Richards v. Commissioner
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANNENWALD,
All of the facts have been stipulated and are found accordingly.
Petitioner*45 resided in Buffalo, N.Y., at the time he filed his petition herein. He timely filed his 1976 income tax return with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Andover, Mass.
During the taxable year 1976, petitioner was employed as a television technician by the National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC).
As a part of his employment duties with NBC, petitioner was intermittently required to work additional hours (to-wit, more than 8 hours) in conjunction with television productions to which he was assigned. In any event, petitioner was allowed a meals break during his daily work period.
On those occasions when petitioner actually worked extended hours, he received a meals allowance.
During the taxable year 1976, petitioner received meals allowances in the total amount of $890.51, all of which was included by NBC in petitioner's Form W-2 for said year.
The meals allowance paid by NBC consisted only of money. No meals were furnished by NBC on its business premises. Petitioner was permitted to use the meals allowance money as he saw fit and could spend the money in any manner he determined, in his sole discretion.
The meals allowance was paid for the convenience of NBC.
*46 During the taxable year at issue, section 119 provided in pertient part:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if--
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer, * * *
In
Section 119 provides that an employee may exclude from income "the valud of any meals… furnished to him by his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if… the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer…" By its terms, § 119 covers
We think that the
Footnotes
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect during the taxable year involved.↩
2. Petitioner can draw no sustenance from section 3 of Pub. L. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996, which retroactively limited the effect of
Kowalski insofar as concerns state police officers who were paid subsistence allowances prior to January 1, 1978. Indeed, it could appear that such legislative action represents a legislative endorsement of the application ofKowalski to other situations. See also , and the Supreme Court's analysis of that case inJones v. United States , 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925) .Commissioner v. Kowalski , 434 U.S. 77, 94↩, n. 29 (1977)3. See also
;Koven v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1979-213 , affd.Qureshi v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1978-223600 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ; ;Fenstermaker v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1978-210 .Austin v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1977-434↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.