PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 606 U. S. Part 2 Pages 942–945

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 30, 2025

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors. 942 OCTOBER TERM, 2024

Syllabus

GOLDEY, ASSOCIATE WARDEN, et al. v. FIELDS et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 24–809. Decided June 30, 2025 Prison offcials at the U. S. Penitentiary in Lee County, Virginia, placed petitioner Fields in solitary confnement. Fields alleges that during periodic checks, offcials physically abused him. Fields sued the Bureau of Prisons and prison offcials for damages, claiming excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The District Court dismissed Fields's complaint, determining he lacked a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. The Fourth Cir- cuit reversed, concluding that Fields could proceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for damages. Held: Bivens does not extend to allow an Eighth Amendment excessive- force claim for damages against federal prison offcials. For 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. This case arises in a new context, and special factors counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. Congress has actively legislated in prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. Extending Bivens to excessive-force claims could have nega- tive consequences for prison operations, and alternative remedial proce- dures already exist for federal prisoners. Certiorari granted; 109 F. 4th 264, reversed and remanded.

Per Curiam. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal offcers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subse- quently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post-1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most un- Cite as: 606 U. S. 942 (2025) 943

Per Curiam

usual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Ap- peals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison offcials. This case began when prison offcials at the U. S. Peniten- tiary in Lee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff Andrew Fields be placed in solitary confnement. Prison offcials monitored Fields while he was isolated. Fields alleges that during their periodic checks, offcials would “physically abuse” him. Fields v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 109 F. 4th 264, 268 (CA4 2024). Fields sued the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the prison war- den, and several prison offcials in federal court for damages, claiming that certain prison offcials used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The U. S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dis- missed Fields's complaint. As relevant here, the court de- termined that Fields lacked a cause of action under Bivens. Because “the Supreme Court has never ruled that a damages remedy exists for claims of excessive force by BOP offcers against an inmate,” the District Court had “no diffculty in concluding that these claims arise in a new context” and that a Bivens remedy was unavailable. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a; see id., at 45a–54a. Fields appealed. In a divided decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed in relevant part, concluding that Fields could pro- ceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim for damages. The Court of Appeals determined that no “special factors counseled against extending Bivens” here. 109 F. 4th, at 270. Judge Richardson dissented and stated: “A faithful applica- tion of our precedent and the Supreme Court's leads squarely to the conclusion that we cannot create a new Bivens action here.” Id., at 283. 944 GOLDEY v. FIELDS

Per Curiam

After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, prison offcials sought review in this Court, with the support of the United States as amicus curiae. We now grant the petition for certiorari and reverse. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is `a disfavored judicial activ- ity.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special fac- tors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to `weigh the costs and benefts of allowing a damages action to proceed.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148–149. In ad- dition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic con- sequences for prison offcials and the “inordinately diffcult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safey, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such al- ternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Cite as: 606 U. S. 942 (2025) 945

Per Curiam

Bivens suits even if such “procedures are `not as effective as an individual damages remedy.' ” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap- tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None