Ruegsegger v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Glenn v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2013)
- Estate of Rubinow v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1980)
- Jacobson v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1979)
- Bennett Land Co. (A Washington Corp.) v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1978)
- Lewy v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1977)
- State v. Phipps (Kan. 2025)
- McCaffery v. United States (United States Court of Federal Claims 2021)
- Richard E. Lacey, II v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2019)
- Lewis v. United States (United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 1996)
- Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1981)
- Krellman v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1979)
- Monasmith v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1979)
- Collegiate Cap & Gown Co. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1978)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*85 Petitioners mailed their petition from New York, N.Y., on the 89th day following the mailing of the notice of deficiency. The envelope containing the petition arrived at the Tax Court 5 days later bearing no postmark of any kind. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
*464 OPINION
This matter is before us on respondent's "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" filed May 25, 1976. It is respondent's contention that the petition in this case was not filed within the time prescribed by
Respondent*87 mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioners on January 9, 1976. The last day for timely filing a petition under
Petitioners' petition was received through the mail in the Tax Court mailroom on Monday, April 12, 1976, and stamped accordingly at 8:16 a.m. Such date was 94 days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency. At 9:50 a.m. that same day the petition was stamped "Filed" by one of the employees in the petition section of the Court.
The envelope containing the petition was mailed in New York, N.Y., petitioners' residence at the time of filing, but bore no postmark on its arrival at the Court. The envelope was properly addressed and had a sufficient amount of postage attached.
The petition was obviously not received by the Court within the 90-day period prescribed in
The question before us is not new. We must decide whether evidence of timely mailing is admissible as evidence of timely filing in the absence of a postmark on the envelope in which the petition was mailed. We have spent many long and tumultuous hours considering this issue in the past, with the result that the Court is strongly divided on the merits. See
In
Respondent raises the issue, however, whether, under the rule expressed in
In
Underlying the
In
candor compels us to say that we find the application of the
Cf.
While the rule in
Moreover, the Second Circuit has indicated that its affirmances in open*91 court without opinion have no precedential value whatever. In
Appellant discounts their precedential value entirely, relying on our recently adopted local rule § 0.23, 2 * * *
We believe that appellant is wholly correct on this point. Although the rule refers to "statements" rather than decisions, its clear intent -- contrary to the interpretation urged upon us by the Government -- is that the decisions themselves shall also have no effect as stare decisis. * * * [
*92 Because the affirmance of
We choose then to follow our decision in
*93 At the hearing on this motion a law clerk for petitioners' attorneys testified that he deposited the envelope containing the petition in a mailbox at approximately 8:10 p.m. on Wednesday, April 7, 1976. Respondent's witness, a postal employee, testified that petitioners' envelope, if mailed when indicated, would have been collected the following day. We take this to mean that the envelope would have received a postmark of April 8, 1976, the 90th day following the mailing of the notice of deficiency, had the postal authorities properly stamped the envelope with a postmark. 4
Respondent's witness also testified that mail picked up
The ordinary amount of time that mail takes in going from New York City to Washington, D.C., is probative evidence of the time the document was mailed. It is not, however, conclusive. See sec. 301.7502-1(c)(iii)(
*95 Because of our opinion in
Respondent relies on
We are not holding that under no circumstances can the taxpayer come within section 7502(c)(2) without producing a timely and properly postmarked sender's receipt for certified mail, but we think the evidence in support of compliance must be more convincing than it*96 is in this case.
We do not doubt that this petition was placed in the United States mail on Wednesday, June 26 or soon thereafter. It was delivered to the Tax Court in Washington, D.C., on Monday, July 1 and would probably have taken that long to get from California to Washington in the regular course of the mails. But, as we have pointed out above, that is not enough. Either the cover must have been postmarked on or before June 27 or it must have been delivered to a postal employee for mailing by certified mail on or before June 27, and the postal employee must have postmarked the sender's receipt with a postmark bearing a date on or before June 27. It seems highly unlikely that had the cover containing the petition been delivered to a postal clerk under the circumstances described by the witnesses that he would have failed to stamp the postmark on the cover. It must be presumed that the postal clerk duly performed his official duty; and his instructions are rather explicit on this point. But in addition the witnesses testified that Hallie specifically asked him to make sure that the postmark was affixed. Under the circumstances it seems to us that the coincidence of the absence*97 of a postmark on the cover and the disappearance of the sender's receipt is too convenient.
On the evidence presented we cannot make a finding that the sender's receipt for certified mail was postmarked by a postal employee on or before June 27, 1963. Without such, and in the absence of a postmark on the covering emvelope, the date the petition was received and filed in the Tax *469 Court must be considered the date the petition was filed. That date was 94 days after the notice of deficiency was mailed to petitioners. Consequently, the petition was not timely and this Court has no jurisdiction, so respondent's motion to dismiss is granted. [
While there was some notion that the sine qua non of section 7502 was the presence of a postmark at the time
Without questioning the admissibility of secondary evidence of the alleged lost certified mail receipt we are of the view that the presentation of the testimony here referred to presented to the Tax Court a question as to the credibility of that testimony. We know of no rule that uncontradicted testimony must be accepted by a court finding the facts, particularly where, as here, the testimony is given by interested parties. These parties appeared in person before the Tax Court and the court had the opportunity to note the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses, the mode in which they responded to questions on cross-examination, their readiness to answer or hesitation as the case may be, and all these are matters as to which we have no equal opportunity of judging. * * * [
We believe that all of the witnesses in the present case were credible. We have no reason to doubt the truth of their testimony. Cf.
Footnotes
1. All statutory references hereafter refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.↩
2. Sec. 0.23, Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supplementing Fed. R. App. P. sec. 0.23, states:
Sec. 0.23.
Dispositions In Open Court Or By Summary Order : The demands of an expanding caseload require the court to be ever conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accordingly, in those cases in which decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion, disposition will be made in open court or by summary order.Where a decision is rendered from the bench, the court may deliver a brief oral statement. Where disposition is by summary order, the court may append a brief written statement to that order. Since these statements do not constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court. [Fn. ref. omitted.]↩
3. See also
.Boyd v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1964-265↩4. See
;Sylvan v. Commissioner, supra at 554 n. 12 .Skolski v. Commissioner , 351 F.2d 485, 488↩ (3d Cir. 1965)5. Contrast sec. 301.7502-1(c)(iii)(
b ), Proced. & Admin. Regs., which utilizes the ordinary time of transit as a definitive standard in determining timely filing where postmarks other than those made by the U.S. Post Office are used. Since the theory ofSylvan↩ is that "no postmark" cases should be treated the same as "illegible postmark" cases, we believe the regulation cited in the text applies.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.