Keogh v. Commissioner
Opinion
*152
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHITAKER,
| Additions to Tax | ||||
| Tax Year | Sec. | Sec. | Sec. | |
| Ended | Deficiency | 6653(a)(1)(A) 1 | 6653(a)(1)(B) | 6661 |
| 12-31-85 | $ 745,899 | $ 37,295 | 50% of the interest | $ 186,475 |
| due on $ 745,899 | ||||
| 12-31-86 | $ 9,392 | $ 470 | 50% of the interest | $ 2,348 |
| due on $ 9,392 | ||||
The principal issue before the Court is whether amounts received by petitioner Patrick J. Keogh upon the disposition of stock in 1985 are*153 taxable as ordinary income pursuant to section 83 2 or whether transfer of the stock to petitioner Patrick J. Keogh was pursuant to the exercise of an incentive stock option under
This will be the second opinion which we have filed in this case. On March 13, 1990, in
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation and attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time of filing the petition in this case petitioners were husband and wife, residing in Easton, Connecticut. Hereinafter all references to petitioner are to Patrick J. Keogh, since only he was involved in the stock transactions in issue in this case. The issue arises out of a stock option with respect to stock of the corporation, Computronics Distributing, Inc. (Computronics), formerly known as Vitex Distributors, Inc. (Vitex).
On May 1, 1982, Epson America, Inc. (Epson) formed Vitex as one of 12 distributors for products of Epson. Each of the distributors was a separate corporation with distinct territories within the United States. On May 1, 1982, petitioner entered into an employment agreement with Vitex pursuant to which he became that corporation's president and chief executive officer. On the*155 same day he also entered into an Option Agreement pursuant to which he was authorized to purchase unissued shares of common stock of Computronics on various dates commencing on August 1, 1984. Petitioner deposited with Computronics the sum of $ 25,000 as a payment for the options, to be credited toward the purchase price of shares of stock according to a specified schedule. The Option Agreement provided that the price of shares of stock purchased by petitioner pursuant to said agreement was to be $ 5 per share. Similar agreements were entered into by Computronics or Epson with other distributor presidents/CEO's at the same price of $ 5 per share.
On May 30, 1984, petitioner exercised his option to acquire 6,618 shares of common stock of Computronics. On April 30, 1985, the Option Agreement was amended in order to cancel or terminate the right of petitioner to acquire further shares of Computronics. On March 25, 1985, an officer of Epson advised petitioner in writing that Epson would repurchase his shares of stock of Computronics in order to facilitate restructuring of the 12 regional distribution companies. On or as of May 1, 1985, petitioner, Computronics, and Epson entered*156 into a repurchase agreement providing for the repurchase of all of petitioner's Computronics stock. Petitioner received from Epson the sum of $ 1,414,365 by check dated June 27, 1985, and transferred to Epson all of his shares of stock in Computronics. On petitioners' 1985 joint Federal income tax return, the gain on petitioner's shares of Computronics stock was reported as long-term capital gain. Respondent in the notice of deficiency determined that the disposition of stock resulted in ordinary income, not capital gain, for petitioner.
Prior to filing petitioners' 1985 Federal income tax return, petitioner discussed with and obtained the advice of his attorney, Sherin Reynolds, the attorney who represented petitioner in these proceedings. He also discussed with and obtained advice from Kevin Byrne who was then with the national accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand and presumably was a certified public accountant. Petitioner's tax return preparer, James Crozier, also advised petitioner. Mr. Crozier, among other degrees, has a master's degree in taxation from the University of New Haven in West Haven, Connecticut. Mr. Crozier testified that, prior to reaching the conclusion*157 that the gain on the resale of the stock to Computronics should be treated for Federal income tax purposes as capital gain, he did research which included reviewing sections 421 and 422 as well as several of the tax services. Mr. Crozier believed that there was substantial authority for reporting the sale proceeds as capital gain.
OPINION
However, we are not required in this case to determine the precise value of the shares of stock on May 1, 1982. It is quite clear on the facts before the Court that petitioner simply accepted the $ 5 price set forth in the*158 option contract without any discussion or negotiation as to that price with Computronics or with Epson personnel. The $ 5 purchase price appeared in all 12 of the distribution agreements. There is no evidence that the $ 5 per share price was intended to represent the fair market value of the stock. Both Epson and Computronics intended the option to be part of the compensation package and the documents were presented to petitioner substantially on a "take it or leave it" basis. Since there is no evidence that either petitioner, Computronics, or Epson intended that this $ 5 per share price should reflect the market value of the shares of stock, we are required to hold for respondent on that issue. The stock option issued to petitioner does not qualify as an incentive stock option issued pursuant to
The remaining issue is whether or not petitioners are subject to the negligence addition. In this connection, respondent's counsel argues that there was no plan and that neither petitioner's attorney nor his tax return preparer ever attempted to determine the value of the*159 Computronics stock as of the appropriate date. It is not necessary in this case to determine whether or not there was in fact an option plan, although it is entirely possible that the option agreement itself, or the option agreements with each of the 12 distributors together, would constitute an option plan. With respect to negligence, by consulting with his attorney, his tax accountant, and his tax return preparer, petitioner did all that was reasonably required of a taxpayer. Perhaps those individuals were in fact negligent, but that does not affect petitioners. Accordingly, we hold for petitioners on the issue of the negligence addition and find that it is not appropriate in this case either as to tax years ended December 31, 1985, or 1986.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.