Gehl v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Michael G. Parker & Julie A. Parker (United States Tax Court 2023)
- Karl F. Simonsen & Christina M. Simonsen v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2018)
- In re Eicholz (District Court, W.D. Washington 2004)
- Richard D. Frazier and Yvonne Frazier v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1998)
- Burke v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1997)
- Correra v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1997)
- Bowden v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1996)
- Marcaccio v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 1995)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*42
Ps transferred property to a creditor in satisfaction of a recourse indebtedness. Ps were insolvent both before and after the transfer. R conceded that the excess of the amount of the indebtedness over the fair market value of the property constituted income from discharge of indebtedness excludable under
*784 OPINION
Tannenwald,
All the facts have been stipulated and are found accordingly. Petitioners resided in Cascade, Iowa, at the time they filed their petition.
As of December 30, 1988, Production Credit Association (Production) held a recourse note from petitioners with a balance due of $ 152,260. At that time, petitioners were unable to make the required payments. Pursuant to a restructuring agreement, petitioners transferred to Production on December 30, 1988, 60 acres of farmland having a fair market value of $ 39,000 and a basis of $ 14,384 and, on January 4, 1989, an additional 141 acres having a fair market value of $ 77,725 and a basis of $ 32,080. Pursuant to the agreement, petitioners also paid $ 6,123 in cash to be applied towards the outstanding balance, and their remaining debt to Production was forgiven. Petitioners were not debtors under title 11 of the U.S. Code (the bankruptcy code) at any time during 1988 and 1989 but were insolvent both before and after the transfers and the discharge of indebtedness. Respondent concedes that the amount of *44 the indebtedness in excess of the fair market value of the transferred land constitutes income from the discharge of indebtedness excludable under
Respondent contends that the transfers in partial satisfaction of petitioners' indebtedness constitute gains taxable under
It is well settled that a transfer of property by a debtor to a creditor in*45 satisfaction, in whole or in part, of an indebtedness constitutes a "sale or exchange" under (1) In general. -- Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if -- * * * (B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,
At the outset, we note that petitioners' *46 obligation was recourse and not nonrecourse, and that respondent has conceded that the amount of the gain represented by the excess of the amount of the debt over the fair market value of the property transferred constitutes cancellation of indebtedness not includable in gross income because of petitioners' insolvency. Under these circumstances, only the amount of the gain represented by the excess of such fair market value over basis is at issue, and we need not and do not resolve any issue of bifurcation 2*47 in the context of either recourse or nonrecourse indebtedness. Compare
*787 Our path to decision involves an analysis of the interplay between
Petitioners seek to distinguish
Case law is clear that when a debt is discharged or reduced upon the debtor's transfer of property to his creditor or a third party, such transaction is treated as a sale or exchange*49 of the debtor's assets, and not as a mere transfer of assets in cancellation of indebtedness. * * * [
*788 Thus,
Petitioners' reliance on
*52 *789 It cannot be gainsaid that the early judicial history in respect of the gain from a sale or exchange with income from discharge of indebtedness has not been exemplary in its message. See
*53 As we see it, paragraphs (3) and (12) of
In sum, we reaffirm
In order to take into account an adjustment resulting from a concession by respondent in respect of the excess of the indebtedness above the fair market value of the property transferred, see
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect during the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. We note that this bifurcation has "not always been clearly defined" and that earlier cases have been described as reflecting "some confusion". See
& n.6 particularly (1979); see also Cunningham, "Payment of Debt with Property -- The Two-Step Analysis afterEstate of Delman v. Commissioner , 73 T.C. 15, 31Commissioner v. Tufts ,"38 Tax Law. 575 (1985) ; Del Cotto, "Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects of Mortgage Financing,"118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 87-88 (1969) ; Eustice, "Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion,"14 Tax L. Rev. 225, 247 (1959) . We further note that the Supreme Court has declined to deal with the issue of bifurcation. See .Commissioner v. Tufts , 461 U.S. 300, 310↩ n.11 (1983)3. See also brief of Wayne G. Barnett, Amicus Curiae, in
, for a detailed explanation of the two-step analysis.Commissioner v. Tufts , 461 U.S. 300↩ (1983)4.
Sec. 1.1001-2, Income Tax Regs. , provides in pertinent part:(a)
Inclusion in amount realized . -- (1) * * *(2)
Discharge of indebtedness . The amount realized on a sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability does not include amounts that are (or would be if realized and recognized) income from the discharge of indebtedness undersection 61(a)(12) . For situations where amounts arising from the discharge of indebtedness are not realized and recognized, seesection 108 and§ 1.61-12(b)(1) .* * *
(c)
Examples . * * *Example (8↩ ). In 1980, F transfers to a creditor an asset with a fair market value of $ 6,000 and the creditor discharges $ 7,500 of indebtedness for which F is personally liable. The amount realized on the disposition of the asset is its fair market value ($ 6,000). In addition, F has income from the discharge of indebtedness of $ 1,500 ($ 7,500 - $ 6,000).5.
Sec. 1.61-12, Income Tax Regs. , provides in pertinent part:(b)
Proceedings under Bankruptcy Act↩ . (1) Income is not realized by a taxpayer * * * by virtue of an agreement among his creditors not consummated under any provision of the Bankruptcy Act, if immediately thereafter the taxpayer's liabilities exceed the value of his assets. * * *6. See comments on
, revg.Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner , 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934)27 B.T.A. 651↩ (1933) , in Trower, Federal Taxation of Bankruptcy and Workouts, par. 2.04[3][b], at 2-75 to 2-76, and par. 5.05[6], at 5-38 n.127 (1993).7.
, revg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated Sept. 25, 1940;Turney's Estate v. Commissioner , 126 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1942) , affg.Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co. , 43 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1930)16 B.T.A. 793 (1929) ; ;Springfield Industrial Building Co. v. Commissioner , 38 B.T.A. 1445 (1938) .Quinn v. Commissioner , 31 B.T.A. 142↩ (1934)8. Contributing to this consequence are the substantial revisions of the statutory provisions dealing with income from discharge of indebtedness which were made by
sec. 108 , enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and by the amendments thereto in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389. See Eustice, "Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion,"14 Tax L. Rev. 225, 272-276↩ (1959) ; Trower, Federal Taxation of Bankruptcy and Workouts, par. 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-8 (1993).
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.