MEMORANDUM OPINION

This insurance coverage declaratory judgment action is unusual. The central *6issue presented is whether an insurer can deny coverage to an insured for causing the death of a child committed to the insured’s care on the basis of policy exclusions for intentional acts and physical abuse where, as here, the insured has pled guilty to felony child abuse and felony murder under Virginia law. But before this central issue can be addressed, it is necessary to resolve defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of abstention in favor of a currently-pending negligence wrongful death action in Virginia state court. In other words, the threshold issue addressed here is whether the coverage issue should be decided now or delayed until after completion of the state wrongful death action.

As this matter has been fully briefed and argued orally, it is now ripe for disposition.

I.1

Plaintiff Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. Nationwide issued the homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”) at issue in this case to Paul Fraraccio, the named insured, for the period of May 24, 2012 to May 24, 2013. Defendant Jessica Anne Fraraccio (“Fraraccio”) is Paul Fraraccio’s daughter, and she qualifies as an insured under the Policy. Fraraccio is currently incarcerated at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women in Fluvan-na County, Virginia, as she pled guilty to felony child abuse and felony murder under Virginia law for the death of Elijah Nealey. Guardians ad litem represent Fra-raccio in this declaratory judgment action and in the state court wrongful death action.2

Defendants Jennifer and Michael Nealey (the “Nealeys”) are Elijah’s parents and administrators of Elijah’s estate. As such, they brought the underlying wrongful death action against Fraraccio now pending in the Circuit Court of Prince William County, Virginia.3

*7The facts underlying this insurance coverage dispute stem from the death of 23-month old Elijah Nealey at his home in Manassas, Virginia on August 22, 2012 while under Fraraccio’s care. In October 2013, Fraraccio pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Prince William County, Virginia to two felonies: (1) abuse and neglect of a child under Va. Code § 18.2-371.1(A), which provides that any “person responsible for the care of a child under the age of 18” is guilty of a felony if “by willful act or willful omission or refusal to provide any necessary care for the child’s health [the person] causes or permits serious injury to the life or health of such child” and (2) felony murder under Va. Code § 18.2-33, which provides that the “killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, while in the' prosecution of some felonious act ... is murder of the second degree.” In January 2014, Frarac-cio was sentenced to forty years for the felony murder conviction' and a consecutive ten-year sentence for the child abuse conviction, for a total of fifty years incarceration. Forty-five years of that fifty-year sentence were suspended.

In April 2014, the Circuit Court of Prince William County appointed the Nea-leys as administrators of Elijah’s estate. Then, in August 2014, the Nealeys filed a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Prince William County against Frarac-cio, alleging that Fraraccio negligently caused Elijah’s death while Elijah was in Fraraccio’s care. The Nealeys seek $4,000,000 in compensatory damages against Fraraccio. Nationwide is not a party to the Nealeys’ wrongful death action.

Fraraccio notified Nationwide of the state court wrongful death action, seeking coverage under the Policy. As relevant here, the Policy’s personal liability coverage provision states that Nationwide will defend the insured at Nationwide’s expense and “will pay damages an insured is legally obligated to pay due to an occurrence,”, up to the Policy limit of $500,000. PI. Ex. 1 at Gl. The Policy defines “occurrence” as bodily injury or death “resulting from an accident” during the Policy period. Id. at 1, Gl. Additionally, the policy includes two coverage exclusions: (1) an exclusion barring liability for bodily injury “caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured, including willful acts the result of which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured’s con-düct,” and (2) an exclusion barring coverage for bodily injury that “result[s] from acts or omissions relating directly or indirectly to” physical abuse. Id. at'HI, H2.

Nationwide filed this declaratory judgment action to resolve whether the Policy requires Nationwide to defend and indemnify Fraraccio in the underlying wrongful death action. Nationwide contends that the Policy does not afford coverage to Frarac-cio because (i) Elijah’s death did not result from an accident and therefore was not an “occurrence” under the Policy, (ii) the exclusion for willful acts applies given Fra-raccio’s guilty plea to felony child abuse, and (in) the exclusion for physical abuse also applies because Fraraccio pled guilty to abusing Elijah. After Nationwide filed this declaratory judgment action to resolve the coverage issue, the Nealeys filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in this action on the basis of abstention in favor of the pending state court wrongful death action, contending that the coverage issue can be more appropriately decided in state court.

*8II.

Because the Nealeys seek dismissal of this declaratory judgment action; the analysis appropriately begins with a review of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the circumstances in which it is appropriate to entertain such actions. The Act provides that in “a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .,. any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any. interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added).4 Based on the text of the Act, the Fourth Circuit has explained, that federal courts have “some measure of discretion” to decline to entertain’a “declaratory judgment that is otherwise properly within its jurisdiction.” Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1994). Although the power 'to entertain declaratory judgment actions’ is discretionary, it is in general appropriate to exercise this discretion “when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir. 1996).

The exercise 'of declaratory judgment jurisdiction is appropriate here as it will serve to resolve the coverage dispute now, at the outset of the state court wrongful death action,5 and thereby settle now whether Nationwide must defend and indemnify Fraraccio in that action. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit, in essentially similar circumstances, recognized that it is imperative to resolve this coverage dispute sooner rather than later in order to avoid the conflict of interest Nationwide now confronts in defending Fraraccio in the underlying wrongful death action. See Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521, 523-25 (4th Cir. 1962). The Stout case, as here, involved an insured who was the defendant in a state court wrongful death action and an insurer who disputed coverage on the ground that the insured’s guilty plea to- a state crime (voluntary manslaughter under North Carolina law) precluded coverage under the policy’s exclusion for intentional acts.6 Id. at 523, 525. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Stout, the insurer in these circumstances faces an “obvious conflict of interest” because “it is not possible for the insurer to defend the insured and at the same time to protect its own interests.” Id. at 524. Specifically, the attorney retained to defend the insured must argue in the state court action that the insured did not act negligently or intentionally, even though the guilty plea indicates that the insured acted intentionally and is therefore not covered by the policy. Id. at 524-25.7 Precisely the same *9conflict of interest confronts Nationwide in this case, and it follows that it is not possible for Nationwide to defend Frarac-cio in the wrongful death action and at the same time protect its own interest in denying coverage to Fraraccio. Absent recourse to a declaratory judgment action, the insurer is stuck between its duty to defend the insured and its interest in asserting the insured is not covered by the insurance policy.8 As a result, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Stout, the “only just and expedient solution” in these circumstances is to entertain the insurer’s declaratory judgment action, which “serves .the dual purpose of determining with finality [the insurer’s]' obligation to defend and its ultimate liability for any judgment rendered against the insured.” Id. at 524.9 The-same result should obtain here; the only just and expedient solution in these circumstances is to proceed to determine, the coverage issue in this declaratory judgment action.10

Although it. is clear that the ■ exer-. cise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction is appropriate in this case, it is nonetheless necessary to consider whether “federalisrri, efficiency, and comity”’ are “sufficiently compelling to justify a refusal to exercise jurisdiction” in light of the Nealeys’ pending state 'court wrongful death action. *10Nautilus, 15 F.3d at 377. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has established four factors .courts must consider in assessing whether dismissal of a federal declaratory judgment action is appropriate in light of a pending state-court action:

(1) the strength of the state’s interest in having the issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided in the state courts;

(2) whether the issues raised in the federal action can more efficiently be resolved in the court in which the state action is pending; ...

(3) whether permitting the federal action to go forward would result in unnecessary entanglement between the federal and state court systems, because of overlapping issues of fact or law.... [and]

(4) whether the declaratory judgment action is being used merely as a device for procedural fencing—that is, to provide another forum in a race for res judicata or to achiéve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not removable.

Id. at 377 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).11 These factors, carefully considered on the basis of this record, point persuasively to the conclusion that the exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.

To begin with, the first factor—the strength of Virginia’s interest in having this coverage dispute decided in a Virginia court—is essentially neutral and does not weigh in favor of dismissal or abstention. Virginia’s interest in “protecting 'its jurisprudence and ... in deciding cases calling for application of its own law” does not apply here because Nationwide is not a party to the state court wrongful death action and the coverage dispute will not be decided in that action. Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368 F.3d 409, 413 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in Coffey, Virginia does not have a “particularly significant” interest where “any state law issues are standard and unlikely to break new ground.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the parties have suggested no reason why this declaratory judgment action will present novel issues of Virginia insurance law.12 Accordingly, this factor does not support abstention in favor of the pending wrongful death action.

The second factor also does not support abstention. Not only will the coverage issue not be more efficiently resolved in the state court wrongful death action, the issue will not even be presented there, let alone resolved. In the state court wrongful death action, the Nealeys have alleged solely that Fraraccio negligently harmed Elijah, and Fraraecio’s counsel cannot argue that Fra-raccio willfully harmed Elijah.13 Moreover, *11Nationwide cannot raise the coverage issue in that action because it is not a party to that action. See Coffey, 368 F.3d at 409 (concluding that an insurance coverage dispute could not be resolved more efficiently in a state court action where the insurer was not a party to that action). And the Nealeys’ argument that Nationwide can simply raise the coverage issue after the state court action concludes unnecessarily postpones resolution of the coverage issue, which is particularly problematic in light of the conflict of interest Nationwide currently faces in defending Fraraccio. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has stated that in “an ideal world, the policy coverage question would be adjudicated before the state tort suit is tried.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Garrity, 785 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1986). This declaratory judgment action presents that ideal scenario, and as a result the second factor does not favor abstention because this action is the most efficient and expeditious way to resolve the coverage dispute.14

With respect to the third factor, the Nealeys argue that deciding the coverage dispute risks unnecessary entanglement with the underlying wrongful death action because the issue of whether Nationwide must defend and indemnify Fraraccio depends on the yet-to-be-litigated facts underlying Elijah’s death. This argument fails. Unnecessary entanglement exists where there are “overlapping issues” of law or fact between the federal declaratory judgment action and the underlying state court action. Nautilus, 15 F.3d at 377 (quotation marks omitted). To begin with, there is no risk of overlap with respect to legal issues because the issue of whether Fraraccio intentionally harmed Elijah will not arise in the state court wrongful death action; the only issue there is whether Fraraccio was negligent with respect to her care of Elijah. And as for factual overlap, there is no need to await the litigation of the facts underlying Elijah’s death because, at this point, Fraraccio’s guilty pleas may well establish that she does not qualify for coverage under the Policy. By pleading guilty to a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-371.1(A), which makes it a felony to cause “serious injury to the life or health *12of’ a child by a “willful act or willful omission or refusal to provide any necés-sary care,” Fraraccio admitted to willful abuse of a child. See Stout, 307 F.2d at 523, 525 (concluding that the insured admitted to intentionally killing the victim by pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter). Although Fraraccio may contest her plea at the summary' judgment stage,15 at this point her plea appears to show that she intentionally harmed Elijah and abused him, either of which is a sufficient-ground for denying coverage under the Policy. As a result, there is no risk of entanglement because resolution of the coverage dispute does not hinge on the litigation of the facts underlying Elijah’s death.

As for the fourth and final factor, the Nealeys admit that there is no evidence that Nationwide is using this declaratory judgment action to engage in procedural fencing or forum-shopping. Instead, as in' Coffey, there is a live and serious question in this case of whether the Policy exclu-, sions apply, and the evidence in this record, as in Coffey, leads to the conclusion that Nationwide has appropriately sought a declaratory judgment here to clarify and settle the coverage issue; Coffey, 368 F.3d at 414.16

In sum, dismissal or abstention' is inappropriate at this point because this action will settle .the coverage dispute, and none of the Nautilus factors compel abstention in favor of the pending wrongful death action. In particular, the current record indicates that the, .coverage dispute can be resolved here without any risk of entanglement with the wrongful death action. Should further factual development raise a substantial risk of entanglement with the state court wrongful- death action, the parties may renew,their request for abstention.

III.

For the foregoing-reasons,-the Nealeys’ motion to dismiss on the basis of abstention is denied.

An appropriate older will issue. A separate order will issue setting a schedule for discovery and summary judgment.