AD Inv. 2000 Fund LLC v. Comm'r
Opinion
An appropriate order will be issued, and decisions will be entered for respondent.
On account of Ps' postdecision challenges to one of R's expert witnesses, we will vacate our decisions, which were substantially for R, in order to reconsider our findings of fact and opinion. Upon reconsideration, disregarding the challenged expert's testimony, we reach the same conclusions and will reenter our decisions for R.
HALPERN,
*228 Respondent does not object to our vacating our decisions in these cases. We will vacate our decisions pursuant to
These cases involve six corporations that entered simultaneously into offsetting long and short currency options and then contributed the option spreads to either AD Investment 2000 Fund LLC (ADI) or AD Global 2000 Fund LLC (ADG) (collectively, LLCs). In less than a year, the corporations disposed of their LLC interests and reported huge tax losses from their investments on the theory that their tax bases in their LLC interests equaled the cost of the long option (or options) that each had contributed to the LLC, unreduced by the offsetting short-option liability (or liabilities) that the LLC had assumed.
*229 Respondent examined the LLCs' 2000 returns, and by the FPAAs he made adjustments to partnership items that would eliminate the losses reported by the corporations. He justified his adjustments in part on the ground that the LLCs had been "formed and availed of solely for purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." Because the transactions and partnership had "no business purpose other than tax avoidance", they "lacked economic substance",*225 and so, respondent determined, he would disregard them for tax purposes and disallow deductions for the related losses.
We conducted a trial in these cases, and the testimony at trial consisted principally of expert testimony concerning the economics of option spreads. Respondent called two expert witnesses, Thomas Murphy, who was accepted by the Court as an expert in valuing and trading foreign currency options, and John B. Finnerty, Ph.D., who was accepted by the Court as an expert in finance with a particular expertise in derivatives. Petitioners called one expert witness, Scott D. Hakala, Ph.D., who was accepted by the Court as an expert on the pricing of currency options with some familiarity with industry practice.
In our Memorandum Opinion The evidence is overwhelming that the LLCs were created and the option spread transactions were executed exclusively for tax avoidance purposes: (1) Mr. Haber [the architect behind the LLCs and the transactions at*226 issue] openly advertised the strategy as a way to generate tax losses, (2) the LLCs themselves engaged in no transactions besides the economic equivalent of putting money in a bank, (3) each corporation joined and resigned from the LLCs within the year, (4) participating in the transactions caused each corporation to completely offset what otherwise would have been a substantial tax liability, and (5) if foreign currency investing and diversification were the goal, there were simpler alternatives with a higher probability of generating profit. [
Of those five numbered findings, we made only two on the basis of expert testimony, viz, "(2) the LLCs themselves engaged in no transactions besides the economic equivalent of putting money in a bank", and "(5) if foreign currency investing and diversification were the goal, there were simpler alternatives with a higher probability of generating profit."
Mr. Murphy was of the opinion that the option transactions that*227 the LLCs entered into were equivalent to depositing cash in a bank: "The two ADG option spreads [and likewise the two ADI option spreads] were so deep in the money that they were essentially cash deposits." Dr. Finnerty was similarly of the opinion that the option transactions that the LLCs entered into "were so deeply in the money with fixed payoff amounts that they were effectively cash-equivalent positions." Dr. Finnerty was a credible witness, and his testimony alone was sufficient for us to make our finding that the LLCs engaged in no transactions besides the economic equivalent of putting money in a bank. Upon reconsideration, we repeat that finding.
Likewise, Dr. Finnerty corroborated Mr. Murphy's testimony that the option pairs acquired by the corporations were not particularly good investments. As we reported in our Memorandum Opinion
Dr. Hakala, petitioners' expert, did not explain why the corporations entered into more complicated transactions when simpler ones with higher probabilities of profit were available, even opining that he did not see anything that suggested an "intent of really beating the market at [a] sophisticated level".
Petitioners called Ronald Buesinger as a fact witness. He is an experienced option trader who had assisted*229 Mr. Haber in implementing FXIS. He testified that he had priced the option trades that were necessary to execute FXIS and was very familiar with the economics of the trades. He further testified that he had negotiated the terms of the trades with Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. *233 (Lehman), which was both the counterparty and the calculation agent for those trades.4 He testified that Lehman was uncomfortable with the risk that the option spreads would expire on the "sweet spot" (the remote possibility that, on the expiration of an option pair, the long option is in the money but the short option is not), which risk figured in setting the market spread to be taken into account in determining whether the sweet spot was hit. He acknowledged that, if Mr. Haber was concerned about the net payoff amount from options trades, then a simpler strategy would have been to invest in single (we assume "unpaired") option transactions.
And while the existence of a sweet spot undoubtedly offered the corporations and the LLCs at least the theoretical possibility of a huge payout, Mr. Buesinger analogized the probability of hitting the sweet spot to "hitting the lottery" (or "hitting the head*230 of a pin"). Mr. Murphy was certain that the sweet spot would never be hit. He testified that Lehman, as the calculation agent, had *234 discretion to pick from a range of prices wider than the sweet spot5 and that, under the terms of the relevant trade confirmations, neither Lehman or the corporations owed a fiduciary duty to the other. He testified that it would be both commercially reasonable and in its interest (as the counterparty to the transaction) for Lehman to pick a price not at the sweet spot. Mr. Murphy convinced us that Lehman would not have closed a transaction on the sweet spot,
Upon reconsideration of the expert testimony, disregarding Mr. Murphy's testimony, we make the same fifth numbered finding that we made in our Memorandum Opinion
We will vacate our decisions in order to reconsider our Memorandum Opinion. Upon reconsideration, we make the same five findings of fact (set forth The LLCs were created solely for tax avoidance purposes, and, for that reason, we do not recognize them as entities for Federal tax purposes. Since they are not tax-recognized entities, they are ineligible to be classified as partnerships for Federal tax purposes.
*237 As stated, we will reenter our decisions for respondent.
Footnotes
*. This opinion supplements our previously filed
Memorandum Opinion, AD Inv. 2000 Fund LLC, T.C. Memo. 2015-223↩ .1. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. On March 16, 2016, during a trial conducted by another Division of the Court, in
Tucker v. Commissioner↩ , T.C. Dkt. No. 12307-04 (filed July 14, 2004), voir dire of Mr. Murphy revealed that he had not updated his curriculum vitae with respect to certain aspects of his employment history and the trials in which he had testified in the prior four years. As a result, we did not permit Mr. Murphy to testify in that case.3. Although petitioners did not do so, we will treat petitioners as having made an untimely motion pursuant to
Rule 161↩ for us to reconsider our findings or opinion. We grant petitioners leave to so move and hereby grant the motion.4. As "counterparty", Lehman bought the options that the corporations sold (it would receive payouts from the corporations if the options expired in the money) and sold the options that the corporations bought (it would have to make payouts to the corporations if the options expired in the money). As "calculation agent", Lehman was responsible for determining the exchange rate price when the options expired.
See .AD Inv. 2000 Fund LLC v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2015-223 at *8↩ n.45. More specifically, Mr. Murphy testified that the market spread on exchange rates was three pips wide, and calculation agents such as Lehman would have discretion to pick a price at least within that range. Because the sweet spot for all of the option spreads was only one pip wide, it, in effect, gave Lehman discretion to always pick a price outside of the sweet spot.↩
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.