Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: June 30, 2026

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * SHELLE JOHNSON, *

* Petitioner, * No. 18-410V

* v. * Special Master Young

* SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

* Respondent. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * Courtney Christine Jorgenson, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.

Nina Ren, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1 On March 19, 2018, Shelle Johnson (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation pursuant to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2018)2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”). Pet., ECF No. 1. that the influenza (“flu”) vaccine Petitioner received on September 28, 2016, caused her to suffer from transverse myelitis (“TM”) and subsequent “medical issues as a result of her [TM], including lack of mobility, tingling in her feet bilaterally, and weakness of her lower extremity.”. Id. at 1. On June 17, 2025, I issued my decision denying entitlement and dismissing the petition. ECF No. 72.

On June 30, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs, requesting $57,696.26 in interim fees and costs. ECF No. 67. On January 19, 2022, Petitioner’s motion was granted in part, and she was awarded $54,101.41 in interim attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 75.

On December 16, 2025, Petitioner filed a final motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Pet’r’s Mot. for AFC, ECF No. 80. Petitioner requests total attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $7,921.40, representing $7,912.00 in attorneys’ fees and $9.40 in attorneys’ costs. Id. at 2. Petitioner states that she did not personally incur any fees or costs related to the prosecution of her petition. Id. at 2. Respondent responded to the motion on December 17, 2025, stating that Respondent “defers to the court regarding whether the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case” and asking the Court to “exercise its discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Resp’t’s Resp. at 2, 4-5 (ECF No. 82). Petitioner did not file a reply. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

I. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs.” § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of her or her claim, the award of attorneys' fees is automatic. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2013). However, a petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1). Here, although the petition was eventually dismissed, I am satisfied that good faith and reasonable basis have been met in the instant case. Respondent offered no opinion on whether the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs have been met in this case. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to a final award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

The Federal Circuit has approved the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008). This is a two-step process. Id. First, a court determines an “initial estimate . . . by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Second, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on specific findings. Id. at 1348.

It is “well within the special master’s discretion” to determine the reasonableness of fees. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521–22 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991). (“[T]he reviewing court must grant the special master wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.”). Applications for attorneys’ fees must include contemporaneous and specific billing records that indicate the work performed and the number of hours spent on said work. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008). Such applications, however, should not include hours that are “‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

Reasonable hourly rates are determined by looking at the “prevailing market rate” in the relevant community. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. The “prevailing market rate” is akin to the rate “in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 895, n.11. Petitioners bear the burden of providing adequate evidence to prove that the requested hourly rate is reasonable. Id.

A. Reasonable Hourly Rates The decision in McCulloch provides a framework for consideration of appropriate ranges for attorneys’ fees based upon the experience of the practicing attorney. McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015), motion for recons. denied, 2015 WL 6181910 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 21, 2015). The Court has since updated the McCulloch rates, and the Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedules can be accessed online.3

I have reviewed the hourly rates requested by Petitioner for the work of her counsel at Siri & Glimstad LLP (the billing records indicate that the majority of attorney work was performed by Attorney. Courtney Jorgenson, with supporting work from Attorney John Beaulieu and paralegals). The rates requested for all time billed in 2025 are consistent with what counsel and support staff have previously been awarded for their Vaccine Program work, and I find them to be reasonable herein. See Ex. 39.

B. Reasonable Number of Hours Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

Upon review, I find the overall hours billed to be reasonable. However, I have identified several billing entries reflecting tasks considered administrative in nature. The non-compensable tasks include updating files and filing documents. See Ex. 39. Further, most of the entries for filing were included with other tasks. Because this constitutes block billing, it is impossible to discern how much time was spent on compensable versus non-compensable tasks. See id. Therefore, I find a 10% reduction reasonable. This results in a reduction of $791.20.

Petitioner is therefore awarded final attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,120.80. C. Costs Like attorneys’ fees, a request for reimbursement of attorneys’ costs must be reasonable. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (Fed. Cl. 1992). Petitioner requests a total of $9.40 in attorneys’ costs comprised of PACER fees. See Ex. 39 at 7, Ex. 40. Petitioner has provided adequate documentation for all claimed expenses, and they appear reasonable in my experience. Accordingly, Petitioner is awarded the full amount of costs sought.

II. Conclusion In accordance with the Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §15(e) (2018), I have reviewed the billing records and costs in this case and find that Petitioner’s request for fees and costs is reasonable. Based on the above analysis, I find that it is reasonable to compensate Petitioner and her counsel as follows:

Attorneys’ Fees Requested $7,912.00 (Reduction of Fees) ($791.20) Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded $7,120.80 Attorneys’ Costs Requested $9.40 (Reduction of Costs) - Total Attorneys’ Costs Awarded $9.40 Total Attorneys’ Fees and Costs $7,130.20

Accordingly, I award Petitioner a lump sum in the amount of $7,130.20, representing reimbursement for Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to Petitioner’s counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment herewith.4

IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Herbrina D. S. Young Herbrina D. S. Young Special Master