Anderson v. Sharma

This matter came before the Court on several motions made by the Andersons. They moved for summary judgment on their bill of complaint, they moved to have their requests for admission deemed admitted, they moved for sanctions against defendants under Rule 4:12 of the Virginia Supreme Court, and they demurred to the Sharmas’ cross-bill.

The motion for summary judgment is denied. Summary judgment is not entered when facts remain in material dispute. Emerson v. Decker Realty Corp., 232 Va. 71 (1986). The facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the creation of the promissory note and deed of trust and the subsequent alleged pay-off still remain in dispute.

The request to have the Sharmas’ response to the request for admissions deemed to be admitted is denied. The evidence as to when the Sharmas were served is conflicting. There is a discrepancy as to when the Sharmas were served because of the disparity in the dates the process server swore to on his American Eagle Process Servers form and the affidavit he filed with the court.

The motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 4:12(d) of the Virginia Supreme Court for failure of the Sharmas to attend the deposition is denied. The certificate of service of the praecipe and notice of motion to quash the deposition and for a protective order, signed by Mr. Mack-all, is dated May 1, 1992. Therefore, the Andersons had sufficient notice that the Sharmas did not intend to appear.

*544The demurrer is sustained in part and overruled in part. The cross-bill, as a whole, does state a cause of action cognizable under Virginia law. The demurrer to paragraph fourteen is sustained with leave to amend within twenty-one days. The Andersons are incorrect in their assertion that defendants should have filed a counterclaim instead of a cross-bill against them. The Andersons are invited to look at Rule 2:13 of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules. The Andersons are not entitled to any costs in filing this demurrer.

March 25, 1994

On January 12, 1994, this Court entered a decree in the instant case, the seventeenth paragraph of which ordered:

The Court, having fully considered the proceedings in this case, the record of baseless litigation instituted in this Court by the Complainant, Charles M. Anderson, against various judges and attorneys, hereby orders the said Charles M. Anderson not to institute any more suits of any kind in this Circuit without obtaining prior leave of Court.

By Complainant’s letters dated March 2, 1994, and February 14, 1994, and Complainant’s Objections to Court Actions at January 10, 1994 Motions and Order Entered January 12, 1994, filed January 27, 1994, with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia, Complainant objects to the January 12, 1994, order of this Court. Specifically, Complainant objects to the seventeenth paragraph of the decree entered in this case on January 12, 1994, and prays the Court to remove the bar against instituting any more suits in this Circuit. Alternatively, Complainant asks the Court to grant leave of the Court to institute an additional action against Chief Judge Richard J. Jamborsky of this Court. Finally, Complainant seeks an extension in time to pay the sanction ordered in the decree of January 12, 1994. Accordingly, the Court has treated Complainant’s objections and letters as a motion for reconsideration on those issues.

After a careful and thorough review of the record of litigation instituted in this Court by Complainant Charles M. Anderson, the Court affirms the decree barring Charles M. Anderson from instituting further suits in this Circuit without prior leave of Court, denies Complainant’s request to institute an action against Chief Judge Jamborsky, denies the prayer for an extension of time and, therefore, denies the motion for *545reconsideration. In fact, paragraph 17 of the decree of January 12, 1994, should be enlarged.

A review of the litigation brought in this Court by Charles M. Anderson reveals a litany of vitriolic and baseless actions replete with allegations repeatedly determined to be unsupported by fact and without merit.1 Further review of the disposition of these actions reveals consistent dismissals with prejudice of the cases and voluntary non-suits entered by Mr. Anderson, frequently in the face of motions for summary judgments and motions for sanctions.2 In addition, the record of litigation instituted by Mr. Anderson in this Court reflects a continuing pattern of frivolous, vindictive, and harassing suits and actions brought against judges, attorneys, litigants, and others associated with past litigation involving Mr. Anderson.3 The record of litigation instituted by Mr. Anderson further reveals a litany of vitriolic and bizarre *546statements and allegations and a pattern of equating adverse rulings with alleged bias by the judiciary of the Court.4

*547The Court has an inherent power to protect its jurisdiction from repetitious, frivolous and harassing conduct which abuses the judicial process.5 A Court’s power to require a litigant to seek leave of court before instituting suit or filing pleadings has been upheld when necessary to prevent further abuse of the judicial system.6 In In re Martin*548Trígona, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed an order which enjoined a litigant from filing “any new action or proceeding in any court (state or federal) without first obtaining leave of that court,” due to the disruptive, frivolous, harassing and meritless filings.7 The pro se litigant of In re Martin-Trigona had a history of litigation similar to the documented history of Mr. Anderson: vexatious, frivolous, and intended to cause harassment and needless expense of defendants who were judges, lawyers, and “individuals who in one way or another had any relationship, directly or indirectly, to any matter concerning him.”8 The Court of Appeals noted in In re Martin-Trigona that:

in cases such as the instant one, private parties and their counsel (who may have to notify an insurance carrier of actions against them no matter how frivolous) may well decide that the course of wisdom is not to seek injunctive relief, which may only generate new harassing actions, but to hope the malicious litigant finds new quarry.9

In the instant case, this Court finds that it possesses both the power and duty to protect the public and judicial system from Mr. Anderson’s abusive penchant for litigation. Therefore, after review of the record of baseless litigation instituted in this Court by Charles M. Anderson, the Court concludes that the decree of January 12, 1994, entered by this Court barring Mr. Anderson from instituting “any more suits of any kind in this Circuit without obtaining prior leave of Court” is merited and necessary to prevent continued abuse of the legal system.

In addition, to preserve and protect the public and judicial system of Virginia, this Court concludes that it is necessary to further establish a procedure for appropriate restrictions on institution of new actions by *549Mr. Anderson in all courts of the state of Virginia. By order attached to and entered contemporaneously with this letter opinion, henceforth, Mr. Anderson is required to: inform the court in which he seeks to file of pertinent facts concerning the action he intends to bring, including the existence of this injunction order and of any outstanding litigation against the named defendants, and that he obtain leave of that court to file the action. The Court concludes that such action is necessary and within its inherent authority.

The Court next addresses Mr. Anderson’s request to institute a second suit against Chief Judge Jamborsky. His proposed suit would allege denial of due process and Mr. Anderson’s alleged loss of consortium with his wife. The Court notes that no cause of action exists in Virginia for loss of consortium; further, when transcribed the transcript of the hearing in which the decision was issued by the Court to allow the deposition of Mr. Anderson’s wife, as well as the order, reflects that this Court gave Mr. Anderson an opportunity to present medical testimony concerning his wife’s condition and to place limitations on the time and method of deposition of Mrs. Anderson. Accordingly, the Court denies the request to permit institution of an action against Chief Judge Jamborsky.

Lastly, the Court addresses Complainant’s request for an extension of time in which to make payment of a monetary sanction imposed by the decree entered January 12, 1994, in this case. In two previous incidences the Complainant has been granted an extension of time by the Court, but continually granting Mr. Anderson an extension defeats the purpose of sanctions which is to deter his conduct. Therefore, the request for an extension of time in which to satisfy a sanction is denied.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and as ordered and decreed in the attached order, Complainant’s motion to reconsider is denied as to all issues.

Order

This comes before the Court on the Motion of Complainant, Charles M. Anderson, pro se, to reconsider the decree of this Court entered on January 12, 1994, in this matter, and Complainants’ request that this Court vacate the decree, which in the seventeenth paragraph orders Complainant Anderson “not to institute any more suits of any kind in this Circuit without obtaining prior leave of Court,” and Complainant *550Anderson’s request for leave of Court to institute an action against Chief Judge Richard Jamborsky, and Complainant Anderson’s request for an extension of time to make payment of a sanction ordered in the decree of January 12, 1994,

And it appearing to the Court upon due and proper consideration that for the reasons set forth by letter opinion, a copy of which is attached hereto, that the Complainant Anderson’s motions should be denied, it is, therefore, adjudged, ordered, and decreed that Complainant Anderson’s motions are denied.

And it is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that for the reasons set forth in the letter opinion that Complainant Charles M. Anderson is restrained from further filings in this Court and the courts of the state of Virginia without obtaining prior leave of the Court, in which the action is to be instituted, pursuant to the following procedure: that Complainant shall inform the court in question of pertinent facts concerning the action he intends to bring, including the existence of this injunction order and of any outstanding litigation against the proposed defendants, and that Mr. Anderson obtain leave of that court to file the action.

And it is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that to obtain leave of a court to institute an action, that Complainant Anderson shall:

1. File with any such complaint a motion captioned, “Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File”;

2. Attach a copy of this order and letter opinion as exhibit 1 to that motion;

3. Attach a sworn affidavit under penalty of law that the claim he wishes to present is a new claim never before raised by him in any court, and that such claim is neither frivolous nor intended to harass;

4. Attach as exhibit 3 to that motion an identification by listing the caption of each and every suit previously filed by him or on his behalf in any court against each and every defendant to the suit he wishes to file;

5. Attach as exhibit 4 to that motion a copy of each such complaint and a certified record of its disposition;

6. Serve a copy of this order on each defendant if and when leave to serve the complaint in the new case is granted.

And it is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that failure to comply with the terms of this order may be sufficient grounds for a court to deny any motion for leave to file made by Charles M. Anderson, and *551further that failure to advise a court in which he has filed a lawsuit of this order or to comply with this order may be considered by the appropriate court as a sufficient defense to sustain a motion to dismiss such a lawsuit.

And it is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that a copy of this order and attached letter opinion be served on the Complainant forthwith.