Bountiful Water Subconservancy District v. Board of Commissioners
Bountiful Water Subconservancy District v. Board of Commissioners
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment declaring that under the provisions of the Water Conservancy Act,
Our Act was passed in 1941. Its purpose generally was declared to be for the development and conservation of the water and land resources of the state for the benefit and advantage of the people of the state, and to effect the greatest possible beneficial use of water. The district boards were empowered to levy an ^ad valorem tax to accomplish their purposes. The Act also permitted organization of subdistricts within or partly in and out of the districts. However, a subdistrict had no such authority to levy ad valorem taxes to accomplish the purpose of the subdistrict. Its board of directors and that of the district were the same.
In 1951 an amendment gave subdistricts an independent entity status within the district and provided for an independent board. It also provided that “The board of directors of a subdistrict shall have the same powers and duties as a district board.”
The defendants contend that the language mentioned 1) is not an express grant of power to a subdistrict board to levy an ad valorem tax; 2) that viewed in the light of other sections, an ambiguity is created resolvable against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer;
Counsel for defendants point out a number of circumstances and reasons which we think may not be of too great moment singly, but which in the aggregate are persuasive in interpreting the Act. They call our attention to the following: 1) That our Act was taken from Colorado
The Act’s avowed purposes point to statewide water conservation and use for the benefit of the public generally, securing water to wide areas, — perhaps entire watersheds. Availability of water to such large areas certainly can be said to innure to the public benefit generally and appreciates the value of everyone’s property in the district. It is doubtful if the same conclusions necessarily need be indulged in the case of localized subdistricts where the water is already available for distribution and designed for consumption.
If the power to tax lay with the subdis-trict board, it would take little or no imagination to visualize a situation where a handful of users sufficient in number to organize a subdistrict could circumscribe within a subdistrict a large non-consuming but highly valuable industrial plant which would virtually pay for all the water used therein with little or no cost to the consumer. We do not believe the legislature intended to provide ^uch an unfair opportunity for a few, but rather had in mind the continuing role of a subdistrict as being the last instrumentality used in the process of getting water to the ultimate consumer who, we believe it also intended, should pay for it and its distribution cost. Such result is ac-complishable under the Act without levying an ad valorem tax, so that this is not a case where the water would be lost to the consumer but for an ad valorem tax.
This very case seems to bear us out. The Bountiful Water Subconservancy District appears to have been organized to deliver water to a comparatively small area, for local people and for a purely local benefit, its area apparently representing but a small fraction of the Weber Basin Conservancy District of which it is a small part.
Furthermore, it will be observed that nowhere in the Act is the word “tax” employed in close proximity with or in the same section where subdistricts are mentioned, except in that section where a sub-district will be furnished water like irrigation districts, whence an assessment can be levied to be “spread on the tax rolls and collected in the same manner as herein provided in the case of irrigation districts.” This section does not square with the idea that a subdistrict has plenary, autonomous power to determine need for the water or to levy and collect an ad valorem tax, since its ability and power to obtain funds under that section, are conditioned on permission obtained from some other agency. The word “subdistrict” actually connotes an operation “under” a controlling agency other than itself, and although the nomen
. Title 73-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
. Laws of Utah 1951, Chap. 120, Sec. 1, now 73-9-14, U.C.A.1953.
. Moss ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Board of Comm., 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961; Cooley, Taxation, Vol. 1, 4th Ed. Sec. 83.
. See. 149-6-15, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953.
. Chap. 149, arts. 8 & 9, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953.
. Title 73-9-16, U.C.A.1953.
. Title 73-9-15, U.C.A.1953.
. Title 73-9-18, U.C.A.1953.
. Title 73-9-13, U.C.A.1953.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- BOUNTIFUL WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a Public Corporation, and v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF DAVIS COUNTY, Utah, and
- Status
- Published