Ryan Michael Hart v. Robin Barnett Hart

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Huff and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia RYAN MICHAEL HART

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1724-11-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY

JUNE 5, 2012 ROBIN BARNETT HART

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

Marjorie A. Taylor Arrington, Judge

Thomas M. Wolf (Joseph M. Rainsbury; LeClairRyan, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.

Kristi A. Wooten (Robin Michelle Barnett, pro se, on brief), for appellee.1

In this hotly contested divorce case, the trial court granted sole physical custody of two young children to their mother, Robin Barnett Hart (wife). The court awarded visitation privileges to their father, Ryan Michael Hart (husband), but required that visitation be supervised “at this point” in time. App. at 181. The court also admitted an expert report into evidence, considered the recommendations of the guardian ad litem, awarded wife a portion of her attorney fees and costs, and, split the guardian ad litem fees and costs evenly between the parties. Finding no reversible error in any of the trial court’s decisions, we affirm.

I.

When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003) (citations omitted). “That principle requires us to discard the evidence of the appellant which conflicts, either directly or inferentially, with the evidence presented by the appellee at trial.” Brandau v. Brandau, 52 Va. App. 632, 635, 666 S.E.2d 532, 534 (2008) (citation omitted). These principles create a prism through which we view the evidence at trial and have considerable efficacy in cases where, as here, the evidence is highly contested.

At an evidentiary hearing spanning twelve days, the trial court heard testimony from the parties and more than twenty fact witnesses and experts. The parties introduced more than thirty exhibits, not counting exhibits and affidavits attached to post-trial motions. In all, the appellate record contains twenty-seven transcripts, six trial court manuscripts, and three sealed exhibit envelopes, as well as three sealed guardian ad litem reports.2 We will discuss only those aspects of the factual record pertinent to our decision and will do so in the context of husband’s arguments on appeal.

At the time of trial, husband and wife were both naval officers. Husband served as a lieutenant at the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center. Wife served as a naval cryptology officer with NATO’s Allied Command Operations as the Executive Officer for the NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre. They married in 2003 and had two children — a son in 2005 and a daughter in 2007. Husband and wife separated in 2008.

II. A. SUPERVISED VISITATION

Husband filed for divorce and sought custody of the children. At trial, wife alleged that their brief marriage ended for various reasons, including her belief that husband had sexually molested one of the children, his inexplicable refusal to engage in conjugal relations with her, his addiction to prescription drugs and alcohol, and his increasingly erratic behavior. Husband denied these allegations.

In support of her request that husband’s visitation with the children be supervised, wife testified that, prior to their separation, husband chronically drank alcohol to excess and abused prescription drugs. When asked if she had any “concerns about Mr. Hart’s interaction with the children for the future, from now going forward,” wife testified:

My concerns now going out would be the fact that I believe that he has serious drug and alcohol issues. I experienced them throughout our whole marriage. We went to three separate therapists to try to fight this battle with alcohol, and then the drugs after he was diagnosed with the GERD and had access to the serious opioids in 2007, which took him away from me.

App. at 827. Husband “drank every night,” wife said. Id. at 916. The trial court inferred from wife’s testimony that husband “commonly mixes alcohol and prescription drugs during his personal time and loses control.” Id. at 174.

In 2008, wife discovered a psychological evaluation of husband performed in 2000.3 At that time, husband reported “fairly heavy drug use in graduate school; it helped him concentrate and reduced his anxiety.” Id. at 211. His mother reported “significant emotional issues” and saw him as “depressed” and, the evaluation report recounts, he “tends to be anxious, manic, and hyperactive.” Id. After receiving a prescription for Oxycontin to treat migraines:

It became a reality to him that after the headache stopped, he could not stop using the Oxycontin. He began doctor shopping and was taking Oxycontin daily, 30 to 40 mgs per day, for one year. This was 1997 to 1998. Mr. Hart’s friends and parents told him that he needed help and needed to stop . . . . He visited a few facilities in California, and his mother came out to help him find treatment for his Oxycontin addiction.

Id. at 215. “Mr. Hart was treated by a psychopharmacologist who used benzodiazepines . . . to prevent him from withdrawal while titrating the Oxycontin.” Id. at 216. “When he moved to Nashville, he was addicted to Percocet, but could not obtain it. He went into withdrawal, was hospitalized for two weeks, and went to outpatient for two months.” Id. at 211. The 2000 report concluded that husband suffered from “Mood Disorder, NOS, Opioid Dependence, in early full remission, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type, [and] Cluster Headache[s].” Id. at 212.

After reviewing husband’s more recent medical records, the trial court found he “filled 530 days of what he characterized as pain pills which amounts to 1690 pain pills in 2 years. Of those pain pills, he filled 320 days’ worth or 1450 pills of Ultram, Vicodin, Flexeril, and Robaxin.” Id. at 170. Even after considering this extensive list, the court found the record “does not provide an accurate picture” because “there were multiple prescriptions from different doctors . . . being filled at other pharmacies.” Id. The court also took note of husband’s failure to alert his current doctors to his history of addiction to opioids, resulting in narcotics prescriptions between 2007 and 2008 for pain associated with an esophageal tear attributed to gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).4 Wife also testified that she observed husband drinking his mother’s prescription codeine cough syrup, id. at 925, and claimed he stole “fifteen pills” from wife’s “mother’s medical bag,” id. at 850.

Regarding husband’s erratic behavior, wife testified husband displayed peculiar behaviors throughout the marriage. Id. at 173. In 2008, he accused wife of “whoring” around and warned her to use condoms, but denied the next day any recollection of saying these things. Id. at 915-16. While on a trip to visit her sister, wife said husband left a voice message consisting solely of one of the children crying, which she claimed he did “if I went somewhere that he didn’t want me to go.” Id. at 917-18. Wife described various other incidents where husband said disparaging things about wife to the children and engaged in inexplicable conduct.5 In addition, the trial court itself noted “that the husband has exhibited erratic and paranoid behaviors throughout this case.” Id. at 173.

The trial court found wife “to be a reliable witness.” Id. at 169. The court described husband as “exceedingly evasive, uncooperative, and paranoid throughout this case.” Id. at 178. The court did not find husband to be reliable. “Many of his explanations did not make sense,” the court found, and his testimony “was evasive and exhibited a selective memory when cross examined regarding these issues.” Id. at 172. The court also took into account that husband had “not complied with previous orders of the Court regarding the children.” Id. at 178. After presiding over many days of pretrial hearings and a lengthy trial, the court found: the husband has exhibited erratic and paranoid behaviors throughout this case. It is clear that he believes everyone in this case is conspiring against him, including the guardian ad litem. He has not been forthcoming with providing his medical records to the guardian ad litem and has become increasingly rude to her.

Throughout the proceedings, he has seemed understandably stressed. However, the Court also found him to be evasive, sarcastic, and uncooperative during the proceedings and has serious doubts as to his credibility. He certainly has exhibited a selective memory. He could recall the most specific details when questioned by his own attorneys but generally could not remember anything presented by the wife, the guardian ad litem, or the Court.

Id. at 173-74.

After reviewing the statutory factors governing its decision, the trial court found it “in the best interests of the children for supervised visitation to continue.” Id. at 180-81. The supervision requirement (initially imposed by pendente lite orders)6 should remain, the court stated, because it was “still extremely concerned about the husband’s drug and alcohol use, as well as his erratic behavior. The Court is not comfortable that unsupervised visitation is appropriate at this point.” Id. Though the court recited the conflicting evidence surrounding wife’s claim of husband’s molestation of their child, the court did not base its supervision requirement upon any concerns regarding this issue.7

We begin our review of the trial court’s decision by restating the governing legal standard applicable to the husband’s objection to supervised visitation and wife’s insistence upon it. In Virginia, trial courts must consider the child’s “best interests” when determining “custody or visitation arrangements” for the child. Code § 20-124.3 (listing various statutory factors). The trial court in this case examined the statutory factors and expressly applied the best-interests test in determining whether husband’s visitation should be supervised.

On appeal, husband argues the trial court should have applied the constitutional actual- harm test, as required by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and its progeny. Husband contends this standard of proof, as applied to the issue of supervised visitation, required the trial court not merely to determine that supervision would be in the children’s best interests but, rather, to specifically find “that unsupervised visits would endanger the child.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. We disagree.

The higher actual-harm standard, articulated in Troxel, governs child custody and visitation disputes between a fit parent and a third-party nonparent — not between two fit parents fighting among themselves. “Custody and visitation disputes between two fit parents involve one parent’s fundamental right pitted against the other parent’s fundamental right. The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83, 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003).8

In other words, when fit parents assert their constitutional rights against each other, neither parent is entitled to primacy over the other. Their conflicting rights settle into oppositional equipoise, leaving the traditional best-interests standard as the sole basis of distinction between them. “Thus, faced with a contest in which one parent’s fundamental rights were pitted against the other parent’s fundamental rights,” a trial court does not err by deciding the case based solely on the best-interests standard. Yopp v. Hodges, 43 Va. App. 427, 439, 598 S.E.2d 760, 766 (2004) (citing Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 83, 581 S.E.2d at 902). Troxel is simply “inapposite” in this intra-parental context. Id.9 For this reason, the trial court in this case correctly employed the statutory best-interests standard under Code § 20-124.3 to mediate the dispute between wife’s request for supervised visitation and husband’s request for unsupervised visitation. Accord M.E.D. v. J.P.M., 3 Va. App. 391, 397, 350 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1986) (noting “a “insufficient to show that unsupervised visitation would be ‘detrimental to the child’s well- being’”); Anderson v. Anderson, 771 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (applying a “direct adverse impact” test), a proposition we would not adopt even if we had the authority to do so. court is not foreclosed from ordering some form of controlled visitation in order to rebuild a normal relationship if that is determined to be in the best interest of the child”).

We next address the appellate standard of review, an equally important principle governing this case. The decision by a trial court to impose conditions on visitation involves an exercise of sound judicial discretion. On appeal, we do not review the statutory factors de novo to determine whether we agree or disagree with the trial court’s decision. Nor do we “retry the facts or substitute our view of the facts for those of the trial court.” Congdon, 40 Va. App. at 266, 578 S.E.2d at 838 (citation omitted). Instead, when dealing with discretionary decisions, “only ‘when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.’” Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 482, 632 S.E.2d 615, 623 (2006) (citation omitted).

Much of husband’s argument on appeal devolves into an attack on the evidentiary weight of the evidence presented against him. The “evidence of alcohol abuse,” husband complains, “was based entirely on Wife’s testimony.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. And his witnesses, including his supervisors at work, testified they never saw him impaired. “But even if Wife’s implausible testimony were to be believed,” husband continues, “there still was no evidence that his was a continuing problem.” Id. The same logic applies to wife’s allegations of prescription drug abuse, husband contends.

Though seemingly framed as sufficiency challenges, these arguments do little more than retry the facts of the case on appeal. The only question before us is whether a reasonable jurist could find wife’s testimony credible and, if so, whether it would provide a basis for a reasonable jurist to conclude that the best interests of the children are supported by wife’s request for supervised visitation with husband. Given the record before us, the answer to both questions is yes.

Despite vigorous cross-examination, wife’s testimony remained consistent and unshaken. Declaring wife a “reliable witness,” the trial court found her “to be calm, organized, and cooperative throughout this case despite showing some anxiety on occasion.” App. at 169. In contrast, the trial court found the husband was “exceedingly evasive,” id. at 178, leaving the court with “serious doubts as to his credibility,” id. at 174. “He certainly has exhibited a selective memory,” the court added. Id. “He could recall the most specific details when questioned by his own attorneys but generally could not remember anything presented by the wife, the guardian ad litem, or the Court.” Id.

Considering the testimony and evidence presented by wife, the trial court had ample basis to conclude the best interests of the children favored the requirement that husband’s visitation continue to be supervised.10 The various statutory factors composing the best-interests standard of Code § 20-124.3 do not reduce themselves into a simple formula. They do not purport to codify a rule that supervised visitation can only be required if specific criteria are met. The best- interests decision involves a holistic judgment, guided not only by the listed statutory factors, but also by such “other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.” Code § 20-124.3 (factor 10).

Given the wide discretion invested in the trial court in such matters, we cannot hold that no reasonable jurist could have concluded supervised visitation would be in the children’s best interests. The trial court focused on demonstrable risks supported by credible evidence: husband’s abuse of alcohol and prescription drugs, coupled with his erratic behavior. Exposing two young children to these risks, the trial court reasonably concluded, was not in their best interests.11 And, though no one can predict the future with certitude, Virginia law recognizes the “maxim that, sometimes, the most reliable way to gauge a person’s future actions is to examine those of his past.” Petry v. Petry, 41 Va. App. 782, 793, 589 S.E.2d 458, 463 (2003). The trial court did just that in this case. The court also added that the supervision requirement was not necessarily permanent, but was considered “appropriate at this point.” App. at 181. Husband remains free to ask the court to lift the supervision requirement at a later time upon the presentation of evidence justifying a modification of the court’s order.

One last point deserves mention. Husband notes on brief that the trial court took into account that, during the pendente lite period, supervised visitation had been generally successful. “This is twisted logic,” husband counters. Appellant’s Br. at 27 n.10. “It is like rewarding a model prisoner with indefinite incarceration because he seemed to be doing so well in prison.” Id. The trial court’s decision, husband continues, can be analogized to using a “chainsaw” instead of a “scalpel” to address the contested issue. Id. at 28. If the purpose of this hyperbole was to persuade us, it fell short of doing so.

We think it quite sensible for the trial court to consider whether the pendente lite period of supervised visitation was successful. The court noted husband acted appropriately, and “[i]t is clear that the husband and children enjoy their time together.” App. at 180. If that were not true — that is, if the supervision requirement caused the husband to misbehave or the children to despise their time with him — the trial court would have necessarily needed to rethink the available options. In this respect, the court’s logic does not appear twisted. Nor does its decision appear to be the work of either a lumberjack or a surgeon, but rather that of a prudent jurist.

B. THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM

Husband next argues the trial court erred in considering the guardian ad litem reports, which husband asserts contain inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony. On appeal, husband also argues the court should not have considered the GAL’s recommendation on the issue of supervised visitation. We find the first assertion moot and the second waived.

With respect to the GAL’s reports, husband objected to them being treated as evidence and admitted as exhibits. See Plaintiff’s Brief Re: Evidentiary Issues, at 4 (Nov. 15, 2010) (arguing that “the court should refrain from admitting the GAL’s report[s] into evidence”); Plaintiff’s Brief Regarding Guardian Ad Litem, at 8 (Nov. 15, 2010) (requesting that “the reports of the guardian ad litem be excluded from evidence”). At trial, husband’s counsel again objected to the admission of the GAL’s reports into evidence:

I have to say that as for the guardian ad litem’s report. I also object to that, parts of it, because there is a lot of hearsay, even hearsay on hearsay in there as well as the guardian ad litem’s apparently expert opinions that she is offering that I don’t think she is qualified to offer. . . . So there is no statutory basis for that to come into evidence and we object to it. She is free to make arguments based on the evidence that’s before the Court, but she is not free to just submit a report that is itself evidence.

App. at 409-10.

In its letter opinion, the trial court noted that “husband objects to [the GAL’s] written reports as hearsay; however, none of the reports have even been offered as evidence. Because no one is asking for their admission, the Court has no reason to rule on the admissibility of the reports.” Id. at 168. The trial court acknowledged it was bound only by “the evidence and testimony presented at trial.” Id. The court, therefore, did not admit the GAL’s reports into evidence and did not rely on any inadmissible hearsay or expert opinion contained in the GAL’s reports.12 This undisputed fact moots husband’s argument on appeal that doing so was error.

With respect to the issue of supervised visitation, the trial court did take the GAL’s recommendation into account. See Letter Op. at 18 (App. at 178) (“The guardian ad litem recommends that supervised visitation continue unaltered at this point.”). At no point, however, did husband object to the trial court considering the GAL’s recommendation on supervised visitation. To the contrary, while objecting to the admissibility of the GAL’s reports, husband expressly acknowledged that the court was nonetheless “bound to consider the recommendation” of the GAL. See Plaintiff’s Brief Regarding Guardian Ad Litem, at 8 (Nov. 15, 2010).13

On appeal, husband claims the trial court “attempted to finesse the issue.” Appellant’s Br. at 40. According to husband, by considering the GAL’s recommendation but not her reports, the trial court embraced a “legal absurdity . . . reminiscent of the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland — whose grin remained even after the entire cat disappeared.” Id. at 41. The alleged absurdity husband allegorically criticizes on appeal, however, is the very one he expressly endorsed in the trial court. While contesting the admissibility of the GAL’s reports, husband expressly conceded the trial court’s obligation to “consider the recommendation” of the GAL. See Plaintiff’s Brief Regarding Guardian Ad Litem, at 8 (Nov. 15, 2010).

We will not notice a claimed error “which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal.” Rahnema v. Rahnema, 47 Va. App. 645, 663, 626 S.E.2d 448, 457 (2006) (citation omitted). A litigant cannot “approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory.” Alford v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 706, 709, 696 S.E.2d 266, 267 (2010) (citation omitted).14 A closely related principle, Rule 5A:18, precludes appellants from raising for the first time on appeal “grounds asserted as a ‘basis for reversal’ of the trial court’s judgment.” White v. White, 56 Va. App. 214, 220, 692 S.E.2d 289, 292 (2010) (citation omitted). “Exceptions to Rule 5A:18 exist — but we employ them only in rare cases, and we never invoke them sua sponte.” Id. For these reasons, we do not address husband’s assertion that the trial court erred by considering the GAL’s recommendation.

C. DR. GANDERSON’S PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION In May 2009, the trial court ordered husband to undergo a psychosexual evaluation by Dr. Stephen Ganderson, whose fees and costs were to be split evenly between the parties. After evaluating husband and referring him to a polygraph examination, Dr. Ganderson issued his report in January 2010. At trial, husband objected to the report being admitted into evidence. The trial court denied the objection, but advised both parties that Dr. Ganderson, who was subpoenaed for trial, should take the stand and present his findings to the court. In his testimony, Dr. Ganderson addressed most, if not all, of his findings outlined in his written report. In both his testimony and his written report, Dr. Ganderson focused almost exclusively on husband’s current psychosexual state for the purpose of determining whether the past allegations of — and future propensity for — child molestation could be confirmed or discredited.

We agree with husband that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Dr. Ganderson’s written report. See Commonwealth v. Wynn, 277 Va. 92, 100, 671 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2009). This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. As in all cases, we must determine whether the error prejudiced the parties. Code § 8.01-678 makes “harmless-error review required in all cases.” Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. ix, ix, 396 S.E.2d 675, 675 (1990) (emphasis in original and text in parenthetical); see generally Kirby v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 691, 698, 653 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2007) (summarizing harmless error standard for nonstructural trial error).

The harmless error statute “puts a limitation on the powers of this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court — a limitation which we must consider on every application for an appeal and on the hearing of every case submitted to our judgment.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 648, 652, 131 S.E. 230, 231 (1926); see also Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 23 n.3, 635 S.E.2d 688, 690 n.3 (2006). “The harmless error check on judicial power has never been a begrudged limitation, but rather one ‘favored’ by Virginia courts, because it grows out of the ‘imperative demands of common sense,’ and consequently has been ‘deeply embedded in our jurisprudence.’” Kirby, 50 Va. App. at 699, 653 S.E.2d at 604 (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court did not base its decision to continue husband’s supervised visitation on any finding that husband molested his son or was somehow predisposed to do so based upon Dr. Ganderson’s psychosexual evaluation report. To be sure, nothing in the report asserted as much. Instead, the court’s decision rested, as husband acknowledges, on concerns about his abuse of alcohol and prescription drugs along with his erratic behavior.15 On these topics, the trial court relied primarily on wife’s testimony and husband’s medical and prescription drug records. To the limited extent that any inferences could arguably be drawn from Dr. Ganderson’s written report on these topics, the impact of his extensive testimony rendered the report itself largely inconsequential. For these reasons, we view the trial court’s erroneous admission of Dr. Ganderson’s written report as harmless error.

D. PARTIAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO WIFE

In the trial court, wife requested an award of her attorney fees. The trial court granted the request in part, ordering husband to pay 30% of wife’s fees and costs. The court found the “cost of litigation was greatly increased due to the husband’s behavior and unwillingness to cooperate as described throughout this opinion.” App. at 182. Husband argues on appeal the trial court erred in requiring him to pay any of wife’s fees. We disagree.

“Whether to award attorney’s fees ‘is a matter submitted to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.’” Smith v. Smith, 43 Va. App. 279, 290, 597 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2004) (quoting Kane v. Szymczak, 41 Va. App. 365, 375, 585 S.E.2d 349, 354 (2003)). Given the “unique set of equities” in each case, “principles of appellate review steer clear of inflexible rules and focus instead on ‘reasonableness under all the circumstances.’” Kane, 41 Va. App. at 375, 571 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Joynes v. Payne, 36 Va. App. 401, 429, 551 S.E.2d 10, 24 (2001)).

The trial court’s letter opinion recited various grounds for making a partial award of attorney fees to wife:

 “[T]he father has not complied with previous orders of the Court regarding the children. He has not been forthcoming with the guardian ad litem in her efforts to ascertain information pertinent to the best interests of the children or participated in family therapy.” App. at 178.

 “He has been exceedingly evasive, uncooperative, and paranoid throughout this case.” Id.  “[Husband] has not been forthcoming with providing his medical records to the guardian ad litem and has become increasingly rude to her. Throughout the proceedings, he has seemed understandably stressed. However, the Court also found him to be evasive, sarcastic, and uncooperative during the proceedings and has serious doubts as to his credibility. He certainly has exhibited a selective memory. He could recall the most specific details when questioned by his own attorneys but generally could not remember anything presented by the wife, the guardian ad litem, or the Court.” Id. at 173-74.

In addition, the record reflects that husband was represented by at least three law firms in the trial court.16 Two attorneys appeared for husband at several hearings and at trial. Husband sought an award for the fees of only one of his attorneys, who was not even husband’s lead counsel.17 Nevertheless, the award requested for that one attorney amounted to $89,281 in fees and costs, R. 830 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 4), significantly more than the $52,318 in fees and costs incurred by wife in the trial court. R. 863 (Defendant’s Ex. 1).18

Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife 30% of her attorney fees and costs.

E. EQUAL DIVISION OF GAL FEES AND COSTS

Finally, husband contends the trial court erred by ordering him to pay half of the GAL’s fees and costs. We find this assertion meritless. “The decision to apportion guardian fees between both parties or to one party alone also involves a matter within the chancellor’s discretion.” Kane, 41 Va. App. at 375, 585 S.E.2d at 354; Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, 16 Va. App. 314, 322, 429 S.E.2d 482, 487 (1993) (“Indivisible from the power of appointment is the associated power equitably to apportion the fees and expenses of the guardian ad litem as costs to the parties.”). Nothing in this record suggests the trial court abused its discretion in apportioning the GAL’s fees and costs equally between the parties.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err by requiring husband’s visitation be supervised “at this point” in time, App. at 181. Nor did the court commit any reversible error in its evidentiary rulings or award of fees and costs. We thus affirm.19

Affirmed.