Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
4 later published cases cite this decision.
- Robinson v. United States (United States Court of Federal Claims 2002)
- Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue (8th Cir. 2001)
- Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner (8th Cir. 2001)
- Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner (United States Tax Court 2000)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*17 An appropriate order will be issued.
P provided its employees with the use of the company-owned aircraft for nonbusiness flights. P notified its employees to report the value of the flights as imputed income. P deducted the expenses incurred in providing the flights. R, relying on
sec. 274(e)(2), I.R.C. , determined that deductions for expenses incurred in providing employees with nonbusiness flights on a company-owned airplane are limited to the amount reported as imputed income to the recipient employees. P contends that its expense deductions are not subject tosec. 274, I.R.C. , or, in the alternative, if subject tosec. 274, I.R.C. , are excepted from the restriction ofsec. 274, I.R.C. , by application of sec.274(e)(2), I.R.C. HELD:
Sec. 274(e)(2), I.R.C. , excepts from the effect ofsec. 274, I.R.C. , deductions of an employer's expenses in connection with an entertainment facility and does not limit*18 or peg the amount deductible to the amount reportable by employees; i.e., the value of the benefit received.
*198 OPINION
GERBER, JUDGE: The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment, seeking resolution of whether petitioner is allowed to deduct its expenses in operating its company aircraft for the benefit of employees or whether the deduction is limited to the value of the use of the aircraft -- the amount reportable by petitioner's employees. The parties' controversy raises the question of whether and how
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. *19 Petitioner's president and vice president are Dwight Sutherland (Dwight) and Perry Sutherland (Perry), respectively. Petitioner is principally engaged in the retail lumber business with outlets located in eight Texas cities. In addition to the retail lumber business, petitioner owned a 1976 Model 25 Lear Jet, which was used for travel related to the lumber business and for its air charter service business operated out of Kansas City. Dwight and Perry also used the plane for travel related to their positions as directors of other businesses (director's flights), for other business and charitable purposes (nonvacation flights), and for vacation travel (vacation flights). In 1992, the plane was used approximately 30 percent for charter business, 23 percent for director's flights, 18 percent for nonvacation flights, 24 percent for vacation flights, and 5 percent for other purposes. In 1993, the plane was used approximately 16 percent of the time for charter business, 16 percent for director's flights, 32 percent for nonvacation flights, 24 percent for vacation flights, and 11 percent for other purposes.
Use of the aircraft for director's flights, nonvacation flights, and vacation flights*20 was reported by Dwight and Perry as compensation in connection with their employment with petitioner. Petitioner calculated and reported the amount of imputed income for Dwight and Perry in accord with the valuation formula provided in
Respondent determined income tax deficiencies of $ 341,631 and $ 119,558 for petitioner's 1992 and 1993 tax years, respectively. The deficiency determinations were based on adjustments to deductions involving airplane expenses, net operating loss, environmental tax, alternative minimum tax, and contributions. Petitioner moved for partial summary judgment solely with respect to the disallowance of a portion of its claimed deduction for expenses to operate the aircraft, asking*21 the Court to hold either that
Respondent, in his cross-motion for partial summary judgment, asks the Court to hold that
Respondent conceded that petitioner is entitled to deduct the expenses for operating the aircraft for flights attributable to the lumber business, the air charter business, the nonvacation flights, and the director's flights.
DISCUSSION
The parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment 2 involve employee fringe benefits. Normally, answers to such *200 matters may be found in sections 61, 162, 132, and related sections. Here, however, we are confronted*22 with the more vexing combination of those sections with
*23
As an ordinary expense of carrying on a trade or business, a taxpayer/employer may deduct expenses paid as compensation for personal services. See
Some deductions previously allowable under
Although
Expenses treated as compensation. -- Expenses for goods, services, and facilities, to the extent that the expenses are treated by the taxpayer, with respect to the recipient of the entertainment, amusement, or recreation, as compensation to an employee on the taxpayer's return of tax under this chapter and as wages to such employee for purposes of chapter 24 (relating to withholding of income tax at source on wages). [Emphasis added.]
Petitioner argues that the "to the extent" language acts to except its deduction, as claimed, from the reach of
*202 Respondent agrees that, but for
*27 The
*29
The bill contains nine exceptions to the general disallowance provision * * *. Where an expense falls within one of the enumerated exceptions, the item will continue to be deductible to the same extent as allowed by existing law.
H. Rept. 1447, supra,
Collaterally, and by way of comparison,
Respondent also seeks support in the legislative history. Respondent contends that his interpretation of
We also note that the
Other portions of
There exist numerous other examples in the Internal Revenue Code where Congress intended to place limitations on particular items. Some are obvious and some more subtle. By means of slight yet significant modification to
Section 83 is another example of a section expressly limiting the amount of an employer's deduction. Addressing the deduction available for property transferred for the performance of services, Congress restricted the amount of the deduction to "an amount equal to the amount included * * * in the gross income of the person who performed such services". Sec. 83(h). These examples, the legislative history, and the above*34 analysis convince us that Congress did not intend a limitation in
As a final comment, we note that while respondent is critical of the mismatch of income and expense that could occur under petitioner's interpretation, respondent does not comment on the mismatch possible under his scenario if the costs associated with providing the flight are less than the SIFL value dictated by the Code. Moreover, respondent does acknowledge that the interaction of sections 61 and 162 in the benefits area already permits the possibility for mis*206 matched income and deductions. There is no indication that Congress was attempting to fix any such possible mismatch by enacting
For the reasons outlined above, we hold that
*35 In light of the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued.
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years under consideration, and Rule references are to the Tax Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2.
Rule 121(b) provides that summary adjudication upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy may be rendered if the pleadings and admissions show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. SeeSundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992) , affd.17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994) ;Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988) ;Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985) . The moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual inferences will be read in a manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. SeeDahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985) ;Marshall v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267, 271↩ (1985) . The facts necessary to consider the questions presented here by each motion are contained in pleadings and other documents in the record and are not controverted. Consequently, the issue herein is ripe for partial summary judgment.3. Because of our holding on the
sec. 274(e) issue, we need not and do not decide whether the aircraft in this case is a "facility" used in connection with "an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation".Sec. 274(a)(1)(A) and(B) . It would also include deciding whether an aircraft, or the aircraft in this case, is a transportation facility and/or which type of facility it may primarily be. The answer to that question would be transitory in nature because the use could change on a year-by-year basis. Because of our holding on thesec. 274(e) issue, the outcome in this case would be the same irrespective of our holding on the broader question of whethersec. 274 applies. In addition, our holding in the context ofsec. 274(e)↩ provides a universal answer to the controversy between the parties here.4. See 131 Cong. Rec. 7305-7310 (1985), wherein Senator Metzenbaum discussed the differences in the cost of travel in a small plane, which could be less than the SIFL value imputed as income, and in a luxury plane, which could be greater than the SIFL value imputed as income.↩
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.