Surace v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 21-1565V

*************************

* LAURA SURACE, * Chief Special Master Corcoran

* Petitioner, * Filed: March 30, 2026

* v. *

* SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

* Respondent. *

* ************************* Phyllis Widman, Widman Law Firm, LLC, Linwood, NJ, for Petitioner.

Madelyn Weeks, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION GRANTING FINAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On July 12, 2021, Laura Surace filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”). 2 Amended Petition (ECF No. 66) at 1. Petitioner alleged that a tetanus-diphtheria-acellular pertussis vaccine she received on July 18, 2019, caused and/or significantly aggravated numerous alleged conditions, including “vestibular/balance dysregulation/difficulty walking, myalgia, malaise, markedly decline functioning, severe pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder [] and other neurological impairments.” Id. I dismissed the claim after briefing, and that determination was not appealed. See Decision, dated Aug. 11, 2026 (ECF No. 79).

Petitioner has now filed a motion for a final award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated Mar. 12, 2026 (ECF No. 82) (“Mot.”). This is Petitioner’s sole fees and costs request. Petitioner requests a total of $74,670.41 ($62,302.25 in attorney’s fees, plus $12,368.16 in costs) for the work of attorney Phyllis Widman. Mot. at 2–3. The requested costs include Petitioner’s unreimbursed litigation costs, which are discussed in greater detail below. Respondent reacted to the fees request on March 26, 2026. See Response, dated Mar. 26, 2026 (ECF No. 85) (“Resp.”). Respondent defers to my discretion as to whether the statutory requirements for a fees and costs award are met herein, and if so, the calculation of the amount to be awarded. Resp. at 2, 4. Petitioner did not file a reply.

For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $74,670.41.

ANALYSIS I. Petitioner’s Claim had Reasonable Basis

Although the Vaccine Act only guarantees a fees award to successful petitioners, a special master may also award fees and costs in an unsuccessful case if: (1) the “petition was brought in good faith”; and (2) “there was reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Section 15(e)(1). I have in prior decisions set forth at length the criteria to be applied when determining if a claim possessed “reasonable basis” sufficient for a fees award. See e.g., Sterling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-551V, 2020 WL 549443, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 3, 2020). Importantly, establishing reasonable basis does not automatically entitle an unsuccessful claimant to fees, but is instead a threshold obligation; fees can still thereafter be limited, if unreasonable, or even denied entirely.

A claim’s reasonable basis 3 is demonstrated through some objective evidentiary showing. Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). This objective inquiry is focused on the claim—counsel’s conduct is irrelevant (although it may bulwark good faith). Simmons, 875 F.3d at 635. Reasonable basis inquiries are not static—they evaluate not only what was known at the time the petition was filed, but also take into account what is learned about the evidentiary support for the claim as the matter progresses. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding the finding that a reasonable basis for petitioners’ claims ceased to exist once they had reviewed their expert's opinion, which consisted entirely of unsupported speculation).

The standard for reasonable basis is lesser (and thus inherently easier to satisfy) than the preponderant standard applied when assessing entitlement, as cases that fail can still have sufficient objective grounding for a fees award. Braun v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 144 Fed. Cl. 72, 77 (2019). The Court of Federal Claims has affirmed that “[r]easonable basis is a standard that petitioners, at least generally, meet by submitting evidence.” Chuisano v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 287 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (affirming special master). The factual basis and medical support for the claim is among the evidence that should be considered. Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 132 Fed. Cl. 372, 378 (Fed. Cl. 2017). Under the Vaccine Act, special masters have “maximum discretion” in applying the reasonable basis standard. See, e.g., Silva v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 108 Fed. Cl. 401, 401–02 (Fed. Cl. 2012). 4

Although Petitioner’s claim was ultimately unsuccessful, I find there was sufficient objective basis to entitle her to a fees and costs award. This case involved a lengthy medical record that strongly established that Petitioner sought medical treatment pre- and post-vaccination for a myriad of reasons, and both sides fairly disputed any number of issues relevant to Petitioner’s alleged injury. Petitioner was ultimately unable to demonstrate that she suffered from a cognizable vaccine injury, nor that the constellation of symptoms she experienced pre-vaccination likely worsened as a result of the Tdap vaccine. Although the claim was ultimately not all that well- founded, there was a modicum of objective evidence to support it, and I find no other reason to deny fees despite the claim’s disposition. A final award of fees and costs in this matter is thus appropriate.

II. Calculation of Fees

Determining the appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method—“multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The second part involves adjusting the lodestar calculation up or down to take relevant factors into consideration. Id. at 1348. This standard for calculating a fee award is considered applicable in most cases where a fee award is authorized by federal statute. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–37 (1983).

An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is determined by the “forum rule,” which bases the proper hourly rate to be awarded on the forum in which the relevant court sits (Washington, D.C., for Vaccine Act cases), except where an attorney’s work was not performed in the forum and there is a substantial difference in rates (the so-called “Davis exception”). Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). A 2015 decision established the hourly rate ranges for attorneys with different levels of experience who are entitled to the forum rate in the Vaccine Program. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015).

Petitioner requests the following rates for his attorney based on the years work was performed:

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Phyllis Widman $350.00 $375.00 $400.00 $420.00 $480.00 $480.00 (Attorney) Paralegal -- -- -- $175.00 $175.00 $175.00 Mot. at 5–22.

Ms. Widman practices in Northfield, New Jersey—a jurisdiction that has been deemed “in forum,” and thus entitling her to rates commensurate with what was established in McCulloch. See Maxwell v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-827V, 2018 WL 5095119, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 17, 2018). The rates requested are also consistent with what has previously been awarded, in accordance with the Office of Special Masters’ fee schedule. 5 Gatto v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-924V, 2025 WL 1235088, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 31, 2025). I thus find no cause to reduce them in this instance. And I deem the time devoted to the matter to be reasonable, and I will therefore award all fees requested without adjustment.

III. Calculation of Attorney’s Costs

Just as they are required to establish the reasonableness of requested fees, petitioners must also demonstrate that requested litigation costs are reasonable. Presault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2002): Perreira v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992). Reasonable costs include the costs of obtaining medical records and expert time incurred while working on a case. Fester v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 10-243V, 2013 WL 5367670, at *16 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 27, 2013). When petitioners fail to substantiate a cost item, such as by not providing appropriate documentation to explain the basis for a particular cost, special masters have refrained from paying the cost at issue. See, e.g., Gardner-Cook v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-480V, 2005 WL 6122520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 2005).

Petitioner seeks $11,534.40 in outstanding costs, including the transcript retrieval costs and the work of a single expert—Georges A. Ghacibeh, M.D. Mot. at 3, 41–42. Dr. Ghacibeh prepared two written reports and submitted an invoice reflecting a total of $11,500.00 (23 hours of work billed at an hourly rate of $500.00) charged to the matter. Id. at 42. This rate is acceptable for the relevant expert, and I deem the work performed on the case to have been reasonable in amount. I will therefore grant this category of costs in its entirety.

Petitioner also seeks $833.76 in unreimbursed litigation costs, including the filing fee and medical record retrieval costs. Id. at 2, 24–39. Such costs are typical in Program cases, were reasonably incurred in this matter, and are not duplicative sums billed by Petitioner’s counsel. These costs are thus appropriately included in this award.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of a final fees award, I GRANT Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs in its entirety. Petitioner is awarded a total amount of $74,670.41, reflecting (a) $73,836.65 in attorney’s fees and costs; and (b) $833.76 in Petitioner’s unreimbursed litigation costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of the Court SHALL ENTER JUDMENT in accordance with the terms of this Decision. 6

IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master