Harris v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- Harris v. Commissioner (Supreme Court of the United States 1950)
- Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1975)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*202
1. Gift Tax -- Nonresident Alien -- Bank Deposits. -- Money on deposit in American banks is not exempt or excluded from gift tax as property without the United States on the theory that
2. Gift Tax -- Premiums on Insurance. -- Payments of premiums by wife on policy belonging exclusively to husband were not precluded from being gift on ground that wife had an interest in the policies as husband's heir.
3. Gift Tax -- Settlement at Divorce. -- Payments by wife pursuant to property settlement adopted in decree of divorce
*742 The Commissioner determined the following deficiencies in gift tax:
| Year | Tax | Penalty |
| 1940 | $ 1,275.32 | |
| 1941 | 13,699.83 | |
| 1942 | 9,861.53 | |
| 1943 | $ 31,434.34 | |
| 1944 | 1,365.00 | |
| 1945 | 360.00 | $ 90.00 |
The parties settled a number of their differences, leaving the following issues for decision:
(1) Did the petitioner, a nonresident alien, make taxable gifts by transferring funds to or for her husband from her bank account in a New York bank?
(2) If so, were checks, in payment of premiums on his annuity insurance policy, gifts?
(3) Were transfers by the petitioner to her husband, pursuant to a property settlement agreement adopted in a decree of divorce, taxable gifts?
(4) If so, was her promise in that agreement to make monthly payments to her husband a gift when the promise was made, or only later, as payments were made?
*204 (5) If the promise was a gift, should the value be reduced by the income tax on the gross amount to be paid?
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The petitioner filed gift tax returns for the years 1940 to 1944, inclusive, with the collector of internal revenue for the third district of New York.
The petitioner was born an American citizen, in New York City, on February 1, 1883. Her name was Cornelia Brady. She became a British subject in 1903 through her marriage to Leland H. deLangley, a British subject. They were divorced in 1924 and three months later she married Reginald Wright, also a British subject, who was fourteen years, three months, and eighteen days younger than she. They have no children. The petitioner obtained a divorce from Wright in Reno, Nevada, on March 6, 1943.
The petitioner resided in England from 1903 until she and Wright came to the United States, on September 20, 1940. They came in order to get away from the war in Europe and intended to return after the conclusion of the war. They did not dispose of their houses, one in London and one in Biarritz, France. They entered the United States on a temporary one-year visa, permitting them to remain until September 20, 1941. *205 That visa was renewed later for another year, permitting them to remain until September 20, 1942. They resided in leased quarters at the Hotel Pierre in New York City until August 1942, when the petitioner separated from Wright. Shortly thereafter she went *743 to Reno, Nevada. She reclaimed her American citizenship there on November 21, 1942, and on March 6, 1943, was granted the divorce from Wright.
Both the petitioner and Wright have remained in the United States since September 20, 1940.
The respondent concedes that the petitioner was in the United States as a nonresident alien from September 20, 1940, until some time in September 1942.
The petitioner has never been engaged in business in the United States. She maintained several bank accounts in the National City Bank of New York, in which she had money on deposit and on which an attorney at law held a power of attorney, made all deposits, and drew checks on her behalf. The National City Bank was a corporation carrying on the banking business.
The petitioner gave Wright the following amounts from her accounts in the National City Bank during the period from September 20, 1940, to September 1942: $ 29,095.91 during *206 1940, $ 76,170.59 during 1941, and $ 39,455.18 during 1942. She also paid $ 1,800.03 in 1940 and $ 3,605.22 in 1941 from the same accounts as premiums on an endowment policy of insurance owned entirely by Wright. The insured was Wright and the policy was to become payable to him, or his executors, administrators, or assigns on May 12, 1953, or at his earlier death.
The petitioner and Wright entered into a property settlement agreement on February 27, 1943. The net worth of the petitioner's estate was in excess of $ 1,000,000 at that time. The net worth of Wright's estate at that time was substantial. Each agreed to release completely the property of the other from all claims arising out of their marriage. Each transferred property of substantial value to the other.
The Commissioner determined that the value of the property transferred to Wright exceeded that transferred to the petitioner by $ 117,903.03 and now agrees that the difference is $ 107,150.78, including $ 41,291.88 representing the then value of her promise to pay Wright $ 416.66 monthly for ten years. The court, in granting the divorce, approved the property settlement agreement and found that the payments of $ 416.66*207 per month were "in discharge of a legal obligation which, because of the marital relationship, has been imposed upon the plaintiff."
OPINION.
The respondent concedes in his brief that the petitioner was a nonresident alien when she made the transfers during 1940, 1941, and 1942 which are in dispute under the first issue. The evidence alone might leave a question as to residence, cf.
The argument of the petitioner in regard to the purpose of the gift tax and its relation to the estate tax and the cases cited have been carefully considered. The Supreme Court has said on more than one occasion that the two taxes are in
The question in the
Those two cases are distinguishable from the present case. The Court pointed out in each of those cases that the release of marital rights was not regarded as an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, even before the amendment to the Estate Tax Act containing the express provision. 1 For example, the Court said in the
* * * We think, however, that the amendment was added merely from an abundance of caution and should be regarded as declaratory of the law as it previously existed.
The Supreme Court said in the
* * * Plainly, the explicitness was one of cautious redundancy to prevent "subversion of the legislative intent." Without this specific provision, Congress undoubtedly intended the requirement of "adequate and full consideration" to exclude relinquishment of dower and other marital rights with respect to the estate tax.
Thus the decisions*211 in those cases would have been the same had there been no provision in regard to marital rights in the estate tax law. It has not been suggested that money on deposit in a bank in the United States would not be regarded as property situated in the United States in the absence of some statutory provision to the contrary or that
The petitioner*213 next argues that, if the first issue is decided against her, nevertheless, the payments of premiums on her husband's insurance policy were not gifts. Her point is that she had an interest in the policy because the proceeds would go either to Wright or to his estate and she would benefit at his death as the chief beneficiary of his estate. She does not contend that her interest in the policy arises out of her payment of the premiums or dispute that the policy belonged to her husband, with the right in him to dispose of it and the proceeds as he might wish. She also concedes that her inchoate interest would terminate if the policy lapsed or if he made some other disposition of it. It is obvious that she had no interest in this policy which would prevent her payment of these premiums from being taxable gifts. She could make the same claim that she is making here if she gave him money for any other purpose, such as, for example, to buy securities. The case of
The petitioner's next contention is that transfers which she made to her husband pursuant to a property settlement agreement adopted in a subsequent decree of divorce were not taxable gifts because there was an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth for those transfers. The Commissioner concedes that the facts in this case are not distinguishable from those on which we decided for the petitioner in
Footnotes
1. Cf.
;Burnet v.Guggenheim , 288 U.S. 280 .Elizabeth W. Lyman , 23 B. T. A. 540↩
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.