Lang v. Lang
Lang v. Lang
Opinion of the Court
This appeal raises the question whether a Utah resident who has been appointed by a California court as executor of the estate of a California decedent, and who holds money from such estate in Utah, is subject to garnishment from a Utah court.
The plaintiff, Phyllis Lang, had recovered judgments in our Third District Court against the defendant, Robert Lang totaling $13,480.00. It had been determined that the latter was to receive certain funds from the estate of his father, John Lang, former Utah industrialist, whose estate was being probated in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, and of which intervenor Samuel J. Carter, resident of Utah, had been appointed executor. Plaintiff had caused to be issued out of our Third District Court a Writ of Garnishment which was served upon Mr. Carter.
In response to the question whether he was indebted to the defendant, Robert Lang, he answered:
“Yes — as executor of the estate of
John Lang, deceased, in the Superior
Court of California.”
As to whether he had assets in his possession, he answered:
“Yes — as such executor, I have in my possession $9,375.00 owing to defendant * * *”
Upon the basis of those answers a garnishee judgment was entered against “Samuel J. Carter as executor of the estate of John Lang, deceased” in the amount stated. A motion was thereafter made to set aside that garnishee judgment on the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction over Mr. Carter in his capacity as executor appointed by the California court. The motion was granted and the plaintiff appeals.
In approaching the question whether the intervenor executor is subject to garnishment, we first note our agreement with the contention that an executor of an estate cannot be charged as garnishee in an action against an heir or legatee before the court has ordered distribution.
However, defendant goes beyond this and contends that because Mr. Carter holds the money in the capacity of an executor appointed by the California court, he is only subject to the orders and the process of the courts of California, and that the courts of Utah have no jurisdiction over him, or over the “California funds.” The ends of justice are not best served by being unduly concerned with niceties as to names or titles. To accomplish its objectives it is often necessary to disregard technicalities of nomenclature and look to substance and to the basic rights of the parties involved.
The reference to the money which was in Mr. Carter’s possession here in Utah as “California funds” is simply a misnomer. The money is, of course, not any more California funds than it is the funds of any other state, including Utah. Money is an intangible that follows the location of the debtor for jurisdictional purposes.
From what we have said it should be plain that the money held by Mr. Carter was subject to the garnishment and to the garnishee judgment, which should be reinstated. Costs to plaintiff (appellant).
. E.g., see Russell v. Prospect Lodge, 172 Old 622, 46 P.2d 478 (1935). See generally Anno., 59 A.L.R. 769.
. E.g., Barusch v. Brainard, 10 E.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1926). See Anno. 59 A.L.R. 777 ; 4 Bancroft, Probate Practice, 504 (2d ed. 1950).
. That creditor issuing garnishment is subrogated to rights of original creditor, see Con. Nat. Bank of Tucson v. Reiniger Mining & Smelting Co., 111 Cal.App. 64, 295 P. 79.
. See Rules 8(f), and 61, U.R.C.P. and annotations which follow; and generally see 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1351-52 (Rev. ed. 1958).
. Distinguishable from the case of Wilcox v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d 227, 272 P.2d 157, wherein the attempt was to have the Utah court assert jurisdiction over a California appointed executrix who was in California, so the person and the assets were in California.
. See footnote 2 above.
. Rule 64D(a), U.R.C.P. omitted the requirement contained in our former statute, (Sec. 10A-19-1, 1943 Code) that if the defendant was not personally served with summons in this state, then the indebtedness had to arise or be payable
. Ibid.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I must dissent. The main opinion says this case is “distinguishable from the case of Wilcox v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d, 227, 272 P.2d 157 (1954), wherein the attempt was to have the Utah Court assert jurisdiction over a California appointed executrix who was in California, so the person and the assets were in California.” That case says no such thing. All it said was that a California appointed representative of a deceased person officially can exercise his authority no further East than the California checking stations. I think the cases are indistinguishable on principles of conflicts of law. In this case it is not so much one of jurisdiction over a “res” but one of jurisdiction over an out of state official, who incidentally is holding a res.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Phyllis LANG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. J. Robert LANG, Defendant, Samuel J. Carter, Intervenor and Respondent
- Cited By
- 6 cases
- Status
- Published