Hirsch v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Granger v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1970)
- Burr v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1966)
- Campbell v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1961)
- Hannaford v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1960)
- Teaford v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1955)
- Berry v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1952)
- Gregg v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1952)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*170
1. Constitutionality of Current Tax Payment Act of 1943. -- Sweeping contentions of petitioner that entire scheme of Current Tax Payment Act, the entire statute, is unconstitutional are rejected.
2. Reduction of 1942 Income. -- For failure of proof and under a stipulation of the petitioner,
*1275 The respondent has determined a deficiency in income tax and victory tax for the year 1943 in the amount of $ 5,633.43. The year 1942 is involved because of the provisions of the Current*171 Tax Payment Act of 1943.
The pleadings present the questions whether the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 is constitutional, the petitioner's contention being that it is, in its entirety, unconstitutional, and whether 1942 income should have been reduced.
The petitioner filed his returns with the collector for the first district of Illinois in Chicago.
All of the facts have been stipulated.
FINDINGS OF FACT.
We find the facts as stipulated by the parties.
The petitioner is an attorney at law licensed and admitted to practice in the State of Illinois. He resides in Chicago. For the years 1942 and 1943, he made his income tax returns on the basis of a cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting and of calendar years.
During the period from September 1932 to September 1936, Aaron J. Schanfarber, an attorney at law, was associated with the petitioner in the practice of law.
On June 26, 1941, Aaron J. Schanfarber brought suit against the petitioner in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case No. 4105750. The dispute concerned attorney's fees which Aaron J. Schanfarber claimed to be entitled to receive from the petitioner for services performed during the period from *172 September 1932 to September 1936 while Aaron J. Schanfarber was associated with petitioner.
*1276 On February 19, 1943, the petitioner and Schanfarber executed an agreement in which it is recited that a dispute existed between the parties concerning attorney's fees which Schanfarber claimed to be entitled to receive from Hirsch for his services during the period from 1932 to 1936 while Schanfarber was in the office of the petitioner, that Schanfarber had filed a suit against the petitioner, and that in consideration of the dismissal of the suit and the payment by the petitioner of $ 11,281.74 to Schanfarber, receipt of which was acknowledged, Schanfarber and the petitioner mutually released and discharged each other from all claims.
In compliance with the above agreement, the petitioner paid Schanfarber $ 11,281.74 on February 19, 1943. As a result of this settlement out of court, the suit in the Cook County Circuit Court was dismissed.
The petitioner deducted the amount of the payment to Schanfarber, which he made in 1943, in his income tax return for 1942 as a "protective measure"; and he also deducted the same amount in his return for 1943, giving the following explanation:
*173 The item of $ 11,281.74 above was claimed in 1942 because taxpayer is not certain whether loss applies to 1942 or 1943.
The respondent allowed the deduction for 1943 and disallowed the identical deduction for 1942. The explanation of the respondent for his determination is set forth in the margin. 1
*174 The income tax of the petitioner for 1942 and 1943, computed under the provisions of Chapter 1 of the Code, without applying section 6 (a) or 6 (b) of the Current Tax Payment Act, amounted to $ 11,035.62, and $ 5,646.33, respectively. Under the provisions of section 6 of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, the respondent has determined that amount of tax "forgiven" is $ 4,234.75, which amount when subtracted from $ 16,681.95 (the total of the 1942 and 1943 tax, computed under Chapter 1 of the Code), leaves $ 12,447.20. The amount of $ 12,447.20 is the amount of income tax for the combined years 1942 and 1943 for which the respondent has determined the petitioner is liable. The petitioner reported in his 1943 return tax in the amount of $ 6,813.77, which the respondent credited to the total amount of tax, leaving the deficiency of $ 5,633.43 which is involved in this proceeding.
*1277 OPINION.
The petition presents a general issue which raises the question whether the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 is constitutional. This is the chief issue presented. It is necessary, in the interests of clarification, however, and in answer to petitioner's rather complicated argument, *175 to discuss other matters first.
Under section 6 of the Current Tax Payment Act and under the regulations promulgated thereunder,
In our consideration of the issue relating to the constitutionality of section 6 of the Current Tax Payment Act, it is necessary to determine whether or not the petitioner has been deprived of 25 per cent or any other part*177 of the deduction of $ 11,281.74 to which he was entitled in 1943. The petitioner has not been deprived of any part *1278 of the deduction. It is difficult to understand the evident confusion of the petitioner. He confuses the computation of the tax for 1943 under section 6 of the Act with the matter of the year in which the deduction of $ 11,281.74 is allowable. Section 6 (b) of the Current Tax Payment Act and section 36.2 (b) of the applicable regulation (
* * * Congress in 1943 passed the Current Tax Payment Act. The basic purpose was to bring forward the payment of income taxes so that all taxpayers would be put as nearly as possible upon a current basis. To accomplish this, and at the same time eliminate the payment of two full years' taxes in one year, provisions were enacted which in effect required*178 the payment of a tax for 1942 or 1943, whichever was greater, and forgiveness of all but one quarter of the tax which would have been due for the forgiven year.
It is held that, under section 6 (b) of the Act, the respondent did not err in taking the amount of the tax liability computed for 1942, $ 11,035.62, which was the greater of the tax liability of the petitioner for the two years -- 1942 and 1943 -- and adding to it one-quarter of the tax which would have been due for 1943, namely, $ 1,411.58; and that the tax thus computed under section 6 (b) of the Act, in the amount of $ 12,447.20, has been properly computed. Cf.
The Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 enacted new provisions respecting the
(1) Where 1942 Tax is Greater Than 1943 Tax. -- The first windfall rule is applied where the 1942 tax is greater than the 1943 tax. In such cases, the tax for 1943 is increased by the amount by which the 1942 tax exceeds the 1943 tax. The effect of such a rule is that the tax for 1943 is canceled instead of the tax for 1942. It insures that, while there will be no doubling up of tax payments, the taxpayer must pay at least the tax he would pay under existing law. * * *
Under this aspect of the question relating to the constitutionality of the Current Tax Payment Act, the petitioner's contention*181 that it is unconstitutional lacks merit.
The Current Tax Payment Act comprises ten sections. The respondent has suggested on brief that the petitioner is in substance challenging the constitutionality of section 6 of the Act, "Relief from Double Payments in 1943." The petitioner objects to this and has replied that the respondent erroneously seeks to limit the issue presented, admitting at the same time that section 6 is involved. On brief the petitioner assails "the whole scheme" of the Act and contends that "the entire acts [
The pleadings of the petitioner are not clear. See Rule 7 of the Court's Rules of Practice, par. (c) (2), and par. (c) (4) (D). Under the determinations which have given rise to the deficiency in this proceeding, only section 6 of the Current Tax Payment Act is involved, and other sections of that Act are not applicable and do not have any bearing upon the respondent's determination. This Court has held frequently that it will not and can not, under its Rules, consider issues which are not*182 raised by the pleadings.
However, we understand the pleadings of the petitioner to raise a question about the application of the Act to his liability for 1943 income tax, and we agree*183 with the respondent that section 6 of the Act is involved. We do not mean to "restrict" the petitioner's pleadings. The petitioner asserts that the respondent undertakes to do that, but with respect to this Court, we must regard the very determination from which this proceeding arises as confining the issue to the validity of the application of section 6 to the petitioner's 1943 tax liability including the computation of a tax for 1942. Therefore, we have considered the petitioner's pleading as presenting the question whether section 6 of the Act deprives the petitioner of his property without due process and deprives him of equal protection of law in violation of the
It is concluded that section 6 of the Current Tax Payment Act, as applied by the respondent to the petitioner's tax liability for the years 1942 and 1943 does not violate the
Footnotes
1. (c) In your income tax return for 1942, you claimed a deduction of $ 11,281.74, which amount was paid by you on February 19, 1943, in settlement of a suit brought against you by one Aaron J. Schanfarber concerning attorney's fees which said Schanfarber claimed to be entitled to receive from you for services performed during the period from September, 1932 to September, 1936. Since your return was prepared on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, it is held that the amount in question is not deductible from your 1942 income under the provisions of
Section 43 of the Internal Revenue Code↩ but such amount has been allowed as a deduction from your income for 1943, the year in which it was paid. Accordingly, your income for the year 1942 has been increased by $ 11,281.74.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.