Schroeder v. Commissioner
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case was heard before this Court in Denver, Colorado, on February 21, 1990. At trial, respondent's counsel orally moved to dismiss the case due to petitioners' failure to properly prosecute, failure to comply with the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and failure to comply with Orders of the Court. This motion was granted by Order dated February 21, 1990.
At trial, respondent also orally moved for imposition of penalties against petitioners pursuant to
J. H. Schroeder and Marlys E. Schroeder are the petitioners in this case. Petitioner in the singular will refer to J. H. Schroeder. Petitioners were residents of Englewood, Colorado, when the petition in this case was filed.
Petitioners are not strangers to the Tax Court. See
As outlined below, it is clear petitioners were purposefully uncooperative in the case at bar. We find petitioners engaged in tactics meant to delay and frustrate respondent's determination of tax liability. 3 We further find the arguments advanced by petitioners were frivolous and groundless.
Respondent contacted petitioners by letter on September 22, 1989, scheduling a conference and informally requesting certain*409 documents. Petitioners did not attend the conference or produce the requested documents. Instead, petitioners sent a letter to respondent indicating Monday mornings were the most convenient for petitioners to meet with respondent. Respondent rescheduled the meeting for Monday, October 30, 1989. Petitioners, by letter on October 27, 1989, informed respondent they would not attend the scheduled meeting. In the same letter, petitioners suggested a meeting on November 6, 1989. Respondent agreed to meet on November 6, 1989, and indicated to petitioners, because of the delay caused by prior postponements of the meeting, respondent was preparing formal discovery. Petitioners and respondent met as scheduled on November 6, 1989. Petitioners failed to produce most of the documents respondent previously requested.
On November 15, 1989, respondent served petitioners a Request for Production of Document and a Request for Admissions. After several extensions were agreed to by respondent, due to petitioner's ill health, 4 petitioners finally produced a few of the documents sought by respondent's request for production.
*410 This Court ordered petitioners to produce the remaining documents by January 22, 1990. Petitioners produced four more documents pursuant to that Order. Four days prior to trial, petitioners produced additional documents. Petitioners have still failed to produce several of the documents requested by respondent. This is in direct contravention to this Court's Order of January 10, 1990.
Petitioners have also failed to respond in good faith to respondent's request for admissions. Among other failures, they have refused to admit the J. H. Schroeder Family Trust and the Loup Valley Cookware Trust were previously held by this Court to be invalid for Federal income tax purposes. 5 On January 16, 1990, this Court ordered petitioners to file an amended response to respondent's request for admissions. Petitioners' amended response was evasive and frivolous.
*411 As a further indication of petitioners' delay tactics, we point out, contrary to this Court's standing pretrial order, petitioners failed to timely submit a trial memorandum to the Court. Petitioners submitted a trial memo to respondent four days prior to trial.
Substantively, the position taken by petitioners is untenable and maintained solely for delay. Petitioners maintain the income from the J. H. Schroeder Family Trust and the Loup Valley Cookware Trust is not taxable income to petitioners but income to the trusts. This Court previously held income from the J. H. Schroeder Family Trust and the Loup Valley Cookware Trust was taxable income of petitioners. 6 Petitioners have shown no new facts which would cause the Court to amend its prior findings. Petitioners raised typical tax protestor arguments concerning the constitutionality of income taxes, challenged the constitutionality of the Tax Court, and demanded a jury trial.
As early as 1926, 7 Congress granted the Tax Court (or the Board of Tax Appeals) discretionary powers to award damages (now called a penalty) against taxpayers for frivolous actions In 1982, Congress increased the amount of damages the Court could award from $ 500 to $ 5,000. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 324, 574, Pub. L. *413 97-248, sec. 292(b). This amount was increased again in 1989 from $ 5,000 to $ 25,000. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 2106, 2400, Pub. L. 101-247, sec. 7731(a).
From 1933, when the Court first exercised its authority in this area,
*414 Petitioners are not caught unaware by application of
*415 This Court will do everything within its discretion to prevent this kind of frivolous action from wasting scarce judicial resources and delaying the resolution of legitimate disputes. 10 While the Court will always hear and decide legitimate disputes, we do not have the time or inclination to waste on this type of sophistry. Accordingly, we require petitioner to pay to the United States a penalty of $ 8,000 pursuant to
Footnotes
1. Schroeder IV did not involve Marlys E. Schroeder.↩
2. In
, petitioners raised several arguments based on procedural grounds showing an intimate knowledge of the Tax Court Rules and Practice and Procedure.Schroeder v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1989-110Schroeder III, 56 T.C.M. 1480↩, at 1485, 58 P-H Memo T.C. par. 89,110 at 530 (1989).3. The Court in
Schroeder I, , andsupra Schroeder III, , discuss in detail petitioners' delay tactics. Petitioners employed the same tactics in the case at bar.supra↩ 4. In
Schroeder III, , taxpayers failed to attend scheduled meetings, also citing ill health.supra↩ 5. In Schroeder I taxpayers originally conceded the issue whether certain income was improperly attributable to the trust. After conclusion of the trial, taxpayers refused to execute a concession of this issue. In a separate Order, this Court held that the J. H. Schroeder Family Trust and the Loup Valley Cookware Trust were not effective for Federal income tax purposes.
In Schroeder II the taxpayers stipulated the income for the cookware trust was attributable to them.
P-H Memo T.C. par. 86,583 at 2721 (1986).Schroeder v. Commissioner , 52 T.C.M. 1163 at 1167, 55In Schroeder III the taxpayers stipulated "these entities should not be respected for Federal income tax purposes and that all income and expenses of the business purportedly conducted through the * * * trusts are properly attributed to Mr. Schroeder."
Schroeder v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. at 1483, 58 P-H Memo T.C. par. 89,110 at 528 (1989).In
First National Bank In , these same trusts were held invalid under Nebraska state law.Ord. v. Schroeder , 222 Neb. 330, 383 N.W.2d 755↩ (1986)6. See note 4 and accompanying text.↩
7.
Section 6673↩ has its origins in section 911 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat 9, 112, Pub. L. 20, section 911.8. M. Garbis, P. Junghans and S. Struntz, Federal Tax Litigation, pp. 12-40, (1985).↩
9. See Schroeder I, 52 T.C.M. at 620 n.2, 621, and
623, P86 ,467 P-H Memo T.C. at 2150 n.2, 2151, and2153 ;Schroeder II, 52 T.C.M. at 1166, P86 ,583 P-H Memo T.C. at 2720; andSchroeder III, 56 T.C.M. at 1483 n.3, 1485 n.4, 1493 , and1494 n.24 ↩; 58 P-H Memo T.C. par. 89,110 at 528 n.3, 530 n.4, 539, and 540 n.24.10. See Committee Reports on H.R. 3299 (Pub. L. 100-647).↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.