INT HEU NITSETDA TDEISS TRCIOCUTR T FORT HEE ASTEDRINS TROIFCV TI RGINIA RichmDoinvdi sion ROMANS EBASTMIOANNZ ON, Plaintiff, CivAicltN ioo3.n: 23CV794 v. KEVIMNC COY, Defendant. MEMORANDOUPMI NION PlaianV itgriiaffnp ,ir ispornoecrep re osd eifi,nlgte hdci iisl avc ti oOnnN. ovem3b0e,r 2023t,hC eo urtc ondi tdoickeotnePadll aliyancttii Pffolsna .irnetqiuffle es att veopedr ociene d forpmaau p BeyrM iesm.oraOnrddueemnr t oenrJ eadn u8a2,r0 y2t 4hC,eo udritr ePcltaeidn tiff t opaayni ni patritafiliilanfelgeo f$1.or3s 3t uantdepe nera lotfpyrj eurthya hte d indoh ta ve suffic aisestne pottassy u acf he weitthhii(nr3 dty0a ) oyf ts h deaot efen ttrhyerSee 2oe8Uf. .S .C. §1915( Bbe)c(alu)s.e n ePilptaaih ithdeneirnt iitpffiaratfilil aiflne ngeo a rv etrrhethad ec annot pasyu acfe heb,yM emoranOdpiuonnmia nOdr deenrt eonrF eerbdu a1r52y,0 2 t4hC,eou rt dismtihsacest ei doO nnF. ebr2u02a,0ry 2 t4hC,eo urrte ceasi wvoesrndt atienmdeintcthat at ing hecou lndop ta y(.E CNFo1.0) 1. OnM ar6c 2,h0 2t4hC,eo urretc eaiM voetdtio oR ne in s(tEaCNtFo e1 ..1Th.e)C ourt willtr etaht re eqfoure rsetc onsaisdo en forerar te iluoinnedF feerd eRruaolf leC ivPriolc edure 59((e")R5 u9l (Meoe t)ioSne" Me)L.C A utLoL.C,Tv o.wo fnSP i.n 5e3sF2,.d 236297,7 (-47t8h

1T hliesttw earrse ceiitnvh Seeud s Msaeixl ornoF oemb r1u62a,0ry 2 (4E.CN Fo1 .0 -1, a2t. ) Cir. 2008) (filings made within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment construed as Rule 59(e) motions (citing Dove v. CODESCO,

(4th Cir. 1978))). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds for relief under Rule 59(e): (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v. Staton,

(4th Cir. 1993) (citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co.,

(D. Md. 1991); Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co.,

(S.D. Miss. 1990)). Here, it appears that relief is warranted in order to prevent manifest injustice. Plaintiff indicates that he submitted his response indicating that he could not pay the filing fee to prison officials for mailing on January 19, 2024. (ECF No. 11, at 1.) Prison officials, however, waited until February 15, 2024, to bill him for postage and mail the document. (/d.) It therefore appears that Plaintiff placed his response in the prison mailing system on January 19, 2024, and his response is deemed timely. See Houston v. Lack,

(1988) (deeming notice of appeal filed at time prisoner delivered it to the prison authorities for mailing). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion, (ECF No. 11), will be GRANTED. The Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on February 15, 2024, will be VACATED. The Court will continue to process the action. An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Ish (A 4 John A. Gibney, Jr. Date: 3 lw 2y Senior United States Ce, Judge Richmond, Virginia