Christopher Nathaniel Archie v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Haley and Petty CHRISTOPHER NATHANIEL ARCHIE

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0585-06-4 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY

JULY 31, 2007 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

William D. Hamblen, Judge

(Myron J. Teluk, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General; Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Appellee submitting on brief.

Convicted of armed bank robbery and wearing a mask, Christopher Nathaniel Archie contends on appeal his convictions should be overturned because the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements he made to the police and physical evidence allegedly seized as a result of those statements. We disagree and affirm his convictions.

Police officers stopped Archie shortly after a reported bank robbery, suspecting he might be one of the armed robbers. On appeal, Archie does not contest the officers’ right to conduct the investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and he accepts without contest the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicions.1 Instead, Archie argues the physical restraints imposed upon him at the time of the initial stop went beyond what was necessary for investigatory purposes and converted the encounter into a de facto arrest requiring a showing of probable cause — a higher standard of probability which Archie claims the officers did not have.

The evidence before the trial court showed that the officers, upon finding Archie in apparent flight from another officer, drew their weapons and ordered him to stop and lie down on the ground. They then handcuffed Archie and placed him in the back of a locked police cruiser. The trial court found the officers used reasonable methods to protect themselves during the stop, particularly given the serious nature of the crime being investigated. These reasonable restraints, the trial court held, did not convert the investigatory detention into a de facto arrest requiring a showing of probable cause.2

We agree with the trial court.3 To protect themselves during a valid Terry stop, officers may draw their weapons, handcuff a suspect, and even use or threaten to use force if the circumstances reasonably warrant it. See generally Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 857, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993), aff’d en banc, 18 Va. App. 454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994).4 A Terry stop involves “a police investigation ‘at close range,’ when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make ‘a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.’” Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1988) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28)). A dangerous suspect, after all, “is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested.” Id.

Coercive measures, therefore, “do not convert a stop and frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the circumstances.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 49, 55, 455 S.E.2d 261, 264-65 (1995) (citation omitted). Questions of scope, whether in terms of duration or degree of physical coercion, must be answered in light of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. “When ‘evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.’” Washington v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 5, 15, 509 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1999) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).

Here, the circumstances surrounding the initial stop of Archie were reasonable for an investigation into a recently reported armed bank robbery. Fearing Archie was armed and dangerous — as well as on the run — the officers faced a “swiftly developing situation,” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, exactly the kind the Fourth Amendment places outside the reach of “unrealistic second-guessing” by courts, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686). Given the unique circumstances of this case, the officers had ample reason to restrain Archie in the manner they did during the investigatory stop.5 Because the trial court did not err in coming to this sensible conclusion, we affirm.

Affirmed.