Avery v. Comm'r
Opinion
Decision will be entered under
JACOBS,
Some of the facts are stipulated and are so found. The stipulated facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time they filed their petition, petitioners resided in Virginia.
PCB Technology Corp. (PCB) is an information technology (IT) company which has been in business for many years.*50 PCB filed a Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 2011.1 Petitioner wife is the sole shareholder and president of PCB; petitioner husband is the executive vice president of PCB and the company's sole technician. PCB operated out of the basement of petitioners' house.
*52 PCB's clients consist of Federal Government agencies and commercial companies. The General Services Administration (GSA) frequently audited payments made by Government agencies to PCB.
PCB provides onsite IT technical support services to its clients. During 2011 petitioner husband traveled daily by automobile to the worksites of PCB's clients. He performed most of his work on the client's site but on occasions had to return to PCB's office to use equipment housed there. He also drove to stores to purchase materials. PCB did not reimburse petitioner husband for his automobile expenses.2*51 Petitioner husband claims he maintained a mileage log wherein he recorded the dates, number, and mileage of trips he made to PCB's clients' sites.
Petitioners engaged Max Taylor to prepare their 2011 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Mr. Taylor was referred to petitioners by acquaintances; petitioners were not familiar with Mr. Taylor's qualifications as a tax return preparer.3
*53 Petitioner husband claims he gave his mileage log to Mr. Taylor, who prepared a Schedule C for him. The Schedule C reflected automobile expenses of $39,991. During 2011 petitioner husband was not self-employed and did not operate a sole proprietorship.4*52 According to the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) standard mileage rate for 2011, the reported $39,991 in automobile expenses would indicate petitioner husband drove approximately 75,000 miles for business in 2011.5
Respondent selected petitioners' 2011 Federal income tax return for examination. The IRS agent sought substantiation of petitioner husband's automobile expenses. Petitioner husband was unable to satisfy the examining agent, stating that he had lost his mileage log.
*54 Respondent mailed petitioners a notice of deficiency on April 28, 2014. Attached to the notice of deficiency was a Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes. On that form respondent disallowed the $39,991 deduction claimed for automobile expenses. Because the $39,991 was claimed on Schedule C, respondent assumed petitioner husband had operated*53 a sole proprietorship and determined that petitioners owed self-employment tax of $4,912. These determinations resulted in a deficiency in income tax of $9,975. Respondent further determined a
A trial in this matter was held on September 28, 2015. Petitioner husband was petitioners' only witness. Petitioner husband did not produce his mileage log. Instead he introduced (1) a list of the names of PCB's clients for which he rendered services and invoices relating thereto, (2) receipts for the servicing and repair of the automobile that he used for business travel, and (3) a list reflecting his estimated business mileage from January through April 2011.
As a general rule, the Commissioner's determinations in the notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving error.*54
Automobile expense deductions are subject to the strict substantiation requirements of
Deductions arising from property subject to the strict substantiation requirements of
A taxpayer may substantiate his/her*55 deductions by adequate records or by sufficient evidence that corroborates his/her own statements. *57 corroborative evidence required to support a statement not made at or near the time of the expenditure or use must have a high degree of probative value to elevate such statement and evidence to the level of credibility reflected by a record made at or near the time of the expenditure or use supported by sufficient documentary evidence. The substantiation requirements of
Petitioner husband did not produce his mileage log at trial. Instead,*56 he introduced several documents to substantiate his claimed business mileage. The first of these documents was a worksheet listing the names and addresses of PCB's clients and an estimate of the total mileage driven with respect to each client. However, this worksheet did not explain how he had calculated the mileage driven. The second document introduced included a series of receipts for expenses he incurred with respect to maintaining his automobile. Some of these receipts included odometer readings, but they gave no indication of petitioner husband's business use of the automobile. The third document was a customer transaction list detailing client invoicing and payment dates for each month of *58 2011. Attached to the list were worksheets on which petitioner husband (1) reconstructed the dates he had visited PCB's clients, (2) estimated the number of daily visits he made to each client, and (3) estimated the mileage driven from January through April 2011.6 Petitioner husband acknowledged that his recollection as to the number of trips he made to the client sites was not reliable and that the number of trips shown on a particular day might in fact reflect the number of trips he made*57 to the client site during the entire month. Petitioner *59 husband further acknowledged that he did not keep records regarding the number of daily site visits with respect to clients who had ongoing maintenance contracts with PCB.
We do not doubt that petitioner husband drove to the worksites of PCB's clients. But he failed to satisfy the adequate record requirements of
Respondent determined that petitioners were liable for an accuracy-related penalty of $1,995 for 2011.
*60
A taxpayer may avoid liability for the accuracy-related penalty if the taxpayer demonstrates that he/she had reasonable cause for the underpayment and acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment.
Petitioners assert that they relied on Mr. Taylor in filing their 2011 income tax return. Reliance on professional advice may constitute reasonable cause and good faith, but "it must be established that the reliance was reasonable." In sum, for a taxpayer to rely reasonably upon advice so as possibly to negate a
Petitioners failed to provide any evidence to establish that they met the three-prong test of
As to the second prong of the test, petitioners did not establish that they provided Mr. Taylor with all necessary and accurate information to prepare their 2011 tax return. Petitioner husband was unable to explain the loss of the mileage *62 log or provide evidence that such a log was kept (for example by showing logs from earlier and later years). We also question the accuracy of the number of miles claimed to have been driven by petitioner husband for business. Petitioner husband asserts he drove 4,860 miles in January and 1,125 miles*61 on January 20 alone.
As to the third prong, we are mindful that PCB has been in business for many years. Presumably, petitioners knew petitioner husband was an employee of PCB. We believe petitioners should have questioned the reporting of petitioner husband's automobile expenses on Schedule C. We thus conclude that petitioners failed to show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.
To reflect the concessions of respondent,
Footnotes
1. PCB's 2011 Form 1120 was prepared by Paul L. Karstetter of Stitely & Karstetter, certified public accountants.↩
2. Petitioner wife did not attend the trial. Petitioner husband (who represented both petitioners) testified that petitioner wife did not want his automobile mileage expenses reported on PCB's Form 1120 because she worried about the ramifications of such an inclusion upon audit of PCB by GSA.
3. Mr. Taylor is not a certified public accountant; petitioner husband did not know whether Mr. Taylor was an enrolled agent. Petitioner husband believes Mr. Taylor earned a Ph.D.; he did not know in what discipline the degree was earned.↩
4. Petitioners concede that claiming petitioner husband's automobile expenses on Schedule C was erroneous and that these expenses should have been reported on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, as unreimbursed employee expenses.
5.
Sec. 1.274-5(g)(1), Income Tax Regs. , provides that the Commissioner may prescribe (in pronouncements of general applicability) a standard mileage rate that a taxpayer may use in determining the amount of a deduction for business use of a passenger automobile. This rate is determined annually by the IRS.See Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883 . For January 1 through June 30, 2011, the rate was 51 cents per mile.Notice 2010-88, 2010-51 I.R.B. 882 . For the balance of the year, the rate was 55.5 cents per mile.Announcement 2011-40, 2011-29 I.R.B. 56↩ .6. As an example, in the January 2001 worksheet, petitioner husband listed clients he visited on 11 days, driving a total of 4,860 miles:
Date Customer Round trip mileage Visits Total miles↩ 1/1 Service Neon Signs 11 28 308 1/1 Int. Broadcasting Bureau 21 26 546 1/1 Adv. Pulmonary Critical Care 14 22 308 1/1 Capital Womans Care 14 8 112 1/5 Apple Store 13 12 156 1/6 Capital Womans Care 14 12 168 1/11 Cedar PC 42 16 672 1/13 USIA State Dept. 21 9 189 1/14 Annandale Balancing 5 21 105 1/17 Annandale Balancing 5 22 110 1/20 Capital Womans Care 42 10 420 1/20 Misc 1 Time Cust. 37 11 407 1/20 North VA Cardiology Assoc. 16 9 144 1/20 VA Medical Accute Care 11 14 154 1/26 OSHA 23 9 207 1/28 Annandale Balancing 5 9 45 1/28 Misc 1 Time Cust. 11 16 176 1/28 VA Medical Accute Care 11 12 132 1/28 Apple Store 14 14 196 1/31 Annandale Balancing 5 61 305 Total mileage driven 4,860
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.