Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
40 later published cases cite this decision. The 24 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1977)
- Selig v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1967)
- Sun Company Inc. And Subsidiaries (Consolidated) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3d Cir. 1982)
- Chevy Chase Land Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1979)
- Southland Royalty Co. v. United States (Court of Claims 1978)
- Thompson v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1976)
- Florida Publishing Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1975)
- Cagle v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1974)
- Southern Natural Gas Company v. The United States (Court of Claims 1969)
- Beatty v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1966)
- Edward R. Godfrey and Georgia G. Godfrey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (6th Cir. 1964)
- Ramos v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1962)
- Wilson v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 1961)
- Morgan v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1961)
- Ruoff v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1958)
- Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1958)
- South American Gold & Platinum Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1947)
- David J. Lychuk and Mary K. Lychuk v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2001)
- Estate of Wood v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1985)
- Vogel v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1984)
- Anderson-Tully Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1984)
- Heath v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1983)
- Wacker v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1980)
- Vulcan Materials Company v. United States (5th Cir. 1971)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*108
1.
2. In 1939 petitioner instituted suit in a Federal District Court to quiet title to land on which in 1928 petitioner had given an oil and gas lease to the Texas Co. In January 1940 Texas Co. obtained an oil and gas lease on this land from the title claimants, paying therefor $ 25,000. In June 1940 petitioner reimbursed Texas for the $ 25,000 payment and Texas agreed to assign to petitioner the claimants' lease if their title should be recognized by District Court. In 1941 the litigation was settled by compromise agreement providing,
3. In 1931 petitioner acquired mineral leases covering two tracts of land comprising approximately 18,000 acres. In 1941 petitioner expended $ 11,361.56 for a geophysical survey of these properties*109 to determine whether subsurface structures thereon were sufficiently high to justify drilling for oil or gas.
4. Petitioner purchased for $ 30,000 a 575-acre tract of land, primarily for the purpose of acquiring the mineral rights thereto, and on its books assigned $ 18,000 to the mineral rights therein and $ 12,000 to the surface. In 1942 petitioner's oil and gas lessee drilled a dry hole on this land and forfeited the lease as worthless. During the taxable year petitioner retained ownership of the land in fee.
*507 The Commissioner determined deficiencies in petitioner's income tax liability for the calendar years 1941 and 1942 in the respective amounts of $ 25,927.19 and $ 47,524.85. These deficiencies were based *508 upon numerous adjustments to petitioner's net income, many of which are not contested. The issues presented are, (1) whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction for percentage depletion on its share of net profits from its lessee's drilling operations on oil and gas leases, (2) whether petitioner sustained a deductible loss of $ 25,000 in 1941 in connection with a certain oil and gas lease, (3) whether petitioner may deduct an amount expended for geophysical surveys on property which it held under a mineral lease, and (4) whether petitioner sustained a deductible loss in 1942 as a result of unsuccessful drilling operations by its lessee on land to which it held fee title. The correctness *111 of respondent's disallowance of a deduction for legal expenses in connection with litigation to quiet title to land was challenged by petitioner in the pleadings but is conceded on brief. The case was submitted upon a stipulation of facts, with joint exhibits, and upon a deposition introduced in evidence at the hearing. The facts stipulated are so found. Other facts are found from the testimony given by the deponent on direct and cross examination.
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The petitioner is a corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Maryland on January 19, 1926, with its principal office and place of business located in Houma, Louisiana. Petitioner filed corporation income and declared value excess profits tax returns, Form 1120, and corporation excess profits tax returns, Form 1121, for the calendar years 1941 and 1942 with the collector of internal revenue for the district of Louisiana.
On January 26, 1940, Texas obtained an oil, gas, and mineral lease from the McEnery heirs covering the land which was claimed by*114 them and which was the subject of the above mentioned suit by petitioner. As consideration for the lease Texas paid the McEnery heirs $ 25,000 in cash and gave them a $ 25,000 oil payment, and agreed to pay the lessors a one-eighth royalty on oil and gas produced on such land as might be adjudged by the Federal court to be owned by them.
On June 24, 1940, petitioner and Texas entered into a letter agreement wherein it was provided that, "In order that we [petitioner] may be protected against the possibility of the failure of our title to all or any portion of the above described lands leased by us to you, and in order to protect our obligation of warranty under our aforesaid contract," Texas would assign to petitioner its rights under the McEnery heirs' lease of January 26, 1940, in the event that the McEnery title should be recognized. Such assigned lease was then immediately to become subject to the original agreement between Texas and petitioner. It was also agreed that Texas was to place in escrow one-half of petitioner's one-fourth royalty interest from oil produced on the lands in dispute. As consideration for Texas' agreement to the assignment, petitioner reimbursed Texas*115 for the $ 25,000 cash payment to the McEnery heirs and assumed the $ 25,000 oil payment. In discharge of this oil payment, petitioner paid the McEnery heirs $ 7,743.94 in 1940 and $ 17,256.06 in 1941. The $ 25,000 cash payment was capitalized on petitioner's books as cost of the "McEnery Heirs" lease.
*510 Petitioner's controversy with the McEnery heirs was settled by compromise agreement on October 7, 1941, which agreement was, on October 28, 1941, approved by and made the judgment of the District Court in the suit pending between the parties. The compromise agreement recognized that petitioner owned fee title to the lands in dispute and recited that petitioner had paid to the McEnery heirs $ 3,302.32 and conveyed to them a one-eightieth royalty interest in all oil, gas, and minerals produced on the disputed lands. The McEnery heirs retained the $ 25,000 cash payment and the $ 25,000 received in discharge of the oil payment. In connection with the settlement of the title controversy, petitioner incurred and paid during the year 1941 attorney's fees of $ 6,000.
In its computation of net income for 1941 petitioner deducted the $ 25,000 cash payment as amortized cost of leases*116 and deducted the $ 6,000 attorneys' fees as a business expense, both of which deductions were disallowed by the respondent.
1. Determination of the elevation of the points to be surveyed.
2. Drilling of small bore holes by portable equipment to a depth which is usually the top of the sands containing fresh water. This may vary from 25" to 300" plus, depending upon the area surveyed.
3. Placing of portable seismographs in proper relation to the bore hole.
4. Connecting said seismographs to the recording wagon or boat.
5. Running in and exploding a dynamite*117 charge in the bore hole.
6. Recording the reflected seismic waves as picked up by the small seismographs. This is recorded in the recording wagon.
7. Correlation of the charts thus recorded.
8. Compilation of such data in order to determine the underground structure.
9. A series of observations taken in the manner above indicated and the complete compilation of the results thereof constitutes a geophysical survey of an area.
On May 7, 1942, after the survey had been completed, petitioner acquired from the State of Louisiana two water bottom leases covering an area of 150 acres in the south tract and acquired from Jan Jean LaFitte Corporation a lease on 2,080 acres immediately south of and contiguous to the south tract.
*511 From November 27, 1942, to August 7, 1944, petitioner completed two gas wells and a dry hole on the south tract. Both gas wells have been capped for lack of a market.
In its 1941 income tax return petitioner deducted the amount expended for the geophysical survey. This deduction was disallowed by the respondent.
Petitioner paid $ 30,000 for Rosedale Plantation, $ 18,000 of which was assigned on petitioner's books to the mineral rights in the land and $ 12,000 to the surface thereof. At the time petitioner purchased the land the surface had a value of $ 15,000 and the mineral rights had a value of $ 15,000.
From the time petitioner acquired the property to the end of 1942 it received the following amounts as rent for the use of the land for agricultural purposes and paid the following taxes thereon:
| Rents | ||
| Year | received | Taxes paid |
| 1936 | $ 139.00 | |
| 1937 | 524.75 | |
| 1938 | $ 494.19 | 545.56 |
| 1939 | 530.51 | |
| 1940 | 520.50 | 555.43 |
| 1941 | 1,063.25 | 509.44 |
| 1942 | * 420.68 | 533.66 |
*119 Prior to or during 1942 petitioner leased the mineral rights to Rosedale Plantation to one Paul G. Benedum, an oil producer who also owned about 39 oil and gas leases covering approximately 4,000 acres of land adjacent to Rosedale. In 1942 Benedum drilled a hole on Rosedale Plantation to a depth of 9,017 feet. Four geologists examined the mud and cuttings from the hole and no shows of oil or gas were found. The Schlumberger test, commonly used in the oil and gas industry as an aid in determining whether a well contains oil or gas shows, was also negative. No cores were taken from the well for examination, since nothing was found which in the opinion of one Buford Miller, an experienced geologist employed by Benedum, justified taking them. The sand from the well was not correlated with *512 the sand producing in the New Iberia Field, for the reason that Miller had concluded that the difference in underlying structures rendered correlation impossible. On February 22, 1942, the well was abandoned by Benedum and all his leases in that area were forfeited by nonpayment of rental. This abandonment and forfeiture were on the recommendation and advice of Miller. This advice was*120 to the effect that the hole had tested the Miocene sands in that area, which were producing in the New Iberia Oil Field to the north at 7,700 feet on one flank and 5,800 feet on the other, and to the effect that the low structure of the Miocene in the hole indicated that the structure of the Oligocene sands, found at about 14,000 feet and productive in the New Iberia Oil Field, were also low and would also be unlikely to produce shows of oil or gas.
Previous to the commencement of the Benedum well a dry hole known as Hamil Smith Baez had been drilled three or four miles northwest of the Benedum well to a depth of 7,948 feet, and about the same distance southeast of the Benedum well a dry hole known as Hamil Smith Burleigh had been drilled to a depth of 3,031 feet. Both of these holes had been abandoned. As a consequence of the unsuccessful drilling by Benedum in 1942 on petitioner's land, it determined the land had no value for oil production purposes and made no further exploration for oil thereon. In 1943 or 1944 one Phillips drilled a 12,000-foot dry hole in the vicinity of the Baez well.
Petitioner took no deduction for loss in its return for 1942 in respect of its determination*121 that the land was valueless for oil production, but it claims in the petition that such a deduction is allowable in the amount of $ 18,000. On brief, petitioner states that $ 15,000 rather than $ 18,000 is the correct amount of the deduction.
The land in question had a substantial market value during the taxable years, regardless of whether or not it was valueless for oil production.
OPINION.
*513
We think a realistic view of the various transactions resulting from the claim of title by the McEnery heirs compels the conclusion that the $ 25,000 represents an additional investment by petitioner in the land. Prior to and during the assertion of title by the McEnery*123 heirs petitioner insisted that it was the title owner. Petitioner paid, among other amounts, the $ 25,000 here in question to rid itself of the difficulties created by the disputants. The McEnery heirs received, among other amounts, a $ 25,000 cash payment. It is stipulated here that "the basis for the [compromise] settlement was that the 'McEnery heirs' were to retain the $ 25,000 cash payment * * *." Although the agreement of compromise contains no provision with respect to this cash payment, the history of the controversy between the parties establishes it as part of the value received by the heirs as a result of their assertion of title. In our view the $ 25,000 must be regarded as part of the consideration paid by petitioner to quiet the claim of the heirs by securing from them a recognition of its ownership of the land, and it must therefore be capitalized to the land.
Petitioner urges on brief that the $ 25,000 payment is in an entirely different category from the amounts paid directly in the conduct and settlement of the litigation. We have not overlooked the fact that petitioner actually*124 made the payment in question to Texas as reimbursement to it of the amount paid the McEnery heirs and that Texas conditionally agreed to assign the McEnery lease to petitioner. It is also true that the payment and the agreement predated the final settlement of the controversy and that the McEnery heirs were not parties to the former. As indicated above, however, we are of the opinion that the acts and motives of petitioner, Texas, and the McEnery heirs with respect to this land must be viewed in their relation to the title dispute and their effect upon its outcome. Cf.
We accordingly hold that respondent correctly disallowed the deduction of $ 25,000 as a loss sustained in 1941. As is conceded by petitioner, the disallowance of the deduction of $ 6,000 attorneys' fees was also proper and we so hold.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss either the arguments of petitioner with respect to the scope of
As to the function and frequency of geophysical surveys in the oil-producing business, we can only rely here upon such inferences as may be drawn from the portion of the stipulation which sets forth the technical procedure by which such a survey is made. On this issue, the record contains no evidence other than the stipulation. We think, however, that the agreed facts do justify a conclusion in accord with petitioner's statement on brief that the purpose of this geophysical*129 survey was to determine whether the land contained subsurface structures sufficiently high so as to make drilling for oil economically feasible.
It thus appears that the results of this survey were to guide petitioner in determining generally whether and to what extent these large areas of land should be explored by drilling wells. Whether or not the scientific knowledge gained from the survey indicated that drilling would be successful or unsuccessful, it was undoubtedly the information upon which would be based further tests and potential drilling operations during the entire period of petitioner's exploitation of the land for oil and gas. Cf.
Petitioner suggests on brief that geophysical expenses are deductible by analogy to the deduction of costs for geological work in preparation for the drilling of wells. Such a deduction is granted taxpayers at their option by section 29.23 (m)-16 (
We hold that the petitioner's expenditure for geophysical explorations in 1941 on the leases held from Louisiana Furs, Inc., is not deductible as business expense.
Petitioner purchased Rosedale Plantation in 1936 for $ 30,000 and still owns it, surface and subsurface. Petitioner hoped, and no doubt believed, at the time of purchase that the land was oil or gas bearing, and the amount of the purchase price reflected this possibility. In 1942, we assume
In our view,
On brief petitioner has attempted to distinguish the facts in the
The rule to be deduced from the more recent cases is that where worthlessness of real property, including*134 a mineral interest, is established by some identifiable event occurring in the year the loss is claimed, it is allowable as a deduction without the taxpayer having divested himself of legal title to the property. * * *
That rule seems to be correct, but in our view it does not conflict with the principle of the
Generally speaking, the income tax law is concerned only with realized losses * * *. Exception is made, however, in the case of losses which are so reasonably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount as to justify their deduction, in certain circumstances, before they are absolutely realized. * * * The general requirement that losses be deducted in the year in which they are sustained calls for a practical, *135 not a legal, test. * * *
*518 Petitioner's position suffers, not from its failure to quitclaim its rights to any oil or gas in Rosedale, but from its failure to come within the exception to the restriction of deductible losses to those "absolutely realized." We find in
In the
We think the
We accordingly hold that no part of the purchase price of Rosedale Plantation is deductible by petitioner as a loss sustained in 1942.
Footnotes
*. This amount represents a compromise settlement made for 1942 and reported as 1943 income.↩
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.