HEYSE v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion
*128 PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b), THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE.
DINAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463.1 The decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion should not be cited as authority.
This case is before us on petitioner's petition under
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Wilmington, Delaware, *129 on the date the petition was filed in this case.
There are no relevant disputed facts in this case. Petitioner and his former spouse filed a joint Federal income tax return for taxable year 1993. Petitioner was subsequently divorced from his spouse, and he has lived alone and has been filing separate returns since 1994.
In 1996, respondent assessed a deficiency of $ 15,479, plus interest, relating to petitioner's taxable year 1993. This deficiency was never paid directly by petitioner to respondent. On February 23, 1998, a Federal income tax overpayment by petitioner of $ 6,842 with respect to his 1997 taxable year was applied to the 1993 liability. On April 12, 1999, a 1998 overpayment by petitioner of $ 9,891 was applied to the remaining 1993 liability.2
*130 On August 9, 1999, petitioner requested relief with respect to the 1993 liability under
Petitioner filed a petition in this Court seeking relief pursuant to
determine that Petitioner is eligible for relief under Section
6015 in the amount of $ 20,367.00 and direct the Internal Revenue
Service to issue a refund to*131 Petitioner in the amount of
$ 20,367.00, together with statutory interest thereon, pursuant
to
Respondent argues that any refund is barred by
After a taxpayer*132 requests relief under
It is clear that the deficiency determined by respondent for taxable year 1993 has been paid in full, and that the basis of the relief respondent granted to petitioner was
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a refund because the payment of the deficiency was "involuntary" in that the liability was satisfied by respondent's crediting of later years' overpayments to the 1993 deficiency, without notification to or permission by petitioner. Respondent, however, has discretion to credit overpayments to any outstanding tax liabilities, and the crediting of such an overpayment is treated as if the taxpayer had received a refund and in turn paid the tax liability.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case Division.
To reflect the foregoing,
*135 Decision will be entered for respondent.
Footnotes
1. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed in this case.↩
2. The amounts credited to petitioner's 1993 tax liability exceed the deficiency amount. Respondent's counsel stated at trial that the excess was applied to assessed interest. Neither party specifically addressed this point, but respondent presumably has relieved petitioner from liability for any remaining unpaid interest.↩
3. It is unclear what the basis for this determination was, however, because
sec. 6015(c) relief applies to assessed deficiencies.Sec. 6015(c)(1)↩ . The deficiency in petitioner's case was only $ 15,479.4. Petitioner states in his petition that "Taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the Petitioner liable." Language similar to this is found in both
sec. 6015(b) and(f)↩ . However, petitioner did not specifically refer to either of these provisions, and at trial the focus of petitioner's argument was on the fact that payment of the 1993 tax deficiency was "involuntary", as discussed infra.5. Petitioner would not be entitled to relief under
sec. 6015(f) unless it were shown that, contrary to respondent's determination, petitioner is not entitled to relief undersec. 6015(c) .Sec. 6015(f)(2)↩ .
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.