Colorado Nat'l Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- Thompson v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1989)
- Smith v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1989)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*18 In trial to determine valuation of core deposits intangibles,
*247 This opinion decides petitioner's motion for sanctions to be imposed on the grounds that
Petitioner has moved to strike (1) all or part of the testimony of respondent's expert witness, Professor Edward Kane; and (2) all or part of the cross-examination of petitioner's expert witness, Dale Winter. The motion is based on petitioner's belief that respondent's*20 counsel showed Professor Kane petitioner's Exhibit 81 outside the courtroom before Professor Kane testified, and that showing him the exhibit violated
The issues for decision are:
(1) Whether
(2) whether and what sanctions should be imposed.
As discussed below, we find that Exhibit 81 constituted testimony for purposes of
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the beginning of the trial,
Professor Edward Kane was an expert witness for respondent. He testified as to his analysis of core deposit *248 intangibles. He has testified for the Government in other core deposit intangible cases in recent years, such as
At trial on Wednesday, October 19, 1988, petitioner's accountant and expert witness, Mr. Dale Winter, testified on direct and cross-examination. On cross-examination, respondent's counsel asked Mr. Winter a series of questions regarding the methods used by Ernst & Whinney to determine runoff values for accounts at Boulder National Bank. From the responses he elicited, respondent's counsel drew a graph on an easel in the courtroom. The graph was admitted as respondent's Exhibit DC. Petitioner's counsel stated its intention to either critique Exhibit DC or to submit its own version during redirect examination of Mr. Winter. Subsequently, after trial*22 recessed on Wednesday, Mr. Winter prepared a graph in response to Exhibit DC, illustrating the present value of the core deposits intangibles arising from the demand deposit accounts at Boulder National Bank. Mr. Winter testified on redirect on Thursday, October 20, 1988. At that time, petitioner's counsel offered the graph and two pages of computer calculations prepared by Mr. Winter as petitioner's Exhibit 81. It was admitted into evidence on Thursday.
Respondent's expert, Professor Kane, was not in the courtroom on Thursday. However, he was shown Exhibit 81 by respondent's counsel outside the courtroom on Thursday night. Professor Kane indicated that he did not see Exhibit 81 until after he completed his own related computations. Professor Kane made his own computations using information contained in Exhibit CS and Exhibit 41, and did not consider Exhibit 81 in making such computations.
OPINION
(a) Exclusion: At the request of a party, the Court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order on its own motion. This Rule does not*23 authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its *249 representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.
(b) Contempt: Among other measures which the Court may take in the circumstances, it may punish as for a contempt (i) any witness who remains within hearing of the proceedings after such exclusion has been directed, that fact being noted in the record; and (ii) any person (witness, counsel, or party) who willfully violates instructions issued by the Court with respect to such exclusion.
At the request of a party, the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party*24 to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
We must decide whether there has been a violation of
The burden of proof is on the movant to show probable prejudice. 2
Petitioner asserts that respondent violated
The first issue to consider is whether showing Exhibit 81 to Professor Kane violated
Mr. Winter prepared Exhibit 81 to clarify his testimony on cross-examination. It was then offered and admitted into evidence. We find that it was equivalent to oral testimony by Mr. Winter for purposes of
We distinguish a recent Claims*26 Court case,
In contrast, Mr. Winter prepared Exhibit 81 during a trial recess to clarify his testimony on cross-examination. Mr. Winter essentially prepared a summary of his testimony in the form of a graph and computer printout.
We hold that exhibits that are prepared after trial has started to clarify witness testimony are testimony for purposes of
Having found that Exhibit 81 constitutes testimony for purposes of the exclusionary provisions of
Petitioner further contends that "Respondent's counsel must also have discussed at least some other prior testimony with Kane. It is unlikely that Kane was merely shown Petitioner's Exhibit 81 without any comment whatsoever."
There is no direct evidence to support a finding that respondent's counsel recounted oral testimony to Professor Kane when respondent's counsel gave Exhibit 81 to Professor Kane. We find that petitioner failed to prove that recounting of oral testimony occurred. Thus, there is no violation of
The Court disapproves of violations of
Based on the violation of
We must determine whether striking respondent's expert witness's testimony and respondent's cross-examination of petitioner's expert witness is an appropriate remedy under the circumstances of this case.
(1) Strike testimony, such as those parts influenced by the violation of the Rule,
(2) Permit comment on noncompliance with the Rule to reflect on the credibility of the witness,
*252 (3) Refuse to let a witness testify,
(4) Permit rebuttal witness as to motives, credibility, etc.;
(5) Cite the witness, counsel, or party for contempt,
(6) Grant a new trial,
(7) Dismiss the petition,
(8) Default either party for failure to proceed in accordance with the
(9) Other sanctions as the Court finds appropriate,
The Court is not required to impose sanctions; sanctions are within the Court's discretion.
It is well established that a violation of a sequestration order does not automatically require exclusion of the witness's testimony.
the weight of authority is that * * * [a witness who violates the sequestration*30 order] cannot be excluded on that ground merely, although the right to exclude under particular circumstances may be supported as within the sound discretion of the trial court. * * * [
In
Even if violation of a proper order under this Rule [615] occurs, this alone does not render the witness' testimony inadmissible and its admission or exclusion is within the court's sound discretion. * * * Probable prejudice should be shown for such exclusion * * * [
The 10th Circuit has further indicated that there must be prejudice to the defendant or an abuse of discretion by the court to obtain reversal. In
Accordingly, we find that probable prejudice must be shown by movant (petitioner) in order to exclude Professor Kane's testimony or Mr. Winter's testimony on cross-examination. We find that no prejudice occurred in allowing Professor Kane to testify in this case, and decline to strike his testimony.
The purpose of the rule permitting exclusion of witnesses is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of prior witnesses and to minimize altered, uncandid testimony.
Similarly, we find that petitioner was not prejudiced by respondent's counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Winter. The record provides no basis for disputing respondent's counsel's assertion on brief that he prepared his cross-examination of Mr. Winter independently. Much of the cross-examination of Mr. Winter consisted of questions seeking to elicit clarification or explanation of Exhibit 81. We believe that respondent's counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Winter was not tainted by the violation of
Exclusion of witness testimony can deprive the Court of a complete record. 4 However, exclusion of witness testimony is appropriate if the Court believes the testimony was doctored or that a party was seeking to produce untruthful testimony. That did not occur here.
*254 While we find that
The Court wants to make clear that it will not abide violations of this nature. The fact that the violation of
Accordingly,
Footnotes
1. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure unless otherwise specified.↩
2. However, under the 11th Circuit's test, testimony will be struck only where the moving party has suffered actual prejudice and there has been connivance by the witness or counsel to violate the rule excluding witnesses.
.United States v. Jimenez , 780 F.2d 975, 980↩ (11th Cir. 1986)3. But compare
(violation ofUnited States v. Ell , 718 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1983)Rule 615↩ creates presumption of prejudice against defendant and requires reversal unless it is "manifestly clear" that error was harmless).4. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, par. 615[03], at 615-26 (1988).↩
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.