United States v. Mendoza-Trujillo
United States v. Mendoza-Trujillo
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
This order grants Javier Mendoza-Trujillo’s Motion to Suppress.
Table of Contents Table of Contents.1209 FINDINGS OF FACT.1210 Incident and First Contact with Officers .1210 Transport to Police Station.1211 Placement in Interview Room.1212 First Interview Segment.1212 Execution of Consent to Search Cell Phone.1213 Bathroom Break ..1215 Execution of Consent to Enter House for Cell Phone .1216 Execution of Third Consent Form.1217 In Forensics.1217 Execution of Fourth Consent Form.1218 Victim Advocates.1219 Search of the Home. 1219 Resumption of Interviews.1220 DISCUSSION.!.1221 I.Mr. Mendoza-Trujillo Was Illegally Seized.'..1221 A. Legal Framework.1221 B. Javier Mendoza-Trujillo Was Illegally Seized.■.1225 II.No Break in the Chain of Events Validates the Consent Forms.1229 A. The Consents to Search Were Executed in the Same Time Frame as the Illegal Seizure.1230 B. No Circumstance Intervened Between the Illegal Seizure and the Consent Form Signatures .1230 C. The Purpose and Flagrancy of the Official Misconduct Show No Break.1231 III.Examined Independently of the Seizure, the Consents Were Not Voluntary.1232 A. Javier Was Not Informed of His Right to Refuse Consent.1233 B. Javier Was Not Generally Cooperative.1234
FINDINGS OF FACT
Incident and First Contact with Officers
In the early morning hours of October 30, 2013, three armed men confronted Ismael Mendoza-Trujillo in the driveway of his brother Javier’s residence at 7133 West Chula Vista Drive in West Valley City, Utah.
Javier and Ismael engaged the assailant, trying to wrestle away the pistol.
The Major Crimes detective, Detective Stanworth, testified to the proper protocol when responding to a home invasion type of crime where one party is seriously injured:
At the time Javier’s house was being processed by the forensics team, the focus of the police investigation was to ascertain who the two escaping assailants were, who the injured assailant was, and simply to determine what had just happened.
Transport to Police Station
The five adults (Javier, Ismael, Maria, and the two tenants in the basement apartment) were told they needed to go to the police station.
Javier was taken to the police station by Officer Cowan.
Upon arriving at the police station, all five adults were kept separated to prevent their respective testimony from being tainted by someone else’s perception.
Placement in Interview Room
Javier arrived at the West Valley City police station at 7:58 a.m.
First Interview Segment
Detective Pittman testified his original intent when he started interviewing Javier was for the purpose of investigating the home invasion robbery.
Detective Pittman refused to believe this was simply a random home robbery, stating his personal belief the armed assailant “was looking for something.”
Execution of Consent to Search Cell Phone
After a discussion about Javier’s wallet, how Detective Pittman was paid by check and not in cash, and whether or not Javier had contraband in his house,
Q. Okay. I want — what I want to do is two things. First I want to get the information off your cell phone like that picture or a text or a history of the calls, things like that so I can verify if you are telling me the truth. Okay, of this case.
A. Yes.
Q. Can I do it? You can say no to me. I’m just asking you permission to do it.
A. Okay.
Q. Can I do it?
A. Like all this, are you going to arrest me for having hit him?
Q. No, no, no, no. You are a victim. Why would I arrest?68
Detective Pittman told Javier “No, no, no, no. You are a victim.”
Q (Pittman): Also, I have to verify what you told me, so then one of those verifications is I want to see inside your cell phone to see if have the picture. I want this picture. And you told me that you never made a call after. I want to verify that. I want to verify that you didn’t do a text or made any calls saying, hey, I hit this guy and I was going to kill him or something like that.
I want to verify because when we go to court, that guy, I want to talk to the judge to tell, no, he told me the truth. He told me he didn’t do a text, and there is not a text. He told me he didn’t do a phone call, and there is not a call. He told me that he took a picture and, yes, there was a picture. Well, okay. Is that fine?
A (Javier): But right now what are you going to do with me? Are you detaining me?
Q: You?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Once we finished talking, you can go back to your house.
A: But I do feel like if I were—
Detective Pittman continued to interview Javier, asking why Javier was the victim of this home invasion.
Detective Pittman returned to the issue of the phone, repeating his request for Javier’s consent to “look inside your cell phone for pictures to see if you did texts or made any calls after.”
Detective Pittman then had Javier complete specific lines
The consent form was executed at 1133.
Bathroom Break
Detective Pittman told Javier he could use the restroom, and then stepped out of the room.
Execution of Consent to Enter House for Cell Phone
Detective Pittman reentered the interview room at approximately 12:31:41.
The statement about the absence of officers at the home is inconsistent with the other facts developed at the hearing. Detective Sean McCarthy received a call around 10:00-10:15 a.m. and he arrived at Javier’s residence around 11:00 a.m.
In answer to Detective Pittman’s request to enter the house to look for the cell phone, Javier repeatedly responded “whatever you want.”
Javier asked then about a drink of water, photographing his injuries, and food.
Javier mentioned wanting to take a shower, and wanted to know if Detective Pittman would be taking him home, or if
Execution of Third Consent Form
Detective Pittman reentered the interview room at approximately 13:ll:40.
Javier had asked for water earlier,
In Forensics
At approximately 13:21:57,
While waiting for the fingerprints, DNA sample and photographs, Detective Pittman kept talking to Javier, “again, talking about why he thought someone would break into his residence and rob him.”
Execution of Fourth Consent Form
As a result of Detective Pittman’s continuing interview of Javier at forensics, a fourth consent to search was presented.
This fourth consent to search asked for Javier’s permission to search Javier’s residence for a cell phone, items used in the assault, drugs, and money.
Javier testified that prior to signing the fourth consent to search, he asked to speak to an attorney.
After Javier filled out the fourth consent to search, Detective Pittman handed the consent form to Detective Dowland, who was also, inside the forensics area
Detective Dowland and others were going to perform the “consent search to retrieve the phone and look for other evidence in the assault and for the motive behind the home invasion being possibly drugs, money, or whatever else, whatever reason it was for the home invasion.”
Victim Advocates
After Javier had been processed at forensics, Detective Pittman offered to walk Javier, Ismael, and Maria to the victim advocates.
Search of the Home
Around 3:00 p.m., Detective Dowland and Lieutenant McClennon arrived at Javier’s residence.
Resumption of Interviews
Approximately ten (10) minutes after Detective Pittman left Javier, Ismael, and Maria with the victim advocates, Detective Pittman received a phone call from Detective Dowland.
Detective Pittman told Javier “the other detectives ... called ... and they said that they found things; drugs, money inside the clothes here in the house.”
Detective Pittman then left the interview room at 14:54:22.
DISCUSSION
This order finds that Mr. Mendoza-Trujillo was illegally seized and held in custody, and that all evidence which was obtained as a result of that illegal seizure must be suppressed, including evidence obtained from searches which were conducted based upon consent given during and as a result of the illegal seizures. The legal conclusions regarding voluntariness of the consent forms are provided in the alternative.
I. Mr. Mendoza-Trujillo Was Illegally Seized
A. Legal Framework
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
Whether “a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”
Prior to Terry, seizures of persons were analyzed in terms of arrest, for which “the requirement of probable cause ... was treated as absolute.”
Beyond narrowly . defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures, any other seizure of any individual is deemed an arrest and “must be supported by the “long-prevailing standards” of probable
Not every police-citizen encounter is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The variety and circumstances of police-citizen interactions are too numerous and varied to be listed or specifically defined. Courts must consider the particulars of each case while retaining “their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”
The Tenth Circuit recognizes three types of police-citizen encounters:
(1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration and must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrest, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and reasonable only if supported by probable cause.203
In evaluating whether a person has been seized, courts consider several factors, including:
(1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the brandishing of a weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching by an officer; (4) aggressive language or tone of voice by an officer indicating compliance is compulsory; (5) prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects; (6) a request to accompany the officer to the police station; (7) interaction in a small, enclosed, or non-public place; and (8) absence of other members of the public.204
Of course, whether or not the individual was told by the officers he was free to leave is also relevant.
While not conclusive, the “strong presence of two or three factors may be sufficient to support the conclusion a seizure occurred.”
A detention can start out consensual or investigative and quickly transform into an arrest,
No bright-line rule exists to determine precisely when a police encounter transforms from something consensual or legitimately investigative to a de facto arrest. While the inquiry is case-specific, courts examine whether the investigative detention was “(1) justified at its inception, and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
Transportation Has Great Significance
In some instances, the police-citizen encounter exceeds the “permissible limits of those temporary seizures.”
Retention of Identification is Significant
In the context of a traffic stop, the Tenth Circuit applies a bright-line rule that a detention may not be deemed consensual unless the driver’s documents have been returned to him.
Length of Detention is Significant
The Supreme Court has stated that investigative detentions that are not based on probable cause must be supported by “reasonable suspicion” and must be “brief.” For example, Terry v. Ohio
In this case, Javier was not briefly detained, but was- held for hours, under circumstances indistinguishable from an arrest. The nature of the intrusion was great, and not “carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it.”
Witness Status Is Not Significant
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures applies whether the individual is deemed a suspect or á witness. “Witness detentions are confined to the type of brief stops that interfere only minimally with liberty.”
B. Javier Mendoza-Trujillo Was Illegally Seized
Javier was seized in direct contravention of the Fourth Amendment when he was forced into the back of a police car for transport to the police station. The Supreme Court has “never ‘sustained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to the police station and his detention there for investigative purposes ... absent probable cause or judicial intervention.’ ”
Previously, Detective Pittman was asked to inform Javier that he “needed” to go back to the police station to be interviewed regarding the home invasion.
Officer Cowan was responsible for taking Javier from his house to the police station.
Prior to leaving the house, but after Javier had been locked in Officer Cowan’s car,
The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting the existence of probable cause at the time Javier was confined and transported. Javier’s “detention was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest and therefore required probable cause or judicial intervention to be legal.”
The seizure continued and was made even more severe once Javier arrived at the police station. When he first was delivered to the police station, Javier was escorted by Officer Cowan to the third floor break room.
As the Supreme Court noted in Kaupp, “[i]t cannot seriously be suggested that when the detectives began to question Kaupp, a reasonable person in his situation would have thought he was sitting in an interview room as a matter of choice, free to change his mind and go home to bed.”
The Seizure Was Not an Investigative Detention
An individual may not be “detained even momentarily without reasonable objective grounds for doing so.”
In this case, police officers not only lacked probable cause, but also lacked the lower threshold of reasonable suspicion to detain Javier, even briefly, at the police station. When Javier was placed in the back of the police car, he was not a suspect in a crime.
The length of time that Javier was detained further supports the finding of an unlawful seizure rather than an investigative detention. Similar to the instant matter, in Leveto v. Lapina,
Here, Javier was held in custody for a minimum of seven hours. He was taken into custody at approximately 7:40 a.m., and then held isolated in a small interview room where he was interrogated for nearly six hours. No members of the public were in the interview room. No other police officers were in the interview room.
The interview began in an accusatory nature, as Detective Pittman told Javier “Don’t give me lies”
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, including Detective Pittman’s unequivocal lack of probable cause, the extreme length of time Javier was detained, the conditions of Javier’s detention (isolated from the public, subjected to aggressive and persistent interrogation, and deprived of food), and the lack of law enforcement interests served by the detention, it is clear Javier was unlawfully seized, and not in an investigative detention, until being left at the victim advocate’s office.
II. No Break in the Chain of Events Validates the Consent Forms
Javier was subjected to a warrantless arrest without probable cause and therefore seized in direct contravention of the Fourth Amendment. The illegal seizure continued for several more hours after Javier arrived at the police station.
The next question is whether, in light of the unconstitutional seizure, any consents to search or any statements given by Javier were sufficiently purged of the taint of the illegal seizure. If the consents or statements were not sufficiently purged of the taint of illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the searches must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
“It is settled law that a confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.”
When an individual is illegally detained or arrested, any evidence flowing from the unlawful seizure must be suppressed unless obtained via an “act of free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint
The government bears the burden of proof to establish that there was a “break in the causal connection between the illegality and evidence thereby obtained” and that “consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.”
A. The Consents to Search Were Executed in the Same Time Frame as the Illegal Seizure
By the time Javier signed the first consent to search form at 1133,
B. No Circumstance Intervened Between the Illegal Seizure and the Consent Form Signatures
As succinctly set forth in the preceding paragraph, the facts do not evidence any intervening circumstance or attenuation between when Javier was illegally arrested and when he signed the first consent to search form. Nothing happened to “create a discontinuity between the illegal seizure and the consent such that the original illegality [was] weakened and attenuated.”
In some cases, carefully explaining a consent form and advising an individual of the right to withhold consent may create an intervening circumstance.
C. The Purpose and Flagrancy of the Official Misconduct Show No Break
The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is the last factor in determining whether a break exists. “[Pjurposeful and flagrant misconduct is generally found where: ‘(1) the impropriety of the official’s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope something might turn up.’ ”
Detective Pittman claimed that when he began his interviews, “there was no speculation of drugs. [He] was trying to find a reason why these people did what they did to Javier and his family.”
Q. So you thought the home invasion robbery might be connected to some other crime; is that right; when you began interviewing all of the adult witnesses?
A No.
Q. You’re just trying to figure out, but you can’t look to anything specifically and say, hey, there’s a reason why I believe that there is some other crime or activity going on in this home.
A. I had no idea what was going on and why they picked that house.
Q. Okay. And based on the interviews that you conducted with all of the three adult individuals at the station you didn’t get any information that there was drugs or a large amount of currency in the home; correct?
A. No. Until later on. In the preliminary interviews, no.
Q. Until later on, until a search was done at the home.
A. Yeah. Until I talked to Javier the second time.
Q. And that was after a search had been done at the home.
A. Correct.304
Detective Pittman’s admitted lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, coupled with the illegal arrest, leads to the inescapable conclusion that Detective Pittman was on a “fishing expedition in the hope that something might turn up.”
But Detective Pittman’s testimony also shows that he was suspicious of criminal activity — without any articulable basis— from the start. Detective Pittman refused to believe this was simply a random home robbery, stating his personal belief that the armed assailant “was looking for some
Detective Pittman’s conduct in detaining Javier for no articulable reason is flagrant, as are his inconsistent explanations of a lack of investigative purpose directed at Javier and a belief that drugs were involved.
Summary
The facts demonstrate that no causal break or attenuation existed between Javier’s illegal arrest and when Javier signed all four of the consents to search. There were no intervening circumstances to separate Javier’s illegal seizure from his signing of any of the consents to search. Finally, in all four situations, Detective Pittman’s questions constituted purposeful and flagrant misconduct, designed to coerce Javier into signing the consent forms.
III. Examined Independently of the Seizure, the Consents Were Not Voluntary
Even if the. prolonged detention of Javier did not invalidate the consents, an independent examination of the circumstances surrounding the consent forms shows that consent was involuntary.
The government’s recitation of factors to be considered when evaluating the volun-tariness of consent is correct.
physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressive tone, the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defendant, the number of officers on the scene, and the display of police weapons. Whether an officer*1233 reads a defendant his Miranda rights, obtains consent pursuant to a claim of lawful authority, or informs a defendant of his or her right to refuse consent are also factors to consider in determining whether consent given was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.316
The government also correctly suggests that relevant factors may include the length of detention and questioning, the extent of the suspect’s cooperation with police, and the suspect’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.
A. Javier Was Not Informed of His Right to Refuse Consent
The record does not support a finding that Javier was informed of his right to refuse consent to the search of his house. The video record does not show this right was ever explained to him except briefly very early in the interrogation. When the first consent to search the cell phone was discussed, thirty minutes before the form was signed, Detective Pittman said “You can say no.”
A. But I did explain to him to the best of my ability in Spanish that he could tell us no, that this was a consent. It was his own free will giving us permission to enter the residence, and he could tell us no.
Q. And after that explanation he signed the consent?
A. Yes, he did.319
Except foi* the first consent to search, Javier was never told he could refuse consent — and the circumstances surrounding the first consent do not clearly demonstrate Javier was informed he could withhold consent as it pertained to the search of his cell phone. In light of the failure to adequately explain the right to withhold consent in the three prior videotaped discussions of the form, Detective Pittman’s testimony that he explained this right in the one other instance is not credible. He is likely recalling his few words said early in the discussion about the first form. He embellishes, however, in this instance saying that h'é also informed Javier that this was a consent, and that it was his own free will. This is more than he explained in the first video-taped instance, and striking in the absence of any explanation of a right to consent when the second and third consent forms were presented, explained and signed.
The government suggests that the consent to search form contains clear and unequivocal language stating that the subject has a constitutional right to refuse permission to search. But the form is in English. At the hearing, the government elicited the following testimony from Javier:
Q: Do you read some English?
A: No.
Q: None?
A: I understand a little, but no, no.320
B. Javier Was Not Generally Cooperative
The government contends further evidence of voluntariness is that Javier was generally cooperative with police.
C. Coercive Tactics Were Used
While the government contends no coercive tactics were used, Detective Pittman used many of the psychologically coercive tactics identified in Miranda:
taking an individual out of his home and removing him to an unfamiliar and isolated location;323
patient and persistent, and at times, relentless questioning; and324
offering legal excuses for his actions to eventually obtain an admission of guilt.325
One example of Detective Pittman’s conduct from Javier’s illegal seizure and interrogation highlights this latter technique:
“They were waiting for you. I want to know why. Wait. When something like this happens, they happen for a reason. They are not just band members that are passing by a house and they say, “Hey, let’s go rob this house.”
This is not what happened. Okay. I believe they were looking for something because when this guy came in the house, he went directly to your bedroom, your wife’s and your bedroom. He was looking for something. He believed there was something inside house. I don’t know what you guys do. I am not going to investigate if you do something illegal.”326
This type of questioning occurred throughout the multiple hours Javier was detained at the police station.
D.Other Factors Do Not Suggest Consent
The government is, however, correct in asserting there was no use or display of force; that Javier Mendoza-Trujillo did not display intellectual or educational deficiencies; and in claiming the neutrality of
However, even if the consents were sufficiently purged of the taint of the illegal arrest, a finding of voluntariness would not be supported. Javier was not informed of his right to refuse consent. Javier was not given the opportunity to read the consent to search form, in English or Spanish. There is no indication Javier was independently cooperative with police; rather the record supports a finding that Javier was merely complying with what he thought was a lawful directive. The length of Javier’s illegal arrest and ensuing custodial interrogation was excessive. Coercive tactics were used throughout the entirety of Javier’s prolonged, unlawful seizure. The facts that Javier seemed to possess his mental faculties, the interview was conducted in Spanish, and Detective Pittman did not make a show of force do not outweigh these factors which show that Javier’s consent was not voluntary.
CONCLUSION
Javier Mendoza-Trujillo was subjected to an illegal, warrantless arrest that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The police lacked probable cause or judicial intervention in the form of a warrant when they transported Javier away from his home to the police station in the back of a patrol car. If not at the time of transport, the seizure clearly became illegal when he was controlled, isolated and retained for such a long period of time in a transparent attempt to obtain evidence of his criminal activity without a basis for his detention.
While illegally detained, Javier signed four discrete consents to search. The only way the fruits of such searches would be admissible is if the government first shows a sufficient attenuation or break in the causal connection between the illegal detention and the arrest, and then that consent was voluntary.
Further, when examined apart from the seizure, the consents were not signed voluntarily. Accordingly, any and all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful detention and arrest of Javier and the resultant consents is and shall be suppressed. Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress
. Docket No. 26, amended by Docket No. 41.
. Docket Nos. 52-53.
. Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, docket no. 60, filed July 7, 2014; (Defendant’s proposed) Memorandum Decision and Order, docket no. 61, filed July 28, 2014.
.Minute Entry, docket no. 64, filed August 14, 2014.
. Transcript of evidentiary hearing on Motion to Suppress (“Transcript”), p. 32, lines 16-19, p. 257, lines 16-18, p. 258, lines 6-15, docket nos. 56 and 63, filed June 12, 2014 and August 7, 2014, respectively.
. Transcript, p. 32, lines 11-15, p. 62, lines 1-2, p. 212, lines 3-4, p. 259, lines 13-14; Exhibit BB, p. 17, lines 14-18.
. Exhibit BB, p. 3, lines 11-15, p. 18, lines 9-12; Transcript p. 62, line 3.
. Transcript, p. 258, lines 9-25, p. 259, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 17, lines 17-19.
. Transcript p. 17, lines 12-23; Transcript, p. 48, lines 2-17; Transcript p. 258, line 24— p. 259, line 4.
. Transcript, p. 278, lines 21-25, p. 279, lines 1-5.
. Exhibit BB, p. 3, lines 15-16, p. 4, lines 1-3.
. Transcript, p. 62, lines 7-8, p. 212, lines 16-18; Exhibit BB, p. 18, lines 16-22.
. Transcript, p. 41, lines 12-13, p. 62, lines 8-10, p. 212, lines 13-15.
. Exhibit BB, p. 4, lines 10-23.
. Exhibit BB, p. 6, lines 21-23; Transcript, p. 50, lines 12-14, p. 260, line 18.
. Exhibit BB, p. 8, lines 21-25, p. 20, lines 4-10, p. 22, lines 11-25, p. 23, lines 1-2; Transcript, p. 259, line 22.
. Transcript, p. 18, lines 14-16, p. 258, lines 9-16, p. 259, lines 1-2.
. Transcript, p. 1824-25, p. 19, lines 1-8, p. 42, lines 3-9.
. Transcript, p. 201, lines 4-10.
. Transcript, p. 201, lines 17-25, p. 202, lines 1-6.
. Transcript, p. 16, lines 15-25, p. 36, lines 21-25, p. 98, lines 13-15.
. Transcript, p. 138, lines 12-16.
. Transcript, p. 16, lines 23-25.
. Transcript, p. 19, lines 15-18, p. 20, lines 1-13.
. Transcript, p. 23, lines 11-12.
. Transcript, p. 23, lines 13-19.
. Transcript, p. 20, lines 19-25.
. Transcript, p. 29, lines 7-10.
. Transcript, p. 24, line 24 to p. 25, line 3.
. Transcript, p. 25, lines 4-7.
. Transcript, p. 281, lines 22-25, p. 282, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 39, lines 5-6. See also Transcript, p. 44, lines 2-6.
. Transcript, p. 203, lines 20-22.
.' Transcript, p. 204, lines 11-16.
. Transcript, p. 204, lines 17-21c.
. Transcript, p. 205, lines 1-7.
. Transcript, p. 205, lines 10-15.
. Transcript, p. 24, lines 1-7.
. Transcript, p. 25, lines 8-18, p. 43, lines 1-8.
. Transcript, p. 26, lines 6-8, p. 38, lines 3-5.
. Transcript, p. 310, line 11.
. The video recording is Exhibit AA. It has captions in English. The transcript of the video in English is Exhibit BB. The times on the video are different than the times indicat-; ed on the paper exhibits as evidenced by comparing the documents and the video time-stamp. Detective Pittman explained the anachronism between the documents and the video, as Detective Pittman used his iPhone for the time. Transcript, p. 95, lines 17-25, p. 96, lines 1-25, p. 97, lines 1-7.
. Transcript, p. 60, lines 2-4.
. Exhibit AA; Transcript, p. 45, lines 17-24.
. Transcript, p. 30, lines 3-5, p. 207, line 25, p. 208, lines 1-3, p. 225, lines 22-25, p. 226, line 1, p. 252, lines 19-25, p. 253, lines 1-4, p. 264, lines 16-25, p. 265, lines 1-8, p. 282, lines 24-25, p. 283, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 68, lines 8-10.
. Transcript, p. 137, lines 3-4.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA, 10:33:05-25, 153847-154453, 01:25:34-54; Exhibit BB, p. 2, lines 23-25, p. 3, lines 1-2.
. Exhibit BB, pp. 3-11, pp. 13-16, pp. 22-23.
. Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 16-20, p. 38, line 14.
. Exhibit AA, 10:57:37-58:01, 197970-198692, 1:50:06-30; Exhibit BB, p. 27, lines 12-13.
. Exhibit AA, 10:57:37-58:01, 197970-198692, 1:50:06-30; Exhibit BB, p. 27, lines 14-15.
. Exhibit AA, 10:59:45, 201810, 01:52:14; Exhibit BB, p. 28, line 22.
. Exhibit AA, 10:59:34-68, 501464-589, 1:52:02-07; Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 15-17. See also Exhibit BB, p. 29, lines 21-24, p. 30, lines 9-10.
. Exhibit AA, 11:01:53-56, 205637-748, 01:54:22-25; Exhibit BB, p. 30, line 9, p. 31, line 9.
. Exhibit AA, 11:01:53-56, 205637-748, 01:54:22-25; Exhibit BB, p. 30, line 10, p. 31, line 10.
. Exhibit AA, 11:01:56-04:17, 205748-209974, 01:54:24-56:46; Exhibit BB, p. 30, lines 11-25, p. 31, lines 1-3.
. Exhibit AA, 11:04:23, 210149, 01:56:52; Exhibit BB, p. 32, lines 21-23.
. Exhibit AA, 11:04:29, 210308, 01:56:57; Exhibit BB, p. 32, lines 24-25.
. Exhibit AA, 11:04:29-34, 210328-462, 01:56:58-57:03; Exhibit BB, p. 33, line 1.
. Exhibit AA, 11:04:29-34, 210328-462, 01:56:58-57:03; Exhibit BB, p. 33, line 3.
. Exhibit AA, 11:04:39-45, 210618-797, 01:57:08-14; Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 6-12.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:04-31, 211358-212164, 01:57:33-59; Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 17-21.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:26, 212016, 01:57:54; ' Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 23-25.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:34, 212281, 01:58:03; Exhibit BB, p. 34, lines 2-3.
. Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 17-25, p. 34, lines 1-5.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:38, 323396, 01:58:07; Exhibit BB, p. 34, line 4.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:50, 212743, 01:58:19; Exhibit BB, p. 34, lines 8-11.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:52-07:13, 212807-215220, 01:58:21-59:41; Exhibit BB, p. 34, lines 19-25, p. 35, lines 1-8.
. Exhibit AA, 11:05:52-07:27, 212807-215657, 01:58:21-59:59; Exhibit BB, p. 34, lines 19-25, p. 35, lines 1-15.
. Exhibit BB, p. 35-38.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:11, 224175, 02:04:40; Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 4-5.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:44, 225169, 02:05:13; Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 12-13.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:48, 225265, 02:05:17; Exhibit BB, p. 38, line 14.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:55-13:02, 225477-225700, 02:05:24-31; Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 15-18.
. Exhibit AA, 11:13:04, 225741, 02:05:32; Exhibit BB, p. 38, line 19.
. Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 20-25, p. 39, lines 1-23.
. Exhibit BB, p. 40, lines 4-6.
. Exhibit AA, 11:15:00-22, 229242-899, 02:0729-51; Exhibit BB, p. 40, lines 6-8;Transcript, p. 40, lines 7-8.
. Exhibit AA, 11:15:32, 230200, 02:08:01; Exhibit BB, p. 40, lines 8-9; Exhibit AA, 11:16:59, 232811, 02:09:28; Exhibit BB, p. 41, lines 9-11.
. Exhibit 1; Transcript, p. 74, line 25, p. 75, lines 1-13.
. Exhibit BB, p. 40, lines 10-25, p. 41, lines 1-9, 13-25.
. Exhibit AA.
. Id.
. Exhibit 1. See n. 43, supra, for an explanation of this different time format.
. Exhibit AA, 11:17:48-18:21, 234276-235245, 02:10:17-50; Exhibit BB, p. 41, lines 13-20.
. Exhibit AA, 11:18:22-25, 235277-362, 02:10:51-53; Exhibit BB, p. 41, lines 21-25.
. Exhibit AA, 11:18:22-25, ’235277-362, 02:10:51-53; Exhibit BB, p. 41, lines 23-25.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Transcript, p. 71, lines 4-12.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit BB, p. 42, lines 2-12.
. Exhibit 1; Exhibit BB, p. 42, line 11.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA, 12:31:52, 367462, 03:24:21; Exhibit BB, p. 43, lines 11-12.
. Exhibit AA, 12:31:52-32:08, 367462-926, 03:24:21-37; Exhibit BB, p. 43, lines 12-15; Transcript, p. 75, lines 23-25, p. 76, lines 1-3.
. Transcript, p. 147, lines 14 — 15.
. Transcript, p. 147, lines 18-24.
. Transcript, p. 150, lines 2-3.
. Transcript, p. 253, lines 16-23.
. Exhibit AA, 12:32:34-57,368712-369414, 03:25:03-26; Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 3-4, line 12.
. Exhibit AA, 12:33:13, 369897, 03:25:42; Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 17-18.
. Exhibit AA, 12:33:17-21, 369993-370114, 03:25:45-50; Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 19-21.
. Exhibit AA, 12:33:32-34:06, 370466-371463, 03:26:01-35; Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 24-25, p. 45, lines 1-9; Transcript, p. 130, lines 21-25, p. 131, lines 1-5.
. Exhibit AA, 12:34:08-10, 371547-868, 03:26:38-48; Exhibit BB, p. 45, lines 10-13.
. Exhibit BB, p. 45, lines 19-20.
. Exhibit 2.
. Exhibit AA, 12:35:00, 373092, 03:27:29; Exhibit BB, p. 45, lines 17-18.
. Exhibit 2.
. Exhibit AA, 12:35:27-45,373914-374451, 03:27:56-28:14; Exhibit BB, p. 46, line 1-5.
. Exhibit AA, 12:35:48, 374521, 03:28:17; Exhibit BB, p. 46, lines 6-7.
. Exhibit AA, 12:35:51-36:16, 374620-375376, 03:28:20-45; Exhibit BB, p. 46, lines 8-16.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA, 13:12:44-13:43, 440965-442725, 04:05:14-06:12; Exhibit BB, p. 47, lines 16-25, p. 48, lines 1-19; Transcript, p. 77, lines 10-13.
. Exhibit 3.
. Exhibit AA, 13:14:55, 444881, 04:07:24; Exhibit BB, p. 48, line 25, p. 49, line 1.
. Exhibit 3.
. Exhibit AA, 13:15:43-16:13, 446329-447208, 04:08:13-42; Exhibit BB, p. 49, lines 8-9.
. Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 24-25.
. Exhibit AA, 13:15:43-16:13, 446329-447208, 04:08:13-42; Exhibit BB, p. 49, lines 11-12.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit AA-1.
. Exhibit BB, p. 49, lines 17-24.
. Transcript, p. 127, lines 7-8, 18-24.
. Transcript, p. 58, lines 17-19.
. Transcript, p. 81, lines 24-25, p. 82, lines 1-4.
. Transcript, p. 80, lines 8-10.
. Transcript, p. 80, lines 12-13.
. Transcript, p. 80, line 15.
. Transcript, p. 80, lines 15-20.
. Transcript, p. 82, lines 7-11.
. Transcript, p. 79, lines 21-24, p. 82, lines 5-12.
. Transcript, p. 122, lines 8-11.
. Transcript, p. 122, lines 24-25.
. Transcript, p. 122, lines 12-17, p. 137, lines 6-12.
. Exhibit 4; Transcript, p. 80, lines 23-25, p. 81, lines 4-5.
. Transcript, p. 283, lines 20-22.
. Transcript, p. 283, lines 23-25.
. Transcript, p. 284, lines 1-3.
. Transcript, p. 289, lines 15-23; Exhibit BB, p. 33, line 23.
. Transcript, p. 284, lines 17-19.
. Transcript, p. 284, lines 20-23, p. 296, lines 12-18.
. Transcript, p. 363, lines 23-25; p. 364, lines 16-17.
. [missing text]
. Transcript, p. 137, lines 6-11.
. Transcript, p. 137, lines 12-14.
. Exhibit 4; Transcript, p. 137, lines 10-12.
. Transcript, p. 82, lines 23-25, p. 83, lines 1-2.
. Transcript, p. 119, lines 20-23.
. Transcript, p. 83, lines 16-21.
. Transcript, p. 83, lines 4-8.
. Transcript, p. 84, 12-25, p. 85, lines 1-6.
. Transcript, p. 86, lines 8-14.
. Transcript, p. 86, lines 15-17.
. Transcript, p. 150, lines 7-9.
. Transcript, p. 150, lines 9-10.
. Transcript, p. 150, lines 11-12.
. Transcript, p. 150, lines 22-25, p. 151, lines 1-4.
. Transcript, p. 151, lines 8-10.
.' Transcript, p. 151, lines 11-15.
. Transcript, p. 151, lines 21-25.
. Transcript, p. 152, lines 4-6.
. Transcript, p. 152, lines 6-14.
. Transcript, p. 88, lines 20-21.
. Transcript, p. 88, lines 22-23.
. Transcript, p. 89, lines 4-6.
. Transcript, p. 89, lines 9-13.
. Transcript, p. 89, lines 17-21, p. 90, lines 3-4.
. Exhibit AA-1; Transcript, p. 90, lines 5-7.
. Exhibit BB, p. 50, lines 4-7; Transcript, p. 90, lines 10-12.
. Exhibit BB, p. 50, lines 12-13.
. Exhibit BB, p. 50, line 14; Transcript, p. 90, line 12.
. Exhibit BB, p. 50, lines 15-18.
. Exhibit BB, p. 50, lines 19-25, p. 51, lines 1-2; Transcript, p. 90, lines 13-14.
. Exhibit BB, p. 51, lines 3-4.
. Exhibit BB, p. 51, line 5; Transcript, p. 90, lines 16-19.
. Exhibit AA-1; Exhibit BB, p. 51, line 19; Transcript p. 90, lines 21-22.
. Exhibit BB, p. 51, line 21.
. Transcript, p. 92, lines 5-9.
. Transcript, p. 92, lines 10-12.
. Transcript, p. 93, lines 1-4, p. 94, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 130, lines 11-22.
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quotation omitted).
. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988).
. Id.
. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).
. Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (quotation omitted); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).
. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. Id.
. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
. United States v. Fox, 600 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2010).
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1258 (citing United States v. Rogers, 556 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2009)). See also United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1313 (10th Cir. 2012) (setting forth eight factors to consider when contemplating whether an individual has been seized).
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1258.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1258 (citing Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1138).
. United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2006).
. Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006).
. Id.
. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03, 103 S.Ct 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (what began as consensual inquiry “escalated into investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room,” where defendant was never informed he was free to leave, and as a practical matter, was under arrest).
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868).
. United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002); Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d at 1248 (citing Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010)).
. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994).
. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985).
. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643; United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985).
. United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996).
. United States v. Butler, 223 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (taking individual to police station for questioning is "sufficiently like arrest to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause”).
. Hayes, .470 U.S. at 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643.
. Id. at 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643.
. United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302, 1309 & nn. 7-8 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
. Id. at 1309.
. Id. at 1308.
. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-211, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 211, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
. Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004)).
. Id., 575 F.3d at 1145 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006)).
. Id. at 1146.
. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)).
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843 (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643) (alteration in original); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
. Transcript, p. 39, lines 1-8.
. Transcript, .p. 29, lines 7-10, p. 44, lines 2-6.
. Transcript, p. 281, lines 22-25, p. 282, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 282, line 1.
. Transcript, p. 203, lines 20-21.
. Transcript, p. 204, lines 11-16.
. Transcript, p. 44, lines 2-6.
. Transcript, p. 204, lines 11-23.
. Transcript, p. 205, lines 1-4.
. Transcript, p. 205, line 8.
. Transcript, p. 205, lines 10-25, p. 206, lines 1-3.
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 631, 123 S.Ct. 1843.
. Transcript, p. 206, lines 7-17, p. 282, lines 10-13.
. Transcript, p. 128, lines 11-13, p. 206, lines 18-26, p. 207, lines 1-3.
. Transcript, p. 310, line 11.
. Exhibit BB.
. Transcript, p. 282, lines 14-16.
. Exhibit BB, p. 34, lines 2-11.
. Exhibit BB, p. 35, lines 9-14.
. Exhibit BB, p. 46, lines 1-2.
. Exhibit BB, p. 45, lines 8-11.
. Exhibit BB, p. 44, lines 24-25.
. Exhibit BB, p. 45, lines 1-6.
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 631, 123 S.Ct. 1843.
. United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 2006) (bright-line rule that a stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documentation, i.e., license and proof of insurance, have been returned). See also Felders v. Bairett, 885 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1201 (D.Utah 2012), aff'd,
. See Fox, 600 F.3d at 1258 (one factor suggestive of a non-consensual encounter is if the officer advised the individual he was free to leave).
. Exhibit AA, 11:07:14-18,215262-215373, 01:59:43-46, Exhibit BB, p. 35, lines 10-14.
. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1259.
. Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted).
. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319).
. Transcript, p. 25, lines 8-10.
. Transcript, p. 25, lines 13, 18, p. 43, line 8, p. 118, lines 11-15.
. Transcript, p. 136, lines 6-17.
. Transcript, p. 135, lines 9-12, 25, p. 136, lines 1-5, p. 137, lines 3-4.
. Transcript, p. 136, lines 6-11.
. Transcript, p. 136, lines 12-17.
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843 (alteration in original) (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643). See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (police may not "seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest”); Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643 (police procedures are so intrusive as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth Amendment when police, absent probable cause or a warrant, transport an individual to the police station where he is detained, however briefly, for investigative purposes).
. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643.
. Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 169 (3rd Cir. 2001).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Mat 170.
. Id. at 167.
. United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382).
. Exhibit AA, 10:33:21, 154326, 01:25:50; Exhibit BB, p. 3, lines 1-2.
. Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 15-16, p. 29, lines 24-25, p. 30, lines 7-9, p. 31, line 9.
. Exhibit BB, p. 3, lines 1-2.
. Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 15-16, p. 29, lines 24-25, p. 30, lines 7-9, p. 31, line 9.
. See United States v. Little, 862 F.Supp. 334, 335 (D.N.M. 1994) (accusatory, persistent and intrusive questioning can turn a voluntarily police-citizen encounter into one that is coercive making responses to police inquiries required, not optional) (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382), aff'd United States v. Little, 60 F.3d at 712.
. Exhibit BB, p. 27, lines 14-15, p. 29, lines 24-25, p. 35, lines 22-23.
. Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 8-9, p. 32, line 18, p. 35, line 16, p. 37, line 25, p. 38, lines 3, 5.
. Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 6, 11, p. 30, lines 16, 21, p. 31, lines 7, 22, p. 32, lines 7, 10, p. 35, line 17, p. 37, line 25, p. 38, lines 3, 5.
. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982)).
. United States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319).
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 632, 123 S.Ct. 1843 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407).
. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407).
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1054).
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1259-60, (quoting Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1054); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254.
. Exhibit 1.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1260 (quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996)).
. See United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1012 (10th Cir. 1992) (in addition to many other events creating attenuation, officers carefully explained the consent to search form in suspect's native language as well as advising her of her right to withhold consent).
. Exhibit BB, pp. 32-41.
. Exhibit BB, p. 41, lines 9-11.
. Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 23-24.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1261 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Transcript, p. 137, lines 2-5.
. Transcript, p. 135, lines 9-12, 25, p. 136, lines 1-17.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1262 (quoting United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1994)).
. Exhibit AA, 10:57:37-58:01, 197970-198692, 1:50:06-30; Exhibit BB, p. 27, lines 12-13.
. Exhibit AA, 10:59:45, 201810, 01:52:14; Exhibit BB, p. 28, line 22.
. Exhibit AA, 10:59:34-68, 501464-589, 1:52:02-07; Exhibit BB, p. 28, lines 15-17. See also Exhibit BB, p. 29, lines 21-24, p. 30, lines 9-10.
. Exhibit AA, 11:01:53-56, 205637-748, 01:54:22-25; Exhibit BB, p. 30, line 9, p. 31, line 9.
. Exhibit AA, 11:01:53-56, 205637-748, 01:54:22-25; Exhibit BB, p. 30, line 10, p. 31, line 10.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:11, 224175, 02:04:40; Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 4-5.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:44, 225169, 02:05:13; Exhibit BB, p. 38, lines 12-13.
. Exhibit AA, 11:12:48, 225265, 02:05:17; Exhibit BB, p. 38, line 14.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1261-62.
. Government's Proposed Findings, p. 6.
. United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1318 (10th Cir. 2012); Government’s Proposed Findings, p. 6.
. Government’s Proposed Findings, p. 6.
. Exhibit BB, p. 33, lines 23-25.
. Transcript, p. 81, lines 18-23.
. Transcript, p. 287, lines 4-7.
. Government’s Proposed Findings. P. 9.
. Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 631, 123 S.Ct. 1843 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319).
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-50, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451-52, 455, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451-52, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
. Exhibit BB, p. 27, lines 4-15.
. Exhibit BB, pp. 28-29, pp. 34-35, pp. 36- . 38.
. Fox, 600 F.3d at 1259.
. Docket no. 41, filed May 12, 2014.
. Transcript, p. 364, lines 11-15.
. [missing text]
Reference
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- United States v. Javier MENDOZA-TRUJILLO
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