IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

THOMAS WILLARD CRAWFORD, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:20CV00776 ) v. ) OPINION ) HARRISONBURG/ROCKINGHAM ) By: James P. Jones REGIONAL JAIL, ET AL., ) United States District Judge ) Defendants. )

Thomas Willard Crawford, Jr., Pro Se Plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Thomas Willard Crawford, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to

. Crawford has complied with financial requirements to proceed without prepayment of the filing costs, pursuant to

. After review of the Complaint, I conclude that this action must be summarily dismissed. Crawford’s allegations are sparse. He has pre-existing respiratory issues (asthma, history of pneumonia, bronchitis, C.O.P.D.) and requests release due to the extreme possibility of contracting COVID-19. Compl. 2, ECF 1. In his § 1983 Complaint, Crawford sues the Harrisonburg/Rockingham County Jail, Commonwealth’s Attorney Marsha Garst, and the “Harrisonburg Courts.” Id. at 1. Crawford states that he has filed a grievance and the response he received was “that jail is not responsible for a bond. Commonwealth Att. and Courts are.” Id. As relief in this lawsuit, Crawford asks the court to grant him “a mercy Release on Grounds

of Covid 19 vulnerability” and $1000 per day for his incarceration to compensate him for lost wages and anxiety. Id. at 2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), the court may dismiss any § 1983 action “with

respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Section 1983 permits an aggrieved party to file a civil action against a person for actions taken under color of state law that violated his constitutional rights. Cooper v. Sheehan,

(4th Cir. 2013). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007).

As an initial matter, Crawford cannot sue the jail itself. A local jail or office building cannot qualify as a person subject to being sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Vinnedge v. Gibbs,

(4th Cir. 1977) (finding that under § 1983, “liability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted

personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff[’s] rights”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted); McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr.,

(E.D. Va. 1992) (“[T]he jail is not a person under § 1983” and thus “lacks the capacity to be sued as a jail.” I will dismiss Crawford’s claims against the jail without prejudice, pursuant to § 1997e(c)(1), for failure to state a claim.

Crawford also cannot sue the courts under § 1983 seeking early release. “It is well settled that a state court is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983. Bradley v. Virginia, No. 7:19CV00253,

, at *2 (W.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2019).

Therefore, Crawford cannot proceed under § 1983 against the Harrisonburg courts for monetary damages. I also find that Crawford has no claim for monetary damages against the prosecutor for failing to move for Crawford’s early release because he is allegedly

in danger of contracting COVID-19. Prosecutors are immune from suit where a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 for actions or inactions of the attorney related to his or her prosecution of the plaintiff. Imbler v. Pachtman,

(1976). A prosecutor’s decision regarding whether a particular detainee is so vulnerable to COVID-19 that he should be released from incarceration despite ongoing criminal proceedings against him is clearly part of her advocative function

for the Commonwealth of Virginia. Accordingly, I will dismiss Crawford’s claims for damages against the prosecutor because she enjoys immunity from such claims. Finally, Crawford cannot use a § 1983 action to seek early release from

detention on his criminal charges. When a petitioner wishes to challenge the “fact or duration” of confinement and seek relief in the form of immediate release, he must do so in a habeas corpus proceeding, not a civil rights action under § 1983. Preiser

v. Rodriguez,

(1973). In conclusion, Crawford’s § 1983 claims for damages cannot proceed against the only defendants he has named — the jail, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and

the state courts, and his claim for early release cannot proceed in a § 1983 action. Therefore, I will summarily dismiss the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983. An appropriate order will enter this day.

DATED: July 2, 2021

/s/ JAMES P. JONES United States District Judge