Estate of Price v. Commissioner
Opinion
*63
WHITAKER,
Some of the facts have been stipulated and in all material respects they are so found. 1 At all times material, decedent was a resident of the State of Texas and on the date of filing of the petition Dr. Price, decedent's son, resided in E1 Paso, Texas. The statutory notice was mailed to petitioner on August 5, 1981. The factual issue with which we are confronted is whether or not an original 1976 income tax return was mailed to and received by respondent's Service Center at Austin, Texas, sometime during May or early June 1977. Respondent's Service Center has no record of the receipt of a tax return for decedent's 1976 calendar year until August 10,
The question as to whether or not respondent received a return for 1976 on or before June 15, 1977, the due date as extended for that return, first arose in connection with respondent's examination of decedent's 1977 income tax return. That return was filed a few days prior to decedent's death on May 11, 1978, although no extension had been obtained. The 1977 return was mailed by decedent's accountant after Dr. Price had found the signed return, which was dated April 15, 1978, at his mother's home and delivered it to her accountant. The return claimed as a credit against the 1977 income tax liability an overpayment reflected on the 1976 income tax return. On July 10, 1978, an employee in respondent's Austin, Texas,
At the outset, it is appropriate to note that the burden of proof as to the running of the statute of limitations*67 is
The facts as to mailing consist solely of Dr. Price's testimony at the trial. Both decedent and Dr. Price used a firm of certified public accountants in El Paso, Texas, for income tax return preparation. For reasons not reflected in the record, the return preparer obtained an extension of time to file decedent's 1976 return to June 15, 1976. Dr. Price had been assisting his mother in connection with financial affairs, including tax returns, since her divorce*69 in 1972. Dr. Price testified that: In the spring of 1977, he obtained the original of that return from the accountant in El Paso, took it with him on a business trip to Houston, Texas, leaving E1 Paso on May 18; on May 19 he flew to Dallas where he rented an automobile and drove to Weatherford, Texas, where his mother was living; he spent the nights of May 19 and 20 in Weatherford; and he returned to Dallas and flew from there back to El Paso on May 21. Dr. Price further testified that while he was with his mother in Weatherford she signed the 1976 return and that on either May 20 or 21 he placed the 1976 return in a mail box or drop at the Weatherford post office. The only corroboration offered for Dr. Price's testimony consisted of American Express carrying charges
*72 Viewing the record as a whole, we are far from convinced that Dr. Price in fact hand-carried to the decedent her 1976 income tax return, watched her sign it and himself placed it in the mail. There is no testimony as to the address to which mailed, whether or not proper postage was on the envelope or even that Dr. Price knew in 1977 where to file an income tax return. The record in this case is at best ambiguous: it will not support a finding that the 1976 income tax return of the decedent was timely mailed to respondent in a stamped and correctly addressed envelope, which facts are essential to the creation of a presumption of receipt and loss by respondent. The facts simply do not justify the application of
We thus have before us only the question whether the presumption of delivery to the addressee arising from
Petitioner has not submitted "positive proof of proper mailing."
Footnotes
1. The stipulation of facts is inconsistent in some respects both with the testimony and with the stipulated documents. ↩
2. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect during the years in issue, and all rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3. Petitioner makes no contention that the unsigned copy was sufficient to start the statute of limitations running. Exhibit 7-G, described in the stipulation as the signed copy received on August 10, 1978, does not appear to be signed, presumably because of the photocopy process used.↩
4. In pertinent part, sec. 6501(a) provides: "General Rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) * * *."↩
5. For example, on cross-examination he testified: Q. And you were only there [in Weatherford] one day?
A. I would assume that I was there--drove over the evening of the 19th. Was there the 20th and drove back the morning of the 21st. Q. You say you assume. You don't remember? A. I don't remember exactly. That is usually what I do * * *. ↩
6. Dr. Price was not asked how and when the "taxpayer copy" of the 1976 return (exhibit 7-G) came into his possession. ↩
7. In this connection, the original letter which was placed in evidence does not appear to have been folded, thus indicating that, if mailed, a large envelope was used. ↩
8. It is at least possible, as respondent suggests, that Dr. Price's recollection of mailing a tax return for the decedent was with respect to the 1975 tax return rather than the 1976 tax return.↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.