MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs filed this suit to enforce the terms of an alleged 1981 oral agreement between their now deceased father and stepmother to execute mutual and reciprocal wills designed to ensure that the testators’ jointly-owned estate would, on the death of the survivor, pass in equal shares to the father and stepmother’s respective heirs. To prove the existence of the alleged agreement, plaintiffs rely in substantial part on the testimony of an heir and her spouse concerning statements made by the deceased testators. This implicates Virginia’s Dead Man’s Statute, Va.Code § 8.01-397, which provides, in pertinent part, that no judgment shall be rendered against a decedent’s estate or her representative in favor of an “adverse or interested party” based on that party’s uncorroborated testimony. At issue here, therefore, is whether the spouse of an heir in a will contest is an “adverse or interested party” for purposes of the Dead Man’s Statute, when the heir admits that the spouse will share in the proceeds of the litigation should she prevail.

I

The three plaintiffs, Jane A. Stephens, Chauncey G. Alyea, and James Alyea, are the children of Louis Alyea, who died in September 1993. Defendants include (i) the heirs of Louis Alyea’s second wife, Genevieve Alyea,1 and (ii) the co-executors of Genevieve’s estate, Stephen B. Watts and Donald S. Caruthers. The pertinent facts disclose a family history not uncommon for the American scene in the latter *701half of the twentieth century. Louis Alyea married his first wife, Virginia Austin, in 1935, and from 1986 until 1943, they had three children together, the plaintiffs in this action. By 1946, however, Louis and Virginia Alyea separated; their divorce became final in 1952, by which time Virginia and the three children had moved to Eus-tis, Florida. In 1954, Louis Alyea married again, this time to Genevieve Fredsall, a lawyer employed by the federal government, whose heirs are the defendants. Together, Louis and Genevieve bought a house in Falls Church, Virginia, where they remained until their deaths. They had no children together.

In 1956, Jane Alyea married Martin Stephens. At that time, Jane, seeking to establish a closer relationship with her father, made several trips with her husband from their home in Florida to visit Louis and Genevieve in Virginia. Whatever success this effort produced was not permanent, as the relationship apparently became strained once Jane and Martin Stephens had children; Louis and Genevieve Alyea, it seems, did not enjoy the presence of small children in their house. As a result, from 1964 until 1979, Jane’s contacts with her father and stepmother were primarily by mail and telephone.

Chauncey Alyea’s relationship with his father and stepmother was of a similar nature. During the period from 1965 until 1967, Chauncey lived in the Washington, D.C., area, and saw Louis and Genevieve only occasionally. Eventually, Chauncey returned to Florida, where in 1971 he married, and later had children. He and his family traveled from Florida to Falls Church, Virginia, to visit Louis and Genevieve on various occasions throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

James Alyea, who also lived in the Washington, D.C., area, apparently had little or no contact with his father and stepmother until 1979, when he was hospitalized as a result of a serious automobile accident. Based on their past differences, Louis Alyea at first would not visit his son in the hospital, but at Jane’s urging, he eventually relented. After visiting James at the hospital, Louis, apparently moved by his son’s brush with death, hired- a lawyer to defend him in the lawsuit arising from the accident.

Old wounds began to heal, and from that time until Louis’s death in 1993, James spent more time with his father and his stepmother. Indeed, the event apparently kindled a family renewal of sorts, as all three children began spending more time with Louis and Genevieve, visiting more frequently and sharing important events together. For example, James celebrated his fiftieth birthday with his father and stepmother, and all of Louis’s children were present for Louis’s eightieth birthday celebration in 1992. And at some point in the 1980s, Louis and Genevieve Alyea began an annual tradition of giving each of Louis’s children a Christmas gift of $500. Plaintiffs each believe that Louis regretted his shortcomings as a father and sought to make amends by making generous cash gifts to his children during his life, and by providing that his children would receive half of his estate after his death. As evidence of Louis’s graciousness, Chauncey claims that his father made several comments to the effect that he was wealthy and planned to share his wealth with his children, including the statements, “I am a millionaire,” “I have more money than I can possibly spend,” “your [plaintiffs’] children have been taken care of in our wills,” and “we [Louis and Genevieve Alyea] are leaving everything to the survivor and then the estate is to be split between the two families.”

Plaintiffs also contend that in 1987 Louis and Genevieve told Jane and Martin Stephens that they had agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. According to the Stephens, Louis, in this conversation, said (i) that he and Genevieve had “agreed that our estate will be divided evenly between our two families,” and (ii) that the property was jointly owned to avoid the expense of probate and estate taxes when *702the first one died. Genevieve allegedly affirmed her husband’s statement by saying, “That’s right.” The morning after this conversation, Martin Stephens claims he compared Louis’s and Genevieve’s wills, and concluded that one was indeed the mirror image of the other. The Stephens’s testimony concerning this 1987 conversation is central to plaintiffs’ suit.

Louis passed away in September 1993. His will, executed on February 20, 1981, was consistent in significant respects with the conversation Louis and Genevieve allegedly had with Jane and Martin Stephens in 1987. Specifically, Louis’s will provided (i) that in the event Genevieve were to survive him, Louis’s estate would pass to Genevieve, and (ii) that in the event Louis were to survive Genevieve, the estate would be shared equally between Louis’s and Genevieve’s respective heirs. The will also reflected that Genevieve and Louis then jointly owned the entire estate. Yet, not all aspects of the alleged 1987 conversation are reflected in Louis’s will; it contained no reference to Genevieve’s will, nor any language indicating that it was mutual and reciprocal with respect to her will. In any event, by the terms of Louis’s will and the fact that Louis and Genevieve were joint owners of Louis’s estate, Genevieve, as the survivor, assumed sole ownership of the joint estate.

After the death of their father, plaintiffs maintained contact with Genevieve, although visits from the out-of-town plaintiffs were less frequent. Only James, who lived in the Washington, D.C., area, saw his stepmother regularly. Jane and her husband, Martin, made occasional trips from Florida to see Genevieve, and Jane and Genevieve also corresponded. Occasionally, the correspondence and conversations between Jane and Genevieve touched on financial matters, including the ultimate disposition of the Alyea estate. Yet, none of the letters written by Genevieve and conversations between Jane and Genevieve mentioned the alleged oral agreement between Louis and Genevieve to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. In a letter dated November 4, 1993, Genevieve advised Jane that she planned to make a cash gift to Jane by making her joint owner of a $25,-000 bank account. In the same letter, Genevieve described Louis’s will, and noted that she filed it, although she was not required to, as the estate was jointly owned. Genevieve assured Jane that, “I trust you know that I will do everything I can to ensure that your father’s wishes are carried out.” The remaining correspondence in the record did not discuss Louis’s will or Genevieve’s plans for disposition of her estate, although it does reflect that Jane and Genevieve maintained a cordial relationship in the years following Louis’s death.

On at least one occasion, plaintiffs contend that Genevieve spoke with Jane and Martin about her plans for her estate. In August 1995, Genevieve allegedly asked Jane a series of probing and frank questions about the Stephens’s financial affairs. After Jane noted that she and her husband faced significant financial hurdles, including a mortgage on their home and debt from their children’s college educations, Genevieve allegedly assured her, “I need to make some changes in my will and now I know what to do. You and Janet [Ge-nieve’s niece, Janet Watts] are going to be residual legatees.... Roger [Genevieve’s brother] has plenty of money.” Plaintiffs claim that Genevieve later repeated the comment about making Jane a residual legatee in Martin’s presence.

Genevieve died in May 1999. Her last will and testament, executed on December 22, 1995, was far from a mirror image of Louis’s. Instead, Genevieve left a specific cash bequest to each of the plaintiffs, totaling $100,000.2 Similarly, the will provided specific bequests for most of Genevieve’s nieces and nephews, except that her brother (now deceased) and her niece each re*703ceived half of the residual estate. Plaintiffs claim that Genevieve’s estate was worth approximately $3.0 million at her death, which is substantially the same as the value of the estate six years earlier at the time of Louis’s death.

Plaintiffs now claim that in 1981 Genevieve and Louis Alyea agreed to execute mutual, reciprocal, and hence irrevocable wills, to provide that their jointly-owned estate would eventually pass in equal parts to his heirs and to hers. If this agreement existed, Louis performed his obligation by executing his 1981 will and not revoking it before he died, while Genevieve breached the agreement by executing a will not in conformity with the agreement, thereby revoking her earlier, conforming will, assuming that such a will existed. Plaintiffs now seek to enforce the terms of .the alleged 1981 oral agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that Genevieve’s will should have distributed her estate consistent with paragraphs 3.A and 3.B of Louis’s will, which provide how Louis’s estate would have been distributed had he survived his wife.

Defendants now seek summary judgment, on the ground that the sole evidence offered as proof of the oral agreement may not be relied upon pursuant to the terms of Virginia’s Dead Man’s Statute, see Va. Code § 8.01-397, and that, even assuming the Dead Man’s Statute is satisfied, plaintiffs have not proffered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.

II

Established Virginia law holds that two testators may enter into a contract to execute mutual and reciprocal wills,3 and that by doing so, each testator is bound to bequeath his or her estate according to the terms of the agreement.4 In essence, mutual and reciprocal wills are the product of a contract by which each party agrees (i) to execute a will according to certain terms, and (ii) not to revoke the will so executed.5 Where two testators make such a contract, the will executed pursuant to that contract therefore becomes irrevocable with respect to the agreed terms. See Williams, 96 S.E. at 750.6 In that event, when the survivor fails to execute a will that conforms to the agreement, or revokes a previously execut*704ed conforming will, the person or persons whom the promised will would have bene-fitted may sue to “prevent ... [the] revocation which would destroy the compact or the trust created” in their favor by the testators’ contract. Williams, 96 S.E. at 750. Of course, while both testators are still living, they may agree to change, modify or revoke an agreement to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. But if there is no change, modification, or revocation by the testators, and one of them dies having performed, the other party’s final will and testament must conform to the agreement. See Williams, 96 S.E. at 751 (finding that a “mutual agreement between the cotesta-tors” to a joint will “became fully executed ... and irrevocable by the survivor” on the death of the first decedent). In that event, the survivor’s will becomes, in effect, irrevocable.

Evidence of the testators’ contract to execute mutual and reciprocal wills may be adduced from several sources. Thus, it may appear in the terms of the wills executed pursuant to the contract; it may be apparent from the testimony of “competent witnesses who testify to admissions of the testators”; or it may be implicit in “the circumstances and relations of the parties and [the terms of] the instrument.” 7 Yet, where the person seeks to enforce a contract to execute a will that contradicts the terms of the decedent’s final will, the person will prevail only upon a showing of “clear, definite and convincing evidence that with reasonable certainty establishes] the making of the contract and [proof of] its terms.”8

Thus, to prevail at trial plaintiffs must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Louis and Genevieve agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. Specifically, plaintiffs must prove that the decedents agreed to execute wills providing that the survivor’s estate would pass in equal parts to his heirs and to hers, and that the will executed in conformity with the agreement would be irrevocable. Yet, the only evidence that Louis and Genevieve made such an agreement is the testimony of Jane and Martin with respect to the 1987 conversation, and according to Virginia’s Dead Man’s Statute, the uncorroborated testimony of an “adverse or interested party” may not form the basis of a judgment against the decedent’s estate in the adverse or interested party’s favor. See Va.Code 8.01-397.9 In this regard, *705Jane’s testimony falls squarely within the terms of the Statute: She is indisputably an “adverse party” and her testimony thus must be corroborated before it can serve as the basis of a judgment against Genevieve’s estate in her favor. See id.; Merchants’ Supply Co., Inc., v. Hughes’ Ex’rs, 139 Va. 212, 123 S.E. 355, 356 (1924) (noting that an “adverse party” is “one who is a party to the record”). As corroboration for Jane’s testimony, plaintiffs offer the testimony of her husband, Martin, who also witnessed the critical 1987 conversation. But, of course, Martin’s testimony cannot serve to corroborate his wife’s testimony unless Martin himself is not an “adverse or interested party.” 10 So the question sharply presented is whether Martin’s status as a party’s spouse, by itself, or in conjunction with other factors present here, mark him as an “adverse or interested party.”

No Virginia authority directly addresses this question.11 Yet, existing authority does make clear that the phrase “adverse or interested party” refers to two, distinct categories of persons, namely “adverse” parties and “interested” parties. See Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v. Robertson’s Ex’r, 135 Va. 247, 116 S.E. 476, 480 (1923).12 And the case law further confirms that an “adverse party” is “one who is a party to the record,”13 while an “interested party” “is one, not a party to the record, who is pecuniarily interested in the result of the suit.” Merchants’ Supply Co., 123 S.E. at 356 (1924).14

*706Martin, it is clear, is not a party to this lawsuit, or not otherwise a “party to the record,” and thus is not an “adverse party.” The sole question, therefore, is whether Martin is an “interested party,” for if he is, then his testimony may not serve to corroborate his wife’s testimony. Whether the spousal relationship by itself renders Stephens “interested” is doubtful, both on principle15 and because authority from Virginia16 and elsewhere17 point per*707suasively to this result. In any event, it is unnecessary to resolve this question because there exists in this case an additional factor that is dispositive in this regard: Jane has admitted in her deposition testimony that her husband will share in her inheritance should she prevail in this litigation. Where, as here, the party to the record declares that her spouse will share in the inheritance, should the will contest succeed, the spouse is an “interested party” whose testimony may not serve as corroborating evidence under the Dead Man’s Statute. This result follows from the test for determining when a party is “interested” under Virginia law.

The Supreme Court of Virginia has noted that a person is an interested party when that person is “in some way ... beneficially interested in the judgment or decree which is sought to be obtained.” Robertson’s Ex’r v. Atlantic Coast Realty Co., 129 Va. 494, 106 S.E. 521, 524 (1921). In that regard, a person has a beneficial interest in litigation where, inter alia, that person has “an interest in the property concerned in the litigation which may be beneficial [sic] or adversely affected by the result of the suit” or “a beneficial interest in the fund sought to be recovered.” Ratliff, 153 Va. at 324, 149 S.E. at 411 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).18 In determining whether a person is “interested” under the analysis, the operative factor is the person’s financial stake in the litigation, rather than the person’s legal or personal association with the party to the litigation.19 Thus, where a corporation is a party to litigation, the corporation’s stockholders are “interested” parties by virtue of their pecuniary interest in the corporation,20 while agents or employees of the corporation may not be classified as interested merely by virtue of their legal relationship to the corporation.21 Similarly, it is clear that the witness’s financial interest in the litigation must exist at the time his testimony is given.22 Thus, a person is an *708“interested” party, only where the person has an actual and present financial stake in the outcome of the litigation.

It is also clear in Virginia that a person’s pecuniary interest in the outcome of litigation may be made manifest by circumstances external to the precise legal claim for which the testimony is introduced. Consistent with the principle that a person is an interested party when that person is “in some way ... beneficially interested in the judgment or decree which is sought to be obtained,”23 the Supreme Court of Virginia has determined that a person’s interest in the outcome of litigation may be made “plainly manifest” from circumstances external to the legal claim. See Ratliff, 153 Va. at 322, 149 S.E. at 410-11. Thus, a person may be an interested party, even where that person is not a party to the actual legal claim, and the “judgment as entered [is not] in terms in [the person’s] favor.” Id., 149 S.E. at 410-11. For example, in Ratliff, a husband possessed a claim against a decedent, which, if successful, would have extinguished the debt owed by the husband and his wife jointly to the decedent, and for which the decedent’s estate had sued to recover. On these facts, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the wife’s testimony could not corroborate her husband’s under the Dead Man’s Statute because her own interest in the husband’s claim was “plainly manifest”; their joint debt to the decedent’s estate would be “cancelled and satisfied” should judgment be rendered in her husband’s favor on his claim. Id., 140 S.E. at 411. Put differently, the wife had a direct, financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, even though she was not a direct beneficiary of her husband’s claim.24

Similarly, in this case, Martin’s interest in the outcome of his wife’s litigation is “plainly manifest,” in light of Jane’s sworn testimony that he will share in her inheritance if she prevails here. This testimony is consistent with their past practice: The record reflects that Jane had shared previous monetary gifts from her father and stepmother with her husband, typically by placing the funds in a joint account. Thus, while Martin’s interest in the outcome of the litigation is, in a formal sense, contingent on his wife’s independent decision whether ultimately to share her inheritance with him, his actual interest in the litigation is made “plainly manifest” by the record; she has admitted that this litigation is for his immediate financial benefit, as well as for hers. In sum, because Martin has an immediate and direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation, his testimony may not be used to corroborate that of his wife.

This does not end the analysis, however, for it remains to be determined whether Jane’s and Martin’s testimony is otherwise sufficiently corroborated in the record to survive summary judgment. The question whether adverse or interested testimony is sufficiently corroborated is not subject to “any hard and fast rule”; rather, “each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances.” Brooks v. Worthington, 206 Va. 352, 357, 143 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1965). It is typically a question of fact, which “in quantity ... [,] must be more than a scintilla” to create a triable issue. Timberlake’s Administrator v. Pugh, 158 Va. 397, 403, 163 S.E. 402, 404 (1932).

The Supreme Court of Virginia has identified the key principles that govern the question whether evidence corroborates interested or adverse testimony. See Hereford v. Paytes, 226 Va. 604, 608, 311 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1984) (discussing the principles). In essence, corroborative evidence is “evidence [that] tends to confirm *709and strengthen the testimony of the witness,” and demonstrates the “probability of its truth.” Id., 311 S.E.2d at 792. Thus, the testimony need not be corroborated on “all material points,” and the “corroborative evidence [need not] be sufficient by itself to support a verdict”; instead, the corroborative evidence need only give the testimony “more strength than was had before.” Id., 311 S.E.2d at 792 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).25 But evidence does not corroborate adverse or interested testimony when it merely confirms or supports a fact the testimony might reflect, but is not otherwise in dispute. Instead, to be corroborative of the interested testimony, the evidence must support the testimony “on some essential fact whose establishment is necessary to sustain the judgment.” Ratliff, 153 Va. at 326, 149 S.E. at 412 (emphasis added). Put another way, corroborative evidence “supports] some essential allegation or issue raised by the pleadings ... which ..., if unsupported, would be fatal to the case.” Vaughn v. Shank, 248 Va. 224, 227, 445 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1994) (emphasis added). Accordingly, where the interested party’s testimony is admitted to prove an essential, disputed allegation, the evidence offered as corroboration must enhance the probability that the disputed allegation is true. 26 Yet, evidence is not corroborative simply because it is consistent with the disputed allegation; instead, the evidence offered as corroboration must “of itself, without the aid of any other evidence, exhibit its corroborative character by pointing with reasonable certainty to the allegation or issue which it supports.” Timberlake’s Adm’r, 158 Va. at 403, 163 S.E. at 404. Evidence that is neutral with respect to the truthfulness of the essential allegation is thus not sufficient corroboration within the meaning of the Dead Man’s Statute.27

In this case, the disputed allegation for which the testimony is offered is the existence of an oral agreement to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. So, the evidence proffered as corroboration must increase the probability that the oral agreement was made. Yet, assuming that Jane’s and Martin’s proffered testimony, if believed, establishes the existence of the decedents’ oral agreement to execute mutual and reciprocal wills, the record contains no other evidence that Genevieve and Louis bound each other by contract to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. First, the sole evidence that Genevieve ever' executed a mirror image of her husband’s will is found in Jane’s and Martin’s testimony, and accordingly their testimony that Gene*710vieve actually executed a mirror image will finds no corroboration in the record.28 The record is similarly devoid of any evidence that Genevieve and Louis told disinterested third parties, or other interested or adverse parties for that matter, that they had agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills.29 Nor, significantly, is there any evidence of such an agreement in Louis’s will, which is silent on the question whether Genevieve had agreed to execute a will that was mutual and reciprocal with respect to his.30 And although the record reflects that had Louis survived his wife, he would have bequeathed his estate equally between his heirs and hers, there is simply no evidence in the record, other than Jane’s and Martin’s testimony, that Genevieve ever bound herself by contract to follow her husband’s lead.31

In fact, most of the so-called corroborating evidence is either silent as to the alleged oral agreement, or diminishes the probability that the agreement existed. The comments allegedly made by Louis to Chauncey and his wife, Ann,32 in the 1970s and 1980s reflect Louis’s desire to provide for his children on his death, but do not support the existence of an oral agreement between Louis and his wife.33 Similarly, the correspondence between Jane and Genevieve is silent on the question whether Genevieve was bound to execute a will that was the mirror image of Louis’s, and actually suggests that Genevieve did not believe she was so bound.34 In short, the *711evidence in the record does not support, or even suggest, the conclusion that Louis and Genevieve agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills.

Finally, plaintiffs contend that Jane’s testimony is corroborated by the underlying theme of plaintiffs ease, namely that the case represents the classic story of a stepmother’s efforts to disinherit her husband’s natural heirs after his death. Further, the record reflects that the natural objects of Genevieve’s bounty, her heirs, were different from the natural objects of Louis’s bounty, his children. Indeed, the record viewed in a light favorable to the plaintiffs suggests that Louis grew fond of his children in his old age, and sought to provide for them in his later years. Over time, his testamentary interests may have diverged from those of his wife, who apparently enjoyed the company of Louis’s children, but was fonder of her own natural heirs, especially her brother, Roger Fredsall, and her niece, Janet Watts. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that Louis, to ensure that his children would receive a portion of his estate after he and Genevieve passed away, agreed with Genevieve to execute mutual and reciprocal wills providing how their estate would be distributed after they both had died. But this is simply plaintiffs’ theory of the case, and plaintiffs’ theory by itself presents no evidence that Louis and Genevieve agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills with their respect to their joint estate.35 In short, without Jane’s and Martin’s testimony, plaintiffs’ theory of the case carries no weight, and to allow that theory to supply the necessary corroboration would render the corroboration requirement nugatory.

For these reasons, no reasonable factfin-der 36 could conclude that the evidence presented by plaintiffs in this case corroborates the interested testimony of Martin Stephens and the adverse testimony of Jane Stephens to the effect that Louis and Genevieve Alyea agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. Furthermore, it is plain that in the absence of Jane’s and Martin’s testimony, no reasonable factfin-der could find, by clear and convincing evidence,37 that Louis and Genevieve agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal wills. Louis may have wished that his wife had left more of her estate to his children, and plaintiffs may think it unfair that she did not, but the law does not require a spouse to follow her husband’s wishes unless she has contractually obligated herself to do so. On the current record, plaintiffs cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that Genevieve and Louis Alyea agreed to execute mutual and reciprocal *712wills, and for that reason summary judgment must be entered in defendants’ favor.

An appropriate Order will enter.