IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

JEREMIAH CORBIN, ) Petitioner, ) Case No. 7:22-cv-00135 ) v. ) ) By: Michael F. Urbanski WARDEN J.C. STREEVAL, ) Chief United States District Judge Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeremiah Corbin, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under

. Corbin challenges the validity of a federal sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The respondent has moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 9. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Hendrix,

,

(2023), the court will grant the respondent’s motion and dismiss the petition without prejudice. Background In 2009, Corbin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of

(a)(1) and 846, and two counts of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of

(g)(1). Br. Supp. Pet., ECF No. 1-1, at 2–3. The government had previously filed a notice of enhanced punishment pursuant to

, citing a felony drug conviction from Indiana.

. As part of the plea agreement, the parties recommended a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months based in part on their belief that the prior felony drug conviction required a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under

(b)(1)(A).

At sentencing, the trial court also determined that Corbin qualified as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

The trial court sentenced Corbin to a term of

imprisonment of 262 months on the conspiracy count and to concurrent 120-month terms on the firearm counts.

Corbin subsequently filed a direct appeal in 2010, which was dismissed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Five years later, Corbin filed a motion to vacate under

in which he challenged the validity of his career offender classification and sentence.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United

States,

(2017), the trial court denied Corbin’s motion. Id. at 4. Corbin is now incarcerated at USP Lee in Lee County, Virginia. In March 2022, he filed the pending petition under

. Relying on a 2019 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Corbin argues that the Indiana drug conviction used to enhance his sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) no longer qualifies as a predicate offense. Corbin also argues that he no longer qualifies for sentencing as a career offender.

The court previously stayed the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, the court lifted the stay, and the respondent moved to dismiss the petition. Corbin has not responded to the motion to dismiss, and the time for doing so has expired. Discussion “As a general matter, a federal prisoner must challenge the execution of a sentence

under

, and the sentence itself under

.” Fontanez v. O’Brien,

(4th Cir. 2015). A prisoner’s ability to utilize § 2255 is limited, however, when the prisoner seeks to file a “second or successive” motion. Pursuant to § 2255(h), such motions are barred unless that are certified by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain

either (1) “newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense,” or (2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”

(h). “A federal prisoner may not, therefore, file a second or successive § 2255 motion based solely on a more favorable interpretation of

statutory law adopted after his conviction became final and his initial § 2255 motion was resolved.” Jones, 143 S. Ct. at 1863. Section 2255 also includes a “savings clause” that preserves the availability of a habeas remedy “in cases where ‘the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.’”

(e). In Jones, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the limitation on second or successive § 2255 motions makes

§ 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” such that a federal prisoner may proceed with a statutory claim under § 2241. 143 S. Ct. at 1863. The Court answered this question in the negative, holding that “the savings clause does not authorize . . . an end-run around” the “two—and only two—conditions in which a second or successive § 2255 may proceed” as described in § 2255(h). Id. at 1868. Instead, the savings clause “preserves recourse to § 2241 in cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing

court, as well as for challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a sentence.” Id.; see_also id. at 1866 (providing examples of such “unusual circumstances” including “the sentencing court’s dissolution”). Thus, “[t]he inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy [the] conditions [of § 2255(h)| does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the savings clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all.” Id. at 1869. Because Corbin seeks to challenge the validity of his sentence, the proper vehicle for his claims is a § 2255 motion, which he has previously pursued. The mere fact that Corbin’s claims do not satisfy either of the requirements for filing a second or successive § 2255 motion does not “make[] § 2255 ‘inadequate or ineffective’ such that [he] may proceed . . . under § 2241.” Id. at 1863. Additionally, Corbin has not identified any “unusual circumstances” that would make it “impossible or impractical for [him] to seek relief from the sentencing coutt.” Id. at 1868. Consequently, his petition does not satisfy the savings clause of § 2255, and he cannot proceed with his claims under § 2241. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS the respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 9, and DISMISSES Corbin’s petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate order will be entered herewith. Entered: September 7 2023 Digitally signed by Michael F. □□□ Urbanski Chief U.S. District Judge Date: 2023.09.07 10:30:13 -04'00' Michael F. Urbanski Chief United States District Judge