Maloney v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
1 later published case cites this decision.
- Connor Drummond Rice and Scott D. Rice as Co-Trustees for the 2001 Scott D. Rice Trust v. Matthew E. Malouf (Tex. App. 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*105
Petitioners were the controlling shareholders of several corporations. One of these (Van), owned real estate (the I-10 property). Petitioners intended to acquire other real estate (Elysian Fields), and also intended to consolidate operations of several of their corporations and use Elysian Fields in these operations. On the advice of Van's attorney, petitioners decided to have Van exchange the I-10 property for Elysian Fields in a like-kind exchange. Also on the attorney's advice, petitioners decided to liquidate Van under
*89 Respondent determined deficiencies in Federal individual income tax and additions to tax under *90
| Additions to tax | ||
| Taxable year | Deficiency | sec. 6653(a) |
| 1978 | $ 39,977 | $ 1,998.85 |
| 1979 | 321,883 | 16,094.15 |
Respondent also determined that each petitioner (in docket No. 1716-85) is liable as a transferee of the assets of Maloney Van & Furniture Storage, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Van) for a deficiency in Federal corporate income tax for 1978 in the amount of $ 115,418.03. These cases have been consolidated for*107 trial, briefs, and opinion. After concessions by both sides in docket No. 41612-84, the issue for decision that controls both dockets is whether a particular exchange of real estate qualifies for nonrecognition under
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated; the stipulations and the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
When the petitions were filed in the instant cases, petitioners Bonny B. Maloney, and Robert S. Maloney (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Maloney), wife and husband, resided in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Van, a Louisiana corporation, was a *108 calendar year taxpayer. Van was formed in 1966, and its initial business activity, as its name suggests, was the moving and storing of furniture. Sometime in 1977, Van discontinued the active conduct of that business; thereafter, its only activity until its dissolution was the leasing of its assets to related corporations. From the time Van was formed until December 12, 1978, petitioners owned 80 percent of Van's stock and Olga Maloney (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Olga) owned the remaining 20 percent. Olga was Maloney's stepmother. Maloney's father died in 1978. On December *91 12, 1978, Maloney acquired the remaining 20 percent of the stock in Van from Olga in exchange for his $ 125,000 nonnegotiable, noninterest-bearing promissory note. The note was payable in installments over 20 years, beginning January 1, 1984. From then until Van's dissolution, petitioners owned all of Van's stock.
Maloney also had an interest in a number of other corporations, including Maloney Trucking & Storage, Inc., and Gallagher Transfer & Storage (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the Maloney interests).
One of Van's primary assets was a piece of real estate (hereinafter*109 sometimes referred to as the I-10 property) located in Jefferson Parish, in or near Metairie, near Cleary Avenue, and extending to the I-10 service road. This is northwest of downtown New Orleans, just outside the New Orleans city limits. Van bought the I-10 property on or about August 15, 1971. At the same time, Van bought land adjoining the I-10 property on the western side. Van's intention at that time was to build a warehouse on this adjoining property and to hold the I-10 property for investment or development. Van built the warehouse on this adjoining property and held the I-10 property for investment.
In mid-1978, Maloney indicated to his attorney, Charles B. Johnson (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Johnson), that there was a possible purchaser for the I-10 property. Maloney also mentioned to Johnson that the Maloney interests were considering acquiring a piece of property on Elysian Fields Avenue in New Orleans (that property is hereinafter sometimes referred to as Elysian Fields). Elysian Fields is northeast of downtown New Orleans. Johnson advised Maloney that a like-kind exchange would produce more favorable tax results than a taxable sale or exchange. As *110 of August 2, 1978, Maloney intended to consolidate the different businesses with which he was associated. He also intended that operations of the Maloney interests be located on Elysian Fields. Neither Van nor Maloney intended to sell Elysian Fields.
On August 2, 1978, Van entered into an exchange agreement (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the exchange agreement) with James Goldsmith and Edward *92 Hernandez (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as Goldsmith and Hernandez). Under the exchange agreement, Van agreed to transfer the I-10 property to Goldsmith and Hernandez. In exchange, Goldsmith and Hernandez were to convey to Van property referred to in the exchange agreement as "the exchange property", which was intended to be Elysian Fields. The I-10 property and Elysian Fields are properties of a like kind.
The exchange described in the exchange agreement was subject to several conditions. Firstly, Goldsmith and Hernandez did not yet own Elysian Fields, so they were to enter into an agreement to buy Elysian Fields under terms acceptable to Van. Secondly, Goldsmith and Hernandez would have to obtain valid and merchantable title to Elysian Fields, and Van*111 would have to provide valid and merchantable title to the I-10 property. If Goldsmith and Hernandez were unable to acquire valid and merchantable title to Elysian Fields (first condition, above) or were unable to enter into an agreement to purchase Elysian Fields on terms acceptable to Van, then Van would nevertheless be obligated to sell the I-10 property to Goldsmith and Hernandez for cash. Thirdly, the exchange was conditioned on Goldsmith and Hernandez' obtaining a zoning change on the property adjacent to the I-10 property. 3
On October 15, 1978, Goldsmith and Hernandez entered into an agreement to buy Elysian Fields from Robert Coffin (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Coffin). Coffin did not at that time own Elysian Fields; on August 8, 1978, *112 Coffin had entered into an agreement to buy Elysian Fields from Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Hibernia). The agreement between Coffin and Hibernia was conditioned on certain zoning changes being made. On October 12, 1978, the Council of the City of New Orleans approved the rezoning upon which the agreement between Coffin and Hibernia was conditioned. The Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the City of New Orleans was amended accordingly on April 19, 1979. On November 29, 1978, the Jefferson Parish Council approved *93 the rezoning of the property adjacent to the I-10 property, as contemplated in the exchange agreement; the rezoning became effective on December 11, 1978.
In early December, Maloney advised Johnson that there was a possible purchaser for the property adjoining the I-10 property on its western side. Johnson began to consider the possibility of liquidating Van. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Maloney discussed the possibility of liquidating Van. Maloney reacted favorably. Johnson recommended that Maloney take certain steps before liquidating Van. Firstly, Johnson recommended that Maloney acquire Olga's Van stock. *113 Maloney bought Olga's Van stock on December 12, 1978, as discussed
Maloney made his decision to liquidate Van in mid-December of 1978, within a few days of his discussions with Johnson.
On December 28, 1978, the following also occurred: (1) Hibernia transferred Elysian Fields to Coffin; (2) Coffin transferred Elysian Fields to Goldsmith and Hernandez; and (3) Goldsmith and Hernandez transferred Elysian Fields to Van, and in return Van transferred the I-10 property plus $ 374,112 in cash to Goldsmith and Hernandez.
Van realized gain on the exchange in the amount of $ 371,144.57. 4
*114 Soon after Van acquired Elysian Fields, a local funeral home sought to buy Elysian Fields from Van, but Van would not sell the property.
On January 2, 1979, Van's directors (i.e., petitioners and Olga) adopted a plan to liquidate Van under
| Table 1 | |
| Asset | Amount |
| Land-Elysian Fields | $ 900,000.00 |
| Land-Metairie | 200,084.00 |
| Building-Metairie | 137,416.00 |
| Accounts receivable | 91.90 |
| Cash | 2,219.97 |
| Total | 1,239,811.87 |
The aggregate value of these assets exceeded Van's income tax liability as determined in the notices of transferee liability issued to petitioners.
On Van's liquidation, petitioners assumed Van's liabilities in the amount of $ 228,347.15. Petitioners' basis in their Van stock as of the time of Van's liquidation was $ 529,000.
As previously stated, Van realized*115 gain on the exchange in the amount of $ 371,144.57. Petitioners realized gain on the liquidation in the amount of $ 482,464.72, computed as follows:
| Property received | $ 1,239,811.87 |
| Less: liabilities assumed | -228,347.15 |
| Balance | 1,011,464.72 |
| Less: basis in stock | -529,000.00 |
| Realized gain | 482,464.72 |
After petitioners acquired Elysian Fields, they leased it to Gallagher Transfer & Storage for a term of about 25 or 30 years. Gallagher Transfer & Storage constructed a building on Elysian Fields and uses about 60 percent of the land for its own purposes and subleases about 40 percent to others for parking of cars and trucks. At the end of the lease term, the building constructed by Gallagher Transfer & Storage is to revert to petitioners.
When Van received Elysian Fields in exchange for the I-10 property and cash, it was intended that Van liquidate and distribute Elysian Fields to petitioners and that Elysian Fields be held for investment. It was not intended that *95 Elysian Fields be sold, or used for personal purposes, or transferred by way of gift.
OPINION
Respondent contends that the exchange of the I-10 property for Elysian Fields does not qualify for nonrecognition*116 under
*117 Petitioners maintain that an intent to liquidate under
We agree with petitioners that the exchange qualifies under
If (a) Elysian Fields and the I-10 property are of like kind, (b) before the exchange Van held the I-10 property for investment, and (c) after the exchange Van held Elysian Fields for investment, then under
The purpose of
*120 In
In passing, we note that the term "liquidation" is often used in this context as equivalent to a disposition that "cashes out" the investment. This is the sense that is described as follows in H. Rept. 73-704 (to accompany H.R. 7835, the Revenue Act of 1934) p. 13 (1934), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 564:
The calculation of the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in cash, marketable securities, or other property not of the same kind [as the property disposed of] having a fair market value.
This is different from "liquidation" under
In
We believe
Even aside from
*99 The instant cases may be viewed as a variant of
Van's purpose was the purpose of petitioners, Van's owners. The acquired property, Elysian Fields, was not liquidated in the sense of being cashed out (as in
The exchange before us reflects both continuity of ownership and of investment intent. Before the exchange, Van owned the I-10 property. After the exchange, Van owned Elysian Fields. Both before and after the exchange, petitioners owned all of Van's stock. After the
If Van had not been liquidated and had used Elysian Fields precisely as its shareholders did, then clearly the exchange would have been nontaxable under
On the authority of
On brief, respondent states that "the evidence in [the instant cases] establishes that Van, an inactive corporation, *100 did not initiate any attempts to acquire the Elysian Fields property, and was not going to use the Elysian Fields property in a trade or business." If we were to accept this view of the situation, and if Van had liquidated before the exchange, then the instant cases would be on all fours with
Respondent states as his view that "the intent to liquidate and to distribute property to shareholders is akin to an intent to sell the property or to gift it." We disagree. This has already been decided adversely to respondent.
On brief, respondent directs our attention to the Court of Appeals' opinion in
At the time of the exchange, Van intended to liquidate and upon liquidation to distribute all of its property, including the property received in the exchange to its shareholders. Van would then cease to exist. It is incomprehensible that such an intent could be viewed as not being an intent to liquidate its investment. Liquidating its investment is in fact clearly what Van intended to do, and did do.
Respondent appears to have confused two senses of "liquidate". Van did not intend to liquidate Elysian*128 Fields in the sense of receiving for it "cash, marketable securities, or other property not of the same kind having a fair market value." See discussion of this point,
*101 Respondent cites
In
After so holding, the Board added the following (
Petitioner contends further that the intention should be gauged by what was actually done rather than by the expression of that intent. We are not persuaded that this is correct. But, assuming we were to do so, the result would be the same. For the action actually taken was to dispose of the property to another corporation controlled by the same interests. It may be true that this transaction was in *130 the nature of a tax-free reorganization. Nevertheless it was a transfer from this petitioner and made it impossible for it to "hold" the property as an investment. We think the provisions of 112(b)(1) [the predecessor of
This alternative holding was relied on in
We need not decide in the instant cases whether we agree with the
We conclude that (1)
Respondent also contends that, from petitioners' perspective, the exchange, in substance, constitutes an exchange of stock for property, which is expressly excluded from the nonrecognition provisions of
We hold for petitioners. As a result, (1) Van does not have an income tax deficiency and so petitioners do not *103 have a transferee liability, and (2) Van does not have increased earnings and profits and so petitioners do not have to recognize increased gain on Van's liquidation.
To reflect petitioners' concessions in*133 docket No. 41612-84,
Footnotes
1. Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as in effect for the years in issue.↩
2. In docket No. 41612-84, the adjustments to medical expense deductions are derivative, and depend on the settled issues and on our determination as to the
sec. 1031↩ issue; petitioners have conceded negligence for 1978 and respondent has conceded it for 1979.3. The exchange agreement provided a requirement for rezoning of the I-10 property. About 2 months later, the exchange agreement was amended to replace that requirement with a requirement for rezoning of certain property immediately to the east of the I-10 property.↩
4. The notices of transferee liability show the gain as $ 371,144.07. The notice of deficiency shows the gain as $ 371,144. Our finding is in accordance with the parties' stipulation.↩
5. The parties agree that if we decide that the exchange did not qualify under
sec. 1031 , then: (1) Van has additional income for 1978 in the amount of $ 371,144.57 (see n. 4,supra and accompanying text), and a deficiency in Federal corporate income tax in the amount of $ 115,418.03; (2) petitioners, as transferees of Van's assets (within the meaning ofsec. 6901(a)(1)(A) ) are liable for Van's entire deficiency as determined in the notices of transferee liability; (3) Van has additional earnings and profits as of Jan. 26, 1979, in the amount of $ 371,144.57; and (4) undersec. 333(e) , petitioners' recognized gain on Van's liquidation is increased by the amount of $ 371,144.57.In order for property to qualify for like-kind exchange treatment, the property must be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment. However, business property may be exchanged for investment property and vice versa.
Sec. 1031(a) ,sec. 1.1031(a)-1(a), Income Tax Regs.↩ Accordingly, the distinction between "trade or business" and "investment" is immaterial for our purposes; for convenience, we will use the term "held for investment".6.
SEC. 1031 . EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY HELD FOR PRODUCTIVE USE OR INVESTMENT.(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss From Exchanges Solely in Kind. -- No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment.
[The subsequent amendments of this provision by sec. 77 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 595) and by sec. 1805(d) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2810) do not apply to the instant cases. The provision now appears as paragraphs (1) and (2) of
sec. 1031(a)↩ .]7. If cash or other property which does not qualify as like-kind property is included in the exchange, then gain is recognized to the extent of the cash or other property received.
Sec. 1031(b) ; . In the instant cases, Van paid cash but did not receive cash, and the parties agree that Elysian Fields and the I-10 property are of like kind.Wagensen v. Commissioner , 74 T.C. 653, 657↩ (1980)8.
Sec. 333 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:SEC. 333 . ELECTION AS TO RECOGNITION OF GAIN IN CERTAIN LIQUIDATIONS.(a) General Rule. -- In the case of property distributed in complete liquidation of a domestic corporation * * *, if --
then in the case of each qualified electing shareholder (as defined in subsection (c)) gain on the shares owned by him at the time of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be recognized only to the extent provided in subsections (e) and (f).(1) the liquidation is made in pursuance of a plan of liquidation adopted, and
(2) the distribution is in complete cancellation or redemption of all the stock, and the transfer of all the property under the liquidation occurs within some one calendar month,
* * * *
(e) Noncorporate Shareholders. -- In the case of a qualified electing shareholder other than a corporation --
[The subsequent repeal of(1) there shall be recognized, and treated as a dividend, so much of the gain as is not in excess of his ratable share of the earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913, such earnings and profits to be determined as of the close of the month in which the transfer in liquidation occurred under subsection (a)(2), but without diminution by reason of distributions made during such month; but by including in the computation thereof all amounts accrued up to the date on which the transfer of all the property under the liquidation is completed; * * *
sec. 333↩ by sec. 631(e)(3) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2273, does not affect the instant cases.]
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.