Shelton v. Comm'r
Opinion
Decision will be entered for respondent.
FOLEY,
Petitioner married Valerie R. Shelton in 2003. On November 23, 2007, petitioner and Ms. Shelton entered into a marital settlement agreement (settlement agreement), which provided mutually agreed-upon terms for their divorce. The settlement agreement required petitioner to pay Ms. Shelton $25,000 "representing her share of his separation pay from the military, in addition to any interest she claims in the real estate and furniture still in the marital home." The settlement agreement further stated that the payment "constitutes full and final settlement *261 of any additional claims to a share of assets" and that each party waived any claim for maintenance from the other party.
On November 29, 2007, the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in St. Clair County, Illinois, entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage (divorce decree) terminating petitioner's and Ms. Shelton's marriage. The divorce decree stated that each party was barred from asserting any claim "for maintenance, formerly known as alimony," and it incorporated by reference the terms of the settlement agreement.
In December 2007, petitioner paid Ms. Shelton $25,000 (the payment). 2 In April 2008, petitioner filed a Federal income tax return relating to 2007 and deducted, as alimony, $25,000. In a statutory notice of deficiency dated March 20, 2009, and relating to 2007, respondent determined petitioner was not entitled to the alimony deduction and was liable for a
Petitioner contends that the payment is alimony and *262 is, therefore, deductible. Respondent contends that none of the payment is deductible because it does not qualify as alimony and is instead a division of marital property.
An individual may generally deduct payments made during the taxable year to the extent that those payments are alimony or separate maintenance includable in the recipient's gross income. See
In order to qualify as alimony, the payment must meet the requirements of
Respondent further determined that petitioner is liable for a
Contentions we have not addressed are irrelevant, moot, or meritless.
To reflect the foregoing,
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Petitioner paid Ms. Shelton $24,000 by wire transfer on Dec. 5, 2007, and $1,000 by check dated Dec. 6, 2007.↩
3. Pursuant to
sec. 7491(a) , petitioner has the burden of proof unless he introduces credible evidence relating to the issue that would shift the burden to respondent. SeeRule 142(a) . Our conclusions, however, are based on a preponderance of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof is immaterial. See .Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner , 110 T.C. 189, 210↩ n.16 (1998)
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.