Estate of Deese v. Comm'r
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THORNTON,
On October 7, 1997, respondent received a Form 870-AD, Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Deficiency and to Accept Overassessment, showing signatures of Bonnie W. Deese (Mr. Deese) and his wife Gladys Deese (Ms. Deese), consenting to the immediate assessment and collection of specified deficiencies in their joint Federal tax liabilities for taxable years 1990 through 1994. On December 26, 1997, Mr. Deese died. On February 9, 1998, respondent assessed these agreed-upon deficiencies along with interest.
On August 21, 2002, respondent sent the deceased Mr. Deese a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under
On February 23, 2005, respondent sent the deceased Mr. Deese another Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under
After a face-to-face hearing between respondent's Appeals officer, Ms. Deese, and her C.P.A. representative, respondent's Appeals Office issued petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under
On July 19, 2006, the petition was timely filed. Ms. Deese, then residing in Georgia, signed the petition as "Personal Representative *380 for Bonnie W. Deese (deceased)". 2 On September 5, 2007, respondent filed his motion for summary judgment. On September 6, 2007, we ordered petitioner to file a response to respondent's motion for summary judgment by October 3, 2007. The Court has received no response.
Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.
At the Appeals Office hearing, the person against whom the lien is filed generally may raise any relevant issue, including spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the Commissioner's intended collection action, and possible alternative means *382 of collection.
In the petition, Ms. Deese contends that she, as "the surviving spouse", should not be liable for the underlying tax liabilities. The proposed collection action and notice of determination upon which this case is based, however, relate only to the unpaid tax liabilities of the deceased Mr. Deese. Consequently, notwithstanding that Ms. Deese may be responsible for paying the underlying joint tax liabilities both in her individual capacity and in her capacity as the personal representative of Mr. Deese's estate, her personal liability in either capacity is outside the scope of judicial review in this proceeding.
Moreover, by submitting the Form 870-AD, consenting to the *383 immediate assessment and collection of their deficiencies, Mr. and Ms. Deese waived their right to a notice of deficiency and gave up any right to challenge their underlying liabilities in a collection proceeding. See
We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial in this case. We hold that respondent is entitled as a matter of law to the entry of a decision sustaining the filing of the notice of tax lien.
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue.↩
2. The petition states that it is with respect to petitioner's taxable years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. By Order dated Dec. 29, 2006, this Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike as to taxable years 1991, 1993, and 1994, on the ground that petitioner had failed to make a timely request for a
sec. 6320↩ hearing within the statutorily mandated period after respondent sent the first notice of tax lien filing for those years on Aug. 21, 2002. Consequently, only taxable years 1990 and 1992 remain at issue.3. The petition alleges that Gladys Deese (Ms. Deese) signed the Form 870-AD, Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Deficiency and to Accept Overassessment, for herself and her ailing husband, Bonnie W. Deese (Mr. Deese). We might question this allegation, inasmuch as the Form 870-AD seems to show the signatures of Mr. and Ms. Deese in two different hands. In his motion for summary judgment, respondent alleges that both Mr. and Ms. Deese signed the Form 870-AD. Since petitioner filed no response to respondent's motion for summary judgment, we might assume that petitioner no longer disputes that Mr. Deese signed the Form 870-AD. See, e.g.,
. We need not decide this issue, however; even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Deese signed the Form 870-AD on behalf of Mr. Deese, it would make no material difference for purposes of our ruling upon respondent's motion for summary judgment. In particular, the petition does not allege or suggest that Ms. Deese lacked authority to sign the Form 870-AD on behalf of her husband; to the contrary, in the petition Ms. Deese appears to justify her allegedly signing Mr. Deese's signature by reason of his illness. Similarly, petitioner has not alleged any duress, coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation such as might invalidate the waiver. SeeBergmann v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1985-290 .Shireman v. Comm'r , T.C. Memo 2004-155↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.