Jarvis v. United States

claim In the Um'ted States Court of Federal Claims

No. l7-762C Filed October 18, 2017 NOT FOR PUBLICATION F| LED ) UCT 1 8 2017 DEREK N. JARVIS, ) U.s. coum OF ) FEDERAL CLA|MS Plaintiff, ) ) Pro Se; Rule 12(b)(l); Subject-Matter v. ) Jurisdiction; fn Forma Pauperis. ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) )

Derek N. Jarvi`s, Silver Spring, MD, plaintiff pro se.

Delisa M. Sarzchez, Trial Attorney, Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, Robert E.

K:`r.s'chman, Jr., Director, and Chac'lA. Reader, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Comrnercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant MEMORANDUM OI’INION AND ORDER GRIGGSBY, ludge I. INTRODUCTION ln this matter, plaintiff pro se, Derek N. Jarvis, challenges the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s dispositions of several civil actions that plaintiff has filed before that court. See generally Compl. Speciflcally, plaintiff alleges that the actions of the district court violated, among other things, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 18 U.S.C. §§ 214-242; and 28 U.S.C. § 453. Compl. at im 4, 5, 31. The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule lZ(b)(l) of the Rules of the United States Court of F ederal Claims (“RCFC”). See generally Def. Mot. Plaintiff has also moved to proceed in this matter iri forma paigperi.s'l See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed fn Forma Pauperis. F or the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGR()UNDl A. F actual Background Plaintiff commenced this action on June 6, 2017. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs complaint is difficult to follow. But, it appears that the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is a challenge of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s dispositions of several civil actions that plaintiff has filed before that court See generally Compl.

As background, plaintiff has collectively filed approximately 36 cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the United States District Court for the District of l\/laryland since 2009. Def. l\/lot. at l. Approximately 17 of these matter have been filed by plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. lal. ln the complaint, plaintiff alleges that several district judges for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and other district court personnel have “fraudulently denied [hirn] access to impartial justice as demonstrated in the order(s) in every one of plaintiffs cases.”

Coinpl. at il l{). Plaintiff also alleges that the district court judges have routinely dismissed his cases, in violation of plaintiffs due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Compl. at 1{1[ 4-5, lS, 39~40. ln this regard, plaintiff contends that he vvas denied the right to proceed to the discovery phases of his litigation, and to trial, in many of these cases. Cornpl. at jill 27, 31, 78. And so, plaintiff contends that the judges presiding over those matters prejudiced him by allowing the defendants to “conceal evidence,” thereby depriving plaintiff of his civil rights Compl. at M 31, 52, 61, 76.

As relief, plaintiff requests that the Couit: l) Appoint a Grand Jury and prosecutor to investigate RICO violations against the l\/laryland Court, 2) VOID all order(s) issued by the Court in Maiyland by the district court judges, 3) submit this brief to the U.S. Attorney‘s Ofl`ice for investigation and the DOJ, and 4) VOlD all

‘ The facts recited in this Mernorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiffs complaint and the exhibits attached thereto (“Compl.”); the government’s motion to dismiss (“Def. l\/lot.”); plaintiffs opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss (“Pl. Resp.); the government’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss (“Def. chly”) and plaintiffs sur-reply (Pl. Sur.”). Except where otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are undisputed

order(s) by the Corrupt federal judges in l\/laryland as the order(s) are Nullities, and were not based upon federal law.

Compl. at il 80.

B. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter on lone 6, 2017. See generally Compl. On .lune 6, 2017, plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed ln Forina Panperis.

On August 7, 2017, the government filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)( l). See generally Def. l\/Iot. On August 23, 2017, plaintiff filed a response and opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss.

See generally Pl. Resp. On September 5, 2017, the government filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss See generally Def. Reply. On September l3, 20l'l, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply and a sur-reply. See generally Sur. Reply. On September lS, 2017, the Court granted plaintiffs motion for leave. See generally Order granting motion for leave.

These matters having been fully briefed, the Court addresses the pending motions.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Pro Se Litigants Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, without the benefit of counsel And so, the Court applies the pleadings requirements leniently. Berioni‘ v. GTE Lal)s., lnc., 535 F. App’x 919, 925-26 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing MeZea.l v. Sprinl Nexiel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, l356 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). When determining Whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, this Court affords more leeway under the rules to pro se plaintiffs than plaintiffs Who are represented by counsel See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 5 l9, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Maithews v. Unired Siaies, 750 F.3d l320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). But, there “is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which lthe plaintiffl has not spelled out in his pleadings.” Lengen v_ Unirecl Siaies, 100 Fedi Cl. 317, 328 (20l l) (brackets existing', internal quotation omitted). ln addition, while “a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, . . . the pro se plaintiff, nevettheless, bears the burden of

establishing the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Riles v. Unilea’ States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (eiting Taylor v. Uniiecl Sra)‘es, 303 F.3d 1357, l359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). And so, the Court may excuse ambiguities, but not defects, in the complaint. Coll)ert v. Unitecl Srales, No. 20l4-5029, 20l5 WL 2343578, at *l (Fed. Cir. May l8, 2015); see also Denies v. Uniteal Stales, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) (“[T]he leniency afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements.”) (citation omitted).

B. Jurisdiction And RCFC lZ(b)(l) lt is well-established that this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction must be established before the Court addresses the merits of a claim. Plains Coinrn. Bank v. Long Faniily Lancl & Catrle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008) (citing Steel Co. v. Cilizensfor a Beiter Env’l, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998) (stating that subject-matter jurisdiction is “a threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”)). When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC l2(b)(l), this Court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Eriekson. v. Parclus, 55l U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also RCFC lZ(b)(l). But, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and he must do so by a preponderance of the evidencel Reynola's v. Arniy & Air Foree Excli. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. l988) (citation omitted). And so, should the Court determine that “it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the claim.” lanham v. anna scales 72 rea er 274, 273 (2006) nitng acre iz(h)(s)). ln this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction and “possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Giiarclian Life lns. Co. of Ani., 51l U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucl<er Act grants the Court jurisdiction over: [A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

23 U.s.c. § 1491(3)(1).

The Tucl<er Act is, however, a “jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages . . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon lthe United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the substantive right exists.” United Sfafes v. Teslan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). And so, to pursue a substantive right against the United States under the Tucl<er Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a money- mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation; an express or implied contract with the United States', or an illegal exaction of money by the United States. Cabral v. United Srares, 317 F. App’x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fisher v. United Srafes, 402 F.3d l167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); Nornian v. United Srares, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for jurisdictional purposes if it ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of the breach of the duties lit] impose[s].”’ Fislier, 402 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United Stales v. Milchell, 463 U.S. 206, 219 (1983)).

Specil'ically relevant to this matter, this Court “does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of district courts relating to proceedings before those courts.” .losliua v. United Slales, 17 l".3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Jones v. Unilecl Siates, No. l5-l044, 2016 WL 447144, at 1 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 4, 2016), And so, the Court must dismiss a claim seeking to review the decisions of district courts for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction IV. DISCUSSION A. Thc Court Does Not Posscss Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff’s Claims The government has moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the grounds that: (l) the Court may not consider plaintiffs challenge to the actions of the United States District Court for the l)istrict of Maryland‘, (2) the Court may not entertain plaintiffs claims against any party other than the United States', and (3) plaintiffs constitutional, criminal law, Bivens, judicial misconduct, and civil rights claims are jurisdictionally precluded by the Tucl<er Act. Def. l\/Iot. at 4-5; Def. Rep. at 2-3. F or the reasons discussed below, the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any of the plaintiffs claims And so, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint RCFC 12(b)(l).

1. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff’s Challenge ()f The District Court’s Deeisions As an initial matter, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to challenge the district court’s decisions to dismiss his cases, the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider this claim. ln the complaint plaintiff alleges that the judges of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland obstructed justice by dismissing his cases. Compl. at jill 25-30.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that “federal judges, engaged in a ‘pattern and practice’ of obstruction of justice tactics to prevent [him] from going to trial and even discovery on the merits of his cases.” Compl. at il 27.

Plaintiff also alleges that several district judges for the United States District Court for the District of l\/laryland and other district court personnel have “fraudulently denied [him] access to impartial justice as demonstrated in the order(s) in every one of Plaintiffs cases.”

Compl. at ll 10. And so, plaintiff maintains in this action that the district court judges have violated his due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Compl. at fill 4-5, 15, 39-40.

The United States Court of Appeals for the F ederal Circuit has long held that this Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts relating to proceedings before those courts. Joslnia, 17 F.3d at 380 (stating that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of district courts relating to proceedings before those courts); Mora v. United Stares, ll8 Fed. Cl. 713, 7l6 (20l4) (“['l`]his court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals.”); see also Verea'a., LTDA. v. Uniiea’ Slaies, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 200l) (explaining that this Court is not an appellate tribunal, and does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts). That is precisely the action that plaintiff seeks in the complaint And so, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs claim challenging the actions of the district court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction RCFC l2(b)(l).

2. The Court May Not Consider Plaintii'f’s Claims Against Parties Other Than The United States This Court is also without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims against the district court judges and other district court personnel named in the complaint See Compl. at 11 l0. lt is

well-established that the United States is the only proper defendant in cases brought in this Court Pilailin v_ United Slales, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 75 (2011); Siephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (“l`T]he only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.”) (emphasis original). And so, the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims against individual judges and court personnel Uniieo.' States v. Slzerwooel, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (l94l) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims “is without jurisdiction of any suit brought against private parties . . . .”); Ana'erson v. Uniiea’ Siates, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (20l4) (stating that “[tjhis court does not have jurisdiction over any claims alleged against states, localities, state and local government entities, or state and local government officials and employees; jurisdiction only extends to suits against the United States itself.”). ln addition, plaintiff may not rely upon Bivens v. Six Unlcnown Naniea’ Agenrs ofllie Fecl.

Bnrean ofNarcoiies, 403 U.S. 388 (l 971), to bring his claims against the court officials named in the complaint See Compl. at ll 2; see also Pl. Resp. at 7. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the Tucker Act does not grant the Court jurisdiction to consider such claims Brown v. United Siaies, 105 F.3d 62l, 624 (Ped. Cir. 1997). And so, the Court must also dismiss plaintiffs Bivens claims.

3. The Court l\/Iay Not Consider Plaintiff’s Criminal Law Claims ln addition, this Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs criminal law claims See Cooper v. United States, l04 Fed. Cl. 306, 311-12 (2012) (holding that this Court cannot review criminal matters); Joslina, 17 F.3d at 379 (“The court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code . . . .”). A careful reading of the complaint demonstrates that plaintiff alleges violations of several federal criminal statutes, including, l8 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights) and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under the color of law). Compl. at jul 19, 2l-23, 24. Because the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider such claims, the Court must also dismiss plaintiffs criminal law claims RCFC l2(b)(l).

4. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Are Also Jurisdictionally Prccluded The Court is similarly without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff s constitutional claims. ln the complaint plaintiff alleges due process and equal protection claims under the Fifth and

13 ourteenth Amendments. See generally Compl. But, this Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider claims based upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as this provision is not a money-mandating provision of law. LeBlanc v. Uniiecl States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed Cir. 1995) (frnding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not constitute “a sufficient basis forjurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government”)', see also Mchllough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 4 (2006) (“['l`]he Fifth Amendment is not a source that mandates the payment of money to plaintiff”). 'l`he Court is similarly without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs equal protection and due process claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See LeBlane, 50 F.3d at 1028; see also Qaailes v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 659, 664, ajj”a', 979 F.2d 216 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“This court does not have jurisdiction . . . because neither the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution ‘obligate the United States to pay money damages.’”) (citation omitted). And so, the Court must also dismiss these claims RCFC 12(b)(l).

5. The Other Statutes Reiied Upon By Plalntiff Do Not Confer Jurisdiction Lastly, the Court is also without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs civil rights claims See 42 U.S.C. § 198l. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the district judges who presided over his a cases should be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has long recognized that civil rights claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 may only be brought in a United States district court See Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (stating that the United States Court of 17 ederal Claims “does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 198l, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts”). 'f his Court similarly does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs allegations of judicial misconduct under 28 U.S.C. § 453. See Pl. Resp. at 4. As the government correctly observes in its reply brief, Section 453 is not a money-mandating source of law and this statute cannot be relied upon by plaintiff to establish jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. See Harclin v. United States, No. 14-557C, 2014 WL 4724472, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 23, 2014) (“Claims for alleged judicial misconduct under 28 U.S.C. § 455 are not money-mandating and therefore cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction in this court.”) (citation omitted). Given this, the Court must dismiss plaintiffs civil rights and judicial misconduct claims RCFC 12(b)(l).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis Satisfies The Statutory Requirement As a final matter, plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter. See generally Pl. l\/lot. to Proceed ln Forma Paaperis. This Court may authorize the commencement of a lawsuit Without prepayment of fees When a plaintiff submits an affidavit including a statement of all assets, a declaration that he or she is unable to pay the fees, and a statement of the nature of the action and a belief that he or she is entitled to redress See 28 U.S.C. § l915(a)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d).2 A'fter reviewing plaintiff s submission, the Court finds that plaintiff has satisfied the statutory requirements to proceed in forma pauperis And so, the Court grants plaintiffs motion to proceed informa pauperis for the limited purpose of resolving the jurisdictional issues raised in the government’s motion to dismiss V. C()NCLUSION ln surn, When construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffJ plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any of his claims in this matter. And so, the Court must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction RCFC l2(b)(l). ln light of plaintiffs pro se status_and plaintiffs representation that he is unable to pay the Court’s filing fee_the Court grants plaintiffs request to proceed in this matter iri forma pauperis for the limited purpose of resolving the jurisdictional issues raised by the government’s motion to dismiss And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court: 1. GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss; and 2. GRANTS plaintiffs motion to proceed informal pauperis

2 The Government does not oppose plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis See generally Def.

Resp. to Pl. Mot. to Proceed ]r: Forma Paaperis, June 23, 2017.

The Clerk’s Offlce is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of the government, DISMISSING the complaintl No Costs IT IS SO ORDERED.