Jennemann v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Rowlee v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1983)
- De Mars v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1982)
- Druker v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1981)
- Addison v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1979)
- Ridenour v. United States (Court of Claims 1983)
- Payne v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1981)
- Stonier v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1981)
- Radnovich v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1977)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*144
*907 Respondent determined a $ 557.91 deficiency in petitioner' 1971 income tax.
The issues for decision are:
(1) Whether this Court is prohibited from taking action herein since it is not established pursuant to the provisions of
(2) Whether
All of the facts have been stipulated and are found accordingly.
Petitioners C. T. *146 and Doris M. Jennemann, husband and wife, resided in St. Louis, Mo., at the time they filed their petition herein. Doris M. Jennemann is a party to this case only by virtue of having filed a joint return with her husband. When we hereafter refer to petitioner, we will be referring to C. T. Jennemann.
From January 2, 1971, and continuing to the present, C. T. Jennemann has been an employee of the Kroger Co. Commencing at some point prior to January 2, 1971, petitioner was a participant in the Kroger Employees Savings and Profit Sharing Plan (Plan). On September 18, 1970, the Kroger Co's board of directors voted to terminate the Plan, effective January 2, 1971. Thereafter, on January 2, 1971, the Plan was terminated.
During 1971, petitioner received a lump-sum distribution of $ 8,557.83 from the Plan by reason of the termination. The distribution included amounts contributed to the Plan by petitioner and by Kroger, and earnings on those contributions. Petitioner correctly excluded from his computation of amounts allegedly subject to capital gains tax his contributions, determined by applying section 72(f). Petitioner correctly included the portion of the lump-sum distribution *147 representing post-1969 employer contributions in gross income as ordinary income under
Petitioner does not argue that respondent misread the statute. Instead, he raises constitutional objections to our power to decide the case and to congressional power to enact
*149 Petitioner first contends that the United States Tax Court cannot lawfully take action herein since it is not established pursuant to the provisions of
In our opinion Congress acted wholly within its constitutional power in creating this Court as an article I court without regard to the provisions of article III; and this Court may exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress without violating article III. * * *
In
Petitioner's final contention is that
Allowance of a deduction from gross income is not a matter of right or equity but depends upon legislative grace.
*910 In providing such treatment for certain employees or their widows, Congress intended to provide relief to these individuals from any "bunched income" problem, i.e., taxing at graduated rates income received in 1 year but accrued to a distributee over a number of years. *152 H.R. Rept. No. 91-413 (Part I) 153-155 (1969),
We are able to perceive a rational basis for granting preferential capital gains treatment only to employees who retire or separate from service, and their widows, i.e., that Congress could have determined that these individuals are generally less able to pay taxes and generally more dependent on their pensions for a livelihood than employees who continue in their employment. Moreover, the denial of the preferential treatment to employees who receive lump-sum*153 distributions upon plan termination, is founded upon the sensible conclusion that such a provision would encourage otherwise unnecessary plan terminations, at the expense of rank and file employees, for the purpose of obtaining capital gains treatment for those in control. All kinds of abuses could be readily imagined, such as a pattern of starting, terminating, and restarting plans.
Petitioner also contends that
Footnotes
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as in effect during the year in issue.↩
2.
Sec. 402(a)(5) as it read prior to amendment in 1974 provided:(5) Limitation on capital gains treatment. -- The first sentence of [sec 402(a)(2)] shall apply to a distribution paid after December 31, 1969, only to the extent that it does not exceed the sum of --
The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this paragraph.(A) the benefits accrued by the employee on behalf of whom it is paid during plan years beginning before January 1, 1970, and
(B) the portion of the benefits accrued by such employee during plan years beginning after December 31, 1969, which the distributee establishes does not consist of the employee's allocable share of employer contributions to the trust by which such distribution is paid.↩
3.
Sec. 402(a)(2) as it read prior to amendment in 1974 provided:(2) Capital gains treatment for certain distributions. -- In the case of an employees' trust described in section 401(a), which is exempt from tax under section 501(a), if the total distributions payable with respect to any employee are paid to the distributee within 1 taxable year of the distributee
on account of the employee's death or other separation from the service, or on account of the death of the employee after his separation from the service↩ , the amount of such distribution, to the extent exceeding the amounts contributed by the employee (determined by applying section 72(f)), which employee contributions shall be reduced by any amounts theretofore distributed to him which were not includible in gross income, shall be considered a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months. * * * [Emphasis added.]
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.