Estate of Gardner v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
57 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Corbalis v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2014)
- Eaton Corp. v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2013)
- Charles M. Corbalis & Linda J. Corbalis v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2014)
- Charles M. Corbalis & Linda J. Corbalis v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2014)
- Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1991)
- Estate of James E. Caan, Jacaan Administrative Trust, Scott Caan, Trustee, Special Administrator (United States Tax Court 2023)
- Estate of James E. Caan, Jacaan Administrative Trust, Scott Caan, Trustee, Special Administrator (United States Tax Court 2023)
- Eaton Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2013)
- Eaton Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2013)
- Estate of Edward P. Roski, Sr., Edward P. Roski, Jr. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2007)
- Baptiste v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2016)
- Gwendolyn A. Ewing v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2004)
- Brown v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1996)
- Estate of Mueller v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 1993)
- Kansas City S. Indus. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1992)
- Estate of Wilbanks v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1990)
- Buzzetta Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1989)
- Woods v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1989)
- Mailman v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1988)
- Rivera v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1987)
- Naftel v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1985)
- Eaton Corp. v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2017)
- Family Chiropractic Sports Injury & Rehab Clinic v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2016)
- DNA Pro Ventures, Inc. v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2015)
- K.H. Co., LLC v. Comm'r (United States Tax Court 2014)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*54 D's estate tax return was not filed within 9 months after her death (
*989 OPINION
This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for partial summary judgment under
*990 Since the case is before us on a motion for partial summary judgment, we must follow the rule that "the factual materials presented and the inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."
Shella B. Gardner (decedent) died on November 14, 1979. Her will devised her real property, including two farms, to her daughter, T. Aleen Macy. Petitioner is the Estate of Shella B. Gardner, Deceased, T. Aleen Macy, Executrix. T. Aleen Macy is the duly qualified executrix and resided in Mattoon, Ill., at the time she filed the petition herein. Decedent's estate tax return was due to be filed by August 14, 1980.
Petitioner relied upon competent counsel for the preparation of the estate tax return. In the week following her death, decedent's file was initially assigned to Mr. Alan Spaniols, an attorney with the firm representing petitioner in this proceeding. On Thanksgiving Day of 1979, Mr. Spaniols was killed in an airplane crash. In reassigning Mr. Spaniols' work, the law firm did not discover that, contrary to the firm's customary practice, Mr. Spaniols had failed to prepare a "statute card" *62 indicating the date decedent's estate tax return was due.
On the day the return was due (August 14, 1980), and for several weeks prior thereto, petitioner's present attorney was engaged in litigation in Federal District Court in Danville, Ill. On August 25, 1980, immediately after returning from Danville, petitioner's attorney, realizing that the return was late, prepared and filed that day a request for an extension of time for filing decedent's estate tax return for a period of 18 days to and including September 1, 1980, i.e., a date 1 week from the date of the request. Decedent's estate tax return (Form 706) was signed by the executrix and her attorney on August 28, 1980, was postmarked on August 30, 1980, and was received in the IRS District Office on September 2, 1980. On a date not disclosed by the record, respondent denied petitioner's request *991 for an extension without considering the reasons stated for the request.
On October 9, 1980, petitioner's attorney filed a written protest of the denial of the requested extension. In response to petitioner's protest, an officer of the St. Louis Appeals Office telephoned petitioner's counsel to inform him that the protest*63 should be handled after the audit of decedent's estate tax return had been completed. The appeals officer also indicated that based on the stated reasons for the request (described above), the extension should have been granted.
At some point, the District Director of the Springfield District Office sought technical advice from the National Office as to the legal effect of a late-filed return on the election under
On December 7, 1982, after the examining agent had submitted his report, an officer of the St. Louis Appeals Office indicated that the extension should not have been denied without consideration of the circumstances, as it appeared from the file that the District Director's Office had done. Consequently, the appeals officer returned the file to the examining agent in the District Director's Office, directing him to consider the factual circumstances surrounding petitioner's extension request.
On April 19, 1983, the examining agent had a meeting with the executrix, her husband, and her attorney, to discuss the circumstances surrounding*64 the request for an extension of time to file the estate tax return, described above. The examining agent stated that petitioner had made a very strong case for an extension but that his supervisor would not allow him to grant it because decedent or the executrix's husband or both were farmers, and his supervisor disliked farmers, believing farmers were too rich, got away with too much already, and did not deserve any further breaks. Petitioner was not thereafter afforded an appellate conference.
In his statutory notice, mailed to petitioner on July 5, 1983, respondent determined that petitioner was not entitled to elect the special use valuation under
Under
As in effect at the time of decedent's death, 2
Election. -- The election under this section shall be made
The regulations provided that the election must be made on a timely filed estate tax return. Sec. 20.2032A-8(a)(3), Estate Tax Regs. In a series of memorandum opinions, we have held that a timely filed return is mandatory, requiring literal compliance, and leaving no room for a "reasonable cause" exception for an untimely return. 3 In these cases, we relied *993 upon decisions reaching the same result in construing substantially identical language in section 2032(c), involving the election of an alternate valuation date under section 2032. See
*68 Decedent's estate tax return was due August 14, 1980, 9 months after her death.
*69 Petitioner's extension request, filed August 25, 1980 (11 days after decedent's return was otherwise due), asked that the due date be extended to September 1, 1980 (18 days after decedent's return was otherwise due). Had that request been granted, the return would have been timely, having been filed within the extended period for filing; 6 however, respondent denied petitioner's extension request.
*994 Respondent has now moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that petitioner's attempt to elect special use valuation under
*71 There is a strong presumption that the actions of an administrative agency are subject to judicial review.
*995 Agency action is exempt from judicial review only where the governing statutes expressly preclude such review or where the action is committed to agency discretion by law. APA sec. 10,
The "committed to agency discretion" exception to the general rule of reviewability is a very narrow one. 9
*74 Thus, as various courts have held --
in the absence of a specific statutory preclusion of review, agency action may be determined to be "committed to agency discretion by law" only when a fair appraisal of the entire legislative scheme, including a weighing of the practical and policy implications of reviewability, persuasively indicates that judicial review should be circumscribed. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
*76 First, our examination of the overall statutory scheme, including the legislative history, discloses no basis upon which "nonreviewability can fairly be inferred."
*997 Second, contrary to respondent's argument, we think that there are ascertainable standards upon which to base our review of respondent's action. See
*79 Next, we think that respondent's exercise of discretion to grant or deny an extension is suitable for judicial review. See
*81 Similarly, we do not think that our review of respondent's denial of an extension of time to file the return will impair respondent's ability to carry out his congressionally assigned duties. See
Two Supreme Court decisions denying interim review of specific administrative actions rely in part upon the subsequent availability of judicial review to protect the interests of the litigants. See
This and other courts have been generally unsympathetic in the past to respondent's arguments, express or implied, for unreviewable administrative discretion. 14 We think respondent should fare no better in this case, for he has failed to rebut the strong presumption that administrative discretion remains subject to judicial review. See
We note that we are
*1000 We also note that reviewing respondent's exercise of discretion under
For the reasons stated above, we hold that respondent's denial of an extension of time for filing is not immune from review in this Court. We conclude that the appropriate standard of review is a narrow one -- whether respondent has abused his statutory discretion. This is a question of fact.
Petitioner's factual allegations regarding the reasons respondent denied the request for an extension of time are twofold: (1) An initial automatic denial without considering the facts and circumstances and (2) a denial on reconsideration solely because decedent or the executrix's husband or both were farmers, the very class of persons the
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to "Rules" is to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect during the taxable years in question unless otherwise noted.↩
2. We note that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 amended
sec. 2032A(d)(1)↩ to provide that the election can be made on the first estate tax return filed, whether or not the return is timely filed. Sec. 421(j)(3), Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 312-313. However, this amendment applies only to the estates of decedents dying after Dec. 31, 1981, sec. 421(k)(1), Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. at 313, and consequently does not apply to the instant case.3. See
;Estate of Williams v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1984-178 ;Estate of Young v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1983-686 . These cases involved the issue as to whether or not "reasonable cause" is relevant where the return was filed late. Respondent seems to assume that that is the issue here. We disagree. Here petitioner takes the position that the return should be treated as timely filed.Estate of Boyd v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1983-316↩4. See also
;Estate of Archer v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1984-57Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner , T.C. 1974-258; , affd. per orderEstate of Bradley v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1974-17511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975) ;Estate of Fisk v. Commissioner , a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated Jan. 29, 1952 (11 T.C.M. 77, 21 P-H Memo T.C. par. 52,018), revd. on other grounds203 F. 2d 358↩ (6th Cir. 1953) .5. Sec. 20.6081-1(b), Estate Tax Regs., states that the application for an extension --
"should be made before the expiration of the time within which the return otherwise must be filed and failure to do so may indicate negligence and constitute sufficient cause for denial. It should, where possible, be made sufficiently early to permit the internal revenue officer to consider the matter and reply before what otherwise would be the due date of the return."↩
6. Even though the return was not received until Sept. 2, 1980, had the extension been granted, the return would have been deemed filed on Aug. 30, 1980, the day it was mailed. Sec. 7502(a).↩
7. In
, involvingEstate of Young v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1983-686sec. 2032A , we assumed that respondent's exercise of discretion was reviewable, but held that he had not abused his discretion. InCrissey v. United States , an unreported decision (N.D. N.Y. 1980, 45 AFTR 2d 80↩-1754, 80-1 USTC par. 13,335), a case involving sec. 2032, the District Court, without discussing the reviewability of respondent's exercise of discretion, held that respondent had not abused his discretion in denying an extension request.8.
5 U.S.C. secs. 701-706 (1982)↩ .9. The use of the word "discretion" in this phrase has been described by commentators and courts as "a linguistic anomaly" and the whole phrase has been defined as "simply a euphemism for agency discretion so broad that it is unreviewable even for abuse of discretion." See
and nn. 33 & 34 (3d Cir. 1983).Hondros v. United States Civil Service Commission , 720 F.2d 278, 292↩10. See
;Hondros v. United States Civil Service Commission , 720 F.2d 278, 293 (3d Cir. 1983) ;Local 1219, Am. Fed. of Gov. Employees v. Donovan , 683 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ;American Federation of Gov. Emp., Etc. v. Brown , 680 F.2d 722, 725 (11th Cir. 1982) ;Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv ., 658 F.2d 1182, 1190-1191 (7th Cir. 1981) . See alsoBullard v. Webster , 623 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1980) ;Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp ., 442 U.S. 444, 454-460 (1979) .Morris v. Gressette , 432 U.S. 491, 501-504↩ (1977)11. Indeed, we regularly apply respondent's regulations in reviewing various of his discretionary actions relating to his deficiency determinations. Examples, by no means exhaustive, include respondent's allowance of a reserve for bad debts under sec. 166(c),
;Roanoke Vending Exchange, Inc. v. Commissioner , 40 T.C. 735, 740-741 (1963) ; respondent's change of a taxpayer's accounting method under sec. 446(b),Apex Brewing Co. v. Commissioner , 40 B.T.A. 1110, 1119 (1939) ;Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner , 439 U.S. 522, 531-535 (1979) ; and respondent's determination under sec. 482 to reallocate income, deductions, and/or credits among related taxpayers,Primo Pants Co. v. Commissioner , 78 T.C. 705, 717-725 (1982) ;Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner , 81 T.C. 520, 593-600 (1983) .Achiro v. Commissioner , 77 T.C. 881, 896-900↩ (1981)12. Sec. 20.6081-1(a), Estate Tax Regs., provides:
(a) In case it is impossible or impracticable for the executor to file a reasonably complete return within 9 months * * * from the date of death, the district director or the director of a service center may, upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, grant a reasonable extension of time for filing the return required by section 6018. * * *↩
13. See
, affg. in part, revg. in partKean v. Commissioner , 469 F.2d 1183, 1188-1189 (9th Cir. 1972)51 T.C. 337 (1968) (denial of an extension of time undersec. 1.1372-3(c), Income Tax Regs. , for filing consents to subch. S election); , revd. on another issueHicks Nurseries, Inc. v. Commissioner , 62 T.C. 138, 144-145 (1974)517 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); (refusal to accept taxpayer's consents to basis adjustment underColumbia Gas System, Inc. v. United States , 473 F.2d 1244, 1250-1251 (2d Cir. 1973)sec. 1017 andsec. 1.108(a)-2, Income Tax Regs. , on amended return); (denial of extension of time under sec. 1033 for acquiring property to replace other property involuntarily converted);Rosefsky v. Commissioner , 70 T.C. 909, 913-914 (1978) (same);Boyce v. United States , 186 Ct. Cl. 420, 405 F.2d 526, 531-532 (1968)United States v. Cury , an unreported decision (W.D. Va. 1961, 7 AFTR 2d 1759↩, 61-1 USTC par. 12,003); (denial of extension of time to pay estate tax under predecessor of sec. 6161(a)(2)).14. See, e.g.,
;Blair v. Oesterlein Co ., 275 U.S. 220, 226-227 (1927) , affg.Stranahan v. Commissioner , 42 F.2d 729, 731-732 (6th Cir. 1930)14 B.T.A. 1405 (1929) , cert. denied283 U.S. 822 (1931) (partially worthless debts, now sec. 166(a)(2)); ;Hicks Nurseries, Inc. v. Commissioner , 62 T.C. at 144 (Court-reviewed), affd.Remco Steamship Co. v. Commissioner , 30 B.T.A. 579, 583-584 (1936)82 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1935) , cert. denied299 U.S. 555 (1936) (reallocations under predecessor of sec. 482); (Court-reviewed) (respondent's decision to abrogate statutory closing agreement for fraud; predecessor to sec. 7121).Holmes & Janes, Inc. v. Commissioner , 30 B.T.A. 74, 79↩ (1934)
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.