McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc.
McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order quashing service of process. Affirmed. Costs on appeal to defendant.
Plaintiff alleges injuries from use of defendant’s hair application. She served process on a local television station’s manager on the assumption that he or the station from which defendant, a foreign corporation, purchased advertising time, was either doing the business of or was in charge of defendant’s office or place of business in Utah, within the meaning of that portion of Rule 4 (e) (4), Rules
Defendant paid the local station for time to advertise its product. At the end of its program, a spokesman for the company invited televiewers to place orders by phoning a number flashed on the screen, that of the television station, where such calls were received and the information obtained mailed to the company in Maryland, without any additional charge other than the regular advertising fee. Plaintiff responded to the invitation and in due course received defendant’s product by mail from Maryland, C.O.D.
Plaintiff urges that defendant was (1) doing business in Utah, (2) the television station was its office and (3) service on the station’s manager brought defendant within the jurisdiction of our courts. We cannot agree that defendant was doing business in the sense that subjected it, as a foreign corporation, to such jurisdiction.
To prove plaintiff’s contention, her attorney’s secretary testified that she frequently had seen defendant’s television program, that its spokesman gave a fine talk, suggesting that if he had convinced his listeners that defendant’s product would do what he said it would do, they should call the number which would be flashed on the screen,— that of the television station. She further stated that after plaintiff had sought the advice of her lawyer-employer, and at the latter’s request, she called the television station. In testimony of questionable admissibility, she then asserted that in response to her call a lady answered, who, when asked where the product could be ordered, replied that it would have to be ordered through the television station
Plaintiff leans heavily on Industrial Commission v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 1944, 106 Utah 476, 150 P.2d 373, to support her contention that defendant was “doing business” in Utah, and was subject to our jurisdiction. In that case, decided on the ground that process had been served on the wrong person, as to the matter of “doing business”, this court quoted language from Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 134 F.2d 511, 515, 146 A.L.R. 926, that “very little more than ‘mere solicitation’ is required” to constitute doing business in the jurisdictional sense. This language followed the statement that
“it is * * * clear that if, in addition to a regular course of solicitation, other business activities are carried on, such as maintaining a warehouse, making deliveries, etc., the corporation is ‘present’ for jurisdictional purposes.”
The obvious difference between the Kemmerer case and this, and the reason it is not controlling here, are apparent when one recalls that the coal company maintained and paid for an office in a local building-, had its name painted on the door, listed itself in the phone and building directories, owned furniture and fixtures, operated 3 automobiles here, and had 3 authorized resident agents seeking and doing its business locally, — factually quite dissimilar, and reflecting activities far beyond solicitation only.
In determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business in a state for jurisdictional purposes, each case
This is not to say that in a proper case solicitation plus something else, or use of radio plus something else, could not constitute doing business in the jurisdictional sense, or could not ascribe to such advertising medium the role of process agent under our rules. The test goes to the “something else.” Somewhere a line is to be drawn and the courts judiciously must mark it. To date the pattern, which in a changing world is ever changing, excludes solicitation alone as justifying jurisdiction conferred. Beyond such solicitation the activity to confer jurisdiction must be of sufficient substance and of such scope and variety as would lead a court of last resort to conclude that immunization of the foreign corporation against the power of our forum would be unrealistic, unreasonable and a vehicle for oppressing or meting out injustice to our own local citizens. But to subject foreign corporations to our local jurisdiction without carefully
We think the instant case is one, the type of which does not and should not justify the imposition of our powers on a foreign corporation. We are not unmindful of the hardship and difficulty in requiring a local citizen sometimes to seek a foreign tribunal for redress, nor are we unmindful of the burdens to which a foreign corporation could be put were we too lightly to pit our jurisdiction against it. Our fundamental principles demand protection of the individual, but not unreasonably at the expense of others. The facts-here, we believe, do not fit the authorities
Rule 4(e) (4). “Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for * * *. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 1945, 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95; Goodrich, Handbook of Conflicts of Laws (1949) p. 216.
Industrial Commission v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 106 Utah 476, 150 P. 2d 373; Dahl v. Collette, 202 Minn. 544, 279 N. W. 561; Williams v. Bruice’s Juices, Inc., D. C., 35 F. Supp. 847; Wabash R. R. Co. v. District Court, 109 Utah 526, 167 P. 2d 973.
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 93 Utah 217, 72 P. 2d 466; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 4 Cir., 115 F. 2d 423; Gloeser v. Dollar S. S. Lines, 192 Minn. 376, 256 N. W. 666, 95 A. L. R. 1470; Holloway Material & Supply Co. v. Perfection Oak Flooring Co., 191 Okl. 350, 130 P. 2d 296; People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587; Junior Frocks, Inc., v. District Court, 105 Colo. 82, 94 P. 2d 694.
Concurring Opinion
(concurring in the result).
I concur on the ground that solicitation of business interstate by a foreign corporation by electronic means, where the foreign corporation is not otherwise within this state when the solicitation is made, does not, without more, constitute having an office or place of business within this state, nor is it doing business in this state nor holding itself out as having an office or place of business in this
Concurring Opinion
(concurring in the result).
Because the cases hold that merely advertising for orders to be sent to the office of an advertising medium within this state, to be forwarded to an out of state business concern is not doing business within this state I concur with the result. However, I do not entertain the misgivings expressed in the prevailing opinion that it would be a bad policy to allow a suit by a local resident against the out of state business firm involving claims arising out of such business. It seems to me that the fact that such out of state business firms cannot be sued within this state creates a definite hardship on the local residents.
Reference
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- McGRIFF v. CHARLES ANTELL, Inc. Et Al.
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- Published