Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                             Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 HOWARD GOLDEY, ASSOCIATE WARDEN, ET AL. v.
         ANDREW FIELDS, III, ET AL.
   ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
   STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
               No. 24–809.    Decided June 30, 2025

  PER CURIAM.
  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 

 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of
action for damages against federal officers for certain al-
leged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court sub-
sequently recognized two additional contexts where implied
Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which
was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After
1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens
to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post-
1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most
unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job
for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 

 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff
here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force
Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials.
  This case began when prison officials at the U. S. Peni-
tentiary in Lee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff An-
drew Fields be placed in solitary confinement. Prison offi-
cials monitored Fields while he was isolated. Fields alleges
that during their periodic checks, officials would “physically
abuse” him. Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

, 268 (CA4 2024).
  Fields sued the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the prison war-
den, and several prison officials in federal court for dam-
ages, claiming that certain prison officials used excessive
force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
2                     GOLDEY v. FIELDS

                         Per Curiam

The U. S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia
dismissed Fields’s complaint. As relevant here, the court
determined that Fields lacked a cause of action under
Bivens. Because “the Supreme Court has never ruled that
a damages remedy exists for claims of excessive force by
BOP officers against an inmate,” the District Court had “no
difficulty in concluding that these claims arise in a new con-
text” and that a Bivens remedy was unavailable. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 49a; see id., at 45a–54a.
   Fields appealed. In a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit
reversed in relevant part, concluding that Fields could pro-
ceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for
damages. The Court of Appeals determined that no “special
factors counseled against extending Bivens” here. 109
F. 4th, at 270.
   Judge Richardson dissented and stated: “A faithful ap-
plication of our precedent and the Supreme Court’s leads
squarely to the conclusion that we cannot create a new
Bivens action here.” Id., at 283.
   After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, prison
officials sought review in this Court, with the support of the
United States as amicus curiae. We now grant the petition
for certiorari and reverse.
   This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing
a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial ac-
tivity.’ ” Egbert, 

. To determine whether a
Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step
test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new
Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a
meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has
recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 

 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 

 (1980);
Davis v. Passman, 

 (1979); Bivens, 

.
   Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special fac-
tors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                           Per Curiam

equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing a damages action to proceed.’ ” Egbert, 

. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers
principles.” Ziglar, 

.
   This case arises in a new context, and “special factors”
counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of ac-
tion for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To
begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of
prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of
action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148–
149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth
Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative
systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordi-
nately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v.
Safley, 

, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alterna-
tive remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal
prisoners. Ziglar, 

; see Correctional Ser-
vices Corp. v. Malesko, 

 (2001). The exist-
ence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels
against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are
‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’ ” Egbert,

.
   For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently de-
clined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596
U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for
certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
                                              It is so ordered.