ANDERSON v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion
*104 PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b), THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of
Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for the taxable year 1998 in the amount of $ 4,347.
The issues for decision by the Court are as follows:
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to deductions for dependency exemptions for his five children. We hold that he is not.
(2) Whether*105 petitioner is entitled to a child tax credit and additional child tax credit. We hold that he is not.
(3) Whether petitioner is entitled to head of household filing status. We hold that he is not.
(4) Whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income credit. We hold that he is not.
An adjustment to the amount of petitioner's standard deduction is a purely mechanical matter, the resolution of which is dependent on our disposition of the disputed issue regarding petitioner's filing status.
Background
This case was deemed to be submitted fully stipulated, and the facts stipulated are so found.2 Petitioner resided in Canton, Ohio, at the time that his petition was filed with the Court.
*106 Originally, petitioner and Viola S. Allison (Ms. Allison), f.k.a. Viola S. Anderson, were married and had five children, three sons and two daughters. In or about 1995, petitioner and Ms. Allison were divorced.
At all relevant times, Ms. Allison had legal custody of the five children and was the residential parent pursuant to the operative divorce instrument. In contrast, petitioner had visitation rights and was obliged to pay child support.
For 1998, petitioner and Ms. Allison provided all (or virtually all) of the support of their five children.3 Moreover, throughout that year, the children were continuously in the care of either petitioner or Ms. Allison. However, petitioner had physical custody of the children for less than half of the year, and his home was not their principal place of abode for more than half of the year.
*107 Petitioner timely filed a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040, for 1998, reporting wages of $ 26,093 and adjusted gross income of $ 22,632. On his return, petitioner designated his filing status as "head of household", and he claimed (1) deductions for dependency exemptions for his five children, (2) an earned income credit, and (3) a child tax credit (on line 43 of Form 1040) and an additional child tax credit (on line 60 of Form 1040). Petitioner did not attach to his return Form 8332, Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents, or any other declaration or statement from Ms. Allison agreeing not to claim exemptions for any of their five children on her return for the year in issue. In contrast, petitioner did attach to his return Form 8812, Additional Child Tax Credit.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner's filing status was "single" rather than "head of household". Respondent also determined that petitioner was not entitled to: (1) Deductions for dependency exemptions, (2) an earned income credit, or (3) a child tax credit and additional child tax credit.
In his petition, petitioner admits that he had physical*108 custody of his children for less than half of the year, but alleges that he maintained a residence for them and provided over 60 percent of their support.
Discussion4
In the case of a child of divorced parents,
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in
such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations
prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such child
as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar
year, and
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written
declaration to the noncustodial parent's*110 return for the taxable
year beginning during such calendar year./[5]/
See
The declaration required by
In the present case, Ms. Allison, as the custodial parent, did not sign Form 8332 or any written declaration or statement agreeing not to claim exemptions for any of the five children, and no such form, declaration, or statement was attached to petitioner's return for the year in issue. It follows, therefore, that the exception set forth in
In view of the foregoing, we sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
The term "qualifying child" is defined in
We have already held that petitioner is not entitled to a deduction under
In view of the foregoing, we sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
As relevant herein, an individual*112 qualifies as a head of household if the individual is not married at the close of the taxable year and maintains as his or her home a household that constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year, the principal place of abode of a son or daughter of the taxpayer. See
Although petitioner may have maintained a residence for his children, petitioner had physical custody of his children for less than half of the year, and his residence was not the principal place of abode of any of his children for more than half of the year. It follows, therefore, that petitioner is not entitled to head of household filing status.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
In the case of an eligible individual,
*113 To be a "qualifying child", an individual must, inter alia, have the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than half of the taxable year.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain respondent's determination on this issue.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case Division.
To give effect to our disposition of the disputed issues,
Decision will be entered for respondent.
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for 1998, the taxable year in issue.↩
2. Petitioner did not appear in court when this case was called for trial. In contrast, counsel for respondent appeared and stated that he had been served by petitioner with a Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Counsel indicated that under these circumstances, respondent was inclined to move to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution. However, the Court, after learning that petitioner had executed a stipulation of facts, intimated that it would not favorably regard such a motion and proposed instead that respondent execute the stipulation of facts and submit the case fully stipulated for decision by the Court on the merits. Respondent then undertook to do so.↩
3. Like petitioner, both Ms. Allison and her second husband were employed in 1998. We note that in the case of the remarriage of a parent, such as Ms. Allison, support of a child received from the parent's new spouse is treated as received from the parent.
Sec. 152(e)(5)↩ .4. We decide the issues in this case without regard to the burden of proof. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the general rule of sec. 7491(a)(1) is applicable in this case. See
Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438↩ (2001) .6. An individual may be eligible for an earned income credit even if the individual does not have a "qualifying child" for the taxable year.
Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii)↩ . However, as relevant herein, such an individual would be eligible only if the individual's adjusted gross income were less than $ 10,030. In the present case, petitioner's adjusted gross income was $ 22,632; accordingly, petitioner would not be eligible for an earned income credit without a "qualifying child".
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.