Jamison v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Fred H. Lenway & Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1978)
- Curphey v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1980)
- Freeland v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1980)
- Fox v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1974)
- Whittemore v. United States (District Court, E.D. Missouri 1966)
- Good v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1951)
- Farry v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1949)
- Wright v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1947)
- Laport v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1980)
- Clinton L. Whittemore, Jr., and Anne W. Whittemore v. United States (8th Cir. 1967)
- Good v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1951)
- Farry v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1949)
- George H. Graf v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1947)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*301
1. A taxpayer prior to 1930 purchased lots which he unsuccessfully listed for sale with brokers. The locations did not develop commercially and, after failure to pay taxes assessed against them, he offered to convey them to the municipality in 1942-1943, and executed deeds of conveyance submitted to him by municipal officers. He received no consideration. The conveyances are
2. A dwelling which the taxpayer used in his business of renting properties,
3. In the absence of adequate evidence on which to base a more reasonable allocation of office expenses between taxable and nontaxable income, such expenses
*173 The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $ 2,374.55 in petitioner's income and victory taxes for 1943 and the unforgiven part of such taxes for 1942 by the disallowance of deductions claimed as losses on the abandonment and sale of real estate and as office and medical expenses. Petitioner assails the determination, contending that the sale and abandonment of real estate involved noncapital *303 assets, so that the losses are deductible in full, and that he required and used the office only for his business. An issue involving the deduction of medical expenses was settled by stipulation.
FINDINGS OF FACT.
Petitioner, an individual residing at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, filed his income tax returns for 1942 and 1943 with the collector of internal revenue for the twenty-third district of Pennsylvania, at Pittsburgh. He owns, rents, and operates 13 apartment houses, 2 rooming houses, and 2 dwellings located in Pittsburgh and 3 dwellings at Dormont and 2 at Brookline, near Pittsburgh. He acquired the apartment houses in 1920 by inheritance from his mother and spent $ 40,000 in improving them. He acquired the dwellings by foreclosure in 1938 and held them for renting. During the past 6 years he has received annually *174 gross rents of over $ 10,000 from these properties. Petitioner also owns securities from which he received and reported dividends of $ 16,427.02 in 1942 and of $ 14,676.40 in 1943; for the same years he received nontaxable income of $ 2,646.14 and $ 2,257.34, respectively, from annuities and tax-exempt bonds. His total gross income for 1942 was $ 30,456.40; *304 for 1943, $ 26,391.73.
Prior to 1930 petitioner made occasional purchases of real estate for resale. He frequently visits a daughter living in Philadelphia, and while there in 1927 he became interested in unimproved lots along a boulevard in Brigantine, New Jersey. He purchased five lots, selling two at a profit the same year, and listed the remaining three with a broker for sale at a better price, but was never able to sell them. In 1938 a bridge to Brigantine was destroyed and was never rebuilt, Brigantine property declined rapidly in value, and a plan thereafter proposed to extend the boulevard on which the lots were situated to New York was never consummated. The lots continued to decline in value, and in 1942 petitioner determined that there was no use in holding them longer, as they had no value to him, and in October 1942 he offered the lots to the taxing authorities at Brigantine for the purpose of abandonment. The taxes on the lots aggregated $ 52 a year and had not been paid for 1941 and 1942. While petitioner was financially able to pay same, he decided the lots were not worth the amount of the taxes, and in October 1942 he offered the city of Brigantine a quitclaim*305 deed to them. The city objected to a quitclaim deed, as it might raise some question as to the validity of the title, but agreed to accept a deed without the general warranty clause, and at petitioner's request, it prepared the draft of such a deed and submitted it to petitioner's attorney. Petitioner executed and delivered it on October 30, 1942, conveying the title to the three lots to the city of Brigantine, the consideration recited in the deed being one dollar, which was not paid, "and the release by the grantee [city of Brigantine] of all municipal liens and claims now due on said premises." These lots cost petitioner $ 7,300.
In 1926 petitioner made a trip to North Carolina to aid in the establishment of a school for colored boys near Morehead. While there he purchased 31 lots near a beach for $ 3,000 and listed them with a broker for sale. Morehead City, near which the beach was located, had a boom on when the lots were bought, but the boom did not continue and the beach was never developed as planned. It remained an undeveloped beach, and petitioner decided in 1943 that the lots had no further value to him and he decided to abandon them. At that time there were unpaid*306 taxes due Carteret County, North Carolina, of $ 35.71 for 1940, $ 30.17 for 1941, and $ 27 for 1942. Petitioner was financially able to pay these taxes, but in January 1943 *175 he communicated with the taxing authorities in Carteret County, North Carolina, and offered to deed them to the county. The offer was accepted. Petitioner executed and delivered the deed (without warranty) dated January 15, 1943, conveying title to all of the 31 lots to Carteret County, North Carolina, the consideration recited therein being "one dollar, and accrued taxes, due to Carteret County, against property hereinafter described." The deed also contained this clause: "This conveyance is made without consideration moving to first party and abandons the described properties by reason of the accrued taxes thereon due to Carteret County." The dollar consideration recited in the deed was not paid to petitioner.
The petitioner never made any improvements on either of the 3 Brigantine lots or the 31 lots in North Carolina, and never received any income from any of them, and after executing and delivering the deeds to such properties, he exercised no further possession, authority, or claim over them.
*307 In 1938 petitioner acquired by foreclosure a brick veneer dwelling at Dormont, Pennsylvania, and rented it. The dwelling was not in a satisfactory condition, and after consultation with a real estate agent in 1943 he decided not to make repairs, but to offer it for sale. He sold it in 1943 for $ 5,250, sustaining a loss of $ 106.37.
Between 1896 and 1930 petitioner made occasional purchases of improved and unimproved real estate in Pittsburgh, New Jersey, Florida, and North Carolina. These purchases included lots and acreage in New Jersey and in Florida which he expected to sell at a profit and in some instances did so. Since 1930 petitioner has made no purchases. In 1938 he acquired by foreclosure five houses in or near Pittsburgh which he has held for renting. One at Dormont, above mentioned, was sold in 1943.
In 1942 and 1943 petitioner was engaged in the business of renting improved real estate. For 42 years he has had an office in the Farmers Bank Building, Pittsburgh, and during the years 1942 and 1943 spent $ 3,379.07 and $ 3,694.94, respectively, in its maintenance. He normally goes to his office every day when in Pittsburgh, but has no regular hours. Only his name*308 appears on the door. He does no advertising and has no regular clients. He employs an agent to collect rents.
In 1942 petitioner paid $ 859.13 on account of medical expenses.
OPINION.
*309 Petitioner assails the determination that the deductions claimed involved losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets as defined by
*310 Respondent asserts in his brief "that in conveying title to the taxing authorities petitioner was making a forced conveyance which the courts hold the equivalent of a foreclosure sale," and cites
In the pending case there was nothing to indicate a "forced conveyance," as there was no evidence that the taxing authorities had brought or threatened foreclosure of the tax lien, but, on the contrary, it appears that the taxpayer's action in deeding both properties was voluntary and he manifested to the taxing authorities his desire to deed the properties as he wished to abandon same, having decided that their value was less than the taxes thereon.
*177 The laws of New Jersey and North Carolina, in which two states these properties are located, both expressly provide that there is no personal liability against the owners of realty for taxes due thereon. The dollar consideration recited not being paid and petitioner not being*311 personally liable for the taxes, the conveyances of both properties were without consideration. As was said in
The cases of
* * *
In the
*178 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, at 115 Fed. (2d) 288, held in favor of the taxpayer that such transaction did not constitute a sale and that the loss was an ordinary one and not limited by
Subsequent to the decisions by the Supreme Court in the
The Board has not taken the view that the
In the more recent case of
*179 * * * Thus a mere abandonment in favor of the lien holder without the interposition of any sale falls outside the definition. E. g.,
In
It is contended on behalf of the Commissioner that the case is governed by
A case in which the essential facts are very similar to those here considered is
Comparing further, the term of tax delinquency in both cases was practically the same, Bickerstaff being three years in arrears and in this case two years on the Brigantine lots and three on the North Carolina lots being unpaid. The aggregate amount of delinquent taxes unpaid is practically the same, Bickerstaff being $ 75 and in this case the total unpaid taxes on the Brigantine lots were $ 104, and on the North Carolina lots $ 82.88. In both cases the taxpayer was financially able to pay the taxes, *319 but determined that the properties were not worth the taxes due on them, and in each case the taxpayer wrote the taxing authorities that he desired to stop further tax payments on the property and abandon same, and in both the taxpayer made deeds conveying the properties to the taxing authorities *180 and the owners thereafter exercised no further possession or claim to them. The deed in the
While such details of accidental factual analogy are not severally factors of decisive importance, in the aggregate they present a set of circumstances which can not be distinguished from those out of which this issue arises. And although the year of loss was the subject of controversy in the
There was more reason to assert in the
In the
The Circuit Court, in the
It appears that the taxpayer was financially able to make payment of the taxes assessed against the property. He refused to make the payments, and made a bona fide attempt to divest himself of title. His attempt to divest himself of title, although ineffective under Florida law because of improper attestation of the deed, was clear evidence of his intention to abandon the property and of its practical worthlessness to him. All that is required is that property actually be abandoned; a technical, legal abandonment and relinquishment of title is not always required. * * *
*181 In this case we are convinced from the testimony and petitioner's action, that the petitioner in 1942, as to the Brigantine lots, and in 1943, as to the North Carolina lots, then determined that no profit could be expected from his investment*322 and that the respective properties were not worth the amount of taxes assessed against them and they were therefore worthless and he abandoned them in those years. The record discloses no act manifesting petitioner's abandonment or intention to abandon prior to these dates.
Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that his renunciation of title in the exercise of reasonable business judgment may be deemed to indicate the time of worthlessness.
We therefore hold that petitioner sustained*323 ordinary and not capital losses in 1942 as to the Brigantine lots and in 1943 as to the North Carolina lots and is entitled to deduction for the full amount of his losses on both.
* * * where the owner of depreciable property devotes it to rental purposes and exclusively to the production of taxable income, the property is used by him in a trade or business, * * *
*182 and, "being subject to the allowance for depreciation," such property does not fall within the definition of a capital asset, so that on disposition the resulting gain or loss is governed by the provision of
Petitioner also contended that the foregoing losses were deductible in full because he held the properties primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. *325 If so, they are expressly excluded from the limitations imposed by
* * * Since the parties submitted no evidence bearing directly on the question as to what portion of the expenditures should be allocated to nontaxable income, and in the absence of evidence indicating what would constitute a more reasonable basis for such allocation, we hold such expenditures for the respective years are to be allocated to taxable income and nontaxable income of such years in the proportion that each bears to the total of the taxable and nontaxable income of the petitioner for such years.
We adhere to the rule so stated for application here and, as the Commissioner has given effect to it in computing the amounts of expenses disallowed, we approve his determination.
Of the medical expenses claimed by the petitioner*328 for 1942, the Commissioner disallowed $ 322.73. The parties have stipulated that such expenses in the amount of $ 859.13 were paid by petitioner, and proper adjustment should be made therefor.
Footnotes
1.
Sec. 117 (d) (2) . In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, losses fromsales or exchanges↩ of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus the net income of the taxpayer of $ 1,000, whichever is smaller. [Italics supplied.]2.
Sec. 117 (a) (1)↩ . Capital Assets. -- The term "capital assets" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer * * * or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (l) * * *.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.