Morris v. Deshazo
Morris v. Deshazo
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of fhe Court.
The appeal in this case, from the County to the Superior Court, was improvidently allowed, upon the condition that the appellant should give bond and security in the clerk’s office within thirty days; and which was accordingly given after the adjournment of the Court. An appeal from a judgment in a Court of Law, cannot be allowed upon such terms, as has been decided in Thompson & O’Neal v. Evans, 6 Munf. 397; although appeals from decisions in the Superior Courts of Chancery may be allowed, upon such a condition. Stealy v. Jackson, 1 Rand. 413. The acts of Assembly upon this subject, as to apjjeals both from Courts of Law and Chancery, seem, at first view, to have the same effect; but they have not. An appeal can be allowed from a judgment at Law, only by the Court pronouncing the judgment, and during the term of the Court at which the judgment was pronounced. The same Court, at a subsequent term, or the Judge thereof, in vacation, cannot, under any circumstances, allow an appeal; nor can an appeal be allowed in such case, by an Appellate Court, or a Judge thereof, under any circumstances. The judgment can be brought before an Appellate Court, only by a writ of error, or a supersedeas, awarded by the Appellate Court, or a Judge thereof. The act of Assembly, in respect to these cases,-provides, that “Before granting any appeal, or issuing of any writ of error or supersedeas, the party praying the same, shall enter into
Appeals may be allowed from decrees in Chancery, by the Court pronouncing the decrees, during the term; in which case the statute directs, that “ before granting any such appeal,” the party shall give bond and security; but, an Appellate Court, or a Judge thereof, in vacation, or the Chancellor who has pronounced the decree, may, during the succeeding vacation, grant an appeal, if it appear to his satisfaction, that the failure to appeal from his decree at the time, or during the term when it was pronounced, did not proceed from any culpable neglect in the petitioner, or that upon the whole circumstances of the case, the petitioner ought to have the benefit of an appeal. These appeals, allowed by the Appellate Court, or a Judge thereof, or by a Chancellor who pronounced the decree, in the next vacation, are analogous to the writ of error, or supersedeas, at law. Although allowed, they have no effect, until the bond and security be given; and this of necessity, for the bond is given, not to the Judge, but in the clerk’s office. If, at the time a decree is pronounced, the party wishes an appeal, but is not then prepared to take and perfect it, by giving bond and security, and should satisfy the Judge that this inability does not arise from his culpable neglect, or, that upon the whole circumstances, he ought to have the benefit of an appeal; to allow an appeal, upon condition that bond and security should be given within a reasonable
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed; and the Court giving such judgment as the Superior Court ought to have given, the appeal from the County to the Superior Court is dismissed as improvidently granted; the appeal bond being given after the expiration of the term at which the judgment was given; the appellee to recover his costs in this Court, being the party substantially pre - vailing.
Judge Coalter, absent.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.