Sartor v. Commissioner
Opinion
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
FAY,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts are stipulated and found accordingly.
Petitioners, Steven F. Sartor and Gwenn Sartor, resided in Kaysville, Utah, when their petition was filed herein.
*403 Except for a one-year period spanning 1977 and 1978 when he was employed by a competitor, since 1970 petitioner Steven F. Sartor (petitioner) has been employed by Dixico, Inc. (herein Dixico) as an outside salesman of "packaging materials." When petitioner returned to Dixico in 1978, he was assigned the sales territory of Utah, Idaho, and Colorado. In March 1980 his sales territory was expanded to include Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Vancouver, Canada.
Petitioner obtained a commercial pilot's license in 1965 and subsequently purchased a Cessna 182 airplane in 1975. He used this plane exclusively for personal purposes until 1979 when he began to use it for business. In August 1980 petitioner purchased a 50 percent interest in a newer and larger Cessna T-206 airplane (hereinafter referred to as the airplane) because it was capable of safe flights in instrument flight conditions. At this time, petitioner began aircraft qualification and instrument flight training in the airplane which he completed in February 1981.
During 1980 petitioner used the airplane almost exclusively for business purposes, flying to see customers in cities throughout Idaho, Utah, Oregon, and Washington. *404 Petitioner determined that because there were less frequent commercial flights due to the deregulation of the airlines for him to cover his large sales territory, it was necessary to use the airplane so that he could maximize his sales.By using the airplane, petitioner was able to arrange a more flexible schedule which enabled him to reach customers before his competitors. Although Dixico only reimbursed petitioner for what it would have cost him to fly commercially, it approved of his using the airplane because Dixico expected it would allow petitioner to increase his sales.
Petitioner's bonus each year was based on the amount of his sales. After purchasing the airplane in 1980, his bonus increased from $4,263 in 1979 to $7,902 in 1980 and, by 1982, it was $12,591.
Petitioner incurred in 1980 the following three types of expenses in connection with the airplane: (1) travel expenses to visit clients (herein the travel expenses); (2) travel expenses to entertain his clients (herein the entertainment expenses); and (3) expenses for aircraft qualification, instrument flight training, and equipment and safety checks (herein the qualification expenses). The entertainment expenses*405 included scenic airplane flights and fishing trips with clients and members of their families. Dixico did not reimburse petitioner for any part of the entertainment expenses.
In 1980 petitioner maintained a flight log wherein the recorded the origin, destination, date and travel time for each of his flights.
On their 1980 return petitioners deducted $14,913 of the airplane expenses as business expenses.1 In his notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioners were not entitled to this deduction because the airplane expenses were not ordinary and necessary business expenses and, with respect to the entertainment expenses, because petitioners failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements under
OPINION
The only issue is whether the expenses petitioner incurred in connection with the airplane are deductible. Conceding that all of the airplane expenses are ordinary within the meaning*406 of
Under
Respondent's next contention is that petitioner's travel expenses were not reasonable. Generally, in order to be deductible a business expense must be reasonable in amount relative to its purpose.
With respect to the entertainment expenses, respondent's sole contention is that petitioner failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements of
*410
In order to constitute an adequate record of business purpose, a written statement is generally required unless the business purpose is evident from the surrounding facts and circumstances.
The entertainment expenses were incurred to take petitioner's clients on scenic flights and fishing trips. Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that business was ever discussed with his clients during these airplane flights or fishing trips. Petitioner's flight log only shows the name of the client who accompanied petitioner and when the trip took place. It does not include any statements concerning a business purpose. Since
To reflect concessions and the foregoing, 6
Footnotes
1. Petitioner incurred total airplane expenses of $16,765 in 1980. Since Dixico reimbursed him $1,852, petitioner's deduction was $14,913. ↩
2. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect during the year in issue.↩
3. Respondent concedes that if we find that the travel expenses were necessary and reasonable business expenses then the qualification expenses are likewise necessary and reasonable business expenses.↩
4. Based on respondent's concession that all of the airplane expenses are ordinary (see text
supra ) and his concession in n. 3, we conclude that the qualification expenses are likewise deductible undersec. 162↩ .5. Petitioner argues in his reply brief that respondent conceded this issue in the stipulation of facts. After careful consideration of the entire record, we conclude that respondent only conceded that the payment of the airplane expenses was substantiated, not that petitioners satisfied the substantiation requirements of
sec. 274 . See , affg. in part and revg. and remanding in partThe South Bay Corporation v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1965)41 T.C. 888 (1964) ; . This conclusion is supported by the fact that petitioners addressed the substantiation issue in their opening brief.Wauwatosa Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1966-51↩6. In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed petitioners' investment credit of $3,580. Respondent, however, has not addressed this issue in either one of his briefs. Since we have found that petitioner used the airplane for business purposes, we see no reason why petitioners are not entitled to an investment credit on a proportion of the purchase price of the airplane corresponding to the proportion of flying time that petitioner used the airplane for business purposes.This determination is an appropriate calculation for the parties under
Rule 155, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.