Santa Fe Ltd. Partnership, L.L.C. v. Hollywood Associates, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
In Count I of die motion for judgment, plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract. In Count II, plaintiff pleads in the alternative that if no contract existed, he should recover in quantum meruit. Defendant argues these positions are mutually exclusive and die plaintiff should be required to elect which count he wishes to pursue. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion is overruled.
There are few restrictions or limitations on alternative pleadings. However, “it is well established in Virginia that a litigant will be precluded from taking inconsistent and mutually contradictory positions.” Dickson v. Dickson, 23 Va. App. 73 (1996). “[A] litigant will not be permitted to assume successively, inconsistent, and mutually contradictory positions” during the ongoing course of litigation. Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201 (1983). Thus, the issue is whether pleading breach of contract or in the alternative quantum meruit rises to the level of “mutually contradictory positions.”
Defendant cites Southern Biscuit Co. v. Lloyd, 174 Va. 299 (1940), for the proposition that “an express contract defining the rights of the parties necessarily precludes the existence of an implied contract of a different nature containing the same subject matter.” Thus, die defendant argues that because an express contract and implied contract cannot co-exist, Count I and Count Q are inconsistent and the plaintiff must choose one or die other. However, in Southern Biscuit, there was undisputably an express contract before the court.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.