Johnson v. Comm'r
Opinion
*38 Decision will be entered for the Commissioner.
Held: PH's debts to lender were discharged pursuant
to discharge order in ch. 7 bankruptcy case, notwithstanding
failure of lender to file proofs of claim; lender's foreclosure
therefore gave rise to excludable discharge of indebtedness
income, which reduced PH's tax attributes pursuant to sec.
108(b), I.R.C., in amount of unsatisfied debt to lender
remaining after foreclosure.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: Respondent has determined deficiencies in petitioners' Federal income taxes of $ 22,297 and $ 13,179 for 1994 and 1995, respectively (the audit years). The parties have settled or otherwise disposed of certain of the adjustments resulting in those determinations, and the only question remaining for decision is whether petitioner husband (petitioner) has available for use by him in the audit years a claimed $ 153,000 net operating loss (NOL) derived from his bankruptcy estate.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references*39 are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the audit years, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
This case was submitted for decision without trial. See
Background
At the time the petition was filed, petitioners*40 resided in Dallas, Texas.
On September 3, 1991, petitioner filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy (the bankruptcy petition) with the U. S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas (the bankruptcy court). The bankruptcy petition was filed pursuant to chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.). Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a taxable person separate from petitioner came into existence; i.e., the bankruptcy estate (bankruptcy estate). See
On October 31, 1991, CMI moved the bankruptcy court to lift the stay prohibiting it from foreclosing petitioner's interests in the properties, and, on December 2, 1991, the court granted the motion. By order of the bankruptcy court dated December 18, 1991 (the discharge order), petitioner was released from all dischargeable debts.
Under the authority of the bankruptcy court's December 2, 1991, order, CMI foreclosed petitioner's interests in the properties and caused the properties to be sold. The Argyle property was sold on March 3, 1992, leaving a deficiency (the amount petitioner still owed) calculated as follows:
Loan balance $ 262,128
Sale price 171,500
Deficiency 90,628
The Dallas property was sold on April 7, 1992, leaving a deficiency (the amount petitioner still owed) calculated as follows:
Loan balance $ 128,572
Sale price 21,700
Deficiency*42 106,872
Neither the trustee nor petitioner satisfied the two deficiencies, totaling $ 197,500 (the CMI deficiencies), in any amount.
On April 15, 1994, the trustee made a final report to the bankruptcy court (trustee's final report), reporting that the total of the debts allowed was $ 52,590.14 and that the sum of $ 47,673.98 was to be paid in respect of those claims, leaving the sum of $ 4,916.16 unpaid. The bankruptcy court accepted the trustee's final report. The bankruptcy court issued a final decree closing the bankruptcy case of petitioner on May 5, 1995.
Neither the bankruptcy estate nor petitioner reported any income from discharge of indebtedness on any Federal income tax return.
Petitioners made joint returns of income for the audit years and, on those returns, claimed that petitioner had available for use by him for those years a $ 153,000 NOL resulting from the worthlessness of the business debt. Following his audit of petitioners' returns for the audit years, respondent disallowed the claimed NOL carryover.
Discussion
The parties are in agreement that the business debt became worthless in the hands of the trustee, producing a deductible loss of $ 153,000. They are in disagreement as to the amount of petitioner's debt discharged by operation of the discharge order. Petitioner appears to argue that, because the trustee's final report (accepted by the bankruptcy court) does not list the CMI debts as claims against the bankruptcy estate, those debts were*44 not discharged. Respondent disagrees. On that point -- whether, by the discharge order, petitioner was discharged from the CMI debts -- we agree with respondent. Petitioner misunderstands the bankruptcy law.
The CMI debts are not listed in the trustee's final report because CMI did not file proofs of claim with respect thereto. A proof of claim is the mechanism by which a creditor seeks recognition (or, in bankruptcy parlance, "allowance") of his claim for purposes of sharing in the distribution of estate assets as part of the bankruptcy proceeding. See 3 Cowans, Bankruptcy Law and Practice, sec. 12.5(a), at 247 (7th ed. 1998). There is no requirement that a creditor file a proof of claim; that is, some creditors may seek recovery outside of the normal estate distribution procedure. See
By failing to file proofs of claim with respect to the CMI debts, CMI waived its right to participate, vis-a-vis the CMI deficiencies, in the distribution of estate assets as provided in the trustee's final report. See
Petitioners concede that, if respondent prevails (i.e., if excludable income from discharge of indebtedness was realized on account of petitioner's discharge from the CMI debts), "$ 153,000 of * * * [the NOL] deduction [claimed on petitioners' 1994 income tax return] is eliminated under
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under
Footnotes
1. Sec. 7491, which, under certain circumstances, shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, is inapplicable because the examination in this case began before July 22, 1998, the effective date of that section. See
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727↩ .
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.