-
cerned the reasons for his lithium prescription, not the
mere fact that he had taken it. Glossip’s counsel was aware
of the latter, not of the former. In any event, the Due Pro-
cess Clause imposes “ ‘the responsibility and duty to cor-
rect’ ” false testimony on “representatives of the State,” not
on defense counsel. Napue, 360 U. S., at 269–270 (quoting
Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d, at 557, 136 N. E., at 854).
   The OCCA also held that Sneed’s testimony was not
“clearly false” because Sneed was “more than likely in de-
nial of his mental health disorders.” 

.
It is not apparent why the OCCA thought Sneed was in de-
nial, nor why such denial should have caused Sneed to be-
lieve that he had never seen a psychiatrist, when in fact he
had. Even supposing it did, however, Sneed’s beliefs are
beside the point. What matters is that his testimony was
false and a prosecutor knowingly let it stand nonetheless.
Napue, 

 (“[I]t is established that a convic-
tion obtained through use of false evidence, known to be
such by representatives of the State, must fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
   The dissent’s arguments in support of the OCCA’s conclu-
sions fare no better. As an initial matter, even the dissent
does not dispute that Sneed falsely testified he had never
seen a psychiatrist. See post, at 29–30 (suggesting Sneed
“misremembered” that a psychiatrist prescribed him lith-
ium to treat bipolar disorder). The dissent does maintain
that other aspects of Sneed’s statement were true, noting
that because Sneed was in denial about his diagnosis, his
“statement about his own knowledge was not false.” Post,
at 30. Sneed’s statement that he asked for “Sudafed” to
treat “a cold” and was given lithium instead, 12 Tr. 64 (May
24                     GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          Opinion of the Court

26, 2004), was not, however, a statement “about his own
knowledge.” Even if Sneed himself did not believe that he
suffered from bipolar disorder, moreover, that would not
render true his assertion that he had no idea why his doctor
thought he needed lithium.
   The dissent next claims that the false testimony must it-
self have directly affected the trial’s outcome to be material
under Napue. Post, at 27 (“[T]he relevant inquiry under
Napue is whether the content of the false testimony at issue
is material”). As Napue made clear, however, “ ‘[a] lie is a
lie, no matter what its subject.’ ” 360 U. S., at 269–270
(quoting Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d, at 557, 136 N. E. 2d, at 854–
855)). Nothing in Napue requires ignoring the fact of
Sneed’s perjury in the prejudice analysis. To the contrary,
materiality instead always requires courts to assess
whether “the error complained of ” could have contributed
to the verdict. Chapman, 

; Bagley, 

. Here, the prosecutor’s failure to correct Sneed’s
false testimony is the relevant error, so the Court asks
whether a correction could have made a material difference.
The answer is clearly yes. See supra, at 18–22. 10
   The remaining arguments offered in defense of the
OCCA’s position are likewise unpersuasive. In an amicus
brief, the Van Treese family argues that it was Glossip’s
counsel who asked Sneed about his lithium prescription,
——————
  10 The dissent also argues Sneed’s lithium use was immaterial because

“the defense chose not to turn” it “into an impeachment issue,” post, at
27, but each premise in that argument is mistaken. First, the defense
did not choose “not to raise Sneed’s mental condition,” ibid.; they asked
him about it in cross-examination and Sneed repeated his false testi-
mony. See 13 Tr. 15 (May 27, 2004). Second, the defense did not know
during trial that Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder; to the
contrary, Glossip later sought (and the State successfully opposed) dis-
covery on that issue. 2 App. 621–622. Third, even if the defense had
made a conscious choice not to raise the (then-uncertain) reasons for
Sneed’s lithium use, that would be irrelevant to the prosecution’s duty to
correct false testimony “when it appears.” Napue, 

.
                 Cite as: 

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                     Opinion of the Court

and that Smothermon’s notes reveal only that Sneed re-
layed those questions to Smothermon. See Brief for Victim
Family Members as Amici Curiae 7–22. That argument re-
lies heavily on extra-record materials not properly before
the Court, including a recent unsworn statement from
Smothermon adopting the family’s interpretation of the
notes. (The dissent, which criticizes the independent coun-
sel for “impugning” the trial prosecutors’ reputation, post,
at 15, justifies its reliance on these materials by accusing
the Oklahoma attorney general of “collusively exclud[ing]”
them from the record, see post, at 42.) Nor would accepting
the family’s account change the Napue analysis. Whatever
the impetus for the conversation, the family agrees that
Sneed and Smothermon discussed Dr. Trombka and lith-
ium. The natural inference is that Sneed explained to
Smothermon the circumstances that led to his lithium use.
To avoid that inference, the family in turn suggests both
that Sneed was never diagnosed with bipolar disorder in
the first place, Brief for Victim Family Members as Amici
Curiae 17, and that Glossip’s counsel “knew about [Dr.
Trombka] more than two decades ago,” id., at 21. Yet for
the reasons previously explained, defense counsel’s pur-
ported knowledge of Dr. Trombka’s existence is irrelevant,
and the prison medical record supports the attorney gen-
eral’s concession that Sneed received a lithium prescription
as treatment for his bipolar disorder.
   The family also maintains (and the dissent agrees) that
Reed Smith and the independent counsel spent insufficient
time interviewing Smothermon. Neither the family nor
Smothermon raised that objection before the OCCA, nor
does anyone now explain its relevance to the Napue analy-
sis. The argument is also unpersuasive on its own terms.
Both investigators spoke to Smothermon. When they did,
Smothermon did not provide the account she now endorses:
that Sneed relayed to her a conversation with Glossip’s
counsel about Dr. Trombka and lithium. Instead, during a
26                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

third interview, Smothermon asked the independent coun-
sel “why he thought it was Dr Trombka and not Dr Trumpet
the jazz musician and I was making a personal note or
something else.” App. to Brief for Victim Family Members
as Amici Curiae 31a. There is no compelling evidence that
a fourth or fifth consultation with Smothermon would have
yielded materially different results.
   The Court-appointed amicus, for his part, largely aban-
dons the OCCA’s reasoning and focuses instead on ambigu-
ities in Smothermon’s notes. Amicus maintains that too
many inferential steps separate those notes from the con-
clusion that Sneed lied on the stand and that Smothermon
knew it. For example, amicus argues that “the parties do
not explain the basis for their asserted link between ‘Dr.
Trumpet?’ and Trombka,” reiterating Smothermon’s earlier
statements that she “ ‘is not convinced that Dr. Trombka
and “Dr. Trumpet” are the same person.’ ” Brief for Court-
Appointed Amicus Curiae 32. As already explained, how-
ever, there is ample evidence in the record before this Court
supporting the inference that Smothermon knew about
Sneed’s psychiatric treatment and lithium prescription, in-
cluding the prison medical record, Dr. Trombka’s attesta-
tions, and Smothermon’s own notes.
   Because ample evidence supports the attorney general’s
confession of error in this Court, there also is no need to
remand for further evidentiary proceedings at the OCCA.
Indeed, that such proceedings are not necessary is the one
point on which Glossip, Oklahoma, amicus, and the OCCA
unanimously agree. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 108 (amicus con-
ceding that “I guess we all agree that [an evidentiary hear-
ing is] not . . . that it’s not necessary”). The partial concur-
rence suggests this Court should nonetheless remand for
further proceedings on the ground that the evidence does
not remove all doubt that the attorney general’s view of the
record is correct. Post, at 4–5 (BARRETT, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Yet for the reasons already
                      Cite as: 

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                          Opinion of the Court

explained, the record establishes a violation of Napue. See
supra, at 16–22. This Court has not required an eviden-
tiary record free of doubt to find a Napue violation in any
case, much less when an attorney general confesses that his
own office erroneously obtained a capital conviction. 11

                              C
  Finally, the dissent maintains this Court lacks the au-
thority to remand for a new trial, but its analysis proves the
contrary. The dissent emphasizes that “ ‘[o]ur only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.’ ” Post, at 33 (quot-
ing Herb v. Pitcairn, 

 (1945)). It further
agrees that, where a state court relies on a procedural rule
whose application turns on “whether federal constitutional
error has been committed,” Ake, 

, this Court
may remand for a new trial if it “ha[s] confidence that no
other state ground could support the decision below,” post,
at 39. Those principles describe this case.
  As explained above, the OCCA “incorrectly adjudge[d ]”
Glossip’s “federal rights.” Herb, 

. In doing
so, it relied on a procedural rule whose application turned
on the merits of a federal claim: “ ‘Where the Attorney Gen-
eral confesses error, [the OCCA] will examine the record,
and if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well
founded in law, the conviction will be reversed.’ ” See supra,
——————
   11 The dissent would order a hearing to provide “the Van Treese family

[with] the opportunity to present its case.” Post, at 43 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.). The family has not requested an evidentiary hearing (or
participation in one) at any stage before the OCCA and does not request
that relief before this Court. Nor has the OCCA ever extended Oklahoma
victims’ right to participate in criminal proceedings to state post-convic-
tion hearings. Cf. post, at 42–43. The request to do so here is the dis-
sent’s alone. In any event, this Court does not “cast aside the family’s
interests,” on procedural or any other grounds. Post, at 43. For the rea-
sons already explained, considering the evidence submitted by the family
would not change the outcome. See supra, at 25–26.
28                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      Opinion of the Court

at 14 (quoting Bindrum, 

, 

, and collecting authorities). Here, the attorney general
“concede[ d] error under Napue,” 

, and the OCCA
rejected that confession because it wrongly concluded that
no such federal error had occurred. See supra, at 15. Be-
cause the Napue confession was “well founded in law,” it
follows that “the conviction will be reversed.” Bindrum, 

, 

. Accordingly, all that
remains below is to vacate the conviction, and a new trial
follows a fortiori.
   The dissent concludes otherwise because, in its view, a
remand for further consideration of alternative state
grounds is mandatory in every case where Michigan v. Long
resolves lingering doubt over the Court’s jurisdiction. Post,
at 34–36. Long describes the circumstances under which
this Court has jurisdiction to review a state-court judg-
ment; it does not limit the Court’s remedial authority over
an established federal constitutional violation. Nor does
any other precedent support the dissent’s rule. That state
courts who “grant relief to criminal defendants” under an
erroneous interpretation of federal law may later grant re-
lief “as a matter of [more protective] state law,” Kansas v.
Carr, 

 (2016) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissent-
ing), plainly does not deprive this Court of the authority to
grant relief where it finds a federal violation, contra, post,
at 35; cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S 1, 8 (1995) (“Under
[Michigan v. Long] state courts are absolutely free to inter-
pret constitutional provisions to accord greater protection
to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United
States Constitution”).
   The dissent inverts this precedent, asserting that state
courts should always have another opportunity to identify
additional grounds for denying relief, even where this Court
has found a federal constitutional violation. Yet there is no
reason to allow state courts a second (or third, or fourth)
bite at the apple to identify alternative state grounds for
                 Cite as: 

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                     Opinion of the Court

their decision in every case involving a dependent ground.
The facts as conceded by the attorney general and sup-
ported by the record establish a violation of Napue. A new
trial is the remedy for a Napue violation. See Giglio, 

. Here, this Court has jurisdiction and a Napue
violation occurred. Thus, Glossip is entitled to a new trial.
See Ake, 470 U. S., at 86–87 (vacating conviction and re-
manding case to the OCCA under similar circumstances).
                        *     *     *
  The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                                                  It is so ordered.

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                    Opinion of BARRETT, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                         No. 22–7466
                         _________________


    RICHARD EUGENE GLOSSIP, PETITIONER v.
                OKLAHOMA
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
                 APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
                      [February 25, 2025]

   JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
   While I agree with much of the Court’s analysis, I would
not order the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
to set aside Richard Glossip’s conviction. The OCCA did not
make factual findings on the most important questions, and
the record is open to multiple plausible interpretations.
Consistent with our ordinary practice, the Court should
have corrected the OCCA’s misstatement of Napue v. Illi-
nois and remanded this case for further proceedings. 

 (1959). Instead, the Court has drawn its own con-
clusions about what the record shows, thereby exceeding its
role.
   I begin with the common ground. At the threshold, I
agree with the Court’s jurisdictional holding and therefore
join Part II of its opinion. We lack jurisdiction to review a
state court’s adjudication of federal claims if the state
court’s decision “rests on a state law ground that is inde-
pendent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 

(1991). But when a state-law ground of decision is inter-
twined with analysis of a federal question, we will treat the
decision as independent only if the state court “make[s]
clear by a plain statement” that its resolution of the state-
law question does not depend on its resolution of the federal
2                   GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     Opinion of BARRETT, J.

question. Michigan v. Long, 

 (1983).
Though it is a closer question for me than it is for the Court,
I agree that the OCCA’s opinion does not clear this bar.
True, the OCCA rejected Glossip’s application based on
state-law procedural limits on postconviction relief. But the
opinion can be read to say that the OCCA refused to accept
the attorney general’s waiver of this procedural bar because
his confession of error was not “based in law.” 

, ¶25, 

. If that is what the OCCA meant,
then its reliance on state law depended on the merits of
Glossip’s federal claims. After all, if the trial contained fed-
eral constitutional error, then the attorney general’s confes-
sion of error may have been “based in law.” Because the
opinion lacks a “plain statement” clarifying that the
OCCA’s reliance on state law was truly independent of its
assessment of Glossip’s federal claims, the Court rightly
proceeds to the merits. Michigan, 

.
   I also share the Court’s view that the OCCA misapplied
Napue. The OCCA appeared to think that Justin Sneed’s
testimony “was not clearly false” because he “was more
than likely in denial of his mental health disorders.” 

. But for purposes of Napue, the question is not
whether a witness subjectively thought he was lying—it is
whether the prosecution knowingly presented untrue testi-
mony. The OCCA also stated that Sneed’s “known mental
health treatment evidence” would not have created a “rea-
sonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different had Sneed’s testimony regarding his
use of lithium been further developed at trial.” 

. Yet the OCCA ignored the critical fact that—had
the prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, corrected Sneed’s tes-
timony—the jury would have learned that Sneed made a
false statement on the stand. Sneed’s testimony was the
primary evidence that the State offered to prove that Glos-
sip planned the murder. Faced with a prosecutor forced to
correct her star witness, a juror might have disbelieved
                    Cite as: 

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                        Opinion of BARRETT, J.

Sneed’s testimony in its entirety. And if a juror went from
belief to disbelief in Sneed, she might have changed her ul-
timate assessment of whether the State had proved Glos-
sip’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. So if Sneed really did
give false testimony, and if Smothermon really did know-
ingly allow that testimony to go uncorrected, then Smother-
mon violated Glossip’s due process rights under Napue.
The OCCA’s contrary statements were wrong as a matter
of federal law.
   I part ways with the Court on what comes next. In exer-
cising our appellate function, it is not our role to find facts;
instead, we review the factual findings of lower courts, sub-
ject to a deferential standard of appellate review. See Price
v. Johnston, 

 (1948). This practice makes
good sense. This Court is well equipped to answer ques-
tions of federal law; it is ill equipped either to determine the
credibility of witnesses or to master voluminous trial rec-
ords. Other actors in our judicial system—including, where
appropriate, state courts like the OCCA—better serve these
functions, as our standard of review reflects. In this case,
however, the Court has chosen to function as the initial
factfinder.
   To establish a violation of Napue, Glossip must show that
(1) Sneed gave false testimony and (2) Smothermon knew
that the testimony was false. To make these showings,
Glossip relies largely on notes taken by Smothermon, an af-
fidavit from Dr. Trombka, and a “medical information
sheet.” According to the Court, these documents clearly
demonstrate that (1) Sneed lied when he said that he did
not know why he had been given lithium and that he had
never seen a psychiatrist and (2) Smothermon knew that
both of these statements were lies. See ante, at 17–19, 26.
Thus, the Court concludes, there is no need for the OCCA
to make its own factual findings.*
——————
 *The Court suggests that this shortcut is appropriate because Glossip,
4                      GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                         Opinion of BARRETT, J.

  I respectfully disagree. Smothermon’s notes, taken dur-
ing a jailhouse interview of Sneed, consist of the words “on
Lithium?” and “Dr. Trumpet?” 

. These notes are
hardly clear, and there are competing explanations of what
they mean. Glossip, the Oklahoma attorney general, and
the Court argue that they demonstrate Smothermon’s
knowledge that Sneed had lied about Dr. Trombka’s pre-
scribing him lithium for bipolar disorder. See ante, at 18–
19, 26. The Van Treese amicus brief and JUSTICE THOMAS
contend that the notes instead reflect Sneed’s account of a
conversation with Glossip’s lawyers, who had asked Sneed
whether he had received lithium from a “Dr. Trumpet.” See
post, at 11–13, and n. 3 (dissenting opinion). There are
other possibilities too: For instance, perhaps Smothermon
was confused by references to “Dr. Trumpet” and lithium
but never investigated the issue further. Neither Dr.
Trombka’s affidavit nor the attached medical information
sheet nor any of the other record evidence discussed by the
——————
the attorney general, the Court-appointed amicus, and the OCCA “unan-
imously agree” that the record is sufficiently developed. Ante, at 26. I
do not think that this assertion fairly captures the views of either the
amicus or the OCCA. When asked whether he “object[ed] to an eviden-
tiary hearing,” amicus—whom we appointed to defend the judgment be-
low in this Court—expressed doubt that he “ha[d] standing to object to
an evidentiary hearing.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 107–108. When pushed on the
point, he responded that the current record supports affirmance “based
on the evidence that [Glossip has] chosen to present and particularly
given that he’s now told you he wants the case decided on the current
record [and] without an evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 109 (emphasis
added). In other words, amicus simply stated that the current record did
not support Glossip’s claim—not that the record was in any objective
sense already fully developed. Moreover, the question here is not only
whether further factual development is warranted, but also which court
should find facts in the first instance. Amicus certainly did not concede
that this Court, rather than the OCCA, should play that role on this rec-
ord. As for the OCCA, its lack of explanation of the facts cannot be di-
vorced from its erroneous view of Napue. Nothing in its opinion indicates
what it would make of this record evidence if it confronted the relevant
questions under Napue.
                 Cite as: 

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                    Opinion of BARRETT, J.

Court forecloses any of these possibilities.
   When the record is susceptible to multiple plausible in-
ferences, this Court should not be in the business of choos-
ing between them. It should have corrected the OCCA’s
misstatements of federal law and vacated the judgment,
leaving next steps—including the decision whether to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing—to the OCCA. By doing oth-
erwise, the Court has both displaced the OCCA as fact-
finder and potentially overridden state-law constraints on
the OCCA’s remedial authority. See post, at 33–40
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because the Court has exceeded
its appellate role, I respectfully dissent in part.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                         No. 22–7466
                         _________________


    RICHARD EUGENE GLOSSIP, PETITIONER v.
                OKLAHOMA
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
                 APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
                      [February 25, 2025]

   JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, and
with whom JUSTICE BARRETT joins as to Parts IV–A–1, IV–
A–2, and IV–A–3, dissenting.
   Richard Glossip—a convicted murderer twice sentenced
to death by Oklahoma juries—challenges the denial of his
fifth application for state post-conviction relief. Although
Glossip won the support of Oklahoma’s new attorney gen-
eral, he failed to persuade either body with authority to
grant him relief: The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA) denied Glossip’s application as both procedurally
deficient and nonmeritorious, and Oklahoma’s Pardon and
Parole Board denied clemency. Because this Court lacks
the power to override these denials, that should have
marked the end of the road for Glossip. Instead, the Court
stretches the law at every turn to rule in his favor. At the
threshold, it concocts federal jurisdiction by misreading the
decision below. On the merits, it finds a due process viola-
tion based on patently immaterial testimony about a wit-
ness’s medical condition. And, for the remedy, it orders a
new trial in violation of black-letter law on this Court’s
power to review state-court judgments. I respectfully dis-
sent.
2                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

                                I
                               A
  This case arises from the 1997 murder of Barry Van
Treese, the owner of an Oklahoma City motel. Beginning
in 1995, Glossip began working for Van Treese as the mo-
tel’s manager. 4 Tr. 182–183 (May 14, 2004). In that ca-
pacity, Glossip unofficially hired 19-year-old Justin Sneed
to be the motel’s handyman. Glossip did not pay Sneed; in-
stead, he let him live at the motel free of charge and occa-
sionally bought him food. Id., at 43–44; 5 Tr. 67–70 (May
17, 2004); 

. In late 1996, Van Treese learned of
discrepancies in Glossip’s accounting suggesting that Glos-
sip had been allowing guests to stay at the motel off the
books and pocketing the money for himself. 4 Tr. 63, 68–71
(May 14, 2004); 7 Tr. 35, 39–40, 45–49 (May 19, 2004); 11
Tr. 172–173 (May 25, 2004). During a visit to the motel on
January 6, 1997, Van Treese confronted Glossip about this
issue, and, having discovered unregistered guests staying
at the motel, he threatened to report Glossip to the police
unless Glossip produced receipts for their rooms. 8 Tr. 82
(May 20, 2004).
  Hours later, after Van Treese had gone to bed, Sneed en-
tered Van Treese’s motel room and repeatedly beat him
over the head with a baseball bat. 2 App. 662–664; 11 Tr.
55 (May 25, 2004). Sneed left when he thought that he had
killed Van Treese, although the State’s forensic pathologist
later determined that Van Treese had initially survived the
attack, and died several hours later after slowly bleeding
out. Id., at 55–57, 61; App. to Response to Petitioner’s Succ.
Application for Post-Conviction Relief in No. PCD–2022–
819 (OCCA), Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9,
1997). Following his arrest, Sneed explained to police that
Glossip had urged him to kill Van Treese. 

, 660.
According to Sneed, Glossip told him that they would both
be evicted if Glossip lost his job, and Glossip had promised
to pay him $10,000 for carrying out the murder. 12 Tr. 95–
                      Cite as: 

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                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

96, 98 (May 26, 2004).
   Shortly after the attack, Sneed went to Glossip’s motel
room and informed him that he had killed Van Treese. Tr.
of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9, 1997). Glossip began
directing a coverup. On Sneed’s account, Glossip first told
Sneed to clean up glass shards from a window that Sneed
had broken during the attack. 12 Tr. 122 (May 26, 2004).
Glossip also sent Sneed to retrieve about $4,000 in cash
from Van Treese’s car, and then to abandon the car in a
nearby credit union parking lot. Id., at 124, 129. When
Sneed returned, the two divided the cash. Id., at 128–129.
They then entered Van Treese’s room, whereupon Glossip
directed Sneed to tape a shower curtain over the broken
window and run the air conditioning at full blast to elimi-
nate any odor. Id., at 130, 132. Glossip then dispatched
Sneed to buy plexiglass, which the pair installed over the
broken window on the morning of January 7. Tr. of Glossip
Police Interview 14–15 (Jan. 9, 1997); 4 Tr. 163–165 (May
14, 2004); 13 Tr. 126 (May 27, 2004). 1


——————
   1 Despite its consistent theme that Sneed’s testimony is too implausi-

ble to sustain Glossip’s conviction, the majority feels the need to bolster
its account by finding “inconsisten[cies]” in his testimony that are not
genuine. Ante, at 5, n. 1. There is no contradiction in Sneed’s claims
that he committed the murder as part of a robbery and that he did so to
avoid being “ ‘evicted if Glossip lost his job.’ ” Ibid. At both of Glossip’s
trials, Sneed consistently testified that Glossip proposed taking the cash
Van Treese had with him and that Glossip told him that they would get
evicted if he did not kill Van Treese. 12 Tr. 95–96, 98, 124 (May 26,
2004); 6 Tr. 89–90, 95–96 (June 8, 1998). Contemporaneous evidence
supports both motivations. In his confession to police, Sneed stated that
Glossip had proposed killing Van Treese and taking the cash that Van
Treese had with him. 

. And, two days after the murder, Glos-
sip told police that Sneed had committed the murder in part because
“[h]e thought Barry [Van Treese] was going to throw him out in the
street.” Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 13 (Jan. 9, 1997). Nor did Sneed
ever claim that “he did not know why Glossip wanted him to kill Van
Treese.” Ante, at 5, n. 1. He testified only that he did not know “why Mr.
4                      GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                         THOMAS, J., dissenting

  Glossip took additional steps to cover up the murder. He
told multiple witnesses that the window in Van Treese’s
room was broken because two drunks had stayed there the
night before and smashed it in a brawl. 5 Tr. 85 (May 17,
2004); 7 Tr. 64 (May 19, 2004); 9 Tr. 46, 206 (May 21, 2004);
11 Tr. 188–189 (May 25, 2004). He told the housekeeper
that she did not need to clean the downstairs rooms—in-
cluding Van Treese’s room. 8 Tr. 122–123 (May 20, 2004).
Instead, as Glossip explained to another employee and a
motel resident, he and Sneed would cover those rooms. 7
Tr. 64 (May 19, 2004); 9 Tr. 49 (May 21, 2004). Glossip had
never taken such steps before. 8 Tr. 122–123 (May 20,
2004). He also told various witnesses that he had seen Van
Treese alive and well around 7 o’clock that morning. 4 Tr.
99 (May 14, 2004); 7 Tr. 62–63 (May 19, 2004); 9 Tr. 194
(May 21, 2004); 11 Tr. 126–127, 182–183 (May 25, 2004).
  That afternoon, the credit union called the motel to report
that Van Treese’s car had been abandoned in its parking
lot. 7 Tr. 70 (May 19, 2004). At that point, it became clear
to the motel’s staff that Van Treese was missing. Id., at 72–
74. Shortly thereafter, Glossip returned to the motel from
a shopping trip, during which he had made several large
purchases, including an engagement ring for his girlfriend.
Id., at 74; 14 Tr. 41 (May 28, 2004). He then purported to
search the rooms and surrounding area for Van Treese. 5
Tr. 97 (May 17, 2004); 9 Tr. 192–193 (May 21, 2004); 11 Tr.
185–186, 190 (May 25, 2004). He even assured Van
Treese’s wife over the phone that everything was fine and
that he had seen Van Treese that morning. 4 Tr. 99–100
(May 14, 2004).
  Glossip later repeated to a local police officer the story
——————
Glossip wanted to kill Mr. Van Treese on this particular night,” because
“[e]very time that Mr. Van Treese showed up, [Glossip] was wanting me
to kill him.” 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998) (emphasis added). As noted, Sneed
clearly testified at the same trial that Glossip wanted Sneed to kill Van
Treese so that they would not be evicted. Id., at 90.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

that two drunks had broken the window and that he had
seen Van Treese that morning. 9 Tr. 194, 206–207 (May 21,
2004). Unpersuaded, the officer checked the room with the
broken window and discovered Van Treese’s body. Id., at
220, 224–225; 11 Tr. 191, 194 (May 25, 2004). Glossip im-
mediately told the officer that he suspected that Sneed had
something to do with the murder, explaining that he had
heard glass breaking and that Sneed had banged on his
door, but he did not claim to know anything more. 9 Tr. 233
(May 21, 2004).
   Homicide detectives interviewed Glossip later that night.
Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 1, 10–11 (Jan. 8, 1997). He
denied knowing that Van Treese had been murdered before
the body was discovered. Id., at 70, 86. And, he vacillated
between doubting that Sneed was involved and asserting
that he likely was. Id., at 27–28, 69–70.
   On the morning of January 8, Glossip began to sell all his
possessions, telling multiple witnesses that he would like to
leave town. 8 Tr. 88 (May 20, 2004); 11 Tr. 199 (May 25,
2004). On January 9, police picked up Glossip after he
failed to appear for a meeting with homicide detectives. 12
Tr. 7 (May 26, 2004). He had $1,757 in cash on his person
and no explanation for how he—living paycheck to
paycheck and having made only $490 from selling his pos-
sessions the previous day—had so much cash. Id., at 12–
13; 14 Tr. 43–44 (May 28, 2004); 15 Tr. 17, 93 (June 1,
2004).
   Glossip sat for a second interview with homicide detec-
tives later that day. Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 1 (Jan.
9, 1997). This time, although continuing to deny that he
had ordered Sneed to kill Van Treese, Glossip admitted that
Sneed had told him about the murder just after committing
it, and that he had instructed Sneed to clean up the glass
and repair the window. Id., at 13–14, 36. Glossip also ad-
mitted that Van Treese “was upset because the motel
wasn’t doing as well as it could.” Id., at 32. When asked
6                   GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

why he hid the murder, Glossip denied doing so to protect
Sneed. He said he covered up the murder instead to protect
himself, because he “was involved in it” and risked losing
his girlfriend otherwise. Id., at 29–30.
   During this interview, Glossip also tried to minimize his
involvement in the crime by insisting that he had not gone
inside Van Treese’s hotel room after the attack. Id., at 18;
see also ante, at 2 (emphasizing this denial). At trial, how-
ever, a motel resident testified that, on the morning of Jan-
uary 7, Glossip had said that he and Sneed had been “in the
room” after the window was broken. 9 Tr. 120 (May 21,
2004).
   Police arrested Sneed five days later and charged him
with capital murder. 2 App. 644–645. He had $1,680 in
cash in his possession. 14 Tr. 12–18 (May 28, 2004). At
first, Sneed denied involvement, claiming that his brother
and Glossip had once discussed the idea but that it never
went beyond talk. 2 App. 655–657. Later in the interview,
however, Sneed confessed to murdering Van Treese at Glos-
sip’s instigation. Id., at 660, 664.
                                B
                                1
   Glossip was convicted and sentenced to death in 1998,
but the OCCA ordered a retrial based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 

, 

.
   At his second trial in 2004, a jury convicted Glossip again,
and the judge again sentenced him to death. Sneed testi-
fied against Glossip during the guilt phase, as he had at the
first trial. While Sneed was providing background infor-
mation about himself at the outset of this testimony, the
State’s lead prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, asked him
whether he had received any “prescription medication” af-
ter being arrested. 12 Tr. 63–64 (May 26, 2004). Sneed
responded that he had briefly been prescribed “Lithium for
some reason, I don’t know why. I never seen no psychiatrist
                  Cite as: 

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                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

or anything.” Id., at 64. The matter did not come up again
during the trial.
   It would not have been challenging for the parties to de-
duce the reason for Sneed’s lithium prescription. It is un-
disputed that lithium’s sole medical purpose, both in 1997
and today, is to treat bipolar disorder and other mental
health disorders. See ante, at 18. Were there any doubt
about Sneed’s condition, records long available to both sides
resolve it. In 1997, Sneed underwent a pretrial competency
evaluation with forensic psychologist Dr. Edith King. Dr.
King’s report strongly suggested that although Sneed him-
self may have been in denial, he was taking lithium to treat
bipolar disorder or a similar condition. During his evalua-
tion, Sneed asserted that he “d[id] not think he ha[d] any
serious mental problems.” 

. And, he reported he
was given the lithium, apparently by mistake, “after his
tooth was pulled.” Id., at 700. Dr. King felt otherwise. Con-
cluding that Sneed qualified as a “mentally ill person or a
person requiring treatment,” ibid., she determined that he
likely had “an atypical mood swing disorder in his past
characterized by ‘ups and downs’ including anger outburst.”
Id., at 702. “His present medication [i.e., the lithium] is
probably helping him control his moods.” Ibid.
   The defense was well aware of this report before Glossip’s
second trial. In fact, on direct appeal of his first conviction,
Glossip’s appellate counsel had faulted his trial counsel for
not using Dr. King’s report to show the jury that Sneed was
taking lithium to control his anger. 1 id., at 18. Neverthe-
less, after the OCCA vacated his first conviction, Glossip
declined to seek further pretrial discovery on the issue or
raise it during his second trial.
   After his second conviction and sentence, Glossip ignored
the lithium issue on direct appeal, instead raising a general
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. The OCCA unani-
mously rejected that challenge, finding that there was suf-
ficient evidence to convict and that the State had satisfied
8                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

an additional state-law requirement for corroborative evi-
dence where a conviction rests on accomplice testimony.

, ¶¶47–53, 

, 153–154. Two
judges dissented on different grounds but “agree[d] with the
majority that the State presented a strong circumstantial
case against Glossip.” 

 (Chapel, J.); see also 

(A. Johnson, J.).
                              2
   Glossip has spent the past two decades challenging his
conviction and sentence through direct appeal, state and
federal collateral proceedings, and civil litigation under
Rev. Stat. §1979, 

. Throughout that time,
no court has “determined error in [his] trial proceeding” or
found that “there [has] been a showing of actual innocence.”

, ¶2, 

 (Lumpkin, J., spe-
cially concurring). And, for almost that entire duration, the
Oklahoma attorney general has steadfastly defended the
verdict and sentence, insisting that the evidence the State
presented in 1998 and 2004 has never “been credibly rebut-
ted.” 

.
   In 2022, as Glossip’s execution date approached, a group
of Oklahoma legislators opposed to his execution commis-
sioned the law firm Reed Smith LLP to conduct an inde-
pendent investigation of his case. The firm, which is pub-
licly committed to “fighting the death penalty,” id., at 709,
n. 3 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted), is-
sued a final report expressing “grave doubt as to the integ-
rity of Glossip’s murder conviction and death sentence,” In-
dependent Investigation of State v. Richard E. Glossip 6
(June 7, 2022) (Reed Smith Report). The attorney general
vigorously disagreed. In subsequent post-conviction filings,
the State asserted that the report was “built on assump-
tions, half-truths, and (in some cases) outright falsehoods,”

, and criticized its findings at length, see id., at
754–769.
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

   In response to the Reed Smith Report, the attorney gen-
eral’s office released all its files from the case to Glossip,
except for one box of attorney work product. Based on
this information, Glossip filed a fourth motion for post-
conviction relief in the OCCA, raising two overarching
claims. The first claim was that the State violated Brady
v. Maryland, 

 (1963), by withholding evidence
that Sneed considered recanting his original testimony be-
fore the second trial. The second claim was that Smother-
mon, the lead prosecutor, committed misconduct and vio-
lated the rule of sequestration (which prohibits witnesses
from hearing other witnesses’ testimony) during trial. Af-
ter the State’s forensic pathologist testified that there was
evidence Sneed used a knife in addition to the bat during
the murder, Smothermon sent a memorandum to Sneed’s
attorney highlighting ways in which this testimony was
hard to square with some of Sneed’s earlier statements.
Glossip thus claimed Smothermon violated the rule of se-
questration by conveying witness statements for the pur-
pose of coaching Sneed into altering his testimony to fit the
forensic evidence. Attorney General John O’Connor op-
posed the application, urging the OCCA not to be cowed by
the ongoing “public relations campaign” to “falsely” present
Glossip as “innocent.” 

.
   The OCCA unanimously denied the application. Under
Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act (PCPA), Glos-
sip’s post-conviction application could not proceed unless he
could show (1) that the “factual basis for the claim” was pre-
viously unavailable and (2) that, but for the alleged error,
no reasonable jury would have convicted him or sentenced
him to death. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1089(D)(8)(b) (2024).
The OCCA held that both claims failed the first require-
ment because they were not based on new information. It
also held that Glossip’s claims failed on the merits.
   As to the recantation claim, the OCCA held that Glossip’s
first claim was procedurally barred because the defense
10                      GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

knew even before the 2004 trial that Sneed was reluctant
to testify again. 

. In fact, one of Glossip’s attor-
neys had even visited Sneed before trial in an effort to per-
suade him not to testify. Ibid. On the merits, there was “no
evidence that Sneed had any desire to recant or change his
testimony.” Id., at 776. Sneed had even told Reed Smith
that “recant[ing]” was “ ‘impossible because I told the
truth.’ ” Id., at 724. Sneed was reluctant to testify because
he wanted to obtain a better plea deal or to avoid the dis-
ruption to his life that testifying would cause. Id., at 776. 2
  Turning to the sequestration claim, the OCCA pointed
out that Smothermon had acknowledged at trial that she
had spoken with Sneed’s counsel, so the claim likewise
lacked a new factual basis. Id., at 780; see 12 Tr. 107–108
——————
   2 The majority points to a letter from Sneed to his attorney in which

Sneed raised the prospect of “ ‘ “recanting” ’ ” his trial testimony. Ante,
at 8 (quoting 

). But, in two subsequent interviews with Reed
Smith attorneys, Sneed made clear that, although he wanted to avoid
testifying again if possible, he continued to stand by the truth of his ear-
lier testimony:
   “[REED SMITH ATTORNEY]: Yeah. Well, I think the bottom line
here, the most important things that we needed to clarify was like when
you’re talking about recanting, you’re not talking about changing your
story about what happened. Have you ever indicated to anybody that
you ever wanted to change your story about what happened?
   “JUSTIN SNEED: No, sir. I have not ever indicated that I wanted to
change the truth of him applying pressure to me.” App. to Response to
Petitioner’s Succ. Application for Post-Conviction Relief in No. PCD–
2022–819 (OCCA), Tr. of Sneed Reed Smith Interview 46–47 (Aug. 15,
2022).
See also id., Tr. of Sneed Reed Smith Interview 24 (Sept. 7, 2022) (“There
isn’t any way of really making up some [new] storyline that isn’t going to
cover all the evidence that is already there . . . ”). Sneed has never on
any occasion indicated that his testimony that Glossip directed him to
kill Van Treese was false, see 3 App. 724–725, and the majority cites no
such occasion. The best explanation for Sneed’s letter, and the one that
the OCCA credited as factual, is thus that Sneed, an eighth-grade drop-
out, used the phrase “recanting my testimony” imprecisely to mean “re-
fuse to testify.” Id., at 725, 776.
                 Cite as: 

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                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

(May 26, 2004). On the merits, the court held that Okla-
homa’s sequestration statute does not prohibit counsel from
discussing with a witness other witnesses’ testimony. 

. Federal courts have similarly interpreted the fed-
eral sequestration rule to permit “witnesses . . . to discuss
the case” with “counsel for either side.” 2A C. Wright & P.
Henning, Federal Practice and Procedure §416, p. 195, and
n. 29 (4th ed. 2009) (collecting cases). And, nothing in
Smothermon’s memorandum indicates she was encourag-
ing Sneed to lie. 3 App. 781–782.
                               3
   In January 2023, Gentner Drummond became Okla-
homa’s attorney general. During his first month in office,
Drummond released the final box of evidence (Box 8) to
Glossip. He also appointed Rex Duncan, a personal friend
and campaign donor, as independent counsel to reexamine
the legitimacy of Glossip’s conviction.
   Among the materials released in Box 8 were handwritten
notes taken by Smothermon and her co-counsel Gary Ack-
ley during a 2003 meeting between them, Sneed, and
Sneed’s attorney.
   Glossip’s counsel quickly seized on Smothermon’s notes.
In the top left corner of the notes, Smothermon had written
“on Lithium?” and “Dr Trumpet?” See Figure 1, infra. Ac-
cording to Glossip’s counsel, these phrases meant that
Sneed had admitted during the meeting that he had been
prescribed lithium by Dr. Lawrence Trombka, the psychia-
trist at the Oklahoma County Jail.
12                   GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                       THOMAS, J., dissenting

    Smothermon and Ackley disagree with this interpreta-
tion. They assert before this Court that, during the meet-
ing, Sneed recounted two interviews that he previously had
with members of Glossip’s defense team. In context,
Smothermon’s notes simply record that Sneed told her that
Glossip’s defense team had asked him about his use of lith-
ium and about “Dr Trumpet.” The prosecutors claim that
this fact is apparent from the other notes on the page and
from Ackley’s notes, both of which refer to details of these
prior interviews. Ackley’s notes also highlight the phrase
“ ‘tooth pulled.’ ” 

. The prosecutors’ interpreta-
tion of their own notes thus suggests that Sneed recounted
that he had responded to questions about lithium and Dr.
Trombka with his earlier story that he was prescribed lith-
ium in error after having his tooth pulled. This interpreta-
tion is explained at great length by the Van Treese family’s




Figure 1. Smothermon’s handwritten notes. See 

.
                      Cite as: 

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                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

brief. See Brief for Victim Family Members as Amici Cu-
riae 7–22. 3 And, as of yet, no one—including the parties
and the majority—has attempted to refute it on the merits.
  Based on Smothermon’s notes, Glossip filed a fifth post-
conviction application in the OCCA in March 2023. He
——————
   3 According to Smothermon, her notes reflect two visits (“2X”) by de-

fense representatives—with notes about the two visits separated by a
horizontal line. According to the notes above the line, Sneed’s first visi-
tors were “women,” one of whom was an investigator (“invest.”) who may
have been heavy set (“heavy set?”). These visitors may have been in-
volved in Glossip’s earlier direct “appeal.” These women asked Sneed
whether he was “on Lithium?” and about a “Dr Trumpet?” The notes also
document a discussion of a “waiver for records,” “IQ test,” and “GED
VoTech.” Similarly, Ackley’s notes record that the “W[itness] [i.e., Sneed]
was visited by 2 women who said they rep Glossip.” They were “heavy,”
“1 ‘Inv.’ & 1 ‘Atty,’ ” who may have been on Sneed’s “Appellate” team.
These two women asked Sneed about lithium (“Li”), and he responded
with something about getting his “ ‘tooth pulled.’ ” Brief for Victim Fam-
ily Members as Amici Curiae 9–12.
   These notes correspond to Sneed’s 2001 meeting with Wyndi Hobbs
(Glossip’s post-conviction counsel) and an investigator named Lisa
Cooper, which was documented in the record of Glossip’s fourth post-
conviction application. See 3 App. 729–730. At this meeting, Sneed
“ ‘signed releases for juvenile, jail, prison and criminal records,’ ” id., at
729, which corresponds to the “waiver for records” mentioned in
Smothermon’s notes. Sneed later wrote a letter to Cooper to ensure that
she received information about his participation in a “vo-tech program,”
id., at 730, which corresponds to the reference to “GED VoTech.”
   According to Smothermon’s notes below the line, Sneed’s second visit
was from a “man” named “Burch” who tried to “con [him] out” of giving
“testimony” against Glossip. Burch “gave [Sneed a] case.” Ackley’s notes
likewise indicate that Sneed “[l]ater” met with “1 guy” named “Burch.”
Sneed said of the meeting, “ ‘Basically all he was trying to do was con me
out of not [sic] getting onto the stand.’ ” Brief for Victim Family Members
as Amici Curiae 9–13 (alteration in original).
   The filings from Glossip’s fourth application also recount that Lynne
Burch, one of Glossip’s attorneys, met with Sneed after the OCCA va-
cated Glossip’s first conviction. 

. Burch told Sneed “ ‘he didn’t
have to testify’ ” in Glossip’s second trial, and (in line with Smothermon’s
notes) gave Sneed a case, State v. Dyer, 

, 

,
holding that the State could not renege on a plea agreement for refusing
to testify at a codefendant’s second trial. 3 App. 731–732.
14                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

framed the notes as new evidence of Sneed’s previously un-
known bipolar disorder. Glossip attached an affidavit from
Dr. Trombka stating that he was the only person who would
have prescribed lithium while Sneed was in jail. Glossip
also attached what appears to be a jail record indicating
that Sneed has bipolar disorder. He argued that the State’s
refusal to produce these notes before trial violated Brady,
on the theory that he could have used Sneed’s condition to
impeach his testimony.
   At the same time, Glossip recognized that he would need
additional evidence to prove his theory. Together with his
application, Glossip also filed a motion for an evidentiary
hearing, in which he sought to call Smothermon and Ackley
as witnesses. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing in No. PCD–
2023–267 (OCCA), p. 2. Glossip explained in the motion
that “the resolution” of his Brady claim “turns in part on
interpretation of prosecutors’ notes.” Motion for Eviden-
tiary Hearing, at 1. “Without their testimony,” he acknowl-
edged, “any finding about what they meant or what the at-
torneys did or did not know when they wrote them would
be speculation.” 

 at 1–2.
   Independent Counsel Duncan, on the other hand, deter-
mined that no further evidence was needed. Duncan re-
leased his final report shortly after Glossip filed his fifth
application. He agreed that the State violated Glossip’s
Brady rights and asserted that Smothermon’s failure to cor-
rect Sneed’s testimony amounted to a due process violation
under Napue v. Illinois, 

 (1959). Duncan
based his conclusions on the speculation that “seasoned
capital homicide prosecutors . . . could be expected” to know
that “Trumpet” referred to Dr. Trombka and that Dr.
Trombka was the psychiatrist at the Oklahoma County
Jail. App. to Reply Brief in Support of Pet. for Cert. 23a.
He then concluded the report with praise for Drummond,
stating that Drummond’s “decision to seek a stay of execu-
tion and more thoroughly examine this case may be the
                     Cite as: 

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                        THOMAS, J., dissenting

bravest leadership decision I’ve ever witnessed.” Id., at
30a.
  Notably, Duncan failed to give Smothermon a meaningful
opportunity to explain what her notes may have meant or
what she knew about Sneed’s medical history. Instead, he
discussed the matter with her only once, during a 3-minute
phone call. App. to Brief for Victim Family Members as
Amici Curiae 31a. Worse, he gave Smothermon no chance
to review the decades-old notes before asking her to explain
them during the brief call. Ibid. Drummond was likewise
uninterested in hearing from the attorney he and Duncan
were impugning.        Following Duncan’s report, both
Smothermon and the Van Treese family contacted Drum-
mond’s office to request that Drummond speak with
Smothermon about the notes. Id., at 6a–7a, 71a. Their
pleas were ignored. 4
  At the attorney general’s behest, the State supported
Glossip’s post-conviction application.     It argued that
Smothermon’s notes proved that the prosecutors violated
Brady and Napue, and that Glossip was entitled to relief
under the State’s PCPA. It neglected to address, however,
the stringent limitations that the PCPA imposes on such
subsequent applications. See §1089(D)(8)(b).
  The OCCA unanimously denied Glossip’s fifth post-
——————
  4 The majority insists that Smothermon had a fair opportunity to ex-

plain her notes because she met once with attorneys at the Reed Smith
law firm and had an earlier, longer phone call with Duncan. Ante, at 25–
26. But, the Reed Smith meeting occurred before the release of Box 8.
See Reed Smith Report 80, n. 321 (noting that the Reed Smith meeting
occurred in May 2022, eight months before Box 8 was released in Janu-
ary 2023). And—by his own admission—Duncan “forgot to ask”
Smothermon about “Dr. Larry Trombka” during his earlier, longer phone
call. App. to Brief for Victim Family Members as Amici Curiae 32a. The
majority also faults Smothermon for not having an explanation ready
during the 3-minute phone call. Ante, at 25–26. But, without giving
Smothermon an opportunity to review the notes, it was unreasonable to
expect her instantaneously to recall their meaning 20 years later.
16                   GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

conviction application. The court first held that Glossip had
not satisfied either requirement of §1089(D)(8)(b), and thus
that the Brady and Napue claims were procedurally barred.

. The OCCA then held that both claims
also failed on the merits. No Brady violation occurred, the
court explained, because Sneed’s 1997 pretrial competency
report already informed the defense of Sneed’s prescription
and condition. The OCCA determined that defense counsel
had likely made a strategic decision not to base a defense
on them. 

. Nor was there any Napue vio-
lation, according to the court, because Sneed’s testimony
“was not clearly false” and, in any event, was not material
given defense counsel’s choice not to raise Sneed’s condi-
tion. 529 P. 3d, at 226–227. After the OCCA issued its de-
cision, Oklahoma’s Pardon and Parole Board denied clem-
ency.
                               II
   As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review this
case. “This Court from the time of its foundation has ad-
hered to the principle that it will not review judgments of
state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 

 (1945). “Be-
cause this Court has no power to review a state law deter-
mination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolu-
tion of any independent federal ground for the decision
could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advi-
sory.” Coleman v. Thompson, 

 (1991).
Thus, on direct review of a state-court judgment, the pres-
ence of an adequate and independent state ground imposes
a “jurisdictional” limitation. 

 The decision below rests
on such grounds, and the majority concludes otherwise only
by grossly mischaracterizing the state court’s analysis.
                              A
     The PCPA authorizes a criminal defendant to collaterally
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

challenge his conviction on the ground that it violates the
Federal Constitution. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1080(1). But,
given the extraordinary nature of collateral challenges, the
statute also imposes a variety of restrictions on relief. In
capital cases, the applicant must establish not just a consti-
tutional violation, but also, among other requirements, that
his claim “could not have been raised in a direct appeal” and
that “the outcome of the trial would have been different but
for the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent.”
§1089(C).
   The PCPA further bars subsequent applications for relief,
such as Glossip’s, unless the applicant satisfies two addi-
tional requirements. As mentioned, the applicant must
show that “the factual basis for the claim” was not previ-
ously “ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence.” §1089(D)(8)(b)(1). And, the applicant must demon-
strate that “the facts underlying the claim” would, if proved,
“establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the
alleged error, no reasonable fact finder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense or would have
rendered the penalty of death.” §1089(D)(8)(b)(2). These
two necessary conditions—the diligence and actual-
innocence requirements—closely mirror limits that the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) imposes on successive federal habeas petitions.
See 

(b)(2)(B); Davison v. State, 

, 

, 651, n. 1.
   As with other state-law requirements, the PCPA’s bar on
subsequent applications ordinarily will constitute an ade-
quate and independent state ground precluding our review.
It is independent because its application does not “depend
upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits.” Stewart
v. Smith, 

 (2002) (per curiam). It is ade-
quate as a general matter because States have no constitu-
tional obligation to create “collateral proceedings” in the
first place. Murray v. Giarratano, 

 (1989)
18                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

(plurality opinion). And, it is adequate in particular cases
so long as the OCCA’s decision to rely on it is not “so un-
founded” in existing law or the record “as to be essentially
arbitrary.” Cruz v. Arizona, 

 (2023) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). A decision will be inade-
quate on this basis only in “the rarest of situations.” 

  Here, the OCCA held that the PCPA barred Glossip’s ap-
plication twice over because he failed to meet either the dil-
igence or actual-innocence requirements. 

.
The OCCA properly grounded these conclusions in its anal-
ysis of the record: It explained that because Glossip had
been aware of Sneed’s condition and lithium prescription
since 1997, with “reasonable diligence” the Napue violation
“could have been presented previously.” 

.
Likewise, Glossip could not establish that, but for the al-
leged Napue violation, “no reasonable fact finder” would
have convicted him. 

. Correcting Sneed’s
testimony simply would have furnished the defense with
additional impeachment evidence that did not directly con-
tradict the State’s basic theory. But, “evidence of factual
innocence must be more than that which merely tends to
discredit or impeach a witness.” 

 (collecting
cases). The OCCA’s reliance on the PCPA thus was both an
adequate basis for its judgment and independent of federal
law, leaving us without jurisdiction. Glossip’s case should
end here.
                                B
  The majority evades this straightforward conclusion by
inventing a federal holding that the OCCA never made. Be-
fore applying the PCPA’s bar on subsequent applications,
the majority contends, the OCCA first addressed the State’s
“confession of Napue error.” Ante, at 13. The OCCA then
found this confession to be “ ‘not based in law or fact.’ ” Ante,
at 14 (quoting 

). Thus, the majority con-
cludes, the OCCA premised its application of the PCPA’s
                     Cite as: 

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                         THOMAS, J., dissenting

bar on an “antecedent holding” of “federal law,” which we
have jurisdiction to review. Ante, at 13. This theory mis-
states the decision below and defies logic.
   As the OCCA recognized (and the majority does not), the
State did not merely confess to a Napue violation; it “con-
cede[d] that [Sneed’s] alleged false testimony combined
with other unspecified cumulative errors warrant post-
conviction relief.” 

 (emphasis added). A
federal claim can warrant post-conviction relief under the
PCPA only if the applicant meets the PCPA’s additional re-
quirements. See §1089(D)(4). The State partly recognized
as much, expressly acknowledging that, “[t]o obtain post-
conviction relief, Glossip needs to show” that he satisfies
the requirements of “§1089(C).” 

. The State
therefore argued that the alleged Napue violation met those
requirements—namely, that the violation “could not have
been asserted in a direct appeal,” and that “the result of the
trial” likely would not “have been the same but for” the Na-
pue violation and cumulative errors. 3 App. 977–978.
   The OCCA properly concluded that this argument
suffered a threshold defect: It ignored the PCPA’s addi-
tional requirements for “subsequent application[s] for post-
conviction relief ” under §1089(D). Beyond showing that he
met the §1089(C) requirements, Glossip also had to show
he satisfied §1089(D)’s diligence and actual-innocence re-
quirements. §1089(D)(8)(b). Yet, the State never addressed
those prerequisites. The OCCA thus held that Oklahoma’s
“concession alone cannot overcome the limitations on suc-
cessive post-conviction review.” 

 (citing
§1089(D)(8)). 5 Because the State’s concession that the cir-
cumstances “warrant post-conviction relief ” overlooked
——————
  5 The majority claims that the OCCA could not have meant to rely on

§1089(D) because the State “expressly attempted to waive” the require-
ments of that provision. Ante, at 16. The State did no such thing. In its
response to Glossip’s application, the State of Oklahoma contended that,
20                      GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

these additional state-law requirements, the OCCA cor-
rectly observed that the State’s assertion was “not based in
law or fact.” 

. And, as the OCCA’s
§1089(D) citation makes clear, the court was referring to
Oklahoma law, not federal law.
  The structure of the OCCA’s analysis reinforces this con-
clusion. The relevant portion of the opinion reads as fol-
lows:
       Ҧ25 Glossip claims that the State failed to disclose
     evidence of Justin Sneed’s mental health treatment
     and that Sneed lied about his mental health treatment
     to the jury. Though the State in its response now con-
     cedes that this alleged false testimony combined with
     other unspecified cumulative errors warrant post-
     conviction relief, the concession alone cannot overcome
     the limitations on successive post-conviction review.
     See 22 O.S.Supp.2022, §1089(D)(8). The State’s con-
     cession is not based in law or fact.
       Ҧ26 This issue is one that could have been presented
     previously, because the factual basis for the claim was
     ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable dili-
     gence, and the facts are not sufficient to establish by
     clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged
     error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the
     applicant guilty of the underlying offense or would

——————
“[t]o obtain post-conviction relief, Glossip needs to show” he satisfies the
PCPA. 

 (citing §1089(C)). It then offered an argument that
Glossip had satisfied the PCPA’s requirements. Id., at 976–978. Such
an argument is distinct from a “waiver,” which “is the voluntary and in-
tentional relinquishment of a known right.” Price v. Zhang, 

, 

, 799–800. Regardless, even if the State had purported
to waive §1089(D), the OCCA nonetheless explicitly applied it. 

 (citing §1089(D)(8)). Perhaps the majority thinks that ruling is
too harsh—even though AEDPA’s analogous limitations on successive
federal habeas petitions are often, if not always, unwaivable. See Burton
v. Stewart, 

 (2007) (per curiam). But, the harshness of
such a ruling would not make it any less independent of federal law.
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

    have rendered the penalty of death.
      “¶27 [Glossip’s Brady claim fails on the merits.]
      Ҧ28 The evidence, moreover, does not create a Na-
    pue error. . . .” Id., at 226–227 (footnotes omitted).
   The OCCA’s application of §1089(D)’s diligence and
actual-innocence requirements in paragraph 26 immedi-
ately followed its “law or fact” comment in paragraph 25.
Only thereafter in paragraph 28 did the court turn to the
State’s Napue claim and conclude that “[t]he evidence,
moreover, does not create a Napue error.” 

(footnote omitted). This structure leaves no doubt that
§1089(D)’s requirements are why the State’s concession
failed: The application of §1089(D) in paragraph 26 ex-
plained the immediately preceding statement that the
“State’s concession is not based in law or fact.” The merits
discussion in paragraph 28 was a follow-on, alternative
holding.
   The majority’s alternative interpretation is incoherent.
According to the Court, the OCCA’s analysis proceeded as
follows: First, the court asserted that the State’s “conces-
sion alone cannot overcome the limitations on successive
post-conviction review,” and expressly cited §1089(D)’s dili-
gence and actual-innocence requirements. Ibid. Second,
the OCCA without explanation switched—in the very next
sentence—to the merits and decided the Napue question in
a single, conclusory assertion that the “State’s concession is
not based in law or fact.” 

. Third, after
summarily deciding the merits of a federal constitutional
claim, the OCCA toggled back to the procedural bar in the
very next paragraph to explain why Glossip failed to meet
the PCPA’s procedural requirements. Fourth and finally,
the OCCA circled around to spell out its “antecedent” Na-
pue merits holding. Ante, at 13. This reading is as convo-
luted and implausible as it sounds. If “the only reason”
22                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

§1089(D) applied had been because the Napue claim inde-
pendently failed on the merits, there would have been no
point in discussing §1089(D) in the first place. Ante, at 14.
   Finally, the majority cannot fall back on Michigan v.
Long, 

 (1983), which establishes a presump-
tion that a state court has based its decision on federal law
when it is “insufficiently ‘clear from the face of the opinion’ ”
that the court meant to rely on an independent state-law
ground. Ante, at 15 (quoting 463 U. S., at 1040–1041).
Here, the OCCA expressly held that §1089(D) barred any
relief based on Napue. 

. That leaves the
“face of the opinion” as “clear” as it gets. Long, 

. The majority’s tortured reading of the OCCA’s
“law or fact” phrase is too farfetched to undermine the force
of that “plain statement” that state law resolved the case.

                              C
   Unable to make a plausible case from the four corners of
the opinion below, the majority attempts to bolster its read-
ing by relying on “Oklahoma precedent involving confes-
sions of error.” Ante, at 14. In particular, in a series of de-
cisions issued between 54 and 106 years ago, the OCCA
held that a confession of error must have “a basis in the law
and in the record” to be sustained. Ante, 14–15, and n. 6.
According to the majority, these decisions establish that
whenever the State identifies that a federal constitutional
error occurred, all independent legal grounds for sustaining
the judgment disappear. Ante, at 14–15.
   We disapproved of the majority’s method of finding juris-
diction in Long. There, we decided that, as a general mat-
ter, we would no longer “decide issues of state law that go
beyond the opinion that we review” to determine whether a
judgment rests on an adequate and independent state
ground. 

. We adopted this practice be-
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

cause the “process of examining state law” ourselves “re-
quires us to interpret state laws with which we are gener-
ally unfamiliar, and which often . . . have not been dis-
cussed at length by the parties.” Id., at 1039. That concern
is on full display here: Not a single merits brief in this case
cites any of the decisions invoked by the majority for its
grand theory of confessions of error under Oklahoma law;
the majority developed it entirely sua sponte. Despite
wrapping itself in the mantle of Long, the majority disre-
gards one of its central teachings.
   If we are to look at other OCCA decisions, I would start
with history that is more recent and more on point. In re-
sponse to Glossip’s fourth application for post-conviction re-
lief, the State explicitly “waive[d] its right to argue the
claims within this . . . application are waived” under the
PCPA. 3 App. 717–718. But, the OCCA refused to accept
the waiver, holding that “[t]his Court alone will determine
whether the rules of this Court should be abandoned.” Id.,
at 775; see also ante, at 9. The OCCA thus made clear that
it would apply the PCPA’s procedural bars whether the
State wanted it to or not. It makes no sense to say, just
months later—and in the same case—that the OCCA re-
versed course without explanation and decided that
§1089(D) becomes irrelevant when the State supports the
applicant’s claim for relief (while at the same time holding
that §1089(D) applies). See ante, at 16. It should go with-
out saying that a decision issued five months before the de-
cision below in Glossip’s own case sheds far more light on
what the OCCA meant than decisions issued in different
cases a century ago.
   In any event, the majority vastly overreads the case law
it cites. The decisions establish the modest point that a con-
fession of error does not automatically entitle a defendant
to relief; rather, the OCCA will independently “examine the
record” to ensure that the confession is “well founded in
law.” Raymer v. State, 

, 

24                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

(1924) (syllabus by the court); see ante, at 14–15, and n. 6.
Of course, a confession that post-conviction relief is war-
ranted is not well founded if the PCPA bars relief. And,
those decisions nowhere hold that procedural bars that
might render an error harmless become irrelevant when-
ever the State confesses error.
   This Court follows the same rule, derived from early Eng-
lish practice, that it must “examine independently” confes-
sions of error before reversing. Young v. United States, 

, 258–259 (1942) (citing Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr.
2527, 2551, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 340–341 (K. B. 1770)). And,
this Court applies independent bars to relief even when the
Government confesses error. See, e.g., Grzegorczyk v.
United States, 

 (2022) (statement of
KAVANAUGH, J., joined by ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS,
ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari)
(rejecting the Government’s confession of error and request
for vacatur of the judgment below because the defendant’s
guilty plea waived his claim). Yet, the majority here foists
upon Oklahoma essentially the opposite rule by requiring
reversal based on errors a court has not independently
ruled to be reversible. There is no basis to infer from the
OCCA’s duty to independently examine confessions of error
that it will ignore independent grounds for upholding a con-
viction.
   The Court’s detour into state-law materials whose con-
sideration Long strongly discouraged does nothing to un-
dermine the straightforward conclusion that the decision
below invoked §1089(D)’s procedural bar as a hurdle inde-
pendent of the Napue claim’s merits. That adequate and
independent state ground bars our review of this case.
                             III
  Even if we had jurisdiction, we could not grant relief be-
cause Glossip has failed to show that he is entitled to a
hearing on the merits of his Napue claim.
                      Cite as: 

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                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

   Napue establishes that “a State may not knowingly use
false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted
conviction.” 

. If a witness gives false tes-
timony, which the prosecutor knows to be false but fails to
correct, then a new trial is warranted if there is “any rea-
sonable likelihood” that the false testimony could “have af-
fected the judgment of the jury.” 

 at 270–271. A Napue
claim therefore requires three elements: falsity, prosecuto-
rial knowledge, and materiality. Here, the OCCA correctly
held, at minimum, that the Napue claim fails the material-
ity requirement. 6

——————
   6 Because the OCCA did not address whether the prosecutors knew

that Sneed’s testimony was false, our review of the knowledge element
is especially improper. The rule that “we are a court of review, not of
first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 

 (2005), applies
with special force to such a fact-intensive question. The OCCA, which
has resolved two direct appeals and five post-conviction applications over
two decades of appeals in this case, is far more steeped in the relevant
facts than this Court. And, it is at least entitled to apply Oklahoma’s
reticulated post-conviction evidentiary standards in the first instance.
See Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1089(D)(4)(a)(1); OCCA Rule 9.7(D) (2024). The
majority’s analysis well illustrates our comparative disadvantage, as it
overreads silence and ignores explicit contrary evidence in an effort to
leap across its inferential gaps. For example, Smothermon’s notes say
nothing about bipolar disorder or psychiatry. So, even if Sneed said Dr.
Trombka prescribed the lithium, that is no justification for inferring that
he communicated the reason for the prescription or the fact that Dr.
Trombka is a psychiatrist. Further, we cannot assume that Smothermon
already knew who Dr. Trombka was at the time of the meeting. In fact,
the evidence suggests the opposite; Smothermon clearly did not under-
stand to whom Sneed was referring given that she mistook his name for
“Trumpet?” See Figure 1, supra. Finally, the Court overlooks the affi-
davit submitted by Glossip from Gary Ackley. It attests that, according
to Ackley’s contemporaneous notes of the meeting, Sneed said something
about his “ ‘tooth’ ” being “ ‘pulled,’ ” 

, which is how he said he
was mistakenly prescribed lithium in Dr. King’s report, see 2 id., at 700.
Ackley also did “not recall knowing or discussing with anyone that Justin
Sneed was on lithium at any time as treatment for bipolar disorder.” 3
id., at 940.
26                     GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                         THOMAS, J., dissenting

                                 A
   The OCCA held that Sneed’s allegedly false statements—
that he had “never seen” a psychiatrist and did not “know
why” he was given lithium—were not material because the
defense already had reason to know about Sneed’s condition
but made a strategic decision not to make an issue of it. 529
P. 3d, at 226–227. That holding is correct.
   The “touchstone of due process analysis in cases of al-
leged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial.”
Smith v. Phillips, 

 (1982). “Even in cases
of egregious prosecutorial misconduct,” we have granted re-
lief “only when the tainted evidence was material to the
case.” 

. To that end, the proper inquiry is
whether “ ‘the false testimony’ ” could have “ ‘affected the
judgment of the jury.’ ” Giglio v. United States, 

 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Napue, 

 (due process violation occurs where the State
“use[s] false evidence . . . to obtain a tainted conviction”).
   There is no reasonable likelihood that Sneed’s challenged
testimony changed the jury’s verdict, because it did not bear
on any contested issue. As early as 1997, the defense knew
that Sneed likely suffered from an “atypical mood swing
disorder” that involved “anger outburst[s],” and that his
lithium prescription helped to treat it. 2 App. 699–700,
702–703; see also ante, at 18 (agreeing that “Glossip had
access” to Sneed’s pretrial competency report). On direct
appeal from his first conviction, Glossip’s counsel identified
——————
   The majority dismisses the significance of Sneed’s “tooth pulled” com-
ment on the ground that Ackley “knew lithium was not a pain medica-
tion.” Ante, at 19, n. 8. But, whether or not Sneed in fact received lith-
ium in connection with his tooth being pulled, the fact that Sneed said
something to that effect strongly undermines the supposedly “straight-
forward inference . . . that Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trombka had
prescribed him the lithium.” Ante, at 18–19. Sneed’s disputed testimony
is not that he received lithium to treat a toothache; it is that he had
“never seen” a psychiatrist and did not “know why” he was given lithium.
12 Tr. 64 (May 26, 2004).
                   Cite as: 

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                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

his use of “lithium” to “ ‘not to feel so angry’ ” as “vital evi-
dence to attack Sneed’s credibility and the State’s specious
theory of the case.” 

.
   Nonetheless, the defense elected not to raise Sneed’s
mental condition at the second trial. Given defense coun-
sel’s awareness of the pretrial competency report, this
choice must have been a conscious one. Perhaps, as the
OCCA suggested, the defense was concerned that highlight-
ing “Sneed’s mental health” could have the counterproduc-
tive effect of “showing that he was mentally vulnerable to
Glossip’s manipulation and control.” 

. Or,
perhaps the defense believed it would not be credible to ar-
gue that Sneed acted on impulse in a manic state, given
other witnesses’ testimony that Sneed possessed a consist-
ently mild-mannered disposition. See, e.g., 7 Tr. 26 (May
19, 2004); 8 Tr. 17–18 (May 21, 2004). Whatever the reason,
the defense chose not to turn Sneed’s mental health into an
impeachment issue. That left no work for Sneed’s chal-
lenged testimony to do, so it could not reasonably have af-
fected the jury’s verdict. See Napue, 

.
   The majority concludes otherwise only by redefining the
Napue materiality inquiry. In its view, Sneed’s testimony
is material because the jury’s verdict could have changed
“[h]ad the prosecution corrected” the testimony. Ante, at
19. Thus, even “wholly irrelevant” testimony that had no
impact on the jury can be material, so long as the act of cor-
recting it might have caused the jury to doubt the witness’s
credibility. 

 We have never defined materiality in
these terms. Rather, we have consistently framed the issue
as whether “the false testimony” itself “had an effect on the
outcome.” Napue, 

. Thus, the relevant in-
quiry under Napue is whether the content of the false testi-
mony at issue is material. Were the test for materiality
whether a counterfactual correction of a false statement
might tend to undermine the witness’s credibility, the ma-
28                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

teriality requirement would be meaningless in a great num-
ber of cases.
   Napue itself illustrates this point. The “principal state
witness” in that case “testified . . . that he had received no
promise of consideration in return for his testimony” when
the prosecutor “had in fact promised him consideration” in
the form of support for a reduced sentence. 

 at 265–266.
The Court did not find this false testimony material merely
because such testimony generally undermines a witness’s
credibility. Rather, the Court took issue with the content
of the testimony: “Had the jury been apprised of the true
facts, . . . it might well have concluded that [the witness]
had fabricated testimony in order to curry the favor of the”
prosecutor. 

; see also Wearry v. Cain, 

, 393–394 (2016) (per curiam) (similarly finding false
testimony material because it concerned whether the wit-
ness was receiving favorable treatment in exchange for tes-
timony); Giglio, 405 U. S., at 154–155 (same).
   Rather than base its holding on Napue’s actual discussion
of materiality, see 360 U. S., at 270–272, the majority seizes
on a line from a different section of the opinion: that “ ‘ “[a]
lie is a lie, no matter what its subject.” ’ ” Ante, at 19, 24
(quoting 360 U. S., at 269–270). But, the majority omits the
second half of the sentence: “ ‘and, if it is in any way relevant
to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and
duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the
truth.’ ” Id., at 270 (emphasis added). Read in its entirety,
the sentence makes clear that the prosecutor’s “ ‘duty to cor-
rect’ ” is triggered only if the false statement “ ‘is . . . rele-
vant to the case.’ ” Ibid. That specification is inconsistent
with the majority’s conception of Napue, under which any
known false statement triggers the duty to correct, and
then the question of materiality turns on a counterfactual
                     Cite as: 

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                         THOMAS, J., dissenting

inquiry into whether the failure to correct could have af-
fected the outcome of the trial. 7
   The majority’s novel approach also unmoors the Napue
materiality standard from its theoretical justification. This
Court applies a defendant-friendly standard of materiality
to Napue claims “because they involve a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process.” United States
v. Agurs, 

 (1976). Where the jury does not
rely on the false testimony because it is irrelevant, no such
corruption occurs.
                              B
  In any event, the majority fails its own test. Even fram-
ing the question as whether a correction could have affected
the outcome of trial, the parties have not established mate-
riality.
  First, irrespective of whether Sneed lied, prosecutorial
correction of his testimony would not have led the jury to
infer that he had consciously committed perjury. The far
more plausible inference would have been that Sneed
——————
   7 The full context of Napue’s materiality discussion further under-

scores the decision’s emphasis on the content of the false testimony ra-
ther than the effect of a counterfactual correction:
   “Had the jury been apprised of the true facts, however, it might well
have concluded that Hamer [the witness] had fabricated testimony in
order to curry the favor of the very representative of the State who was
prosecuting the case in which Hamer was testifying, for Hamer might
have believed that such a representative was in a position to implement
(as he ultimately attempted to do) any promise of consideration. That
the Assistant State’s Attorney himself thought it important to establish
before the jury that no official source had promised Hamer consideration
is made clear by his redirect examination, which was the last testimony
of Hamer’s heard by the jury:
              .             .            .           .           .
  “[O]ur own evaluation of the record here compels us to hold that the
false testimony used by the State in securing the conviction of petitioner
may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.” 360 U. S., at 270–
272.
30                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

simply misremembered—like numerous other witnesses in
the same trial. Recall that Glossip’s second trial took place
seven years after the events in question and six years after
his first trial. Many key witnesses in Glossip’s second trial
testified in his first, leaving them open to impeachment on
any details they remembered differently six years later.
   The record is replete with instances of counsel—including
the prosecutors—reminding the State’s witnesses of facts
they had forgotten or misremembered. See, e.g., 5 Tr. 90
(May 17, 2004); 7 Tr. 83–85 (May 19, 2004); 8 Tr. 40–42
(May 20, 2004); 9 Tr. 100 (May 21, 2004); 10 Tr. 31 (May 24,
2004); 14 Tr. 18 (May 28, 2004). Moreover, Sneed took lith-
ium for only a brief period in 1997. Considering that this
testimony held no significance for any contested issue at
trial, in this environment there is no reason to think its cor-
rection would have been noteworthy, much less the voilà
moment the majority imagines.
   Second, correcting Sneed’s allegedly false statements
would not have led the jury to believe that Sneed’s mental
condition led him to attack Van Treese on his own initia-
tive. To begin with, the prosecution had no Napue obliga-
tion to disclose that Sneed had bipolar disorder. Napue re-
quires prosecutors “to correct” what they know to be “false
testimony,” not to proactively identify impeachment mate-
rial. 

. At most, the only false statement
was Sneed’s assertion that he had not seen a psychiatrist.
The OCCA found Sneed “was more than likely in denial of
his mental health disorders.” 

. This fac-
tual finding has record support. Sneed asserted during his
pretrial competency evaluation that he “does not think he
has any serious mental problems.” 

. That state-
ment predated his plea agreement and so cannot be chalked
up to trying to maintain his credibility on the stand. The
OCCA thus reasonably found Sneed’s statement about his
own knowledge was not false. Nor did Sneed testify that he
was given lithium to treat a cold. See ante, at 23–24. He
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

said only that “shortly after” he had asked for Sudafed he
was given lithium for a “reason” that he “d[id]n’t know.” 12
Tr. 64 (May 26, 2004). Sneed thus never falsely testified as
to why he received lithium. And, without knowing why a
psychiatrist prescribed lithium to Sneed, a lay jury would
not likely be able to attribute much significance to the mere
fact that a psychiatrist did so.
   Regardless, there is no reason to think that disclosing
Sneed’s bipolar disorder would have affected the outcome of
the trial. Glossip’s defense team was well aware of Sneed’s
condition and chose not to use it as impeachment evidence.
As appellate judges examining a cold record 20 years after
the trial, we should be wary of believing that we understand
the import of evidence better than Glossip’s counsel. More-
over, the defense made no effort in its questions and argu-
mentation to lay the groundwork for a theory that Sneed
acted on a manic impulse. So, it is hard to see why the jury
would have developed any theory on its own from a cursory
mention of the condition.
   Finally, the Court cannot rescue its materiality analysis
by invoking the cumulative-error doctrine. The Court as-
serts with virtually no legal analysis that various other vi-
olations of state and federal law undermine confidence in
the verdict. Ante, at 21–22. But, the cumulative-error doc-
trine applies only if there are multiple errors to consider cu-
mulatively. See Wearry, 

 (only “wrongfully
withheld” evidence can be assessed cumulatively under
Brady and Napue); Hanson v. Sherrod, 

(CA10 2015) (“We cumulate error only upon a showing of at
least two actual errors”). The OCCA held that the remain-
ing claims of error the Court asserts are either procedurally
barred, meritless, or both. See 

; 3 App.
776–783; No. PCD–2022–589 (OCCA, Nov. 10, 2022), p. 11;
supra, at 9–11. We did not grant certiorari to review the
correctness of those decisions, so they are not properly be-
fore us. See Pet. for Cert. i.
32                      GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

   In all events, the other claimed violations are meritless
or beyond our jurisdiction. The State’s supposed violation
of the rule of sequestration is a state-law issue over which
we have no jurisdiction. See 3 App. 780–781. 8 The
evidence-destruction claim is the majority’s own creation.
Although both parties mention alleged evidence destruction
in the background statements of their briefs, neither argues
to this Court that any destruction of evidence amounted to
a violation of federal law militating in favor of reversal. See
Brief for Petitioner 33–38; Brief for Respondent 30–31. So
too, there is no evidence that Sneed wished to “recant” his
testimony, ante, at 21; to the contrary, Sneed explained to
Reed Smith that “recant[ing]” was “impossible because I
told the truth,” 

 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also n. 2, supra (further explaining that Sneed has
never denied the truth of his testimony against Glossip).
And, the claim that Glossip sold his couch and television for
——————
  8 The majority insists that the alleged violation of the rule of seques-

tration is more than a state-law issue, ante, at 22, n. 9, but for support it
offers only a case discussing “the ethical limits on guiding witnesses” as
defined by the American Bar Association’s model professional responsi-
bility code for States, see Geders v. United States, 

, and
n. 3 (1976). Moreover, although the State has confessed a violation of
“the rule of sequestration” (without addressing the OCCA’s earlier, con-
trary decision, see supra, at 10–11), it has not conceded that Smothermon
improperly influenced Sneed’s testimony, see Brief for Respondent 13; 

. Such a claim is utterly unsupported. Glossip initially based
this accusation on “handwritten notes” found in a copy of Smothermon’s
letter to Sneed’s attorney, which Glossip claimed were instructions from
Smothermon on what Sneed was to say at trial. See Pet. for Cert. in
No. 22–6500, p. 20. But, Glossip now concedes that those notes came
from Sneed’s attorney, not Smothermon. Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 4.
Despite this concession, the majority asserts that Smothermon acted im-
properly when she stated at trial that, although she had spoken with
Sneed’s attorney, she had never before heard him claim that he had at-
tempted to stab Van Treese in the chest. Ante, at 22, n. 9 (citing 12 Tr.
107–108 (May 26, 2004)). The majority offers no evidence to suggest that
this statement was false. Yet, it insists on deeming Smothermon’s con-
duct a serious ethical breach.
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

$900 on January 8—thus suggesting an alternative source
for the money he stole from Van Treese—is a nonstarter:
Glossip himself testified under oath that he received only
$490 for those items and others. 15 Tr. 17 (June 1, 2004).
  In short, even setting aside our lack of jurisdiction, Glos-
sip still lacks a valid Napue claim because Sneed’s allegedly
false testimony was immaterial.
                              IV
   Having erred in both its threshold and merits analyses,
the majority rounds out its opinion with an indefensible re-
medial decree. Rather than vacate the decision below, the
majority takes the remarkable step of requiring a new trial.
Ante, at 27–29. But, whether Glossip is entitled to a new
trial turns on several unresolved questions of state law that
this Court has no authority to disregard or decide for itself.
And, at the very least, Glossip cannot show that he is enti-
tled to relief without an evidentiary hearing.
                             A
  Even if the majority is correct that this Court has juris-
diction and that the OCCA misapplied Napue, the appro-
priate remedy is to remand for further proceedings. This
Court has no authority to order a new trial.
                              1
   This Court cannot order a new trial unless federal law
required the OCCA to do so in the decision below. “It is
beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power
over the courts of the several States.” Dickerson v. United
States, 

 (2000). “Our only power over
state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they
incorrectly adjudge federal rights.” Herb, 324 U. S., at 125–
126. Even when a federal question gives this Court juris-
diction to review a state-court judgment, “State courts” re-
main “the only proper tribunal” for “the decision of ques-
tions” in the case “arising under their local law.” Murdock
34                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

v. Memphis, 

 (1875). Thus, when a state
court’s judgment rests on an erroneous interpretation of
federal law, this Court must “either render such judgment
here as the State court should have rendered, or remand
the case to that court, as the circumstances of the case may
require.” 

. It has no authority to order relief that
the state court could legitimately have refused. And, natu-
rally, we cannot determine what judgment “the State court
should have rendered” if doing so requires resolving ques-
tions of state law beyond our jurisdiction. 

.
In such cases, remand is the only legitimate disposition.

.
   Our customary practice reflects these principles. “Nor-
mally the Supreme Court, when reversing a state court
judgment, remands the case for proceedings ‘not incon-
sistent’ with the Court’s opinion. The state court is there-
fore free to resolve any undecided questions or even to alter
its determination of underlying state law.” W. Baude, J.
Goldsmith, J. Manning, J. Pfander, & A. Tyler, Hart and
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 634
(8th ed. 2025) (Hart & Wechsler); accord, S. Shapiro, K. Gel-
ler, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme
Court Practice §3.27, p. 3–94 (11th ed. 2019). The Court
usually refrains from directing a specific form of relief even
when reversing decisions made on direct appeal of a crimi-
nal conviction, with no apparent issues of state law remain-
ing to be decided. See, e.g., Counterman v. Colorado, 

, 82–83 (2023); Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 

 (2022); Hemphill v. New York, 

 (2022).
                               2
   The Court today instead “remand[s] the case for a new
trial.” Ante, at 2. This step would be unusual even on direct
review. In the context of a successive motion for post-
                   Cite as: 

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                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

conviction relief in a state-law regime replete with special-
ized procedural requirements, it is without precedent. And,
more importantly, the majority’s directive exceeds the lim-
its on this Court’s jurisdiction. For at least three reasons,
state-law questions prevent this Court from holding that
the OCCA should have granted Glossip a new trial below.
   First, the majority’s jurisdictional holding necessarily
leaves open state-law questions for the OCCA to address on
remand. The Court finds jurisdiction by invoking the Long
presumption that a state court “reli[es] on federal law”
when it is “insufficiently ‘clear from the face of the opinion’ ”
that its decision rests on state law. Ante, at 15 (quoting 463
U. S., at 1040–1041). But, the Long presumption is just
that—a presumption. When this Court invokes it, state
courts “remai[n] free” to “ ‘reinstat[e] their prior judgments
after clarifying their reliance on state grounds.’ ” Arizona
v. Evans, 

, and n. 3 (1995); see also Kansas v.
Carr, 

 (2016) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that, when this Court relies on the Long pre-
sumption, the “lower court is able to reinstate its holding as
a matter of state law”). “Even when the Supreme Court
does review an ambiguous decision and reverses on the fed-
eral issue, the state courts retain the power on remand to
consider independent state-law grounds and, indeed, to rely
on such grounds in reinstating their initial judgment.”
Hart & Wechsler 672. The OCCA is therefore entitled to
clarify that it meant to invoke §1089(D)’s bar on subsequent
applications even accepting the majority’s Napue analysis.
The majority’s contrary directive ignores settled law.
   This error is no mere technical violation. It erases an es-
sential component of the Long presumption, which is meant
to “preserve the integrity of federal law” and to “provide
state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state ju-
risprudence unimpeded by federal interference.” 

. Presuming a federal basis for ambiguous decisions
36                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

ensures that States cannot evade federal review by obfus-
cation. At the same time, allowing for clarification on re-
mand preserves state courts’ freedom to develop and apply
their own law as they see fit. We have even said that re-
versing under the Long presumption makes state courts
“freer” to develop their own law because they can do so
while “disabused of [an] erroneous view of what the United
States Constitution requires.” Evans, 

. In
contrast, under the majority’s approach, ambiguity in the
decision below gives this Court license to vaporize any in-
dependent state grounds that it does not like, no matter
how clearly they ought to apply as a matter of state law.
This sort of federal power grab dishonors our dual system
of state and federal courts.
   Second, even setting aside §1089(D)(8), there are several
potential independent state-law grounds for denying relief
that the OCCA has not yet considered. Where there is “a
possible adequate and independent state ground” for the de-
cision below that “was not addressed by the state court,”
“the state court may address th[e] question on remand.”
California v. Ramos, 

, 997–998, n. 7 (1983).
Indeed, the “settled rule” is that “the Supreme Court will
remand to permit the state court to resolve the undeter-
mined state law issue.” Hart & Wechsler 655. “The state
court remains free to reinstate its prior judgment on that
state-law ground.” 

 (collecting cases of reinstatement);
see also Smith v. Texas, 

 (2007) (ALITO,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n cases in which this Court has reversed
a state-court decision based on a possible federal constitu-
tional violation, it is not uncommon for the state court on
remand to reinstate the same judgment on state-law
grounds” (collecting cases)).       Here, several potential
grounds for reinstating the decision below are apparent.
   To begin, the alleged Napue violation may be harmless
under the PCPA’s prejudice standard. See §1089(C)(2). Be-
                  Cite as: 

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                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

low, the OCCA recognized that this standard required Glos-
sip to prove that preventing the errors he alleged “would
have changed the outcome” of the trial. 

;
see §1089(C)(2). In its confession of error, the State also
agreed that “Glossip needs to show . . . that the outcome of
the trial would have been different.” 

 (citing
§1089(C)). The OCCA had no occasion to consider this
standard, however, because it concluded that any false tes-
timony would have been immaterial under the federal no-
reasonable-probability standard. See 

.
The Court today applies that standard and disagrees. Ante,
at 19–22. But, no court has yet applied §1089(C)(2)’s
higher—and concededly applicable—standard. The OCCA
should have the chance to do so on remand.
   In addition, in the proceedings below, only the State ar-
gued that there was a Napue violation, and it is unclear
whether the State can raise a claim on a defendant’s behalf.
See §1089(A) (assuming that an “application for post-
conviction relief ” comes from “a defendant”). Nor is it clear
that the State timely raised its Napue objection. State law
required Glossip to file his application within 60 days of the
State’s disclosure of Box 8. See OCCA Rule 9.7(G)(3). Glos-
sip met that deadline. The State did not. See 

(response dated 69 days after disclosure of Box 8). Thus,
any Napue claim is at least arguably untimely. And, there
may be more state-law issues for the OCCA to consider of
which we are unaware simply because we are unfamiliar
with Oklahoma’s highly specialized post-conviction proce-
dure.
   Third, even if state law does not bar Glossip’s Napue
claim entirely, state law appears not to authorize a new
trial as the remedy for a violation at this stage. Cf. Price v.
Georgia, 

 (1970) (remanding after finding
petitioner’s conviction unconstitutional because petitioner’s
precise remedy turned “upon the construction of several
38                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

Georgia statutes and on the power of Georgia courts to fash-
ion remedial orders” “under Georgia law”). The PCPA au-
thorizes only two dispositions of a capital post-conviction
application when it is first filed with the OCCA: denial, or
remand to the trial court for a merits determination.
§§1089(D)(4) and (5). The OCCA has made clear that the
Act does not authorize vacating the applicant’s conviction
or sentence at that initial stage, for “affidavits and eviden-
tiary materials filed in support of a post-conviction applica-
tion are not part of the trial record but are only part of the
capital post-conviction record.” Slaughter v. State, 

, 

. “As such, those affidavits
and evidentiary materials are not reviewed on their merits
but are reviewed . . . ‘[t]o determine if a threshold showing
is met to require a review on the merits.’ ” 

 (quoting
OCCA Rule 9.7(D)(1)(a); emphasis added).
   In this respect, the OCCA’s initial review of capital post-
conviction proceedings is analogous to AEDPA’s procedure
for second and successive federal habeas petitions. Before
an applicant can proceed with such a petition, he must first
file a motion for authorization in the court of appeals. 

(b)(3)(A). If the applicant makes a prima fa-
cie showing that he satisfies the special requirements for
second and successive petitions, the court of appeals au-
thorizes proceedings in the district court. §2244(b)(3)(C).
But, if the applicant fails to make a prima facie showing,
the court of appeals denies authorization, and the proceed-
ings end. No matter how strong the applicant’s ultimate
claim, the court of appeals cannot grant habeas relief at
that stage; only a district court may do so. For the same
reason, it makes no sense to say that no “further eviden-
tiary proceedings” are warranted because the OCCA
“agree[d]” they are unnecessary. Ante, at 26. The OCCA’s
authority to deny relief without a hearing does not imply
corresponding authority to summarily grant relief.
   In short, multiple state-law issues foreclose this Court
                 Cite as: 

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                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

from holding that the OCCA “should have rendered” a
“judgment” ordering a new trial. Murdock, 

.
The Court therefore has no authority to order one itself.
                               3
   The majority insists that “Glossip is entitled to a new
trial” simply because “this Court has jurisdiction” and “[a]
new trial is the remedy for a Napue violation.” Ante, at 29.
This response overlooks, however, that “States may apply
their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims.” How-
lett v. Rose, 

 (1990). Here, Glossip seeks
post-conviction relief under Oklahoma’s PCPA.             See
§1080(1); supra, at 16–18. Under that Act, a new trial is
not the remedy for a Napue violation unless Glossip also
satisfies certain procedural requirements and unless his
case first proceeds to a merits hearing before a state trial
court. See §1089(D)(4); Slaughter, 

.
   For similar reasons, the majority’s reliance on Ake v. Ok-
lahoma, 

 (1985), in which this Court reversed
the OCCA and remanded for a new trial, 

 at 73–74, 87,
is misplaced. See ante, at 29. The asserted state ground in
that case was a “waiver rule” with an established exception
for “federal constitutional errors.” 470 U. S., at 74–75. In
other words, the waiver rule turned on “whether federal
constitutional error ha[d] been committed.” 

.
Thus, it was perfectly clear that the rule there could not
supply an independent ground for denying a federal consti-
tutional claim. And, because the case arose on direct re-
view, 

 at 73–74, the Court could also have confidence
that no other state ground could support the decision below,
and therefore that the petitioner was legally entitled to a
new trial. Here, by contrast, the Court has found jurisdic-
tion only by applying the Long presumption; the case arises
from a subsequent post-conviction application in a complex
state-law regime that imposes numerous procedural bars;
there are several state grounds that could foreclose relief
40                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

entirely; and the OCCA issued the decision below in a pre-
liminary posture in which it was not authorized to order a
new trial. Further, although the new-trial order in Ake was
legally defensible, it was still a significant departure from
ordinary practice, which is to remand for further proceed-
ings even on direct review. See supra, at 34.
   The majority further insists that no “precedent” requires
a remand based on the Long presumption. Ante, at 28. It
claims that at most this Court has recognized the power of
state courts to “ ‘grant relief to criminal defendants’ ” under
state law after erroneously granting relief under federal
law. Ibid. That assertion is incorrect. Evans recognized
state courts’ power to reinstate their judgments after rever-
sal as part of a general discussion of the Long presumption.
See 514 U. S., at 7–9. Its reasoning was not confined to the
specific context of a state court granting relief to a criminal
defendant. Similarly, treatise writers have recognized that
state courts can reinstate their judgments whenever this
Court “review[s] an ambiguous decision.” Hart & Wechsler
672. And, more fundamentally, when this Court asserts ju-
risdiction based on the Long presumption, “we merely as-
sume that there are no [adequate and independent state]
grounds” justifying the decision below; we do not conclu-
sively decide that none exists. 463 U. S., at 1042 (emphasis
added). Without a definitive ruling that no independent
state ground bars ordering a new trial, we cannot hold that
ordering a new trial is the “judgment” that “the State court
should have rendered.” Murdock, 

. The ma-
jority cannot have it both ways. If it wants to rely on the
Long presumption to find jurisdiction, it must accept the
limitations that the presumption entails.
                              4
   Finally, the majority asserts that Glossip is presently en-
titled to a new trial, because, under Oklahoma law, a con-
cession that an error occurred at trial renders irrelevant all
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)           41

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

other legal obstacles to a new trial. Ante, at 27–28. As I
have already explained, the precedents cited by the Court
do not support that proposition; they establish only that
courts have an independent duty to assess confessed errors
for themselves, which is nearly the opposite of the major-
ity’s point. Supra, at 23–24. To make matters even more
implausible, the Court apparently interprets this principle
to mean that a confession of error transforms a nonmerits
preliminary proceeding into a merits proceeding where the
OCCA can directly order ultimate relief. And, more im-
portantly, it is for the OCCA to decide whether state law
entitles Glossip to a new trial at this time, and it is absurd
to think that the only conclusion the OCCA could reach is
the majority’s.
                              B
   Even if we could blind ourselves to the foregoing proce-
dural issues, Glossip would still be entitled to no more than
an evidentiary hearing on his Napue claim. The Court says
that the facts “supported by the record establish a violation
of Napue,” as though it were a trial court making findings
after an evidentiary hearing. Ante, at 29. That approach
cannot possibly be right. The PCPA envisions that further
proceedings are necessary if there are “controverted, previ-
ously unresolved factual issues.” §1089(D)(5). On this rec-
ord, I do not see how one could conclude that there is not
even a genuine issue of fact as to whether a Napue claim
has been established—especially considering that Glossip
himself recognized below that, without further discovery,
his claims rested on “speculation.” Motion for Evidentiary
Hearing, at 1–2.
   Concluding that no new factual development is needed is
particularly inappropriate given the alternative reading of
the notes advanced by the Van Treese family in this Court.
As discussed above, the family has argued that the sup-
posed “smoking gun”—the notes from Box 8—in fact reflects
42                  GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

Sneed’s recollection of what defense counsel had asked him
at two prior meetings. Supra, at 12–13, and n. 3. Smother-
mon and Ackley have likewise endorsed this interpretation,
which casts serious doubt on Glossip’s and the State’s the-
ory. Ibid. If Sneed simply reported that he was asked about
Dr. Trombka without admitting Dr. Trombka prescribed
him lithium, Smothermon and Ackley would have had no
reason to know that Dr. Trombka prescribed him lithium.
And, the indication in Ackley’s notes that Sneed apparently
mentioned his “ ‘tooth’ ” being “ ‘pulled’ ” suggests that Sneed
stood by his earlier story that he was mistakenly prescribed
lithium when his tooth was pulled. 

; see 2 id., at
700 (Sneed’s earlier statement).
   Given the existence of a plausible alternative interpreta-
tion of the evidence, I would not order a new trial at this
time even if we had discretion to do so. To the extent the
Court insists it cannot endorse the family’s theory because
it relies on “extra-record materials not properly before the
Court,” ante, at 25, such as parts of Ackley’s notes, that is
because the parties collusively excluded this highly rele-
vant evidence from the record in order to reach a predeter-
mined outcome. The majority rewards this gamesmanship,
and in so doing denies the victim’s family the opportunity
to present contrary evidence.
   The “Government should turn square corners in dealing
with the people.” St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 

 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). That command
extends not only to criminal defendants, but also to their
victims. “[C]onducting retrials years later inflicts substan-
tial pain on crime victims,” who must “relive their trauma
and testify again,” in this case 28 “years after the crim[e]
occurred.” Edwards v. Vannoy, 

, 263–264
(2021). The Oklahoma Constitution recognizes this interest
by giving crime victims like the Van Treese family the
right—“which shall be protected by law in a manner no less
vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused”—“to be
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            43

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing,
disposition, parole and any proceeding during which a right
of the victim is implicated.” Art. II, §34(A). Glossip, on the
other hand, would suffer no prejudice from an evidentiary
hearing in which the Van Treese family had the opportunity
to present its case. If the evidence is as decisive as the ma-
jority believes, Glossip would still receive a new trial. There
is no excuse for denying the Van Treese family its day in
court.
   After having bent the law at every turn to grant relief to
Glossip, the Court suddenly retreats to faux formalism
when dealing with the victim’s family. The Court concludes
that it need not honor the family’s right to be heard because
the family did not request an evidentiary hearing earlier in
the proceedings. Ante, at 27, n. 11. But, the family had no
need to do so, since Glossip had conceded that “a hearing is
necessary” for his claim to rise above the level of “specula-
tion.” Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, at 2. And, before
this Court, the Van Treese family has vigorously asserted
its interests. The family filed the only brief opposing certi-
orari in this case. See Brief for Victim Family Members
et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition. It filed a merits brief
highlighting critical evidence that the parties sought to
sweep under the rug. See supra, at 12–13, and n. 3. And,
it filed a motion to participate in oral argument, which this
Court denied. 

 (2024). The majority’s asser-
tion that the family has sat on its rights is groundless. Nor
is there any reason to believe that Oklahoma victims’ right
to be heard in “any proceeding,” Art. II, §34(A), contains an
implicit exception for “post-conviction hearings,” ante, at
27, n. 11. Finally, even if the family had no formal right to
be heard, any reasonable factfinder plainly could consider
the account of the evidence that the family has brought to
light, making the majority’s procedural objections beside
the point. Make no mistake: The majority is choosing to
cast aside the family’s interests. I would not.
44                 GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

                         *     *   *
  The Court’s decision distorts our jurisdiction, imagines a
constitutional violation where none occurred, and abandons
basic principles governing the disposition of state-court ap-
peals. I respectfully dissent.