State v. Waters
State v. Waters
Opinion of the Court
Defendant, Delbert Waters, waived a jury trial and the court found him guilty of an assault with intent to rape a 15 year old girl, hereinafter called the prosecutrix. He appeals contending that the court’s finding, that all reasonable doubt that the assault was made with intent to commit rape was eliminated, was unreasonable under the evidence. We conclude that such finding was within the bounds of reason, and affirm the judgment.
As soon as they were out, she locked the front door, testifying that she did not lock the back door because she had to leave it open so a chore boy could get in early in the morning. She again turned the lights off and retired, and soon she heard their car drive away and she went to sleep.
A few hours later she was aroused from her sleep by the defendant in her bed embracing her around the waist from behind, with his face pressed against the back of her neck. He was clothed but his pants were unbuttoned and his penis out, and he was trying to press it between her legs. IWhen she tried to remove his hands, he moved them onto her breasts pressing “so hard I could not move” and then down to the lower part of her body under her panties which he tried to remove. She made a desperate effort to remove his hands and he gathered her hands in his and held them firmly for a short period and she raised partly up on her elbow. He remained still and she felt his grasp ease so she took one hand after the other from around her body and when she found that he did not move them back but appeared to have passed out or fallen asleep she darted for the bathroom and locked the door. He made no further move and she slipped into a house coat and in her bare feet ran for a couple of blocks to her uncle and aunt’s place who, after she had aroused them, called the town marshal who in turn after he had found defendant still asleep on her bed called the county sheriff who took the defendant into custody.
Defendant contends that the evidence does not exclude all reasonable doubt of his intention to force intercourse upon her. He relies on State v. Whittinghill, 109 Utah 48, 163 P. 2d 342, quoting extensively from Mr. Justice Turner’s opinion which was not concurred in by the majority of the
Here the facts are different; every conscious act he did after he returned alone to her home indicated that he intended to accomplish intercourse with her by force. He broke into the home where he knew she was alone, he unbuttoned his pants exposing his penis and got into her bed with her while she was asleep and embraced her tightly at the same time trying to force his penis between her legs, and placing his hands on her breasts and privates at the same time trying to remove her panties. This continued until he suddenly, and apparently unexpectedly, passed out or fell asleep. There is nothing in this case which indicates an intention on the part of defendant to voluntarily cease or withdraw from the struggle. Up to the time that she noticed his grip was weakening, he was strong and seemed to be accomplishing his purpose. This case is somewhat similar to the case of People v. Norrington, 55 Cal. App. 103, 202 P. 932, where a policeman started to drive a married woman home who had inquired of him about the street car, but drove her to lonesome road where he tried to force her to have intercourse with him. In the course of the struggle, he had an emission without penetration and on those facts the court held that it was a question of fact for the jury whether he intended to overcome her resistance by force and violence. In that case, as in this one, the defendant ceased the struggle on account of his own physical condition.
We do not question the rule that in order to sustain a conviction for an assault with attempt to commit rape, the Court had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the de
Judgment is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent, respectfully suggesting that the main opinion has confused the necessary intent involved in an assault with intent to commit rape, with a drunken, poor and unsuccessful show of salesmanship. There is no violence here of the type generally attending the serious offense charged, where more than a woman’s feelings are injured. There was no torn clothing, no scratches, lesions or bruises. The only evidence of intent to overpower by force was a roving hand and a firm embrace, — both of which became relaxed when the defendant found himself, not in the arms of the prosecutrix, but in those of Morpheus.
To say the facts of this case justify a conclusion that the acts showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the specific intent to overpower by force, or that his actions were such as to be unexplainable on any reasonable hypothesis other than that of intent to overpower, is, to the writer, unrealistic and not reflected in the record.
It is believed that had the prosecution charged an assault, the facts more nearly would have fitted the offense.' The facts of the Whittinghill case, with its evidence of scratching, bruising and some unnecessary roughness, seem stronger than those here, where the best that can be said is that a firm desire yielded to sweet repose. The accused either was too drunk to have a specific intent to rapé, or too tired to acquire one.
People v. Mullen, . . . Cal. .. ., 114 P. 2d 11 (1941).
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