Brown v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Hambleton v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1973)
- Grace S. Pyle, a Disabled Adult, by Carolyn Straub, Successor Guardian of Her Estate v. United States (7th Cir. 1985)
- Estate of Lidbury v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1985)
- Estate of Craft v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1977)
- Mitchell v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1976)
- Estate of Mandels v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1975)
- Estate of O'Brien v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1971)
- Kamins v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1970)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*158
Petitioner and Maude C. Brown, his wife, executed a joint will which contained reciprocal provisions. Upon Maude's death, the instrument, probated as her separate will, conveyed a life estate in her share of the community property to petitioner and the remainder therein to their sons.
*50 Respondent determined a gift tax deficiency of $ 41,276.54 against petitioner for the year 1963. The ultimate issue for decision is whether petitioner made a gift of the value of the remainder interest in his half of community property upon his wife's death in 1963.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
S. E. Brown (herein referred to *160 as petitioner) resided in Amarillo, Tex., at the time the petition was filed in this proceeding.
Petitioner was married to Maude C. Brown (herein referred to as Maude). Prior to Maude's death on February 3, 1963, they resided in Dalhart, Tex. Their two sons, Sam Ed Brown and Billy Neil Brown, were 42 and 39 years of age respectively when Maude died. All the property owned by petitioner and Maude was community property, *51 which consisted of realty and personalty aggregating $ 606,133.08 in value.
At various times prior to 1961, petitioner and Maude had discussed in the presence of their sons their proposed testamentary disposition of their respective portions of the community property. Their principal concern, as reflected by these discussions, was to provide sufficient income for Maude in the event of petitioner's prior death. Nothing was ever said in the presence of their sons by either Maude or petitioner about assuring that either or both of them would subsequently inherit the property owned by their parents.
Before 1961 Maude and petitioner had on two occasions made wills. On the first occasion, each had executed separate wills leaving everything outright to the surviving*161 spouse. The second wills were jointly executed, i.e., incorporated in a single instrument, and left each testator's share in the land to the two sons and the residue of his or her property to the surviving spouse.
Sometime before the month of April 1961, petitioner contacted King Fike (herein referred to as Fike), an attorney practicing in Dalhart, Tex., for the purpose of discussing the matter of making a new will. Petitioner informed Fike that he wanted to leave Maude a life estate in his share of the community property with a remainder to his sons. Maude was not present when this discussion took place, and petitioner said nothing about what she wanted to do with her half of the community property.
Subsequently, petitioner told Maude of his visit to Fike and of the testamentary disposition which he proposed to make of his share of the community property. Maude expressed her desire to see Fike because she thought she might want to make a similar distribution of her share of the property. Maude did contact Fike and told him that, if she predeceased petitioner, she wanted petitioner to have the income from her share of the community property for life with the remainder to their*162 sons.
At no time during the initial discussions involving Maude, petitioner, and Fike, did Maude or petitioner ever advise Fike that they had agreed or contracted between themselves as to the disposition of their respective property. Nor did either of them indicate to him that they wanted him to make a joint and mutual will.
Considering the similar nature of their plan, Fike suggested that they incorporate their respective wills into a single instrument to save time and money. They accepted his suggestion.
After dictating the material portions of the respective wills to his secretary, Fike instructed her to get the proper form to make it a self-proving will from Stayton's Form Book. It was Fike's intention to draft a joint will, i.e., a single instrument incorporating *52 Maude's and petitioner's respective wills, but not a mutual or a joint and mutual will.
On or about April 19, 1961, Maude and petitioner published and declared an instrument jointly executed by them on that day as their last will and testament (herein referred to as joint will). This instrument provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
That we, S. E. BROWN and MAUDE C. BROWN, husband and wife, having our *163 residence and permanent domicile in the City of Dalhart, Hartley County, Texas, each of us being more than twenty-one years of age, of sound mind and disposing memory, do make, publish and declare this to be our last joint and mutual will, hereby revoking all wills and codicils heretofore made by us.
FIRST
We direct that we be buried in a Christian-like manner, suitable to our circumstances and conditions in life and that our Executors, Executor or Executrix, as the case may be, shall pay all of our just debts, including expenses of our last sickness and funeral expense, all State Inheritance and Federal Estate Taxes and all other taxes; and that a suitable marker be purchased for our graves and that all of such be paid for out of the personal property of our estate and that such be paid as soon as practical, but without the necessity of making undue sacrifice of the assets of our estate.
SECOND
All of the property that we now own or have an interest in, is community property and it is the intention of each of us to dispose of only our part of the community property that we now own or have an interest in or that we may hereafter acquire and any separate property, if any, we may, at*164 any time acquire after this date.
THIRD
It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, S. E. Brown or Maude C. Brown, as the case may be, shall have all of the income from all of the property we own at the time of death, real, personal or mixed and wherever located for and during the lifetime of such survivor; such survivor also to have the right to manage and control said properties during his or her lifetime and we do hereby give, devise and bequeath to the survivor of us all of the income from all of the property, we own at the time of death, whether real, personal or mixed and wherever located for and during the lifetime of such survivor; which such survivor is to have the full power, right and authority to manage and control all of said property during the lifetime of said survivor; such survivor to have the use, enjoyment and occupancy of all of said properties during his or her lifetime.
FOURTH
We and each of us subject to the provisions of the Third paragraph of this will, give, devise and bequeath to our sons SAM E. BROWN and BILLY N. BROWN all of our property of every kind and character and wherever located, whether in the State of Texas or any other state, in full fee*165 simple, share and share alike.
In executing this instrument, petitioner did not intend that either he or Maude be in any way obligated to leave their respective property *53 in the manner set forth in their respective wills. Petitioner did not discuss with Fike the possibility of being contractually bound by the will; Fike did not ever advise him of this possibility; and petitioner was not aware of or familiar with the term "joint and mutual will" at the time he executed the instrument.
Maude died at the age of 68 years in Dalhart, Tex. On the application of petitioner, the instrument executed on April 19, 1961, was admitted to probate on or about February 25, 1963, as Maude's separate will. Under its provisions the petitioner received a life estate in her share of the community property, and the remainder therein was conveyed to their two sons.
About 3 months after Maude's death, petitioner sold the residence which had been his and Maude's home. The sons joined in the deed to convey the remainder in their mother's share which they had inherited under the will. They received none of the proceeds from the sale.
Petitioner later remarried, and he executed a new will. The*166 provisions of the new will make essentially the same testamentary disposition as petitioner's prior one. Essentially all of petitioner's property at his death is to go to his two sons.
After Maude's death, but before his remarriage, petitioner also sold cattle which had been owned as community property by him and Maude. He has reinvested the proceeds received from the sale of such cattle in other cattle two or three times since his remarriage.
Prior to October 1965, respondent's agent informed petitioner of a proposed gift tax deficiency against him for the year 1963. In his written report to petitioner, the agent asserted that petitioner had made a taxable gift of the remainder interest in his share of the community property at the date of Maude's death because the instrument jointly executed by Maude and petitioner in 1961 constituted a contract between them and that at her death he was contractually obligated to retain his share of the community property subject to his use, and at his death convey such property in accordance with the terms of the instrument.
Petitioner challenged the proposed deficiency by filing a written protest requesting a district conference. The protest*167 was in the form of an affidavit prepared by a certified public accountant and was signed by petitioner on or about October 1, 1965. The affidavit provides, in part, as follows:
In April, 1961, the taxpayer and his wife had prepared and signed a joint and mutual will, in which each of them directed the disposition of their respective one-half community interests at their death.
The terms of the will in effect provide that the survivor shall have the income from the property owned by the decedent at the time of death, and shall have the right to manage and control the property during his or her lifetime. Subject *54 to this provision the will states that such property is to go to their two sons, Sam E. Brown and Billy N. Brown, in full fee simple, share and share alike.
* * * *
The taxpayer contends that the joint will is nothing more than a single instrument by which the taxpayer and his wife intended to and did dispose of only their one-half community interest at the time of their death. The signing of this will was not a contractual obligation whereby the survivor agreed to dispose of his community interest in any specified manner, and the wording of the will does not reflect*168 any contractual obligation. * * *
In the second paragraph of the will it states that "it is the intention of each of us to dispose of only our part of the community property that we now own or have an interest in." If there had been any intent of the parties to enter into a contract such intent would have been stated in the will.
Respondent subsequently determined a gift tax deficiency against petitioner with the following explanation:
It is determined by reason of the contractual provisions of the joint and mutual will of you and your deceased wife, Maude C. Brown, that you made a gift of $ 214,451.31 in 1963 consisting of the remainder value of your community interest in certain properties owned as community property by you and your wife, Maude C. Brown, prior to her death in 1963. * * *
OPINION
The principal issue herein is whether petitioner made a taxable gift of the remainder interest in his share of the community property upon Maude's death. Resolution of this issue depends upon whether petitioner made a transfer of such remainder interest within the provisions of sections 2501(a) 1*169 and 2511(a), 2
The fundamental prerequisite for the application of section 2501(a) is that there must be a completed, irrevocable transfer of property by gift.
We will first consider respondent's argument that there was a transfer of the remainder interest by operation of the election doctrine of the law of wills. Respondent argues that Maude's will "unequivocally conveyed the [remainder] to all of the community property to the petitioner's sons"; that petitioner was forced to elect between taking the*171 benefits which accrued to him under the will or retaining his complete ownership interest in his share of the community property; that petitioner elected to take under the will; and that by so doing he transferred by gift his interest in the community property, subject to a retained life estate therein.
The crucial question with respect to the doctrine of election is whether Maude's will "unequivocally conveyed" the remainder interest of petitioner's share of the community property to their sons at her death. If such is the case, there can be no doubt that petitioner, in accepting the benefits provided him under the will, relinquished the remainder interest in his share of the community property.
We are controlled by the law of Texas in determining the legal effect of the joint will upon petitioner's property rights.
*172 The doctrine of election, based on the equitable principle of estoppel by conduct, applies in those situations where a testator purports to dispose of property belonging to a beneficiary and at the same time gives the beneficiary other property, and it is evident that the testator intends the beneficiary to take under the will only upon the condition that he relinquishes his own property which then passes in accordance with the dispository provisions of the will. The beneficiary, by electing to accept the benefits provided for him under the will, is estopped to deny that his property passes under the will. Conversely, if he elects to retain his own property, he loses the testamentary gift.
Did Maude by clear and unequivocal language purport to dispose of the remainder interest in all the community property, including petitioner's share? We think not. It is insufficient that her will may be construed as revealing such an intention. It is required that the language of the will
The key to the correct interpretation of this instrument is found in the second paragraph which provides that "it is the intention of each of us to dispose of only our part of the community property." Obviously the parties meant that each intended to dispose of his or her part of the community property; neither*175 intended to dispose of the other's property. See
This conclusion is further supported by the rule fashioned by the Supreme Court of Texas that, in interpreting a joint will, the "provisions *57 * * * dealing with 'our property' are to be interpreted as though each of the parties were making separate disposition of his or her property only."
When read in light of the restrictive gloss of the language*176 of the second paragraph and of the rule of interpretation laid down in
SECOND
All of the property that [I] now own or have an interest in, is community property and it is [my] intention * * * to dispose of only [my] part of the community property that [I] now own or have an interest in or that [I] hereafter acquire and any separate property, if any, [I] may, at any time acquire after this date.
THIRD
It is [my] will and desire that * * * S. E. Brown * * * shall have all of the income from all of the property [I] own at the time of death, real, personal or mixed and wherever located for and during [his] lifetime * * *; [he] also to have the right to manage and control said properties during his * * * lifetime and [I] do hereby give, devise, and bequeath to [him] * * * all of the income from all of the property, [I] own at the time of death, whether real, personal or mixed and wherever located for and during [his] lifetime * * *; which [he] is to have the full power, right and authority to manage and control all of said property during [his] lifetime * *177 * *; [he] to have the use, enjoyment and occupancy of all of said properties during his * * * lifetime.
FOURTH
[I] * * * subject to the provisions of the Third paragraph of this will, give, devise and bequeath to [my] sons SAM E. BROWN and BILLY N. BROWN all of [my] property of every kind and character and wherever located, whether in the State of Texas or any other state, in full fee simple, share and share alike.
When the provisions of Maude's will are read and interpreted in this manner, it is clear that she intended to give petitioner a life estate in her one-half interest of the community property, and their sons the remainder in such property, without affecting in any way petitioner's complete ownership as to his one-half of the community property. The instrument did not require that petitioner give up his community property as a condition to receiving the life estate.
Correlatively, prior to Maude's death and prior to petitioner's revocation of the instrument as his will, the instrument had a similar import as his separate will. Had he been the first to die, the instrument would have operated to have given Maude a life estate in his share of the community property with the*178 remainder therein to their sons. Similarly, under such circumstances, the instrument could not have operated to divest Maude of her remainder interest in her share of the community property, as it did not divest petitioner of the remainder *58 interest in his property. Since Maude did not purport by clear and unequivocal language to dispose of petitioner's property, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of election herein, and petitioner took the benefits under Maude's will without any equities arising against his own property. In other words, petitioner's acceptance of the life estate under Maude's will did not effect a "transfer" of the remainder interest in his share of the community property.
Respondent maintains that petitioner and Maude made an inter vivos gift and bequest, respectively, by using the terminology to "give, devise and bequeath to our sons Sam E. Brown and Billy N. Brown all of our property." We agree with respondent that by this provision Maude made a bequest of the remainder interest in her share of the community property to her sons, but we disagree with him, for the reasons already stated, that petitioner made an inter vivos gift of *179 the remainder in his community property. As to petitioner, the joint will at Maude's death, prior to the time he revoked it as his will, was no more than just that -- his will. It is settled law that a will speaks only at the time of the testator's death. Petitioner, by executing the joint will as his separate testament, intended only to make a testamentary disposition, not an inter vivos transfer.
We will next consider respondent's contention that there was a transfer of the remainder interest by gift on the ground that the will which was jointly executed by petitioner and Maude and which purported to be mutual, as well as joint, was executed pursuant to a contract.
A "mutual" will, as defined by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Respondent claims that the instrument involved herein is in fact what it purports to be -- a mutual will; that a "joint and mutual" will becomes irrevocable at the death of the first testator; and that, upon Maude's death, petitioner could not revoke such joint and mutual will. Respondent concludes that petitioner at that time "irrevocably disposed *59 of his property" and thus made a taxable gift. Petitioner counters by asserting that the will, though joint, was not "mutual" in the legal sense of the term and that, even if it were mutual, there still was no taxable gift*181 of the remainder interest at Maude's death.
In support of his contention, respondent, among other things, points to and relies on the provision in the introductory paragraph of the will which describes the instrument as a "joint and mutual will," and on language in the protest filed with the Internal Revenue Service in which petitioner referred to the instrument as a "joint and mutual will."
Petitioner, relying principally on his testimony which was corroborated by Fike, the attorney who drafted the instrument, argues that the instrument was not executed pursuant to any contract, notwithstanding the provision in the introductory paragraph. Respondent objected to the admission of such testimony on the ground that it violated the parol evidence rule because it was offered to vary or contradict the terms of the instrument. 5 In tentatively overruling the objection, the Court indicated that the question of the admissibility of this testimony might be crucial. Consequently, it was suggested that counsel brief this evidentiary question at the same time they briefed the substantive issues. Neither party, however, has complied with our request.
*182 The parol evidence rule provides that "when two parties
*60 Where, as here, the issue is whether there is in fact a contract, the parol evidence rule by its very terms has no application, and any evidence tending to explain or clarify the intention and purpose of the parties is clearly admissible. Accordingly, we have accepted the testimony concerning the intention of the parties as not falling within the ambit of the parol evidence rule. But even if the testimony were offered for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the writing, we think it still would be admissible. The rule in this Court is well settled that the parol evidence rule has no application in Federal tax cases where the Government is not a party or privy to a party to the instrument. What we said in
The Supreme Court of the United States, almost all the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and this Court have held that the parol evidence rule cannot be invoked by a third party, not a party to the written instrument involved. * * * [The] *184 United States is a stranger to the contract. It asserts a tax liability, not a claim derived from either party to the contract.
It has generally been held that the parol evidence rule applies only in those cases where the litigants are parties to the written instrument or privies to such parties.
Generally, "[in] the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding." [
The rule in the Texas courts is that the burden of proving a contract for the execution of wills containing reciprocal provisions is upon the party asserting the existence of such a contract.
In determining whether or not there is a subsisting contract for the execution of mutual wills, courts generally look to the provisions of the will itself, the testimony of competent witnesses as to the alleged agreement, and declarations of the alleged promisor. Evidence as to the relations and conduct of the parties and as to other facts and circumstances that tend to prove that an agreement was or was not made is also admissible.
*61 Turning to the provisions of the instrument in question, we find no express recitation that the parties had a contractual *186 understanding or that it was the product of an agreement. Nowhere in the instrument are there any words of promise, agreement, or contract. We do not think the will is contractual in nature despite the reciprocal dispository provisions and the use of the word "mutual" in the introductory paragraph.
It has been held that a jointly executed will containing mutual and reciprocal provisions, absent any other evidence of the parties' intention, is sufficient to show the existence of a contract to make such a will.
For many years, the Texas courts have held that a joint and mutual will, which is probated and under which the survivor took the property, represented a conclusive presumption that the contract was entered into as stated in the joint and mutual will.
We find respondent's statement of the law anomalous. He must not be using the term "mutual" in its legal sense, i.e., a will executed pursuant to a contract. Apparently what respondent*187 means to say is that a joint and reciprocal will, which is probated and under which the survivor takes the property, represents a conclusive presumption that such a will was executed pursuant to a contract. If a will were mutual in the first instance, the act of probating the will and taking under it could not make it any more mutual. See
Contrary to respondent's contention, there is substantial authority for the rule that a will jointly executed by two persons is not necessarily contractual in nature, *189 even though it contains reciprocal testamentary dispositions. In
But it does not follow merely because a husband and wife jointly sign a will, even though the terms and provisions thereof be mutual and reciprocal, that the same is necessarily contractual in nature or is made in pursuance of a contract between them or that all of the devises therein contained become irrevocable. 44 T.J. pp. 665-670, and authorities;
Despite the joint and reciprocal form of the will, we are satisfied that petitioner has shown by competent evidence that it was not contractual in nature or made in pursuance of a contract.
Since it was*190 Fike's suggestion that the parties incorporate their respective wills into one instrument to save time and money, we attach little significance to the use of the joint and reciprocal form of the instrument as tending to show that it was contractual or based on a contract. Unlike
The provision of the*191 will describing it as a "mutual" will, considered in light of the circumstances under which it was executed, does not conclusively prove that the will was contractual in nature. See
Respondent relies on the affidavit signed by petitioner on or about October 1, 1965, in which petitioner refers to the instrument as a "joint and mutual will," as evidence that the instrument was such in fact. Instead of confirming respondent's argument, the affidavit demonstrates to us the petitioner's total unfamiliarity with the legal significance of the *192 term "joint and mutual will." The sole purpose for filing the affidavit was to request a conference to protest the proposed deficiency of the gift tax here in issue. Such a purpose is completely inconsistent with the notion that petitioner used the term "mutual will" to mean a will executed pursuant to an agreement, because his principal argument then, as now, was that no contract or agreement existed. Apparently respondent's agent proposed the gift tax deficiency on the theory that the joint will constituted a contract between Maude and petitioner. Petitioner flatly denied the existence of any contractual obligations arising from the execution of the joint will. Petitioner expressly makes this point in the affidavit where he states: "The signing of this will was not a contractual obligation whereby the survivor agreed to dispose of his interest in any specified manner." Petitioner did not intend the word "mutual" in either the instrument or the affidavit to be interpreted in its legal sense of a will based on a contract. It is significant that the protest was prepared by a certified public accountant and not by an attorney.
To be sure, the nature of the instrument in question*193 necessarily implies some prior arrangement between the parties. It was drafted by the same attorney, it was jointly executed, it was witnessed by the same witnesses, and it contained reciprocal provisions. Petitioner readily admits discussing the proposed testamentary disposition of his property with Maude, but we see nothing unusual or strange about a husband who was 68 years of age discussing his arrangements for the testamentary disposition of his property with his wife who was 66 years of age. Such prior discussions and arrangements by Maude and petitioner, who were obviously bound by the closest ties of affection, do not establish that the joint will was necessarily made pursuant to an enforceable contract or agreement. See
It is also settled law that a*194 contract to make a will must be supported by consideration.
Accordingly, *196 we conclude that the joint will was not based on a contract. There was no transfer of the remainder interest in petitioner's share of the community property effected by operation of the joint will because petitioner was in no way contractually bound to convey any interest in his property to his two sons at the time of Maude's death.
Even if we assume
As we have already indicated, the provisions of the will should be read and interpreted as though each of the parties thereto were making a separate disposition of only his or her share of the community property. When the instrument is so construed, it appears that each of the parties undertook by the third and fourth paragraphs of the instrument to guard against two contingencies: (1) By the third paragraph each*197 undertook to make a disposition of his or her share of the property in the event he or she was the first to die, in which event a life estate interest in the property of the first to die was given to the survivor, with the remainder in such property to their sons; and (2) by the fourth paragraph each undertook to dispose of his or her property if he or she was the last to die, in which event the property owned by the survivor at that time was to go to their sons.
If the parties had intended the joint will to be contractual as well as testamentary in nature, the terms of such a contract must be adduced from the will itself, for there is no other evidence with respect to any agreement between them. The contract, as determined from the will, could only have been that, if the first to die would give to the survivor a life estate in his or her share of the community property owned at death, the survivor would leave all his property owned at death to the sons. Consequently, petitioner, as the survivor, would be obligated under the alleged contract to convey to his sons only the property owned by him at his death. He would be under no duty to make a present transfer of the remainder interest*198 in his share of the community property owned by him at Maude's death.
Texas courts will not consider that parties to a joint and mutual will intended to limit the disposition by each of his or her own property in good faith during his or her lifetime unless a plain intention to that effect is expressed in the will.
*201 We are convinced that petitioner did not make a taxable gift of the remainder interest in the community property which he owned at Maude's death. The only thing that can conceivably be considered as having passed at that time under the theory of mutual wills was the right to receive the property which petitioner owned at death. There is a substantial difference between the present transfer of a remainder interest in property owned by petitioner at Maude's death and the present transfer of a right to receive whatever property petitioner owns at his death. A joint and mutual will at the time of the death of the first testator passes no present interest in the property of the survivor. Its effect is contractual not dispositive.
In his reply brief respondent points to
It thus appears that even though an instrument is designated a mutual or joint will it may as to the survivor, by reason of provisions contained therein, be more than a will which would not be operative until his or her *203 death, but may effect the transfer or conveyance of property of such survivor at the same time it becomes becomes effective as the will of the first spouse to die.
The Board held that the instrument clearly indicated that the cotestators, husband and wife, intended that "their entire interests in the community estate should pass to * * * [their children] and that from and after the death of the first spouse to die the interest of the survivor in the community estate should be limited to that of a life tenant."
We believe the contract analysis is inadequate to explain the result reached in
The fact is simply this, Anna Eliza Masterson [the survivor] bound herself by waiving her community interest and accepting in lieu thereof a life interest in all of the property in accordance with the *205 terms of the joint will and covenant.
This language connotes the application of the election doctrine rather than that of mutual wills. Under the laws of Texas this petitioner did not waive his interest in his share of the community property by accepting the benefit provided for him under Maude's will either on the theory of election or on the theory of mutual wills.
It is important to note that at its very next opportunity to apply the
This case [
In conclusion, we hold that the petitioner did not make a taxable gift of the remainder interest of his property at Maude's death. 9 Respondent's determination is erroneous.
Footnotes
1. SEC. 2501. IMPOSITION OF TAX.
(a) Taxable Transfers. --
(1) General Rule. -- For the calendar year 1955 and each calendar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided in section 2502, is hereby imposed on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual, resident or nonresident.↩
2. SEC. 2511. TRANSFERS IN GENERAL.
(a) Scope. -- Subject to the limitations contained in this chapter, the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible; but in the case of a nonresident not a citizen of the United States, shall apply to a transfer only if the property is situated within the United States.↩
3. Respondent has caused considerable confusion by his attempt to indiscriminately merge these two arguments into one. It is clear that under the law of Texas the concept of election and the concept of mutual wills are separate, distinct, unrelated, and productive of entirely different legal consequences. See
.Graser v.Graser , 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867, 870↩ (1948)4. Respondent cites
Chase Manhattan Bank and, after stating that it is "comparable to the instant case," sets out more than two pages of quoted material therefrom but fails to specify how the quoted excerpts relate to the facts in the instant case. The Court of Appeals inChase Manhattan Bank↩ held that where a husband in Texas, a community property State, transfers community property by gift and the wife fails to assert her right to her community interest in such property, the wife is deemed to have made a gift of her interest therein. Suffice it to say that, after careful study of this case, we conclude that it has no relevance as support for any of respondent's contentions.5. Respondent also objected to this testimony on the ground that it called for a legal conclusion from petitioner. This objection is without merit since the crucial issue to be decided is whether the parties intended to be contractually bound by the terms of the instrument.↩
6. If the joint will was based on a contract, petitioner's control over his property would not be completely unrestricted. He could not do anything which would constitute a fraud to defeat the contract. However, it is clear that petitioner would have vast control or power over the property even within these limits.↩
7. Petitioner cites
(C.A. 8, 1955);Awtry's Estate v.Commissioner , 221 F.2d 749 (C.A. 8, 1967); andUnited States v.Ford , 377 F.2d 93 (C.A. 5, 1954), as authority for the proposition that no property or property rights or interests were transferred from petitioner to his sons at Maude's death even if the joint will were based on a contract.McFarland v.Campbell , 213 F.2d 855↩8. Part I, par. 3, of the will provided, in part, as follows: "And for such purposes, we each waive our respective community rights and interest in said estate, and here agree that the same shall remain intact, subject to the terms, conditions and provisions hereof."↩
9. In view of the conclusions reached herein, we did not consider it necessary to make any findings of fact requested by petitioner with respect to the execution or existence of the holographic codicil to Maude's will.↩
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.