Blair v. Comm'r
Opinion
Decision will be entered under
BUCH,
Mr. Blair is a tax protester.2 This proceeding is not the first time he has appeared before this Court. He has previously appeared at least twice:
In 2010 Mr. Blair received income. Mr. Blair stipulated that he received wages, a dividend, and a distribution from a qualified retirement plan. Mr. Blair received wages from MolyCorp Minerals, LLC, of $91,354. MolyCorp reported that it withheld*214 $9,830 from his wages. Mr. Blair received a dividend from Chevron Corp. of $68. Mr. Blair received a total distribution from a qualified retirement plan held at Wells Fargo Bank N.A. of $164,071. Wells Fargo reported *218 that it withheld $32,814 from the distribution and indicated that the distribution was an "[e]arly distribution, no known exception".
Mr. Blair also incurred expenses. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, reported to the Commissioner that Mr. Blair paid $6,356 of mortgage interest, and Wells Fargo reported to the Commissioner that Mr. Blair paid $6,987 of mortgage interest. Mr. Blair does not allege that the interest was qualified residence interest.
Mr. Blair stipulated that he did not file a Federal tax return for 2010.
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency determining a deficiency attributable to the wages, dividend, and taxable distribution and a
While residing in Nevada, Mr. Blair timely petitioned for redetermination of the deficiency. Mr. Blair disputes the determinations made in the notice, challenges the constitutionality of the Code, and asserts that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does*215 not have jurisdiction over him.
The case was scheduled for trial at the Court's trial session in Las Vegas, Nevada. When the parties appeared at the calendar call, Mr. Blair argued that he does not have to pay taxes. We disposed of many of his arguments on the record. We warned Mr. Blair that he would risk a
We must decide whether Mr. Blair received taxable income. Additionally, we must decide whether he is liable for an additional tax and additions to tax. Finally, we must decide whether we should impose a
Mr. Blair asserts various arguments as to why he does not owe tax, including arguments that the Code lacks constitutionality and that the IRS does not have jurisdiction over him. His arguments have been repeatedly*216 rejected, and "[w]e perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have *220 some colorable merit."7 For Mr. Blair, this Court has rejected many of his arguments in his previous cases. We also rejected many of Mr. Blair's arguments on the record at the calendar call, citing cases for him that rejected those.
None of Mr. Blair's arguments absolves him from his obligations under the Code. "The constitutionality of our income tax system--including the role played within that system by the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court--has long been established."8
It is clear that Mr. Blair is subject to the income tax laws.
The Commissioner bears the burden of production for additions to tax, and once the Commissioner satisfies his burden, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to prove that an addition to tax should not apply.10
The Commissioner failed to meet his burden. As part of the Commissioner's burden of production, the Commissioner must produce evidence necessary to enable the Court to conclude that the taxpayer had a required annual payment under
A
A taxpayer evidences a primary purpose of delay if he uses frivolous or groundless arguments to delay paying his taxes.20 A position is frivolous if it is *225 "contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law."21 "Groundless" means "having no ground or foundation: lacking cause or reason for support."22 More specifically, a position is groundless if it lacks merit or states no justiciable facts in the petition and has no valid ground or foundation.23 Frivolous and groundless claims divert the Court's time, energy, and resources away from more serious claims and increase the needless cost imposed on other litigants*221 by these types of lawsuits.24
Mr. Blair instituted the proceedings primarily for delay and has taken positions that are frivolous or groundless. Mr. Blair is also a repeat offender; he has previously been warned and penalized.25 In this proceeding Mr. Blair was *226 warned about making arguments that had already been rejected by this Court, yet he continued to raise those same arguments. Specifically, in his memorandum brief, Mr. Blair advanced arguments that were rejected at the calendar call and that were rejected in the two cases that the Court cited for him. We will impose a $10,000 sanction.
Mr. Blair raised frivolous and groundless arguments as to why he is not liable for tax. The arguments he raised have been repeatedly rejected. Mr. Blair received income, including an early distribution from a qualified retirement plan; therefore, he is liable for tax and an additional tax. He*222 is liable for additions to tax under
To reflect the foregoing,
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue. All monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
2. "Tax protesters" and "tax defiers" are "[p]ersons who make frivolous anti-tax arguments".
.Wnuck v. Commissioner , 136 T.C. 498, 502↩ n.2 (2011)3.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201 ;see also .Estate of Reis v. Commissioner , 87 T.C. 1016, 1026-1027↩ (1986)4.
.Blair v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2002-189, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 137↩, 141 (2002)5.
(order and decision).Blair v. Commissioner↩ , T.C. Dkt. No. 6368-05L (Feb. 2, 2006)6.
.Blair v. Commissioner↩ , T.C. Dkt. No. 6368-05L7.
.Crain v. Commissioner , 737 F.2d 1417, 1417-1418↩ (5th Cir. 1984)8.
.Crain v. Commissioner , 737 F.2d at 1417-1418↩9.
See ;El v. Commissioner , 144 T.C. 140, 145-149 (2015) .Bunney v. Commissioner , 114 T.C. 259, 265↩ (2000)10.
See sec. 7491(c) ; .Higbee v. Commissioner , 116 T.C. 438, 446-447↩ (2001)11.
Sec. 6651(a)(1) ; .Higbee v. Commissioner , 116 T.C. at 446-447↩12.
Sec. 6012(a)(1)(A) ;see (theWheeler v. Commissioner , 127 T.C. 200, 208 (2006)Paperwork Reduction Act is not a defense tosection 6651(a)(1) ), aff'd,521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008) ; (stating that the Commissioner is not required to send taxpayers notice that they are required to file returns).Kernan v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2014-228↩, at P2213.
Sec. 6651(a)(2)↩ .14.
Sec. 6654(d) ;see also sec. 6654(d)(1)(C)↩ (providing that if an individual's adjusted gross income shown on the previous year's return exceeds $150,000, a higher percentage may apply).15.
.Wheeler v. Commissioner , 127 T.C. at 211↩16.
See also (holding that the Commissioner did not meet his burden of production to establish that the taxpayer was required to make annual payments underWheeler v. Commissioner , 127 T.C. at 211-212sec. 6654(d) ); , aff'd,Seidel v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2007-45, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 938, 940 (2007)324 Fed. Appx 621↩ (9th Cir. 2009) .17.
Sec. 6673(a)(1)↩ .18.
Sec. 6673(a)(1)↩ .19.
, aff'd,Leyshon v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2015-104, at P29-P30649 F. App'x 299↩ (4th Cir. 2016) .20.
See (noting that taxpayer admitted in his brief that he knew Court had rejected arguments similar to his as frivolous and groundless in many prior cases), aff'd,Beard v. Commissioner , 82 T.C. 766, 781 (1984)793 F.2d 139↩ (6th Cir. 1986) .21.
(quotingTakaba v. Commissioner , 119 T.C. 285, 287 .Coleman v. Commissioner , 791 F.2d 68, 71↩ (7th Cir. 1986))22.
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged).Nies v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1985-216, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 418, at *14↩23.
See ;Keating v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1985-312, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 329, at *13-*14 .Nies v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 1985-216, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 418, at *14↩-*1524.
.Coleman v. Commissioner , 791 F.2d at 72↩25.
;Blair v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo 2002-189, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at 140-141 .Blair v. Commissioner↩ , T.C. Dkt. No. 6368-05L
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.