Estate of Natale B. Giustina v. Comm'r
Opinion
Decision will be entered under
MORRISON,
• We adjust our valuation*114 of the 41% limited-partner interest to give no weight to the value of the assets owned by the partnership.
• We further explain our original reason for reducing the partnership-specific risk premium from 3.5% to 1.75%.
• We hold that our original reason is not valid because it is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
• We recalculate our valuation of the 41% limited-partner interest as $13,954,730.
When he died in 2005, Natale Giustina owned a 41% limited-partner interest in a partnership named Giustina Land & Timber Co. Limited Partnership. The partnership owned 47,939 acres of timberland and had 12 to 15 employees. It earned profits from growing trees, cutting them down, and selling the logs. It had continuously operated this business since its formation in 1990.
It was*115 agreed for the purpose of this litigation that, if the partnership were to sell off its timberlands, it would receive almost $143 million. If one adds in the value of the nontimberland assets, the partnership would receive $150,680,000 if it were to sell all of its assets.
Through corporate structures, the partnership had two general partners: Larry Giustina2 and James Giustina. The partnership had eight limited partners: (1) the revocable trust of Natale Giustina, (2) Sylvia Giustina (daughter of Anselmo Giustina, Natale Giustina's brother), *117 (3) James Giustina (son of Anselmo Giustina), (4) Natalie Giustina Newlove (daughter of Natale Giustina), (5) Irene Giustina Goldbeck (daughter of Natale Giustina), (6) Dolores Giustina Fruiht (another relative), (7) Larry Giustina (son of Natale Giustina), and (8) the Anselmo Giustina Family Trust.
In 2010 this case was tried. In 2011 we filed our first opinion. There we declined to adopt entirely the findings of either the estate's expert or the IRS's expert with respect to the value of the 41% limited-partner interest.
*118 The IRS's expert gave a 60% weight to the value of the partnership's assets. We took the view that these asset values were relevant to the value of the 41% limited-partner interest only to the extent of the probability that the partnership would sell its assets.3 The value of the 41% limited-partner interest is the price that would be agreed to by a hypothetical seller and buyer.
The estate's expert gave a 30% weight to the cashflows that would be received by the partnership if it were to continue its operations. We took the view *119 that the cashflows were relevant to the value of the 41% limited-partner interest only to the extent of the probability that the partnership would continue its operations.4*118 We determined there was a 75% chance that the partnership would continue its operations. Therefore we used a weight of 75%, rather than the 30% used by the estate's expert.
In order to incorporate the cashflows from continued operations into our valuation, we had to determine the present value of the cashflows. We did this by adjusting the calculations that the estate's expert had made of the present value of the cashflows. The estate's expert assumed that the partnership's cashflows would increase 4% each year. We agreed with this assumption. The estate's expert also assumed that the discount rate for discounting the cashflows to present value should be 18%. This 18% rate is the sum of: (1) 4.5% risk-free rate of return equal to the rate of return on Treasury bonds, (2) 3.6% risk premium for timber-industry companies, (3) 6.4% risk premium for small companies, and (4) 3.5% risk premium for the unique risk of the partnership. We accepted all of these components of the estate expert's discount rate with the exception of the 3.5% risk premium for the unique risk of the partnership. We concluded that this risk *120 premium should be only 1.75% (half the premium assigned by the estate's expert) because an investor could partially eliminate the risk by owning a diversified portfolio of assets.*119
In 2012 we entered a decision consistent with the first opinion, and the estate appealed. The Ninth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion reversing the decision and remanding the case. The Ninth Circuit held that we had clearly erred by finding that there was a 25% chance that the partnership would dissolve. The Ninth Circuit held that a buyer who intended to dissolve the partnership would not be allowed to become a limited partner by the general partners, who favored the continued operation of the partnership. And the Ninth Circuit found it implausible that the buyer would seek the removal of the general partners who had just granted the buyer admission to the partnership. Finally, the Ninth Circuit found it implausible that enough of the other partners would go along with a plan to dissolve the partnership. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit directed us on remand to "recalculate the value of the Estate based on the partnership's value as a going concern."
The Ninth Circuit also held that the Tax Court "clearly erred by failing to adequately explain its basis for cutting in half the Estate's expert's proffered *121 company-specific risk premium."
The Ninth Circuit's opinion ended with the words "REVERSED and REMANDED for recalculation of valuation."
The Ninth Circuit has directed us to revise our valuation of the 41% limited-partner interest. The first revision we make is to change the weight we accorded the value of the partnership's assets. In our first opinion, we assigned a 25% weight to this value and a 75% weight to the present value of the cashflows from the continued operation of the partnership. The Ninth Circuit has instructed us to "recalculate the value of the Estate based on the partnership's value as a going concern." In our view, the going-concern value is the present value of the cashflows the partnership would receive if it were to continue its operations. Therefore, we implement the Ninth Circuit's instruction by changing the weight we accord the present value of cashflows from 75% to 100%. This causes our *122 adjusted*121 valuation of the 41% limited-partner interest to be entirely based on the partnership's value as a "going concern".
With respect to the partnership-specific risk premium, our first task in implementing the remand is to further explain our reason for making a 50% reduction in the premium assigned by the estate's expert. The Ninth Circuit held that we erred by failing to consider whether a prospective buyer would need to be wealthy enough to diversify the partnership-specific risk.
We address this error on remand by providing a further explanation of our reasoning. In our first opinion, we believed that the hypothetical buyer,
*123 Risk is not preferred by investors. Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 182 (8th ed. 2006) ("Most investors dislike uncertainty".). They require a premium to bear it. However, some of the risk associated with an asset (the "unique risk") can be eliminated through diversification (1) if the owner of the asset also owns other assets, (2) if the risks of the other assets are not associated with the asset in question, and (3) if the other assets are great enough in value.6*123
*124 In evaluating the potential buyer's ability to diversify the risks associated with the partnership, we assumed that the buyer could be an entity owned by multiple owners. Examples of such an entity include a publicly-traded timber company, a real-estate investment trust, or a hedge fund. The unique risk associated with the 41%*124 limited-partner interest would have been diversified because the entity's owners--wealthy or not--could hold other assets outside the entity.7 For example, suppose that a publicly-traded timber company were the buyer of the 41% limited-partner interest. Suppose that a shareholder of the company owns $1,000 in stock in the company and $15,000 of other assets *125 unrelated to timber. The shareholder would be unconcerned by the individual risk associated with the purchase of the 41% limited-partner interest by the publicly-traded timber company in which he or she had a $1,000 stake. That risk would be diversified by the shareholder's $15,000 stake in other assets.
On the basis of our assumption*125 that an entity with multiple owners could be the hypothetical buyer of the 41% limited-partner interest, we believed that a hypothetical buyer would not require a premium for all the partnership-specific risk associated with owning the interest.8 We also clarify that the
The text in part 2.a above is a more extensive explanation for our halving the 3.5% partnership-specific*126 risk premium. It includes an explanation of how the *126 potential buyer could diversify the partnership-specific risk. This explanation partially resolves our duty to implement the remand of the Ninth Circuit. But we have more work to do. We should also consider whether our reasoning is still valid after the Court of Appeals opinion.
The Court of Appeals opinion, in discussing the possibility that a hypothetical buyer could force the sale of the partnership's assets, held that the hypothetical buyer must be a buyer to whom a transfer of a limited-partner interest is permitted under
Under
Under
As a result of our finding above, we determine that a hypothetical buyer of the 41% limited-partner interest would be unable to diversify the individual*129 risks associated with the partnership. Without diversification, the buyer would demand the full 3.5% risk premium assigned to the interest by the estate's expert. In our first opinion, we determined that the discount rate should be 16.25%, which corresponds to a direct capitalization rate of 12.25%. We now determine that the discount rate should be 18%, which corresponds to a direct capitalization rate of 14%.
In our first opinion we determined that the present value of the partnership's cashflows was $51,702,857. Increasing the discount rate from 16.25% to 18% *129 causes this value to decrease to $45,240,000. The mechanics of this recalculation are illustrated by the table below:
| Normalized pretax income | $6,120,000 | $6,120,000 | $6,120,000 |
| Normalized net income (normalized | 4,590,000 | 6,120,000 | 6,120,000 |
| pretax income reduced 25% by | |||
| estate's expert for income tax) | |||
| Total adjustments to estimated | -30,000 | -30,000 | -30,000 |
| cashflows | |||
| Normalized net cashflows | 4,560,000 | 6,090,000 | 6,090,000 |
| Projected normalized*130 net cashflows | 4,743,000 | 6,333,600 | 6,333,600 |
| (normalized net cashflows increased | |||
| by long-term growth rate of 4%) | |||
| Direct capitalization rate | 14% | 12.25% | 14% |
| Total equity value on a marketable, | 33,800,000 | 51,702,857 | 45,240,000 |
| noncontrolling ownership interest | |||
| basis (estate's expert's estimate is | |||
| rounded) | |||
In our first opinion we valued the 41% limited-partner interest at $27,454,115. After making the two changes discussed in this supplemental opinion (eliminating any weight attributed to the value of the partnership's assets and applying the 3.5% partnership-specific risk premium), our valuation changes to $13,954,730. This change in explained in the table below:
| Asset-accumulation | 10% x | --- | --- |
| method | $51,100,000 | ||
| Cashflow method | 30% x | 20% x | 75% x |
| $33,800,000 | $65,760,000 | $51,702,857 | |
| Capitalization-of- | 30% x | --- | --- |
| distributions method | $52,100,000 | ||
| Price-of-shares-of- | |||
| other-companies | 30% x | 20% x | --- |
| method | $59,100,000 | $99,550,000 | |
| Asset method | --- | 60% x | 25% x |
| $150,680,000 | $150,680,000 | ||
| Total | $48,610,000 | $123,470,000 | $76,447,143 |
| Discount for lack of | 35% | 25% | 25% (applied to*131 |
| marketability | value from cash- | ||
| flow method only, | |||
| for a weighted | |||
| discount of | |||
| $9,694,286) | |||
| Discount for lack of | 0% | 12% | 0% |
| control | |||
| Total after | |||
| discounts | $31,597,000 | $81,490,200 | $66,752,857 |
| x 41.128% | $12,995,000 | $33,515,000 | $27,454,115 |
| Asset-accumulation | --- |
| method | |
| Cashflow method | 100% x |
| $45,240,000 | |
| Capitalization-of- | --- |
| distributions method | |
| Price-of-shares-of- | |
| other-companies | --- |
| method | |
| Asset method | 0% x |
| $150,680,000 | |
| Total | $45,240,000 |
| Discount for lack of | 25% (or |
| marketability | $11,310,000) |
| Discount for lack of | 0% |
| control | |
| Total after | |
| discounts | $33,930,000 |
| x 41.128% | $13,954,730 |
*131 The change in valuation of the 41% limited-partner interest will affect the deficiency. The parties will be ordered to provide their recomputation of the deficiency under
To reflect the foregoing,
Footnotes
*. This opinion supplements Estate of Giustina v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-141, rev'd and remanded, 586 F. App'x 417 (9th Cir. 2014).↩
1. The interest we valued was a 41.128% limited-partner interest in Giustina Land & Timber Co. Limited Partnership owned by Natale Giustina through a revocable trust at his death. For simplicity, we refer to this interest as a 41% limited-partner interest.↩
2. Larry Giustina's full name is Laraway Michael Giustina.↩
3. Our first opinion stated: "In our view, * * * the asset method is appropriate to reflect the value of the partnership if its assets are sold."
.Estate of Giustina v. Commissioner↩ , slip op. at 19-204. Our first opinion stated: "In our view, the cashflow method is appropriate to reflect the value of the partnership if it is operated as a timber company".
.Estate of Giustina v. Commissioner↩ , slip op. at 19-205. Our first opinion said:
The fourth component of Reilly's [the estate's expert's] 18-percent discount rate was a partnership-specific risk premium of 3.5 percent. Reilly explained that this risk premium was justified because the partnership's timberlands were not geographically dispersed. All were in Oregon. He also explained that the partnership's operations were nondiversified. The partnership's sole source of revenue was timber harvesting. Thus, it is apparent that a portion of the 3.5-percent premium reflects the unique risks of the partnership. But unique risk does not justify a higher rate of return. Investors can eliminate such risks by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. We conclude that the partnership-specific risk premium should be only 1.75 percent.
(fn. ref. omitted).Estate of Giustina v. Commissioner↩ , slip op. at 16-176. A footnote in our first opinion stated:
Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers explain:
The risk that potentially can be eliminated by diversification is called
unique risk . Unique risk stems from the fact that many of the perils that surround an individual company are peculiar to that company and perhaps its immediate competitors. But there is also some risk that you can't avoid, regardless of how much you diversify. This risk is generally known asmarket risk . Market risk stems from the fact that there are other economywide perils that threaten all businesses.Brealy [sic] & Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 168 (7th ed. 2003) (fn. refs. omitted); see also Booth, "The Uncertain Case for Regulating Program Trading",
1994 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 28 ("Because diversification can eliminate the unique risks associated with investing in individual companies, the market pays no additional return to those who assume such risks."). .Estate of Giustina v. Commissioner↩ , slip op. at 17 n.57. Alternatively, one could think that the entity, not its owners, could diversify the risks of holding the 41% limited-partner interest. For example, suppose that the hypothetical buyer is a publicly-traded timber company. Such a company could purchase the 41% limited-partner interest while holding other substantial assets. These other assets could have returns that are unaffected by the partnership-specific risk. Thus, these other assets could provide diversification of the partnership-specific risk.↩
8. The estate's expert opined that a 3.5% premium was appropriate for the partnership-specific risk of owning the 41% limited-partner interest.
. The theory of asset diversification might suggest that the entire 3.5% premium should be eliminated. The reason we did not completely eliminate the 3.5% premium is that we believed that in practice (as opposed to theory) a buyer might still be averse to the partnership-specific risk.Estate of Giustina↩ , slip op. at 16
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.