Bryan S. Alterman Trust v. Comm'r
Opinion
An appropriate order will be issued denying petitioner's motion, and decision will be entered for petitioner.
In
*226 BUCH,
On December 1, 2015, we issued
The sole issue we must decide is whether petitioner is entitled to administrative and litigation costs under
To recover administrative and litigation costs under
Taxpayers can prove that they are the prevailing party in two ways: (1) by establishing that they substantially prevailed or (2) by establishing that*17 they made a qualified offer and that the Court's judgment was equal to or less than that offer.
Generally, taxpayers seeking costs and fees under
*229 Petitioner argues without support that its net worth should be determined as of one of three possible dates: (1) the date the petition was filed, March 22, 2010; (2) the administrative proceeding date when the Commissioner issued the notice of liability, December 22, 2009; or (3) the last day of the taxable year when the Commissioner issued petitioner the notice of liability, December 31, 2009. Petitioner first argues that there was no taxable year involved in this proceeding and concludes that the valuation date should be March 22, 2010, the date it filed its petition. Petitioner explains that "[b]ecause there is no taxable year involved in this proceeding, the 'special rules' in
Each of these arguments fails because there is a taxable year involved in this proceeding, and it is 2003. The statute is clear, and it requires the net worth of the trust "shall be determined as of the last day of the taxable year involved in the proceeding".3
Petitioner concedes that its net worth as of the close of 2003, the taxable year involved in the proceeding, exceeded $2 million, the statutory limit to be eligible for fees and costs. Accordingly, it has not satisfied this requirement under
Petitioner cannot recover its costs because it failed to establish that it met the applicable net worth requirement. Because petitioner is not entitled to relief for this reason alone, we do not address the parties' other*21 arguments.
To reflect the foregoing,
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the relevant times.↩
2.
Sec. 7430(c)(4)(D) was enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. 1453, 111 Stat. at 1055 . H.R. Rept. No. 105-148 at 638-639 (1997),1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 1) 319, 960-961 , explained the reason for the addition ofsection 7430(c)(4)(D)↩ : "Although the net worth requirements are explicit for individuals, corporations, and partnerships, it is not clear which net worth requirement is to apply to other potential litigants. * * * The bill provides that the net worth limitations currently applicable to individuals also apply to estates and trusts."3. One can easily posit a rationale for this rule. Oftentimes, a trust's assets can easily be depleted, thus enabling a trust to manipulate whether it meets the net worth requirements by the time a notice is issued at the end of a protracted proceeding. By looking retrospectively to the taxable year involved in the proceeding, the statute limits or eliminates gamesmanship that might be used to fit within the net worth requirements. There is no evidence of any such gamesmanship in this case.↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.