opinion of the Court:

€ 1 In this case we consider the legal basis for an order of visitation for a child's grandparents, issued over the wishes of the parent. The order in question was issued after a trial under the terms of Utah Code section 80-5-2. Our court of appeals invalidated the order as a violation of the custodial parent's constitutional right to the custody, care, and control of her child. Jones v. Jones, 2013 UT App 174, ¶¶ 32-35, 307-P.3d 598.

1 2 We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. In so doing, we hold that a visitation order under section 30-5-2 is subject to strict scrutiny review, requiring proof that a grandparent visitation order is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. Under the operative statute as applied by the district court in this case, we find only one interest that even arguably qualifies as compelling-a showing of "harm" resulting from the loss of a "substantial relationship" with a grandparent, where the grandparent "acted as the grandechild's custodian or caregiver." Urax Cope 80-5-2(2)(d). And finding no such proof on the record here, we hold that the grandparents failed to establish a legally sufficient basis for an order of visitation.

I

3 In November of 2007, LJ. was born to Sharon Jones 1 and Tracy Jones Jr., her *605 then-husband. Tracy's parents, Tracy Sr. and Ellie Jones, lived more than an hour away. They visited their granddaughter and her parents about onee or twice a month. Occasionally they also babysat.

T4 Sharon and Tracy Jr. had a troubled marriage. - Evidence in the record indicates that Tracy Ir. struggled with addiction and was physically and emotionally abusive. The couple divorced when I.J. was around fourteen months old. Custody was split equally between them at that time.

15 For six weeks, beginning in late January of 2009, Tracy Jr. moved in with his parents. During this time, LJ., who was less than eighteen months old, spent several days a week in her grandparents' home with Tracy Jr. And when Tracy Sr. and Ellie were not at their full-time jobs, they took part in the day-to-day care of I.J.-changing diapers, feeding, ete. In early May of that same year, Tracy Jr. died of a heroin overdose while LJ. was in his custody. Once authorities discovered Tracy Jr.'s body-and 1.J., who was alone in her deceased father's care-they returned LJ. to her mother's custody.

T6 From this point on, LJ.'s grandparents and mother began to disagree over visitation. Tracy Sr. and Ellie requested overnight visits with their granddaughter, but Sharon felt that L.J. was not ready. She told the grandparents that LJ. was "struggling" to understand what had happened to her father, and that she thought it was best that she try to "get [I.J.] back into a routine" before allowing the grandparents to take I.J. for weekend or overnight trips. Instead Sharon proposed that the grandparents call twice a week and that they plan sporadic "day visits." The grandparents were not happy with this arrangement. They asked to "have every other weekend with [LJ.] (Friday night to Sunday night)." But for a time they respected Sharon's wishes and accordingly stuck with phone calls and occasional day visits.

17 In time, however, the grandparents thought better of this arrangement. They renewed their request for an overnight weekend visit. When Sharon denied this request (explaining that she had scheduled time with other family members on the weekend in question), the grandparents accused her of "stripping" them of their relationship with LJ. They then demanded the right to take 1.J. for two weekends a month from Friday through Sunday, to have a summer vacation with I.J. each year, and to have a right of visitation on all major holidays and on L.J.'s birthday. When Sharon did not reply, the grandparents followed up with an email threatening to sue for a right of visitation. Sharon then made a counter-offer-of visitation on one Saturday every other month, with the condition that she or another family member be present during the visit, The grandparents responded that they would "see [her] in court." They then filed a petition for visitation under Utah Code section 80-5-2.

T8 In their visitation petition, the grandparents sought unsupervised visitation with 1.J. for two weekends a month (from Friday evening through Sunday evening), two full consecutive weeks during the summer for a vacation, and half of all major holidays and I.J.'s birthdays. In evaluating the basis for this request, the grandparents' expert, Dr. Heather Walker, observed L.J.'s interactions with her grandparents to assess whether (a) they were "fit and proper persons to have visitation"; (b) visitation "ha[d] been denied" to them; (c) they had "acted as a grandchild's custodian or caregiver"; (d) visitation was "in the best interest of the grandchild," based on an assessment of the "nature and extent and degree of the child's natural attachment to her grandparents," how well they interacted with each other, "the child's preferences," and how contact with the grandparents might "affect the child's ability to deal with the death and loss of her father." After reading some affidavits, spending twenty minutes or so with Sharon, and observing I.J.'s interactions with her grandparents for about an hour, Walker prepared an expert report. She concluded that LJ. "should have time with her grandparents" for "her emotional well[-]being and her best interest."

19 A two-day trial was then held on the visitation petition. Walker testified that L.J. was perfectly comfortable in the presence of *606 her grandparents and that their relationship appeared to be "positive." She then began testifying, over Sharon's counsel's objection, to something nowhere explicitly contained in her report-that it would be "harmful" to LJ. to have her relationship with her grandparents severed or too limited. Specifically, Walker expressed concerns that LJ. not knowing her deceased father's parents could potentially be "harm{full" to her in that she might "overidentify" with her deceased father and "put him on a pedestal" and thereby commit the same kinds of life mistakes he had made because she would not be "allowed to grieve and realize[ ] that there were good and bad [things] about [her] father." Walker further expressed "concern" about LJ. living in Price, Utah, because of its small size and the associated chance that L.J. might run into her grandparents. In her view, if that happened and LJ,. were suddenly "whisked away," it "would be kind of strange" for her because she might remember her grandparents but not understand why she couldn't speak with them. She further concluded that "[i]t could be kind of [a] potentially ... huge problem" in the fature when LJ. started school in Price because people at the school might know her grandparents (on account of the small community) and therefore those people might "start making comments to her," thus resulting in some species of harm. f

{10 On eross-examination, Sharon's counsel challenged the basis of Walker's opinions. When asked whether there was "any research that suggests that afn]l [eighteen month old] child's memory of a deceased father ... has any developmental impact on the child's ability to grow up and be a well-adjusted human being," Walker responded "no." When asked whether she could "conclude that a child has a substantial relationship with a grandparent if it's not clear to you whether or not they are attached to that grandparent?," Walker responded as follows: "You can if the child is older [than LJ. was]. It's probably easier to determine the sub-stantiality of the relationship [in that cireum-stance]." - But on account of LJ.'s age (being younger than two), Walker simply had "to go by what people have said" with respect to there being a substantial relationship between LJ. and Petitioners,. She then admitted twice that she "could not conclude that there was any attachment between [I.J.] and the [Petitioners].

{11 Sharon's counsel also questioned Walker's conception of what counts as "harm" under the statute. When Walker insisted that visitation was appropriate because it "would be in [I.J.'s] best interest," Sharon's counsel challenged the basis for any allegation of "harm" to LJ. Counsel suggested that Walker's testimony was really "dealing more with [her] evaluation of ... '[LJ.'s] best interests." In response, Walker indicated that was "correct," but suggested that "lack of best interest would be harm." Counsel then pressed Walker further, asking whether she thought there was any "difference between what's in the best interest of a child and whether or not something will cause them emotional harm." Walker said there was a difference but that "what is in a child's best interest would be for them to not have the possibility of emotional harm," and that in her opinion there was such a possibility here based on her earlier testimony. Based on her observations, Walker recommended one daytime visit per month for somewhere between three to seven hours per visit. And, in Walker's opinion, overnight visits might be appropriate in a few years.

T12 Sharon put on her own expert, Dr. Monica Christy, Christy similarly challenged Walker's conclusions, testifying that "there's no research showing that in a normal grandparent relationship there would be harm done to the child if that grandparent was not available." She concluded that the only established "harm" that would accompany the "loss of a grandparent" relationship would be "[ilf they were the primary caretaker," or played "a parenttype role" in the child's life.

1 13 The court ruled in favor of the grandparents. It found that Sharon was "a very fit, proper, caring mother," but nonetheless concluded "that the grandparents had rebutted the statutory presumption that a parent's decision with regard to grandparent visita tion is in the grandchild's best interest." The court further concluded that Sharon had *607 "denied and unreasonably limited" visitation; the grandparents had a "substantial relation- - ship with [LJ.]"; the denial of visitation had "likely caused harm to [LJ.]"; and that grandparent visitation was in LJ.'s "best interest." The court consequently ordered unsupervised visitation every other weekend, alternating between overnight visits from Friday to Saturday evenings and eight-hour visits on Saturday afternoons.

T 14 Sharon subsequently sought to place certain limitations on the grandparents' visits with LJ. She asked that a member of her family drop L.J. off (rather than having the grandparents pick her up), that they refer to themselves as "Ellie and Tracy," and that they not take I.J. to any fast-food restaurants, In response, the grandparents canceled the first planned visit and initiated a contempt proceeding. The district court reserved ruling on the motion but held that the grandparents were entitled to disregard some of Sharon's restrictions (the requests as to fast-food and drop-off).

1 15 Sharon appealed, challéng-Ing the trial court's visitation order as an infringement of her fundamental rights as a parent. The court of appeals reversed, holding that strict serutiny applied, that there was no compelling interest supporting the visitation award, and that the award was not narrowly tailored. Jones v. Jones, 2013 UT App 174, ¶¶ 24, 32-35, 307 P.3d 598. Specifically, the court of appeals reasoned that the government's interest in ordering visitation with the grandparents was not compelling because there was insufficient compelling evidence that "Grandparents had a substantial relationship with Child and that Child would be harmed by denied visitation." Id. 182. Further, the court held that the court-ordered visitation was not narrowly tailored, even if there was a compelling interest, as the "level of visitation [ordered].... is more substantial than the visitation many grandparents enjoy, especially those who, like Grandparents here, live in a different city from their grandchild." Id. 185.

116 Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari, which we granted. Our review of the court of appeals' decision is de novo. State v. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 7, 289 P.3d 444, In reviewing the court of appeals' decision, however, we consider whether it "accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

II

T 17 The case before us presents both statutory and constitutional questions. To sustain an order of visitation under Utah Code section 30-5-2, the grandparents bore the burden of rebutting a "presumption that a parent's decision with regard to grandparent visitation is in the grandchild's best interests"-a burden informed by "factors" enumerated in the statute. Urazx Cope $ 30-5-2(2). Under controlling precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, any decision to override a parent's decision regarding visitation is also subject to serutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. , See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) Thus, the grandparents' right to visitation in this case is sustainable only if the order in question also survives under the governing standard of constitutional serutiny.

18 That much is clear, The governing statutory and constitutional standards are less so. The statute enumerates "factors" that the court may "consider[] to be relevant" in deciding whether grandparents have rebutted the presumption in favor of the parent's decision regarding visitation. Uraxk Cope 80-5-2(2). But it doesn't say much more. It doesn't tell us how those factors are to be balanced or weighted.

119 The constitutional standard is even fuzzier. The fuzziness stems from the governing decision in Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57, 120 Troxel recognized a fundamental right of parents to limit grandparent visitation. Id. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. And it struck down .a Washington visitation statute on constitutional grounds-as applied in a case in which a trial judge's "mere disagreement" with the parent's determination of the effect of visitation on the child's "best interests" was deemed sufficient to sustain a grandparent visitation order. Id. at 67-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Yet the plurality opinion in *608 Troxel declined to "define ... the precise seope of the parental due process right in the visitation context" or to articulate the operative standard of serutiny. Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Instead of prescribing a-constitutional standard, the plurality struck down the Washington statute as applied based on a case-specific opposition to the operation of the Washington provision' in question-expressing concerns as to the "sweeping breadth" of a statutory provision that permitted "any person" to be awarded visitation at "any time" based purely on a "best interest" analysis that failed to give any "special weight" to the presumption in favor of a parent's assessment of a child's welfare. Id., at 61, 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054.

. 120 That' decision resolved the constitutional question in Troxel. But it yielded little guidance for lower courts going forward. From Troxel we know that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions about visitation, that their decisions are entitled to "special weight," and that the presumption in favor of their decisions may not be overridden by a "mere disagreement" over' a child's best interests. But we know little more than that. We do not have a clear statement of the operative standard of seruti-ny-and thus no way to know exactly how much "special weight" the parent's decision gets or what kind of proof is required to overcome it. See id. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (identifying this concern).

[21 Case-by-case decisionmaking of this sort is perhaps understandable. In matters as sensitive and difficult as grandparent visitation,. the course of case-by-case balancing may seem to represent the course of judicial restraint. In the broad run of cases in the lower courts, however, the Troxel approach paves a path for uncertainty. To decide a case like the one pending before us today we must identify and apply a standard of seruti-ny.

122 We do so in the paragraphs below. First, we conclude that the high court's ree-ognition of a "fundamental" right of a parent to regulate the visitation of a child implies a standard of strict scrutiny. That standard, we conclude, requires a party seeking to override a parent's decision on visitation to present concrete proof that a visitation order is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. Second, turning to the district court's decision under the Utah statute, we find only one interest evaluated by the court that even arguably qualifies as compelling-proof of "harm" resulting from the loss of a "substantial relationship" with a grandparent, as where the grandparent "act, ed as the grandehild's custodian or caregiver." Uras Cope § 80-5-2(2)(d). We resolve this case based on a failure of proof under this statutory factor.

23 In so doing, we leave for another day the precise content of the compelling interest test that governs in this area. We need not and do not decide whether the interference with a grandparent's "custodian or caregiver" relationship would be enough to sustain a visitation order under the standard of strict scrutiny. Instead we simply find a lack of record support for the statutory harm asserted by the grandparents and accepted by the district court in this case (leaving for a future case the question whether such harm would be sufficient as a matter of strict serutiny). 2

A

' 124 The courts that have confronted the question of the standard of serutiny under Troxel have charted a range of courses. Most have adopted a standard of strict seru- *609 tiny, or at least a requirement of proof of substantial "harm" as a prerequisite to an award of third-party visitation. 3 But others have applied a somewhat looser standard, opening the door to more discretionary balancing by the court. 4

125 Uncertainty in the operative constitu-. tional standard is troubling. The stakes are high in a matter of rights of visitation. We owe it to the parties to identify the operative standard of serutiny,. Anything less leaves the appearance of case-by-case policy-making,. We therefore confront the question that the high court has left unresolved.

126 We start with the threshold premise that the court has established-that a parent's right to decide who has a right of visitation with her child is "fundamental" under the Due Process Clause. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054. That premise is dispositive. When the court has recognized a due process right it deems "fundamental," it consistently has applied a standard of strict serutiny to the protection of such a right. 5

127 The strict serutiny standard is a stiff one. Under this standard, a fundamental right is protected ' except in the limited cireumstance in which an infringement of it is shown to be "narrowly tailored" to protect a "compelling governmental interest." 6

128 This is not the only standard that conceivably could apply. In a few instances the high court has invoked sut generis standards of serutiny in cases involying rights it deems "fundamental" (but nonetheless sub-jeet to some lower level of protection). 7

129 Perhaps the high court, in time, will embrace some sort of intermediate standard of scrutiny for child visitation cases. But the enterprise of so doing-of abandoning the usual standard for a lesser one that balances the relevant interests in a new way-is an uncomfortable, venture for a lower court. *610 Such a venture seems more an act of policy-making than of application of controlling law. So, unless and until the United States Supreme Court prescribes a different standard in this field, we are left to view its determination of a fundamental parental right of control over visitation as the prescription of the standard of strict serutiny. 8

[ 30 That leaves the matter of defining the interests that are sufficiently "compelling" to satisfy strict serutiny in this field, Although Troxel itself does not answer that question, other opinions of the court in this area provide helpful guidance. To sustain an incursion on a fundamental right of a parent, the U.S. Supreme Court has required proof that substantial harm to a child is at stake. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944).

181 The court's cases do not give an exhaustive list of harms that may qualify, but the examples in its cases suggest that the bar is a high one. The state may override a parent's right to direct the upbringing of a child, for example, in a case involving proof of "child neglect and abuse," where the child's "physical or mental health is jeopardized," Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03, 99 S.Ct. 2493, or where a parent is "unfit" in a manner causing a potential "harm|[ ]" to the child, Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) 9

€32. The foregoing shows that the state interest in overriding a parent's fundamental rights is "compelling" only in cireum-stances involving the avoidance of harm that is substantial. 10 - But it hardly paints a *611 bright line of the standard of substantiality. We know from Troxel that a mere conclusion that a child's "best interests" may be advanced by an award of visitation is insufficient. 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to do more than to say that proof of substantial harm is required.

133 We so hold. But in so doing we stop short of attempting to define the compelling interest line with greater precision. Instead we avoid that question on the statutory grounds applied below:; We find only one basis in the statutory standard invoked by the district court that could even arguably qualify as establishing any substantial harm, and, absent evidence to support a showing of such harm in this case, we affirm the court of appeals' decision vacating the visitation order entered in this case. -

B

134 Utah Code section 30-5-2 prescribes a presumption in favor of parents' decisions regarding visitation. Consistent with the Troxel decision, the statute requires a grandparent seeking visitation to rebut a "presumption that a parent's decision with regard to grandparent visitation is in the grandchild's best interests." Utar Cong § 80-5-2(2). Beyond that, the statute gives little guidance as to the basis for rebutting the presumption. It directs only that the court may grant "reasonable rights of visitation" to grandparents if it "finds that the petitioner has rebutted the presumption based upon factors which the court considers to be relevant." Id. Then, without indicating how the listed factors are to be balanced or weighted, the statute prescribes a list of potentially relevant considerations-

whether: (a) the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation with the grandchild; (b) visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably limited; (c) the parent is unfit or incompetent; (d) the petitioner has acted as the grandehild's custodian or caregiver, or otherwise has had a substantial relationship with the grandchild, and the loss or cessation of that relationship is likely to cause harm to the grandchild; (e) the petitioner's child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has died, or has become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal separation; (f) the petitioner's child, who.is a parent of the grandchild, has been missing for an extended period of time; or (g) visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. Id. >

1 85 In the trial proceedings leading to the visitation order in this case, the parties and the court focused on these statutory factors. 11 The grandparents presented evidence under several of the factors, and the district court's findings were guided 'by them. Ultimately, the basis of the visitation order was that the grandparents had rebutted the presumption "that a parent's decision. with regard to grandparent visitation is in- the grandehild's best interest." The decision was based on the following findings: Sharon had "denied and unreasonably limited" visitation with the grandparents; the grandparents had a "substantial relationship with [1.J.] until the denial of visitation, and the denial has likely caused harm" to LJ.; and visitation was in LJ.'s "best interest." >

136 Our review of the basis for this decision must be informed by the above-noted constitutional limitations. To withstand strict serutiny, a grandparent visitation order must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest, or in other words to protect against substantial harm to the child. The only harm mentioned expressly by statute-or considered expressly *612 by the parties or the district court-is the interference with a "substantial relationship" between LJ. and her grandparents. 12 Even assuming for the sake of argument (and without resolving the matter: conclusively) that the loss of a "custodian or caregiver" relationship would be enough to show substantial harm, however, there was insufficient evidence of such a relationship in this case. We affirm the court of appeals' vacatur of the visitation order on that basis. |

The statutory "harm" that was the focus of the proceedings below concerned the loss of a "substantial relationship" of a specific sort-that of a "custodian or caregiver," or something along those lines. Urax Copm § 80-5-2(2)(d). This limitation is important. In a very real sense, all grandparental relationships are "substantial," The cross-generational connection of a child to her grandparents is of unquestioned value and significance. But under Troxel and particularly under the strict serutiny standard that that decision seems to require, the mere. (but unquestioned) significance of the grandparental relationship cannot be enough to override a parent's fundamental right to raise a child as she sees fit, Nor can a vague sense that the child would be better off with grandparents in her life. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct 2054. Grandparent visitation orders must be limited to the exceptional case where the fallure to override the parent's wishes would cause substantial harm to the child.

138 The exceptional case identified by statute (which we presume without deciding may be enough to satisfy strict serutiny) is the case where the grandparents' role is akin to that of a parent-where the grandparent has filled the role of "custodian or caregiver" or something similar.. No such proof was presented here.

139 By all accounts, the relationship between LJ. and her grandparents was a warm, healthy, loving one. And, as the grandparents' expert testified, there is reason to believe that "[the more time this child spends with her grandparents and paternal relatives, the better off she will be in terms of knowing and understanding that many people love her" But again a mere "best interests" determination is insufficient to override a fundamental parental right. ' And the mere existence of a healthy, loving grandparental relationship falls short. By statute, the kind of "substantial relationship" that can sustain proof of "harm" to the child is that of a "custodian or caregiver" or the like.

4 40 The operative statutory provision encompasses not only those who "acted as the grandchild's custodian or caregiver," but also grandparents who "otherwise ... had a substantial relationship with the grandchfld " Urax Cop® § 80-5-2(2)(d) (emphasis added). Not every grandparental relationship counts as "substantial" under this provision, howev-r. . Under the gjusdem generis canon of construction, and in light of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, we give a limiting construction to this provision. 13 We limit the "other[ J' "substantial relationship{s]" encompassed by the cited provision to those that are comparable to a "custodian or caregiver" relationship.

*613 § 41 The record cannot sustain a determination that the grandparents had that kind of relationship with LJ. This is not a case like Uzelac v. Thurgood, where the grandmother "took care of the child on a daily basis throughout most of the child's first four years of life," such that she had an "emotional attachment ... as strong as [that] seen between parents and children" and the "loss of contact" would have been "devastating and caused the child to suffer." 2006 UT 46, ¶ 42, 144 P.3d 1083 (alteration in original). Instead, the record in this case shows that the grandparents helped to care for LJ. for three or four days a week over a six-week period in early 2009, when I.J. was not yet eighteen-months old. During that time, moreover, the grandparents were not the child's legal guardian or custodian. Her f2-ther, Tracy Ir., was the child's custodian, and he was living in the same household during that time. Throughout this six-week period, it appears that all three individuals-Tracy Jr. and his parents (LJ.'s grandparents)shared in the responsibility of caring for LJ. The grandparents, after all, both worked full time, and Tracy Jr. was living in the home.

I 42 Given the nature of the grandparents' role and the short span of their involvement in LJ.'s day-to-day care, there is no basis for finding that they had a substantial "custodian or caregiver" type of relationship with their grandchild. This is reflected, in part, in the expert testimony. The grandparents' expert opined that the relationship was "positive" but stated that she "could not conclude that there was any attachment" between 1.J. and her grandparents. The district court, moreover, never found that there was a "custodian or caregiver" type of relationship with LJ. It held only that the relationship was "substantial," in some vague sense, and that the cessation of such relationship "likely caused" some unidentifiable "harm" to the child. That is insufficient.

. [[ 48 The- evidence at trial did include some vague references to "harm" identified by the grandparents' expert. But the expert's testimony, for the most part, seemed to equate "harm" with any decision that is not in the child's best interest. And to the extent the expert alluded to the possibility of harm in the form of "developmental impact on the child's ability to grow up and be a well-adjusted human being," she conceded that there was no concrete basis or "research" to support that conclusion. Most important, moreover, is the fact that the district judge never found any harm of this sort. She simply found that the loss of the kind of (non-caregiver) relationship the grandparents had with 1.J. "likely caused" harm-presumably in the same sense in which any child would be harmed by the loss of such a relationship.

T 44 That is insufficient under the statute, as informed by the standard of strict seruti-ny. A grandparent visitation order requires proof of a potential for substantial harm to the child, and by statute the only harm that is implicated here is the loss of a substantial relationship like that of a custodian or caregiver, Absent such proof, we hold that the grandparents in this case failed to carry their burden of showing that a visitation order was necessary to prevent substantial harm to the child.

TII

45 Family connections are fundamental stitches in the fabric of our society. It is hard to fault the grandparents in this case for seeking to preserve their relationship with their granddaughter. And we can understand the district judge's apparent interest in preserving a need for these grandparents to have a meaningful relationship with LJ. That is a laudable goal. As compassionate human beings we can hope that all grand-parental relationships will be healthy, meaningful, and respected.

146 But court-ordered relationships are another matter. In this sensitive field the United States Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. That means that parents, as a general rule, have the final say in who has a right to interact with their children on a regular basis. The rule is subject to an exception, but the exception was not met on this record. Thus, while we can hope that I.J. may one day develop a relationship with her grandparents, we cannot sustain an order requiring that outcome.

*614 147 The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed and the district court's visitation order is vacated. The court of appeals' opinion is vacated, however, as to its analysis of narrow tailoring. See supra ¶ 23 n. 2. We remand for any further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.